MORALITY. – By m. is understood the quality of human actions whereby they are morally good or evil. The fundamental and necessary presupposition of the m. freedom (v.). Any act performed, for example, under the irresistible influence of violence, is not only not a moral act, human act (v.).
However, although freedom is a necessary condition, it does not seem to constitute the essence of m., as some would have it (an opinion attributed to Scoto: 1266–1308). Nor does the opinion of Pufendorf (1632–94), who sees the essence of m. in the imputability of the act itself, seem acceptable; nor that of Suárez (1548–1617), who locates it in a denomination extrinsic to the act.
The essence of m. (which constitutes, as it were, the genus divided, as species, into goodness and malice) seems to consist in the relation which the human act bears to its rule; that is, to the eternal law of God, which is the supreme or remote rule, and to right reason, which is the proximate rule (this is the position of the Thomists).
It follows, against every form of moral positivism, that a good human act is so called because it conforms to rational nature, perfects it, helps it to attain the ultimate end of human actions, and therefore corresponds to the order established by God. An act is called evil, on the other hand, when it does not conform to rational nature, that is, when it is contrary to the order of right reason.
The first and fundamental norm of m. is, as has been said, the eternal law, insofar as it is considered as the divine intellect (ratio divina) conceiving the natural order to be observed by creatures, that is, the essential relations of creatures both in relation to God and among themselves—not insofar as it is God’s will commanding the preservation of the established order and prohibiting its violation. In this latter aspect, the eternal law is the foundation of every moral obligation, which follows upon m., but it must not be confused with m. This explains how there are actions which, by their very nature, are good or evil, independently of any extrinsic precept and of any human or divine will. In conceiving the natural order, the ratio divina cannot fail to take rational creature as it is into account. This also explains why the opinion of those (Occam, Gersone, Descartes, etc.) who assert that God’s free will could have established a m. different from that which now exists must be rejected. Considered in man, not in the individual but in all men (so as to be a rule common to all and to possess a universal character), the objective and ultimate norm of m. in the created order is simply the law.
There is some diversity among Catholic authors in the exposition of these concepts. Some give as the norm of m. the ordering of things toward their ultimate end (Th. Bouquillon, J. Mausbach, J. Donat, J. Gredt); others, rational human nature considered as a whole (Wittmann, O. Lottin, E. Elter); others, right reason (L. Lehu and many Thomists); and still others, the essential order of things (M. Liberatore). If the last position, now abandoned, is left aside, the various positions are not so opposed as to be irreconcilable. Fundamentally, human nature is nothing other than the essence given by God to man insofar as it is the principle of operation ordered toward the ultimate end. Therefore every act that is in accord with human nature thereby expresses an ordering toward the end, and conversely every act in conformity with the end corresponds to human nature (cf. I. E. Van Roey, De virtute chartitatis, Malines 1929, pp. 16–17). Good and evil are therefore determined by conformity or nonconformity both to rational nature, to reason, and to the ultimate end; in the final analysis, all these concepts amount to the same thing. The subjective norm of m. is conscience, which consists in the final practical judgment stating, in a particular case, whether the act is licit or illicit.
With regard to the extension of m., two specific questions arise: 1) whether, besides good and evil acts, there also exist indifferent acts, that is, neither good nor evil; 2) whether, in the human act, in which one can distinguish the internal act of the commanding will from the external act of the internal or external faculty (in relation to the will) that carries out the command of the will, m. is to be located wholly in the internal act, or whether some element of m. is also supplied by the external act.
It seems more logical to exclude in practice the existence of indifferent acts and to restrict formal m. to the internal act alone, to which the external act, by perfecting it, adds the material element within the same order. The conformity or nonconformity of the act to the norm of m. is the objective principle or criterion of m. in general. In the specific case, this conformity or nonconformity is discerned through the connection which the elements in which the human act is actualized have with the norm of m. The human act therefore derives its m. primarily from its object, and for this reason it is called objective m. Indeed, the act of the will is a certain movement of the will itself directed toward an object. But as the term of the movement is, so is the movement itself. Therefore the action of the will (good or evil) is such as its object or term (good or evil).
The human act also derives its m. from the circumstances of the person, thing, place, means, end, manner, and time. The most important circumstance is the end, that is, that for which the will is moved to do something (v. FONTI DEL DIRITTO).
Alongside objective m. there is also subjective m., namely, the personal m. of one who, although lacking an evil end, is induced to act by the mistaken conviction that he is acting well or at least not acting badly in something that is objectively evil. If the agent is in perfect good faith, although he materially performs an evil action, he nevertheless does not formally sin so long as he perseveres, without any serious contrary doubt, in his good faith. It may happen that, through a combination of causes, this mistaken conviction becomes widespread and shapes the customs of entire social strata, among which certain actions that are reprehensible by their nature are consequently regarded as honest, or at least as not evil; for example, certain displays in the immoral press.
M. may also be intrinsic, when it flows from the very essence of the moral object (for example, love of God is an intrinsically good act; hatred of God and blasphemy are intrinsically evil acts), or extrinsic, when the goodness or malice of the act proceeds solely from positive law (for example, eating meat on Friday is an evil action insofar as there exists an ecclesiastical law forbidding it). Thus there are actions that are good or evil because they are commanded or prohibited (extrinsic m.), but there are others that are commanded or prohibited because they are good or evil (intrinsic m.).