CONSCIENCE. -
I. PHILOSOPHY
In its etymological sense (from Lat. cum-scientia, conscience συν-εἰδησις = common knowledge, corresponding to judgment) conscience is the awareness of the presence of something to a knowing subject, whether it concerns acts and states of mind proper to the subject itself or objects and facts of the external world. Conscience is therefore first and foremost the “awareness” of the existence of something within the entire sphere of higher life, whether cognitive or affective, of sensitivity or of spirit. Conscience thus implies, in its actualization, a certain primitive judgment and a synthetic grasp of the “belonging” of such states, acts, objects, etc., to a subject of inherence and attribution, by virtue of which they acquire a certain structure in both the perceptual and ontological orders, and thereby gain meaning. Thus the higher degrees and forms of conscience presuppose higher forms and degrees of structures not only on the part of the object but in the development of the conscience itself of the subject and of its personality. In this latter field one speaks especially of moral conscience, which is the awareness of good and evil in concreto, or the judgment of morality that each person must make of his own particular actions. St. Thomas therefore places conscience in an act, namely in the application of knowledge: “nomen conscientiae significat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid: unde conscire dicitur quasi simul scire.” Psychological conscience is when “consideratur an actus sit vel fuerit”; moral conscience is “an actus sit rectus vel non” (De Ver., q. 21, a. 1). The former therefore involves a judgment of existence, the latter a judgment of value, and its exercise depends on the moral virtue of prudence (q.v.); the Germanic languages also distinguish between the psychological form (Bewusstsein) and the moral form (Gewissen) by means of verbal forms.Consciousness is usually defined as the “science of c.” (Gemelli): that is, it investigates the forms and laws of the appearance of phenomena and the actualization of subjective processes insofar as they relate to the contents both of the subject and of the object. Consciousness therefore has an “operational field” whose limits are determined by the stimuli or global conditions that define it (the so-called maximum and minimum “threshold” of c.). From this functional point of view, Aristotle had already distinguished a sensitive and an intellectual consciousness. Sensitive consciousness unfolds in two moments: “common sense” with respect to the existence of acts or objects in the present, which is “sensation of sensation” (κοινὸν αἴσθησις), and as a “common power” (κοινὸν δύναμις), by which “we feel that we see and hear” (De An., III, 2, 425 b 12); consciousness of the past is instead the function of memory, to which belongs in its own right the perception of time (De Mem., I, 450 a 12, 22). Intellectual consciousness evidently belongs to the intellect (νοῦς) as the capacity for perfect reflection and complete mastery of the act and its objects, both from the standpoint of the object and of the action (freedom). Consciousness is therefore either “sensation of sensation” or “intellection of intellection.” These are still summary indications, which will encounter criticism especially from Plotinus (Eun., IV, VI), for whom consciousness, even from its lower degrees, is not a simple awareness of objects but includes an activity of the spirit.
In modern thought a threefold direction has progressively asserted itself, so to speak, regarding the nature of consciousness: negative in empiricism, positive-constructive in criticism and idealism, and positive-descriptive in phenomenology.
For empiricism, which ranges from classical English phenomenism (especially D. Hume) to the positivism of E. Mach and R. Avenarius and on to contemporary neopositivism (notably the Vienna school), consciousness is reduced to the “fact” of attention and exists only as an “epiphenomenon” (v.), or derived function: consciousness, W. Mach asserts, does not indicate a particular quality but consists in a particular “connection” (Zusammenhang) of given qualities.
It received a predominantly metaphysical treatment in Spinoza, for whom "cogitatio" is, together with "extensio," an attribute of substance, and in Leibniz, who made "cogitare" the essence of the monad and first distinguished the two functions of consciousness: perception and apperception, the former directed toward explicit content, the latter rather toward the act. Kant, in his search for the possibility of valid knowledge, posited a "consciousness in general" (Bewusstsein überhaupt), constituted by the "I think" (das Ich denkt) as "transcendental apperception," from which the categories derive, by which the contents of experience can be thought necessarily. The many obscure points of Kantian consciousness gave rise to the various post-Kantian systems: the idealist systems transformed the epistemological function that consciousness had in Kant into metaphysical reality and substance. For the post-Kantians, "consciousness in general" assumes the new function of originating and sustaining the world of values: no value exists except in relation to a consciousness that appreciates it, and thus the "value-in-itself" is the necessary correlate of the "thing-in-itself" (W. Windelband, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1920, p. 255). A vigorous attempt to restore consciousness to its original meaning was made by F. Brentano (q.v.), who, following the Aristotelian tradition, identified as the distinctive character of psychic phenomena "intentionality," i.e., the necessary reference to an object. Brentano distinguished a twofold consciousness: primary and secondary, one of the object and the other of the act, the latter already indicated by Aristotle as "accessory" (ἐν σκέψει: Met., XII, 9, 1074 b 36). Directly linked to Brentano is the phenomenology of E. Husserl, in whose theory of consciousness as "pure intentionality" realist and idealist principles coexist (cf., e.g., Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie..., Halle a. S. 1913, p. 37). O. Külpe, affirming the positivity of consciousness, vindicated for psychology the "method of (elicited) introspection," which has made possible the notable results of "Denk- und Willenspsychologie," securing the originality of our higher processes.
Al concetto brentaniano di c., che non dava ragione della soggettività affettiva come « intenzionalità », è stato sostituito quello di una c. come « Schauen » puro, inteso non solo come un « vedere » della c., ma come l'immediatezza fondamentale dello « spirito apprensivo » in tutta l'estensione e varietà della sue funzioni (Max Beck). Per S. A. Kierkegaard la disposizione fondamentale della c. è l'angoscia come indeterminatezza radicale di fronte al bene e al male: se la « fede » non stabilisce la c. nel bene assoluto ch'è il suo vero oggetto, essa sprofonda nel male e l'angoscia diventa « disperazione » (cf. La malattia mortale, trad. it., Milano 1947, specie parte 2ª, B). Questa struttura ontologico-teologica della c. è sostituita nell'esistenzialismo contemporaneo dal dialettismo fenomenologico, ch'è a sfondo kantiano in K. Jaspers e d'ispirazione diltevano-storicista in M. Heidegger. In senso ontologico-fenomenista J.-P. Sartre concepisce la c. come il « Pour-soi », riferito assenzialmente allo « En-soi » (il mondo) come impossibilità di assorbimento dell'uno nell'altro (L'être et le néant, 9ª ed., Parigi 1946, p. 235).
Così la c., se in un primo momento si presenta come ciò ch'è assolutamente primo e presupposta perciò ad ogni conoscenza ed è condizione della stessa filosofia, non si manifesta nella sua compiuta realtà e natura che in funzione di una teoria dell'essere e viene dunque a sua volta fondata cioè mediata da una filosofia.
lichkeit der Seele, Leida 1938, p. 330 sgg.; N. Hartmann, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, 3ª ed., Berlino 1941; C. Fabro, Percezione e pensiero, Milano 1941; H. Wallon, La conscience et la vie subconsciente, in Nouveau traité de psychologie, VII, 1, Parigi 1942; A. Gemelli-G. Zunini, Introduzione alla psicologia, Milano 1947. Cornelio Fabro
II. MORAL THEOLOGY
I. Definition and nature
In the moral sphere it is the immediate practical judgment on the moral character of our actions. It is, that is, a judgment of practical reason, i.e., on individual concrete actions, by which the intellect judges single concrete acts in the light of general ethical principles.Conscience in its activity fulfills two functions: before the action it indicates the path of order and forbids evil (antecedent conscience); after the action it approves, praises well-done good (conscientiae bonae laetitia paradius est, St. Augustine: PL 34, 482), and punishes with remorse (Non est pax impiis, Is. 22, 57) whoever has done evil (consequent conscience).
Conscience must not be confused with the so-called synderesis, nor with moral science, nor with natural law. Synderesis (from the Greek συντήρησις = preservation) is both the tendency of the intellect to know the most universal moral principles and their habitual presence in II. It is called by St. Jerome (PL 25, 22) « igniculus », as it were a spark kindled by God in the human intellect, which enlightens, since it makes known moral principles, and burns, since it urges to good and deters from evil: actus eius duplex scilicet inclinatio ad bonum et murmuratio contra malum (Albert the Great, Sum. Theol., 2, tr. 16, q. 99, n. 2, a. 3). Moral science deduces from certain principles objective conclusions regarding ethical questions; whereas natural law — participatio legis aeternae in creatura rationali (Sum. Theol., 1ª-2ªe, q. 91, a. 2) — is the moral order itself in its objective universality made manifest to man by God through the light of reason. Synderesis, moral science, and natural law remain in the objective sphere, while conscience applies the aforesaid principles and conclusions in the practical judgment regarding an action to be done or already done. Briefly, St. Thomas: lex naturalis nominat ipsa universalia principia iuris; synderesis nominat vero habitum eorum; conscientia vero nominat applicationem quandam legis naturalis ad aliquod faciendum per modum conclusionis cuiusdam (in II Sent., dist. 24, q. 2, a. 3).
This practical judgment of reason may be considered as the conclusion of a syllogism whose major premise is given by the ethical norm (synderesis, natural law, moral science); the minor premise is given by the action to be done or already done or to be omitted, to which the moral law is applied; the conclusion declares the conformity or lack thereof of that action with the law (cf. St. Thomas, Quaest. disput. de veritate, q. 17, a. 2).
Thus conceived, conscience may be called: the voice of God within us that enjoins the application of the law and guides us to the observance of the moral order.
Nothing is more intimate to man than his conscience; and its psychological reality is not perceived only in grave or extraordinary moments of life, but even in our daily and simple actions we hear its voice. It constitutes a universal phenomenon not limited by national boundaries nor circumscribed by periods of time: it manifests itself in every man endowed with reason. It is an absolutely undeniable fact that all men of all times and places distinguish between good and evil, and therefore we are also faced with a universally uniform and constant fact. And what is more important, the moral law is held by the common consent of men to be immutable, obligatory, indeed invested with sanction; that is to say, obedience to it must be rewarded, while disobedience must be punished. The foundation of this immutable world of ideas that governs all human thought cannot be other than God and the eternal ideas of His intellect, and reason is compelled by the axiom that without God the norm of morality cannot be conceived.
2. Opinions regarding the nature and origin of conscience — All those who have sought to explain the origin of conscience or to find a moral law independent of God are therefore in error.
The various conceptions of the nature and genesis of moral conscience, which have arisen particularly in modern philosophy, are for the most part functions of the different interpretations that general ethical systems have given of the fact and moral values. Thus it is clear that where the concept of moral good as an unconditional value is rejected, making it coincide entirely with the pleasant or the useful (ancient and modern hedonism, utilitarianism), conscience can no longer be affirmed as the judgment of reason on the absolute moral value of our acts, but rather as empirically acquired knowledge of what is pleasant or useful to the individual or to society. For T. Hobbes (1588–1679), who ascribes to primitive social laws the distinction between good and evil, conscience is nothing more than a product of education and custom. This doctrine was taken up by the various materialistic currents of the eighteenth century (C. A. Helvétius, P. E. D’Holbach) and developed in an associationist sense in the utilitarian empiricism of J. Stuart Mill. The latter traces moral conscience back to the association that gradually establishes itself between a series of actions and the ideas of utility, praise, precept, reward, or else harm, prohibition, blame, punishment, etc., with which those actions are conjoined from the first years of our life in the family and social environment, until they come to be understood as absolutely good or bad in themselves.
C. Darwin and especially E. Spencer revived the associationist theory, expanding it within the general framework of evolution. Moral conscience would be nothing more than the final development of a “moral sense” already present in rudimentary form in the social and altruistic tendencies of some lower species. Man inherited it from these and subsequently perfected it through further progress toward forms of social life: altruistic actions, which in society are imposed and at first are understood merely as a means to the common good, gradually come to be considered good in themselves, contributing to the formation of this conscience the approval and reward that in every society are linked to them. Thus, in evolutionism moral conscience is merely a slow conquest of the human species, destined to reach more perfect and definitive ethical forms. Arising also in reaction to T. Hobbes’s ethical positivism, the theory of the “moral sense” (A. Shaftesbury, F. Hutcheson and, in part, D. Hume) maintains that the perception of moral good and evil, and hence conscience, is to be attributed to an immediate intuitive feeling, analogous to the perceptual faculty of aesthetic values, distinct from and independent of reason. E. Kant, who at first inclined toward the theory of the “moral sense,” in the second Critique vindicates the rational value of moral conscience, understood as the knowledge (or self-affirmation of reason) of the universal law inherent a priori in practical reason (the categorical imperative). Apart from the assertion of the impossibility of deducing the ethical norm from any metaphysical conception and the other shortcomings inherent in the autonomy of the will and the purely formal character of the moral law, the unconditional value of conscience, recognized as a fact that imposes itself by its own authority on reason, is openly affirmed in the Kantian conception of law and of the good as absolute rational positing.
In more modern ethical theories (e.g., in W. Wundt, E. Westermarck), conscience is generally conceived once again as a pure expression of moral feeling, whose objective foundation is variously understood, most often in an utilitarian and eudaimonistic sense.
More than the product of a true “sense” in the strict sense, Christian philosophy affirms conscience, in its essential expression, as a fundamental rational intuition, inherent in the very value of the human person (which also justifies the etymological sense of the word), whereby man, as soon as ethical personality enters into his action, fundamentally grasps his good: a good that is not confined to a merely physical value, as it is for the rest of nature, but is understood as an absolute rational congruity, as duty, as what ought to be. The empirical theories mentioned above, apart from the inconsistency of their scientific and philosophical premises, are unable to provide an adequate explanation for the universality and unconditioned value with which conscience presents itself, even in the most primitive cultural conditions of primitive man. Education and custom, real but secondary and relative factors, may indeed and must influence the development and extension of conscience, but they are not a proportionate cause of the arising in the human spirit of a fact so irreducible and imposing in its universality as is the perception of good and evil, the conscience of duty.
As for the theory of the “moral sense” (also called ethical intuitionism), it is noted that, while it is true that the first awakening of conscience has something immediate and spontaneous about it, so that one may, in a broad sense, speak of an “ethical sense,” this does not argue for the absence, even in that first function of the human spirit, of every rational element; rather, it indicates, as has been mentioned, the innate disposition of reason to immediate and in a certain way unreflective intuition, both of the good and of the truth: a faculty and disposition which the ancients designated by the name of “habitus primorum principiorum moralium,” or “syndereis.” It must moreover be noted that, even in the further forms of its progressive development, moral conscience is intimately conjoined with feeling. An act of brutal violence or of merciless injustice does not provoke less the condemnation of reason than a deep feeling of aversion. This, rather than being proof of the supremacy of feeling in the perception of good and evil, is due to the fact that, in a harmonious development of the human person, the higher activities of reason, acquiring their natural function of preeminence, invest and strongly influence all other activities of the spirit, and in particular feeling. Yet this psychological achievement is bound, as has been said, to the formation and harmonious development of the ethical personality of the individual. Moral conscience will be all the more alive, all the more active and decisive in relation to action, the more the integral value of the personality is affirmed in a correct formation and education. Where this value is weakened or fails, through weakness of will or the influence of adverse circumstances, there may coexist, alongside a normal and perhaps superior development of reason, a moral conscience altogether inoperative and inert in the face of life.
3. Natural and supernatural moral conscience. — Profoundly different is the conscience that has its foundations in the natural moral norm, from that which embraces the supernatural order. For the upright man who is not a believer, conscience affirms itself in the use of right reason and in the consequent will that performs the good; whereas for the Christian the scope of the moral program is vastly enlarged by the addition of Christian norms, in which the framework of natural morality is summarized, specified, and corroborated.
Moreover, for the believer the fundamental motive from which moral life begins is changed: the upright man performs the good out of natural love, the Christian grounds his moral activity in supernatural love. This is not to say that natural conscience can abstract from God as the foundation of the moral norm. God remains the ultimate end and the source
of moral norm both in the natural order and in the supernatural order, and the duties toward God are part of the natural norm; nor should it be understood that a Christian morality can exist separate from natural morality, since the former necessarily includes the latter.
4. Various aspects of morality — In addition to the already mentioned distinction between antecedent and consequent morality, morality — and properly antecedent morality — in relation to conformity with the moral law, can be true or erroneous. True morality exists when, from true principles, one declares an act concretely licit or illicit that is truly such; erroneous morality exists when, from false principles nevertheless held as true by the subject, or by incorrectly applying true principles, one declares an act concretely licit or illicit that is not truly such. As is clear, the first case occurs when the subjective norm of morality (morality) coincides with the objective norm; the second when the subjective norm, due to ignorance or error, is discordant from the objective norm. Erroneous morality can be inculpable or culpable, depending on whether the subject, in judging, has exercised due diligence or not (the first is also called invincibly erroneous, while the second is called vincibly erroneous). Erroneous morality is also commonly distinguished, in relation to the psychological elements of the subject, into scrupulous, perplexed, lax, casuistic, and pharisaical: it is scrupulous when, for trivial reasons, it judges or fears that an action is evil when it is not; it is perplexed when it judges an action to be wrong, whether it concludes to act or not; it is lax when, without sound and certain reasons, it judges an action to be licit; it is casuistic when, through habit of committing evil, it no longer perceives its dishonesty; it is pharisaical when it has no difficulty in approving or judging as lightly prohibited certain gravely illicit acts, while considering dishonest certain specific actions that are not (Excolantes culicem, camelum autem deglutientes: Mt. 23, 24).
In relation to the degree of assent, conscience is distinguished as certain, probable, and doubtful. Conscience is certain when the subject, without any prudent fear of erring, judges a given act to be lawful or unlawful; therefore, certain conscience differs from true conscience: the former excludes the previous fear of error, but it might not agree with the truth or with the objective norm of morality; the latter, besides possessing subjective certainty, also agrees with the truth or objective norm. Conscience is probable when, despite fearing to err, the subject judges a given action to be lawful or unlawful, basing this judgment on solid arguments either for intrinsic reasons or by authority. It is doubtful if the judgment on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action remains suspended, or if, even when such a judgment is formed, the subject remains equally uncertain regarding the lawfulness or unlawfulness. It should be noted that strictly speaking one could not speak of doubtful conscience, since by definition it is “a practical judgment of reason,” and thus excludes doubt, which is the suspension of judgment. Therefore, only this aspect of conscience is mentioned here, and reference is made to the relevant questions in the article SISTEMI MORALI.
In relation to obligation, conscience can be commanding, prohibiting, permitting, or advisory, according to whether it imposes, prohibits, permits, or advises a given action.
5. Duty in the face of conscience. — Here is the attitude that must be maintained in the face of the various states of conscience. True and erroneous conscience: a) first of all, the agent is bound to exercise due diligence so that his conscience may truly agree with the objective norm of morality, that is, so that it may be true (Necessaria est inquisitio rationis ante iudicium de eligendis: Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 14, a. 1). Indeed, since conscience is the proximate norm of action, it is evident that the subject must derive from the objective norm the primary source of morality. If the subject does not exercise due diligence, and in this way the subjective norm comes to disagree with the objective norm, it is clear that he would become guilty in cause, that is, indirectly responsible for the action.
b) Man is bound to follow commanding or prohibiting conscience both when such conscience is true and when it is invincibly erroneous. For if conscience is true, since it is nothing other than the application of the law to a concrete case, it is clear that it has the same obliging force as just law. And equally obligatory is invincibly erroneous conscience: “All that is not from faith is sin” (Rom. 14, 23); this text is commonly interpreted, not so much with regard to supernatural faith, but in relation to conscience, in the sense that when a man acts against his own conscience, he commits sin (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 19, a. 5); hence the axiom of Innocent III: “Whatever is done against conscience leads to hell.”
Reason then clearly states that the action against conscience is not licit, because in reality the morality of the action is deduced not from the object in itself, but: “as proposed by conscience”; if therefore conscience proposes, even though through invincibly erroneous judgment, an act to be done or omitted, whoever acts against such conscience would act against the moral order. And the specific transgression is to be judged in its kind and gravity as if the subject had acted, in the same matter, against right conscience (St. Thomas, Quaest. disp. de veritate, q. 17, a. 4, ad 9). It is evident, however, that if such a conscience, instead of commanding or forbidding, merely permitted or advised the action, there would be no obligation to follow such a judgment.
It follows that it is not licit to act with a vincibly erroneous conscience; in such a case the error must be removed through that due diligence which one is obliged to exercise before acting, unless it be an action which does not expose the agent to the danger of violating the ethical norm. And it is clear that whoever acts with a vincibly erroneous conscience acts against the moral order, realizing the object even in the hypothesis that it be evil; he thus voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of violating the moral law, which is to be judged dishonest.
6. Certain and doubtful conscience. — Certainty can be defined with St. Thomas: “Firmitas adhaesionis virtutis cognoscitivae in suum cognoscibile” (cf. In III Sent., dist. 26, q. 2, a. 4); and, as everyone knows, certainty is the effect of intrinsic evidence (when it arises from the force of the reasoning itself) or extrinsic evidence (when it is based on human or divine testimony). From the fact, however, that certainty arises from the evidence of the truth, it cannot be concluded that certain conscience must be at the same time true conscience, for by reason of ignorance or error it may well happen that conscience can be false or erroneous even while being certain, as has been observed above. Certainty can be metaphysical, physical, and moral (v. CERTEZZA); here we are concerned only with moral certainty, which is had when one can exclude “omnem formidinem errandi, attento ordine morali rerum.” Such certainty, taking into account the gravity of the arguments capable of excluding the danger of error, is perfect if it absolutely excludes every reasonable doubt of error; it is imperfect if, while resting on solid argument, it does not exclude some slight fear of error. Again, there can be speculative certainty (if it concerns only an objective truth without reference to a practical case) or practical certainty (if instead it is a question of judging a case in its special circumstances); thus there can be direct certainty (if it arises from clear and sure internal principles) or indirect certainty (if it is obtained on the basis of indirect, i.e., reflected, principles) (v. SISTEMI MORALI).
What has been said makes it clear that only certain conscience (whether directly or indirectly) is the true proximate rule of the morality of human acts. Indeed, man, in order to act, is bound to exercise due diligence so that his acts may conform to the objective norm of morality; until he firmly believes that such conformity obtains (certain conscience), the agent remains in doubt and thus exposed to the danger of violating the moral law; which is tantamount to saying that, if he acts, he virtually intends to violate II.
However, moral certainty—even imperfect—is sufficient for human action. Indeed, absolute certainty in human acts is often impossible. This principle is confirmed by the condemnation issued by Alexander VIII against the following proposition: « Non licet sequi opinionem vel inter probabilissimam » (Denz.-U., 1293). But since even the most probable opinion is not absolutely certain, if it is permissible to follow a most probable opinion, it must be concluded that imperfect moral certainty is sufficient for human action.
It is also agreed that for moral action speculative moral certainty is not required (which is sometimes impossible to attain, since controversial moral questions are very frequent from a speculative point of view); rather, practical moral certainty is sufficient.
7. The education of conscience — Everyone understands how grave the problem of the education of conscience is: grave for each individual as well as for anyone who, by mission or office, carries out an educational activity. By raising the question of the education of conscience, one is addressing the problem of the practical honesty of human actions, of the attainment of the ultimate end and of true good—both individual and social. The child, as has been said, as soon as he reaches the use of reason, gradually comes to know the highest moral concepts and principles by himself and spontaneously takes them as the norm of his actions; but from this first appearance of moral life to the possession of a truly virtuous life, there is a long way to go. All of man’s faculties cooperate in his moral life, and especially reason, the will, and the sensitive appetite.
Reason perceives the law; the will is bound to engage victoriously with the good to be done; the sensitive appetite must adhere to the command of the will. Reason perceives, with evidence, that good is to be done and evil to be avoided; but to form an honest man it is necessary to enrich the mind with notions pertaining to moral order, to instill in the adolescent a solid conviction of the value of reason in the face of duty; above all, it is necessary, through sound education, to strengthen the will so that it may be capable of containing within the bounds of moral order the passions that continually resurface and are often violent.
In substance, man possesses all the faculties suited to performing good, but in reality acting according to moral order is the fruit of a struggle between right reason and the contrary tendencies of human nature; for the honest man is not he who occasionally performs good acts, but he who has acquired the habit of acting according to right conscience. Just as it is true that a man is distinguished by the intellectual, volitional and affective qualities he has been able to acquire, so too can it be said that a man is distinguished by his conscience. And whoever wishes
to educate his conscience according to Christian morality cannot stop at the virtues of the honest man; he must enrich his mind with the teachings of the Gospel and conform his entire private and public life to the sense of Christian conscience: he must acquire the supernatural virtues. To the obligations of the honest man in individual, family and social life, for the Christian are added the obligations that stem from a view of life based on supernatural love.
For freedom of conscience: V. LIBERTÀ.
COSENZA - Interior of the Cathedral consecrated in 1222,
partially rebuilt in 1750.
CONSCIENCE (Lat. conscientia; Gr. syneídēsis).
The internal judgment by which the human person, in the light of the moral law, evaluates the moral quality of a concrete act, whether performed or to be performed. This article will treat: 1. Notion and nature; 2. Formation; 3. Obligation; 4. Erroneous conscience; 5. Certain and doubtful conscience.
I. Notion and Nature
The term conscientia in classical Latin originally indicated the knowledge one has of oneself, of one’s own acts, and of their moral value. In Christian theology, it acquired a more precise meaning, designating the practical judgment of reason that applies the moral law to a particular case. St. Thomas Aquinas defines it as the actus rationis by which we judge that something must be done or avoided (Summa theol., I-II, q. 19, a. 5). It is not a habit or a faculty, but an act, though it presupposes the habit of synderesis (v. SYNDERESIS), which is the natural inclination of the intellect to know the first principles of the moral law.
Conscience is not an autonomous source of morality, independent of the objective moral law; rather, it is the subjective application of that law to concrete actions. It does not create moral norms but recognizes and applies them. Thus, conscience is bound to the truth: it must conform to the objective moral order established by God. When it does so, it is called true conscience; when it does not, it is erroneous conscience (v. infra, § 4).
The act of conscience can be antecedent (before the action, directing it) or consequent (after the action, evaluating it). The antecedent conscience is the one that properly obliges, as it guides the will toward good and away from evil. The consequent conscience, instead, produces remorse or satisfaction, depending on whether the act was evil or good.
II. Formation of Conscience
Since conscience is the application of the moral law to particular cases, its rectitude depends on the knowledge of that law and on the ability to apply it correctly. The formation of conscience is therefore a duty for every Christian, who must strive to know the moral teachings of the Church and to understand how they apply to his own life.
The primary sources for the formation of conscience are:
1. Divine Revelation, contained in Sacred Scripture and Tradition, which provides the fundamental principles of morality.
2. The Magisterium of the Church, which interprets and applies Revelation to the concrete circumstances of life. The faithful are bound to adhere to the teachings of the Magisterium, especially in matters of faith and morals (v. MAGISTERIUM).
3. Natural reason, which, enlightened by faith, allows the individual to discern the moral quality of actions in the light of the natural law (v. LEX NATURALIS).
4. Spiritual direction, which helps the person to apply general principles to particular cases, avoiding errors of judgment.
The formation of conscience requires humility, docility to the teachings of the Church, and a sincere desire to seek the truth. It is not a static process but a lifelong task, as the moral challenges faced by the individual evolve over time.
III. Obligation of Conscience
Conscience obliges in virtue of the moral law, which is the expression of God’s will. The obligation arises from the fact that the moral law is not an arbitrary imposition but the reflection of the divine wisdom and goodness, which orders all things to their proper end. To act against conscience is to act against the truth, and thus against God, who is the source of all truth.
The obligation of conscience is twofold:
1. Negative obligation: one must never act against a certain and true conscience, even if it were to err materially (i.e., even if the judgment of conscience does not correspond to the objective moral law). This is because the person is bound to follow what he sincerely believes to be the will of God.
2. Positive obligation: one must form one’s conscience correctly, seeking the truth and adhering to the teachings of the Church. This obligation is particularly strong in matters of grave importance, where the risk of error is greater.
The obligation to follow conscience does not imply that conscience is infallible. On the contrary, it is subject to error, especially when it is not properly formed. However, the person is bound to follow his conscience as long as he is not aware of its error. If he later discovers that his conscience was erroneous, he must correct it and, if necessary, repair any harm caused by his actions.
IV. Erroneous Conscience
An erroneous conscience is one that judges an action to be good when it is objectively evil, or vice versa. The error can be vincible (i.e., the person could and should have known the truth) or invincible (i.e., the person could not have known the truth despite his best efforts).
1. Vincible error: This occurs when the person neglects his duty to form his conscience correctly, either through ignorance that could have been overcome (e.g., by studying the teachings of the Church) or through negligence in applying those teachings to his actions. In such cases, the person is morally responsible for his error and for the evil actions that result from II. 2. Invincible error: This occurs when the person, despite his sincere efforts to seek the truth, remains in ignorance of the moral law. In such cases, the person is not morally responsible for his error, as he acted in good faith. However, the objective evil of the action remains, and if the error is later discovered, the person must correct his conscience and, if possible, repair any harm caused.
The distinction between vincible and invincible error is crucial for determining moral responsibility. While invincible error excuses from sin, vincible error does not, as it is the result of negligence or bad will.
V. Conscience
Conscience can be certain or doubtful, depending on the degree of conviction with which it judges an action.
2. Doubtful conscience: This is the conscience that hesitates between two judgments, uncertain about the moral quality of an action. In such cases, the general principle is that one must not act with a doubtful conscience. Instead, one must seek to resolve the doubt by consulting the moral law, the teachings of the Church, or a spiritual director. If the doubt cannot be resolved, one must apply the principle of tutiorism (v. TUTIORISMUS), choosing the safer course, i.e., the one that is more likely to avoid sin.
The resolution of a doubtful conscience can be achieved through:
- Direct study: examining the moral principles applicable to the case.
- Consultation: seeking the advice of a competent authority, such as a confessor or spiritual director.
- Application of moral principles: such as the principle of double effect (v. EFFECTUS, PRINCIPIUM DUPLICIS) or the principle of totality (v. TOTALITATIS, PRINCIPIUM).
In cases of grave doubt, where the moral quality of an action is uncertain, the Church teaches that one must refrain from acting until the doubt is resolved. This is to avoid the risk of committing sin.
BIBL.:
F. Tillmann, Handbuch der kath. Sittenlehre..., vol. 2, Düsseldorf 1934;
P. Rousselot, Quaestiones de conscientia, Bruxelles 1937;
C. Spica, La conscience dans le Nouveau Testament, in Revue bibl., 20 (1938), 50-80;
H. Merckelbach, Summa theologiae moralis, I, Paris 1942, pp. 186-206;
O. Lottin, Principes de morale, Louvain 1947, I, pp. 147-59, 201-40;
H. Doms, Du sens et de la valeur de la vie humaine, Paris 1946, pp. 29-32, 105-13, 140-34, 177-83, 191-94;
G. Leclercq, La conscience du chrétien, essai de théol. mor., Paris 1947;
A. Lanza, Theol. mor., I, Torino-Roma 1949, pp. 351-437.