PSICANALISI

PSYCHOANALYSIS. - It is a system of dynamic psychology, that is to say, one which studies in particular the driving and directing forces of psychic activity, conceived and developed by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939).

At first it was merely an exploratory and curative method for a certain category of nervous disorders. Subsequently it expanded into a full-fledged psychological system, which interprets subjective activities as originally produced by unconscious forces. A complete understanding of human nature, according to psychoanalysis, must take into account, besides introspective and behavioral data, other factors that cannot be directly observed but can only be inferred from their effects, and which, though escaping consciousness, actively influence conduct.

Psychoanalysis is linked to the French school of psychopathology. Jean-Martin Charcot had set out to study the symptoms presented by hysterics during hypnosis, which he considered closely connected with hysteria. At the same time, Bernheim in Nancy was successfully using suggestion in the hypnotic state to treat certain illnesses; and he believed that hypnosis, though varying in intensity according to the person inducing it and the person undergoing it, should be considered a normal phenomenon for all human beings. After graduating, Freud studied for about a year in Paris at the Salpêtrière under Charcot’s guidance; and later he also became acquainted with Bernheim. Both Freud and one of Charcot’s most distinguished pupils, Pierre Janet, observed that not only in hysterics but in almost all patients suffering from functional nervous disorders (those in which no anatomical or physiological alteration can be discovered) there occurs a fragmentation or disintegration of the mind, whereby activities that normally work harmoniously in man function independently and sometimes in conflict. While Janet believed this to be due to a weakening of the general psychological tension and to the re-emergence of automatisms, and that hypnosis could be used to re-establish the connection of dissociated functions, Freud maintained that the cause of disintegration lies in an incompatibility between the dissociated activities and the rest of psychic activity, caused by unconscious forces. Therefore, only when the cause of the disorder is brought to light in consciousness does the disorder itself disappear. Hence the cathartic method, that is, the recognition and elimination of the unconscious causes of disorders, a method that Freud outlined in a study of a famous case treated by Dr. Breuer and which he employed especially at the beginning of his psychoanalytic treatments.

The birth of psychoanalysis may be considered the publication of *Studien über die Hysterie* by Breuer and Freud in 1895. Later Freud parted ways with Breuer and continued his work alone. Since hypnosis was not successful with all patients and in many cases seemed to circumvent an obstacle rather than overcome it—because, once one symptom was removed, another would spring up in its place—Freud abandoned hypnosis and replaced it with the method of free association. Abandoning the premise of physiological relaxation (the subject reclines comfortably on a couch in a quiet, moderately lit room), the injunction to hypnotic sleep was replaced by the instruction to say freely everything that comes to mind, regardless of whether it is logically coherent, important, pleasant, or unpleasant. One must abandon any voluntary control over one’s thoughts and let them manifest themselves as they arise. This is not always an easy task; and the analyst’s skill lies precisely in guiding the subject very discreetly and allowing the outpouring to flow. Freud gained the impression that there was an active force opposing the return of dissociated activities to consciousness. At first it seemed that the origin of the disorders could be traced to events that had aroused a strong and unpleasant emotion and that the memory of the event had been repressed into the unconscious, where it continued to influence behavior. Later, however, Freud came to believe that the importance of these traumatic events lay in their stimulation of certain desires and tendencies at odds with the general line of the personality; he maintained that these unconscious desires are of two types, aggressive and sexual, but with a great preponderance of the latter. Hence the great development that sexuality assumed in Freud’s conception.

In the study of dreams, Freud found another path, indeed the main road, the royal road, as he put it, to the study of the unconscious. In his 1900 work *Die Traumdeutung* he set out to show that dreams are the manifestation of unconscious desires under disguised forms, so as to elude the forces that would repel them into the unconscious; and that many typical characteristics of neurotic symptoms appear in them. But other phenomena can also serve to explore the unconscious. In the two volumes *Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* and *Der Witz und seine Beziehungen zum Unbewussten*, published in 1904 and 1905, Freud asserts that slips of the tongue and pen, clumsy acts, delays, forgetfulness, and fantasies—which we might consider entirely fortuitous and inexplicable—are instead revelatory of a hidden design; and that the same holds true for jokes, witticisms, and humor.

In 1905, with the volume *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, Freud expounded a theory of the development of the sexual instinct from a number of component instincts connected with particular parts of the body, which in an initial stage would appear independent but would later merge into the sexual instinct. In the work *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus* Freud complicated the description of psychosexual development by introducing, after the autoerotic stage, a narcissistic stage in which the libido, having already organized the component instincts, turns back upon the subject. Subsequent development requires the passage from the narcissistic stage to that of object-love, whether of a person or a thing, in which a good part of the libido is sublimated, diverted from a sexual outlet to various objects or activities of social and civil life. A critical moment in development is the Oedipus complex: the child loves the mother and finds a rival in the father (the myth of Oedipus, who kills his father and marries his mother, expresses in adult terms the child’s desires). But since he cannot achieve satisfaction of his desire, the libido seeks new objects to serve as substitutes for the unattained one: the beloved woman, the school, the city, etc., become the object of feelings originally directed toward the mother; the teacher, the policeman, the priest become the object of a mixture of feelings of love, admiration, respect, or hatred that were directed toward the father. Thus Freud interprets the psychic activity of the adult man as repressed infantile sexuality.

But what forces are at work in this repression? The question is answered in the work *Das Ich und das Es* (1923). He divides the psyche into three main parts: 1) the *Es* (a neuter demonstrative pronoun in German, translatable as the Latin *Id*), the unconscious where instinctive forces operate; 2) the *Ich* (translatable as the Latin *Ego*), the conscious *I*, which expresses and implements the tendencies of the *Ego* compatibly with circumstances; 3) the *Super-ego* or moral conscience. The *Super-ego* is not preformed like the *Id* and the *Ego*, but arises from their antagonism around the age of five; it is largely composed of unconscious forces that fold back upon themselves and, in part, are sublimated. At the boundary between the *Id* and the *Ego*, repression operates, removing certain conscious facts from the *Ego* and pushing them into the *Id*; and censorship, which obstructs the reverse passage from the *Id* to the *Ego*. The fact that moral conscience is formed by the folding back of tendencies directed outward accounts for its inflexibility and aggressiveness. Freud developed his doctrine in relation to the problems of civilization (*Totem und Tabu*, 1912; *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, 1930) and religion (*Die Zukunft einer Illusion*, 1927; and *Moses and Monotheism*, 1939). In addressing religious issues, although Freud displayed ingenuity in framing facts within his doctrine, he arrived at rash and unfounded assertions; but what is more serious, he demonstrated no understanding of the positive value of the religious fact.

Psychoanalysis, in Freud’s formulation, has not gone without criticism and dissent. As early as 1912, two of his disciples, Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung, broke away from him; others followed later (Bleuler, Stekel), and today there are countless doctrines that qualify as psychoanalytic but openly contrast with Freud’s psychoanalysis. Important developments have occurred in the United States through figures such as F. Alexander, Karen Horney, and Carl Rogers. Here we will briefly touch only on the positions of Adler and Jung. The former attributes the driving force of psychic activity not so much to sexuality as to the will to power, the need to affirm one’s individuality, and the sense of community—what he considers the social need. The feeling of inferiority, which arises from both, drives one to overcome obstacles or to compensate. Dreams express these fundamental tendencies: neurosis is their exacerbation in the impotence to realize them. Jung gives the term *libido* a much broader meaning, encompassing all vital impulses; and, in addition to the individual unconscious, he affirms the existence of a collective unconscious containing archetypes, the patterns of concepts and needs common to all humanity. Analysis must be carried out to uncover aspirations for the future. Religion is not an illusion, as Freud defined it, but the most significant and inescapable expression of psychic activity.

ASSESSMENT. — It is not easy to offer a critical judgment on a doctrine so vast, which, despite the multiplicity of its aspects, maintains a simple and decisive line. One may observe that Freud’s exceptional ability to focus on the study of a problem and to follow interpretive threads to their extreme conclusions is reflected throughout his doctrinal construction, giving it a unified character but also a onesided and closed one. Starting from a rather limited field of observation (the study of psychoneuroses) and establishing the active character of the unconscious, psychoanalysis turns to discovering the unconscious in all forms of psychic activity; once the principles of *libido* and repression are fixed, it employs them to explain any human fact.

Hence the interpretive schematism, easily accessible even to laypeople, which gives the impression of penetrating all the mysteries of earth and heaven. Psychoanalysis, as a conception of life—i.e., as a philosophy—bears a clear positivist and pessimistic imprint, yet it has encountered easy enthusiasm not only because it touches on points particularly sensitive to human nature but also because (contrary to what Freud taught and practiced) it seems to justify a free way of life. Hence the passionate and excessive sympathies and reactions it has aroused. The fact remains that, under Freud’s guidance, psychoanalysis established and developed in almost complete isolation, both from experimental psychology and from the secessions that threatened its cohesion. Yet it is interesting that the very secessionist schools draw on ideas that Freud himself expressed but did not develop. Here again, the onesidedness appears as both the strength and the weakness of Freud’s conception. Among the most serious shortcomings is the excessive role attributed to sexuality at the expense of other deeply rooted human drives: the purely formal aspect of moral conscience; the indiscriminate use of pathological terms in describing both abnormal and normal facts; the enigma of sublimation, which gives rise to the most contrasting and qualitatively different activities and which unfolds moreover in the unconscious; and the sometimes hostile indifference toward the religious fact. Another defect of psychoanalysis must be noted: that of attributing to certain facts an interpretation that goes beyond the mere data. This results in the difficulty of separating fact from interpretation. Perhaps this is why little progress has been made in experimentally verifying many psychoanalytic claims. But this also makes it difficult to distinguish what may be considered established in consciousness from what is a doctrinal superstructure.

As for the investigative methods introduced by psychoanalysis, the difficulty is not so great. Thus, following Dalbiez, one can distinguish between doctrine and method, each to be evaluated within its own sphere. If the psychoanalytic doctrine as a whole cannot be judged definitive or satisfactory, and its philosophical developments are unacceptable, this does not exclude the possibility of accepting and using psychoanalytic methods (free association, dream analysis, projective techniques). But this already means breaking the unity of Freud’s system. On the other hand, psychoanalysis must be acknowledged for having posed the problem of the unconscious and for boldly opening some paths to explore it; for having given a “dynamic” formulation to psychic processes, and for highlighting the enormous importance of affectivity within them.

Regarding therapeutic applications, which go under the generic name of psychoanalysis, despite employing highly varied criteria, one remains perplexed in the face of the claimed successes of the different schools. This would seem to indicate that the therapeutic value of the treatment is independent of the doctrinal principle that inspires it, and that its mode of action is therefore highly obscure. A psychoanalytic treatment is not something to be taken lightly. Freud’s interpretation is an interpretation—indeed, as His Holiness Pius XII stated—“it finds here a moral limit. It is not proven, indeed it is even incorrect, that the pansexual method of a certain school of psychoanalysis is an indispensable integral part of every serious and worthy psychotherapy; that the fact of having neglected this method in the past has caused serious psychological harm, errors in doctrine and in applications in education, in psychotherapy, and no less in pastoral care; that it is urgent to fill this gap and to initiate all those who deal with psychological issues into the guiding ideas, and if necessary, into the practical handling of this technique of sexuality” (*Discorso di S. S. Pio XII al Congresso internazionale di istopatologia del sistema nervoso*, in *L’Osservatore Romano*, 17 Sept. 1952, col. 4).

BIBL.: A complete collection of Freud’s works up to 1934 exists: *Gesammelte Werke*, 12 vols. (Internationaler psychohistorischer Verlag, Vienna 1925–34). Many of these have been translated into Italian, especially in recent years. Likewise, the most significant works of the dissident founders Adler and Jung are available in Italian translation. Among the most accessible works on psychoanalysis, the following may be noted: R. Dalbèz, *La méthode psychoanalyt. et la doctrine freudienne*, Paris 1936; E. Boraventura, *La p.*, Milan 1938 (an objective, sympathetic overview with some critical observations); A. Miotto, *Conoscere la p.*, Milan 1949 (popularly oriented, well-informed, with some critical insights); C. L. Masetti, *Trattato di p.*, 2 vols., Turin 1960 (a systematic and complete work faithfully reflecting Freudian doctrine); J. Nuttin, *Psychoanalyse et conception spiritualiste de l’homme*, Louvain–Paris 1950 (a well-informed, critical but not negative work that sketches a dynamic theory of normal personality). For the dissident schools: A. Adler, *Teoria e prassi della psicologia individuale*, Rome 1949; J. Jacobi, *La psicologia di C. G. Jung*, Turin 1949; F. Alexander, *Medicina psicosomatica*, Florence 1952.

Giorgio Zunini

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PEDAGOGY. — The extreme delicacy and gravity of the consequences inherent in any psychoanalytic treatment would be further heightened if, as some propose, the treatment were applied in the field of education. This would be the most anti-pedagogical and dangerous undertaking imaginable.

Indeed, the mind of a child is still comparable to soft wax, upon which impressions—especially certain pressing impressions such as those concerning sexuality—are stamped so deeply that one can never be too cautious about allowing children to witness, overhear, or read certain topics. This is a common principle in every method of education, even when dealing with normal subjects. Now, to probe the soul of a child or adolescent (who, under the assumption that psychotherapeutic care is necessary, is already inclined toward hypererotism) with untimely, often crude questions about everything that stirs the “libido,” the first stirrings of passion, the first defeats and subsequent relapses along with descriptions of environments and companions, the analysis of images and dreams touching on matters that modesty would not wish to reveal, and the bringing to light of tendencies perhaps still hidden—none of this can fail to make the veins and pulses tremble in every honest and conscientious educator. All the more so because, on the one hand, the psychoanalyst, instead of grounding his approach in a true and reasoned understanding of the child’s or adolescent’s state of mind, bases it on the unilateral interpretation of his doctrines, which reduce everything to sexuality; and on the other, the images and ideas concerning the “libido” possess such strong dynamism that they sharpen the violence of the passions. For this reason, highly experienced psychologists warn against the psychoanalysis of children, in which one easily runs the risk of suggesting things to which the subject would never have arrived or of irreparably clouding and destroying his healthy, serene, and precious innocence (cf. Address by His Holiness Pius XII, *ibid.*, col. 4).

Nor does it avail to compare psychoanalytic treatment with the sacrament of Penance in the Catholic Church or with a confidential confession made to a trusted person, to whom one may reveal even the most vehement crises and doubts in order to obtain relief, comfort, or words of encouragement. For revealing one’s uncertainties, struggles, and defeats confidentially or sacramentally to a trusted person is not the same as subtly investigating and bringing to light what offends natural modesty and one would not wish to manifest in that manner or under those circumstances. Moreover, the value of sacramental Penance does not consist solely in the relief of a burden weighing on the conscience, obtained through the mere verbal recounting of one’s faults, but in the necessary presence of repentance and the resolve to amend, and above all in the divine efficacy of the words of absolution, which reintroduce grace into the soul.

BIBL.: G. Lorenzini, *Psicopatologia ed educazione*, Turin 1921, pp. 364–78; L. Scremin, *Dis. di morale professionale per i medici*, 4th ed., Rome 1949, pp. 282–92; E. Boganelli, *Corpo e spirito*, Rome 1951; C. Corsanego, *Tecnica della p. e tecnica della Confessione*, in the volume by various authors: *P.*, Assisi 1951, pp. 152–69.