MORALITY. - By m. is meant the quality of human actions by virtue of which they are morally good or bad. A fundamental and necessary prerequisite of the m. of an act is undoubtedly freedom (v.). Any act whatsoever performed, for example, under the irresistible influence of violence is not only not a moral act, but is not even a human act (v.).
However, if freedom is a necessary condition, it does not seem to constitute the essence of m., as some would have it (an opinion attributed to Scotus: 1266-1308). Nor does the opinion of Pufendorf (1632-94) seem acceptable either, which sees the essence of m. in the very imputability of the act, or that of Suárez (1548-1617), who discerns it in a denomination extrinsic to the act.
The essence of m. (which constitutes, as it were, the genus that is divided, as species, into goodness and malice), seems to consist in the relation that the human act has to its rule; that is, to the eternal law of God, which is the supreme or remote rule, and to right reason, which is the proximate rule (this is the position of the Thomists).
It follows, against all moral positivism, that a good human act is called that which is in conformity with rational nature, perfects it, helps it to attain the ultimate end of human actions, and corresponds therefore to the order established by God. Bad, on the other hand, is called that act which is not in conformity with rational nature, that is, is contrary to the order of right reason.
The first and fundamental norm of m. is, as has been said, the eternal law, insofar as it is considered as the divine intellect (ratio divina) that conceives the natural order to be observed by creatures, that is, the essential relations of creatures both in relation to God and among themselves, not insofar as it is the will of God that commands the preservation of the established order and forbids its violation. Under this second aspect the eternal law is the foundation of every moral obligation, which follows upon m., but is not to be confused with it. This explains how there are actions that are, by their very nature, good or bad, independently of any extrinsic precept, of any human or divine will. The ratio divina, in conceiving the natural order, cannot but take into account the rational creature as it is. This further explains how the opinion of those (Ockham, Gerson, Descartes, etc.) who assert that the free will of God could have established a m. different from that which now exists is to be rejected. Considered in man, not in the individual, but in all men (so as to be a rule common to all and to have a universal character), the objective and ultimate norm, in the created order, of m. is the law simply.
Some diversity in the exposition of these concepts exists among Catholic authors. Some give as the norm of m. the ordering of things to their ultimate end (Th. Bouquillon, J. Mausbach, J. Donat, J. Gredt); others rational human nature, considered as a whole (Wittmann, O. Lottin, E. Elter); others right reason (L. Lehu, and many Thomists); others finally the essential order of things (M. Liberatore). If one sets aside the last position, today abandoned, the various positions are not so opposed as to be irreconcilable. At bottom, human nature is nothing other than the essence given by God to man insofar as it is a principle of operation ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore every act that befits human nature thereby bespeaks order to the end, and conversely every act conformable to the end corresponds to human nature (cf. I. E. Van Roey, De virtute chartitatis, Malines 1929, pp. 16-17). Good and evil are therefore determined by conformity or difformity either to rational nature, or to reason, or to the ultimate end; all these concepts in the final analysis come to be summed up in the same thing. The subjective norm of m. is conscience, which consists in the ultimate practical judgment, which says in particular whether the act is licit or illicit.
As for the extension of m., two specific questions arise: 1) whether, besides good and bad acts, there also exist indifferent ones, that is, neither good nor bad; 2) whether in the human act, in which one can distinguish the internal act of the commanding will and the external act (in relation to the will) of the internal or external faculty that executes the command of the will, the m. is to be placed entirely in the internal act or whether some element of m. is also given by the external act.
It seems more logical to exclude in the concrete the existence of indifferent acts, and to limit formal m. to the internal act alone, to which the external act, perfecting it, adds in the same order the material element. The conformity or difformity of the act to the norm of m. is the objective principle or criterion of m. in general. In the specific case this conformity or difformity is detected through the connection that the elements in which the human act is actualized have with the norm of m. The human act therefore derives its m. primarily from the object, which is why it is called objective m. In fact, the act of the will is a certain movement of the will itself tending toward the object. But as is the term of the movement, so too is the movement itself. Therefore such as the object or term of it is (good or bad), such is the action of the will (good or bad).
The human act derives its m. also from the circumstances of person, thing, place, means, end, manner, time. The most important circumstance is the end, that is, that for the sake of which the will is moved to do something (v. FONTI DELLA M.).
Alongside objective m. there is also a subjective m., namely the personal one of someone who, while not having a bad end, is induced to act moved by a false persuasion of acting well or at least of not acting badly in what is objectively bad. If the agent is in perfect good faith, although materially he performs a bad action, nevertheless formally he does not sin as long as he perseveres, without a grave doubt to the contrary, in his good faith. It can happen that through a complex of causes this false persuasion spreads widely and informs the customs of entire social strata, among which therefore certain actions, by their nature reprehensible, are reputed honest or at least not bad, for example, certain displays of immoral press.
The m. can also be intrinsic, when it springs from the very essence of the moral object (for example, the love of God is an intrinsically good act; the hatred of God, blasphemy are intrinsically bad acts), or extrinsic, when the goodness or malice of the act comes solely from positive law (for example, eating meat on Friday is a bad action, insofar as there exists an ecclesiastical law that forbids it). There exist therefore actions that are good or bad because they are commanded or forbidden (extrinsic m.), but there exist others that are commanded or forbidden because they are good or bad (intrinsic m.).