FAITH, GOOD (and BAD). — Among the various meanings of the word faith (Latin *fides*) is also that of trust and its foundation (faithfulness, loyalty, veracity). It is with this meaning in mind that one speaks of good or bad faith in the realm of morality or law. One acts in good faith when one acts with loyalty and veracity, without any shadow of deceit or fraud. Thus, good faith may be defined as a conviction of lawfulness formed in the subject, free from moral or at least juridical culpability, however objectively erroneous it may be.
True good faith is theological good faith, and it consists in the absence of moral fault due to lack of attention and consent to the true character of the moral object. The other kind of good faith, juridical good faith, is the presumption that the law makes, under certain circumstances, of the existence of theological good faith, or rather of the absence of deceit. There are many ethical and juridical relationships in which both good and bad faith—whether theological or juridical—must be taken into consideration.
First of all, both the *Codex Iuris Canonici* (CIC) and the Italian Civil Code refer to good and bad faith in matters of possession and prescription (CIC, cann. 1509–12; Italian Civil Code, arts. 1140–70), though not in an entirely univocal sense.
The Italian Code states: “One is a possessor in good faith who possesses while unaware of violating another’s right. Good faith does not avail if the ignorance stems from gross negligence. Good faith is presumed” (art. 1147, pars. 1–3). These principles, which clearly reflect natural law, align with canon law and morality. From the first, it is deduced that one is a possessor in bad faith who is conscious of violating another’s right (mere material possession of another’s goods is not sufficient for this purpose); from the second, that ignorance not culpably incurred does not create bad faith (the same applies to mere negative doubt); and from the third, that good faith is presumed (this is understood to apply to the external forum and until proven otherwise). It should be noted, however, that the Italian Code sometimes attributes to the term “good faith” other meanings, such as goodwill, civil correctness, or sincerity (e.g., arts. 785, 1337, 1358, 1366, 1375, 1416, 1460, 1909, 2036, 2920).
Since bad faith coincides with the formal violation of another’s right, and since good faith is therefore a fundamental requirement of natural law, it is no wonder that the CIC considers the latter absolutely necessary at every moment, prescribing in can. 1512 that no prescription can have validity unless it is corroborated by good faith—not only at the beginning of possession, but throughout the entire duration of the prescription. Indeed, the force of canon law in upholding this principle from its very inception was such that all coexisting legal systems were at least partially influenced by it, including the Roman law that it encountered. Whereas Roman law required only that possession in *usucapio* and *longi temporis praescriptio* not be *vi* (not obtained by force) or *clam* (not clandestinely seized), and thus did not juridically transfer ownership, it later required at least initial good faith at the beginning of possession (inasmuch as it was held that subsequent bad faith does not vitiate the prescription); under this influence, in later periods, good faith was required throughout the entire duration (as was said: *mala fides superveniens nocet*). There was indeed a moment when it seemed that an opposing influence might prevail. Gratian adopted in the *Decretum* (dictum ad c. 15, C. 16, q. 3) the Roman principle that required only initial good faith at the moment of acquiring possession. But the reaction against this deviation was immediately manifested in the doctrine of the canonists and in conciliar legislation (c. 20, X, II, 26).
It is therefore necessary to clarify this essential aspect of good faith. According to Catholic doctrine and natural law, it is necessary that one who holds another’s property never, for the entire period required for prescription, have the consciousness that it belongs to another. It was under Innocent III that, in reaction to Gratian, the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), in can. 41, expressly declared: “It is necessary that he who prescribes at no moment have the consciousness of possessing another’s property.” And by way of reflection, the reg. 2 of c. 1. VI of Boniface VIII (1298) sanctioned that a possessor in good faith can never prescribe; the norm thus passed into the CIC, can. 1512. Moreover, it is the Seventh Commandment, “You shall not steal,” that forbids retaining what is not one’s own (cf. theft).
Consequently, civil legislations that oppose the aforementioned principle on good faith have no juridical value in conscience. To refer to the Italian legislation, which either does not require good faith at any moment of possession—as in the case of twenty-year usucapion (cf. arts. 1158, 1160 par. 1, 1161 par. 2, to mention only immovable property, universal succession, and movable property not registered in public records)—or is content with initial good faith (art. 1147 par. 3), as in ten-year usucapion (arts. 1159, 1160 par. 2, 1161 par. 1, etc.), one would have to say, if it intends to produce effects even in conscience, that it is immoral, even if the same effects do not pertain to prescription. But it is reasonable to suppose (and the very nature of civil legislation, which does not directly concern the internal forum, leads one to believe this) that the legislator’s intention in drafting the said article was to deny a juridical action to one who has possessed another’s property for ten or twenty years without ever contesting it (even if this occurs unchallenged), and to relieve the judge of the extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, burden of proving bad faith that not only does not appear externally but cannot even be presumed *a priori* in one who has possessed movable or immovable property for such a duration without being disturbed. From this perspective and in the sense explained, it could be considered morally licit or at least tolerable that a civil law norm does not perfectly conform to what is dictated by natural law, which in the end does not positively renounce II. In any case, it remains beyond dispute that for prescription to produce its effects in conscience, internal or theological good faith from the beginning to the end of the required time is absolutely indispensable. These observations evidently apply to any legislation.
Nevertheless, it is considered probable that, in the sole case of liberative prescription, it is sufficient—even with regard to conscience—that one who knows of another’s right (and is thus in a certain sense in bad faith) does not actively oppose its enforcement: inasmuch as not opposing it and remaining internally disposed to satisfy it if claimed constitutes a certain kind of, at least negative, good faith, as some moralists have called it, even if the other’s right is known. Among those who hold this opinion are A. Vermeersch (*Theologia moralis*, II, Rome 1937, n. 37; B 2), D. Prümmer (*Manuale studiorum theologiae moralis*, II, Freiburg im Br. 1936, n. 60), and T. Iorio (*Theologia moralis*, II, Naples 1947, n. 584). One cannot accuse the debtor of grave injustice if he remains silent while having conflicting interests.
Finally, it should be noted that good faith ceases and gives way to bad faith not only by operation of law with the interruption of prescription (Italian Civil Code, arts. 2043 pars. 1–4; 2044; CIC, can. 1725, n. 4), but also whenever, for whatever reason, the one prescribing becomes aware that what he possesses belongs to another.
To conclude, although natural law and canon law require good faith (*bona fides*) throughout the entire period of possession necessary for prescription, civil laws that do not expressly admit this—limiting good faith to its initial stage or merely to material possession—cannot be entirely condemned. Such laws aim solely to safeguard the smooth functioning of legal processes without directly addressing the conscience, which lies beyond their control. Indeed, it is likely that negative good faith, even when united with concrete knowledge of another's right, may at times free one from certain obligations even in conscience.
Based on these principles, moralists resolve questions concerning the obligations of possession in good faith, bad faith, and doubtful faith, with a vast casuistry that extends to the field of restitution. Good or bad faith permeates nearly the entire domain of the licit and illicit, for a fundamental principle of moral theology holds that one may never act against conscience (cf. *v.* CONSCIENCE), though this conscience, in commanding or forbidding an action, may be true or false without fault. Vincibly erroneous conscience is a legitimate rule for human action, but only *per accidens*, provided that good faith is present, which justifies the discrepancy between subjective and objective moral norms. The extent to which such false persuasion may persist will be discussed when treating ignorance, a term that includes error. It is sometimes advisable to leave undisturbed one who acts under such false persuasion (to leave in good faith), especially when the enlightenment of the intellect of one who has already undertaken a series of actions in that direction and is preparing to continue them might otherwise cause severe disturbance of conscience, due to the difficulties to be overcome or other factors, with the consequent risk of transforming a merely material violation of the law into a formal violation—or, as moralists say, turning a material sin into a formal sin.
Without entering into excessive exemplification, this is the case with illicit operations whose illicit nature is difficult to grasp, particularly at certain moments (cf. *v.* EMBRYOTOMY); or with certain illicit acts between spouses that are erroneously deemed licit and difficult to avoid in a particular case. In matrimonial matters, good faith also finds wide application in the so-called putative marriage, with repercussions on the legitimacy of children, the validation and radical sanation of marriages, and the like.
Expanding the scope to other Sacraments, even the reception of the Sacraments of the living in a state of mortal sin, but in good faith, can produce the effect of obtaining the first grace through attrition alone. Extreme Unction certainly and directly produces this effect; the other Sacraments probably and *per accidens*.
Yet the matter differs when it is no longer a question of the liceity but of the validity of acts. The omission of an essential element or of a *condicio sine qua non*, even when done in good faith, does not render an invalid act valid. This principle has immense application in the field of moral law. For example, in sacramental matters, the conferral or administration of a Sacrament with substantial variations in matter or form renders the Sacrament null, even if this was done with the most perfect good faith. This occurs either because the objective arrangement of the elements is required by the very nature of things, as in the matter and form of the Sacraments, or by the will of the legislator, as in the case of a particular form—ordinary or extraordinary—required by the Church for marriage, or by the nature of certain laws (irritant or inhabilitating, at least as a general principle, cf. can. 16 § 1). Sometimes, however, the legislator shows leniency toward those acting in good faith—recognizing certain effects even in irritant or inhabilitating laws (cf. can. 99 § 1). Regarding the validity of rescripts whose petitions contained substantial or accidental omissions made in good or bad faith, cf. *RESCRIPTS*.
It is understood, however, that the proper domain of good faith is that of the liceity rather than the validity of acts; it pertains to the internal forum rather than the external.