COSCIENZA

CONSCIENCE. —

I. PHILOSOPHY

In its etymological sense (from Lat. cum-scientia, consciousness = common knowledge, corresponding to judgment), conscience is the awareness of the presence of something to a knowing subject, whether it concerns acts and states of mind proper to the subject itself or objects and facts of the external world. Conscience is therefore, first and foremost, “awareness” of the existence of something throughout the entire sphere of higher life, whether cognitive or affective, of sensitivity or of spirit. Conscience thus implies, in its actualization, a certain primitive judgment and a synthetic grasp of the “belonging” of such states, acts, objects, etc., to an overall subject and of their attribution, by which they acquire a certain structure in both the perceptual and ontological orders, and thereby gain meaning.

Thus, the higher degrees and forms of conscience presuppose higher degrees and forms of structures not only on the part of the object but also in the development of the conscience itself of the subject and of his personality. In this latter domain, one speaks especially of moral conscience, which is the awareness of good and evil in concreto, or the judgment of morality that each person must make regarding his own particular actions. St. Thomas therefore places conscience in an act, namely, in the application of knowledge: “for knowledge signifies the scientific application to something: whence to be conscious is said as it were to know together” (De Ver., q. 21, a. 1). Psychological conscience is when “it is considered whether an act is or was”; moral conscience is when “whether an act is right or not” (De Ver., q. 21, a. 1). The former therefore involves a judgment of existence, the latter a judgment of value, and its exercise depends on the moral virtue of prudence (q.v.). The Germanic languages also distinguish, in verbal forms, psychological conscience (Bewusstsein) and moral conscience (Gewissen).

Far from being identified with being, as in idealism, conscience is not identified with life or with the soul, because, whereas life is continuous, conscience in us is intermittent; nor is it identified with knowledge itself, because there is a possession of knowledge distinct from its act, of which conscience makes use and enjoys according to different circumstances.

Psychology is usually defined as the “science of conscience” (Gemelli): it investigates the forms and laws of the appearance of phenomena and the actualization of subjective processes insofar as they relate to the contents of both the subject and the object. Conscience therefore has a “field” of operation that has its limits with respect to the stimuli or global conditions that determine it (the so-called “maximum” and “minimum” thresholds of conscience). From this functional point of view, Aristotle had already distinguished a sensitive conscience and an intellectual conscience. Sensitive conscience is accomplished in two moments: “common sense” with respect to the existence of acts or objects in the present, which is “sensation of sensation” (κοινὴ αἴσθησις), and as a “common power” (κοινὴ δύναμις), by which “we feel that we see and hear” (De An., III, 2, 425 b 12); conscience of the past is instead the function of memory, to which belongs properly the perception of time (De Mem., I, 450 a 12, 22). Intellectual conscience evidently belongs to the intellect (νοῦς) as the capacity for perfect reflection and complete mastery of the act and its objects, both from the point of view of the object and of the action (freedom). Conscience is therefore “sensation of sensation” or “intelligence of intelligence.” These are still summary indications, which will encounter criticism especially from Plotinus (Enn., IV, VI), for whom conscience in its lower degrees is not a simple awareness of objects, but includes an activity of the spirit.

In modern thought, a threefold direction has progressively asserted itself, so to speak, regarding the nature of conscience: negative in empiricism, positive-constructive in criticism and idealism, and positive-descriptive in phenomenology.

For empiricism, which ranges from classical English phenomenism (especially D. Hume) to the positivism of E. Mach and R. Avenarius and to contemporary neopositivism (particularly the Vienna school), conscience is reduced to the “fact” of attention and exists only as an “epiphenomenon” (q.v.), or derived function: conscience, as W. Mach states, for example, does not denote a particular quality, but consists in a particular “connection” (Zusammenhang) of given qualities (Erkenntnis und Irrtum, Leipzig 1905, p. 41). A treatment that was predominantly metaphysical was given to the “cogito” by Spinoza, for whom “cogitatio,” together with “extensio,” is an attribute of substance, and by Leibniz, who makes “cogitare” the essence of the monad and distinguishes for the first time the two functions of conscience, perception and apperception, the former directed to explicit content, the latter rather to the act. It is well known how Kant, in seeking the possibility of valid knowledge, posited a “consciousness in general” (Bewusstsein überhaupt), constituted by the “I think” (das Ich denkt) as “transcendental apperception,” from which the categories derive, according to which the contents of experience can be thought necessarily. The many obscure points of Kantian conscience gave rise to post-Kantian systems: idealist systems transformed the gnoseological function that conscience had in Kant into metaphysical reality and substance. For the neo-Kantians, “consciousness in general” receives the new function of giving origin and consistency to the world of values: no value is given except with respect to a conscience that appreciates it, and thus the “value-in-itself” is the necessary correlate of the “thing-in-itself” (W. Windelband, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1920, p. 255).

A vigorous attempt to restore conscience to its original meaning was made by F. Brentano (q.v.), who, following in the footsteps of Aristotelian philosophy, indicated as the distinctive character of psychic phenomena “intentionality,” that is, the necessary reference to an object. Brentano distinguished a twofold conscience, primary and secondary, one of the object and the other of the act, the latter of which Aristotle had already indicated as “accessory” (ἐν παραγώγῳ: Met., XII, 9, 1074 b 36). Brentano is directly connected with the phenomenology of E. Husserl, in whose theory of conscience as “pure intentionality” realist and idealist principles coexist together (cf., for example, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie..., Halle a. S., 1913, p. 37). O. Külpe, affirming the positivity of conscience, vindicated for psychology the “method of introspection” (provoked), which has made possible the notable results of “Denk- und Willenspsychologie,” which have secured the originality of our higher processes.

To the Brentanian concept of conscience, which did not account for affective subjectivity as “intentionality,” there was substituted that of conscience as pure “Schauen,” understood not only as a “seeing” of conscience, but as the fundamental immediacy of the “apprehensive spirit” in all the extension and variety of its function (Max Beck). For S. A. Kierkegaard, the fundamental disposition of conscience is anxiety as radical indeterminateness in the face of good and evil: if “faith” does not establish conscience in the absolute good, which is its true object, it sinks into evil, and anxiety becomes “despair” (cf. La malattia mortale, Italian trans., Milan 1947, esp. part 2, B). This ontological-theological structure of conscience is replaced in contemporary existentialism by phenomenological dialecticism, which has a Kantian background in K. Jaspers and a delightful-historical inspiration in M. Heidegger. In an ontological-phenomenist sense, J.-P. Sartre conceives conscience as the “Pour-soi,” essentially related to the “En-soi” (the world) as the impossibility of one being absorbed into the other (L’être et le néant, 9th ed., Paris 1946, p. 235).

Thus conscience, if at first it presents itself as that which is absolutely primary and is therefore presupposed by all knowledge and is the condition even of philosophy itself, does not reveal its complete reality and nature except in relation to a theory of being, and thus in turn is itself founded—i.e., mediated—by philosophy.

II. MORAL THEOLOGY

1. Definition and nature

In the moral sphere, conscience is the immediate practical judgment on the moral character of our actions. It is, namely, a judgment of practical reason concerning concrete individual actions, by which the intellect judges particular concrete acts in the light of general ethical principles.

Conscience fulfills two offices in its activity: before an action it indicates the path of order and forbids evil (antecedent conscience); after an action it approves and praises good deeds (“behold, the paradise of the consenting conscience,” St. Augustine: PL 34, 482) and punishes with remorse (“There is no peace for the wicked,” Is. 22, 57) whoever has done evil (consequent conscience).

Conscience must not be confused with the so-called synteresis, nor with moral science, nor with natural law. Synteresis (from the Greek συνδράσις = preservation) is both the tendency of the intellect to know the most universal moral principles and their habitual presence within II. It is called by St. Jerome (PL 25, 22) “a little spark,” as it were, kindled by God in the human intellect: it enlightens, since it makes moral principles known, and it burns, since it urges toward good and withdraws from evil: “its act is twofold, namely an inclination toward good and a murmuring against evil” (Albert the Great, Summa Theologiae, 2, tr. 16, q. 99, art. 3). Moral science deduces from certain principles objective conclusions about ethical questions, whereas natural law—“a participation in the eternal law in a rational creature” (Summa Theologiae, 1a–2ae, q. 91, art. 2)—is the moral order itself in its objective universality, made manifest to man through the light of reason. Synteresis, moral science, and natural law remain in the objective realm, while conscience applies these principles and conclusions in a practical judgment regarding an action to be done or already performed. In brief, as St. Thomas says: “natural law names the universal principles of right; synteresis names the habit of these; conscience, however, names a certain application of natural law to something to be done, as a kind of conclusion” (In II Sent., dist. 24, q. 2, art. 3).

This practical judgment of reason can be regarded as the conclusion of a syllogism whose major premise is given by the ethical norm (synteresis, natural law, moral science), whose minor premise is given by the action to be performed or already performed or omitted, to which the moral law is applied; and the conclusion declares the conformity or lack thereof of that action with the law (cf. St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 17, art. 2).

Thus conceived, conscience may be called the voice of God within us that commands the application of the law and guides us to observe the moral order.

Nothing is more intimate to man than his conscience; and its psychological reality is not perceived only in grave or extraordinary moments of life, but even in the ordinary and simple actions of our daily existence we hear its voice. It constitutes a universal phenomenon not limited by national boundaries nor confined to any period of time: it manifests itself in every rational human being. It is an absolutely undeniable fact that all men of all times and places distinguish between good and evil, and thus we are confronted with a universally uniform and constant fact. What is more, the moral law is held by the common consent of mankind to be immutable, obligatory, and indeed attended by sanction; that is to say, obedience to it must be rewarded, while disobedience must be punished. The foundation of this immutable world of ideas that governs all human thought cannot be anything other than God and the eternal ideas of His intellect, and it imposes upon reason the axiom by which, without God, the norm of morality cannot be conceived.

2. Opinions regarding the nature and origin of conscience

All those who have sought to explain the origin of conscience or to find a moral law independent of God are therefore in error.

The various conceptions of the nature and genesis of moral conscience that have arisen particularly in modern philosophy are mostly functions of the differing interpretations given to the fact and values of morality by general ethical systems. Thus it is clear that where the concept of moral good as an unconditional value is rejected—making it entirely coincide with the pleasant or the useful (ancient and modern hedonism, utilitarianism)—conscience can no longer be affirmed as the judgment of reason on the absolute moral value of our acts, but rather as empirically acquired knowledge of what is pleasant or useful to the individual or to society. For T. Hobbes (1588–1679), who attributes the distinction between good and evil to primitive social laws, conscience is nothing more than a product of education and custom. A doctrine that was taken up by the various materialist currents of the eighteenth century (C. A. Helvétius, P. E. D’Holbach) and developed in an associationist sense in the utilitarian empiricism of J. Stuart Mill. He traces moral conscience back to the association that gradually establishes itself between a series of actions and the ideas of utility, praise, precept, reward, or else harm, prohibition, blame, punishment, etc., with which those actions are linked from the earliest years of our life in the family and social environment, until they come to be regarded as absolutely good or bad in themselves.

C. Darwin and especially H. Spencer revived the associationist theory, expanding it within the general framework of evolution. Moral conscience would be nothing more than the final development of a “moral sense” already present in rudimentary form in the social and altruistic tendencies of some lower species. From these, man is believed to have evolved, subsequently perfecting it through further progress toward social forms of life: altruistic actions, which in society impose themselves and at first are understood as simple means to the common good, gradually come to be regarded as good in themselves, contributing to the formation of this conscience through the approval and reward that in every society is linked to them. Thus, in evolutionism, moral conscience is merely a slow conquest of the human species, destined to reach more perfect and definitive ethical forms. Arising also in reaction to T. Hobbes’s ethical positivism, the theory of the “moral sense” (A. Shaftesbury, F. Hutcheson, and in part D. Hume) holds that the perception of moral good and evil, and hence conscience, is to be attributed to an immediate intuitive sentiment, analogous to the perceptive faculty of aesthetic values, distinct and independent from reason. E. Kant, who had initially inclined toward the theory of the “moral sense,” in the second *Critique* vindicates the rational value of moral conscience, understood as the (self-consciousness of reason’s) knowledge of the universal law, inherent as a priori form in practical reason (the categorical imperative). Apart from the assertion of the unthinkability of deducing the ethical norm from any metaphysical conception and the other deficiencies inherent in the autonomy of the will and the purely formal character of the moral law, the unconditional value of conscience, recognized as a fact that imposes itself on reason, is openly affirmed in the Kantian conception of law and the good as absolute rational positing.

In more modern ethical theories (e.g., in W. Wundt, E. Westermarck), conscience is generally conceived once more as a pure expression of moral sentiment, whose objective foundation is variously understood, most often in utilitarian and eudaimonistic terms.

Rather than being the product of a “sense” in the strict sense, Christian philosophy affirms conscience, in its essential expression, as a fundamental rational intuition, immanent to the very value of the human person (whence also a justification of the etymological sense of the word), by which man, as soon as ethical personality is engaged in action, fundamentally apprehends his good: a good that is not confined to a merely physical value, as it is for the rest of nature, but is understood as absolute rational fitness, as duty, as *dover essere*. The empirical theories mentioned above, apart from the inconsistency of their scientific and philosophical presuppositions, are unable to provide an adequate explanation of the universality and unconditional value with which conscience presents itself, even in the most primitive cultural conditions of primitive man. Education and custom, real but secondary and relative factors, may indeed and must influence the development and extension of conscience, but they are not proportionally the cause of the arising in the human spirit of a fact so irreducible and imposing in its universality as is the perception of good and evil, the conscience of duty.

As for the theory of the “moral sense” (also called ethical intuition), it is noted that, while it is true that the first awakening of conscience has something immediate and spontaneous—so that in a broad sense one may speak of an “ethical sense”—this does not argue the absence, even in that first function of the human spirit, of any rational element; rather, it indicates, as has been noted, the innate disposition of reason to immediate and in a sense unreflective intuition, both of the good and of the true: a faculty and disposition that the ancients designated by the name of *habitus primorum principiorum moralium*, or *synderesis*. It must also be noted that, even in its further forms of progressive development, moral conscience is intimately conjoined with feeling. An act of brutal violence or merciless injustice provokes no less the condemnation of reason than does a deep feeling of aversion. This, rather than being proof of the supremacy of feeling in the perception of good and evil, is due to the fact that, in the harmonious development of the human person, the higher activities of reason, acquiring their natural function of preeminence, strongly invest and influence all other activities of the spirit, and in particular feeling. Yet this psychological achievement is linked, as has been said, to the formation and harmonious development of the individual’s ethical personality. Moral conscience will be all the more alive, active, and determinative in relation to action, the more the integral value of personality is affirmed in right formation and education. Where this value is diminished or lacking, through weakness of will or the influence of adverse circumstances, there may coexist, alongside a normal and perhaps superior development of reason, a moral conscience that is altogether inoperative and inert in the face of life.

3. Natural and supernatural moral conscience

Profoundly different is the conscience that has its basis in the natural moral norm from that which embraces the ordered supernatural. For the upright man who is not a believer, conscience is affirmed in the use of right reason and the consequent will that does good; whereas for the Christian the scope of the moral program is vastly enlarged by the addition of Christian norms, in which the framework of natural morality is summarized, clarified, and corroborated.

Moreover, for the believer the fundamental motive from which moral life begins changes: the upright man does good out of natural love, the Christian grounds his moral activity in supernatural love. This is not to say that natural morality can abstract from God as the foundation of the moral norm. God remains the ultimate end and source of the moral norm both in the natural order and in the supernatural order; duties toward God are part of the natural norm; nor should it be understood that a Christian morality can exist separate from natural morality, since the former necessarily includes the latter.

### 4. Various aspects of conscience

In addition to the already mentioned distinction between antecedent and consequent conscience, conscience — and properly antecedent conscience — in relation to conformity with the moral law, can be either true or erroneous. True conscience occurs when, from true principles, one declares a concrete action to be licit or illicit as it truly is; erroneous conscience occurs when, from false principles that are nevertheless believed to be true by the subject, or by incorrectly applying true principles, one declares a concrete action to be licit or illicit when it is not truly so. As is clear, the first case arises when the subjective norm of morality (conscience) coincides with the objective norm; the second arises when the subjective norm, due to ignorance or error, is discordant from the objective norm. Erroneous conscience can be inculpable or culpable, depending on whether the subject exercised due diligence in judgment or not (the first is also called invincibly erroneous, while the second is called vincibly erroneous).

Erroneous conscience is also commonly distinguished, in relation to the psychological elements of the subject, into scrupulous, perplexed, lax, cauterized, and pharisaical: it is scrupulous when, for trivial reasons, it judges or fears that an action is evil when it is not; it is perplexed when it judges an action to be wrong, whether it concludes to act or not; it is lax when, without solid or certain reasons, it judges an action to be licit; it is cauterized when, through habit of doing evil, it no longer perceives its dishonesty; it is pharisaical when it has no difficulty in approving or judging as lightly prohibited certain gravely illicit acts, while considering certain specific actions to be dishonest when they are not (*Excolantes culicem, camelum autem deglutientes*: Mt. 23, 24).

With regard to the degree of assent, conscience is distinguished into certain, probable, and doubtful. Certain conscience occurs when the subject, without any prudent fear of erring, judges a particular act to be licit or illicit; hence, certain conscience differs from true conscience: the former excludes the previous fear of error, but it might not agree with the truth or with the objective norm of morality; the latter, in addition to possessing subjective certainty, also agrees with the truth or objective norm. Probable conscience occurs when, while fearing to err, one judges a particular action to be licit or illicit based on solid arguments from intrinsic reasons or authority. It is doubtful when the judgment on the licitness or illicitness of the action remains suspended, or when, even if such a judgment is formed, the subject is equally uncertain about the licitness or illicitness. It should be noted that strictly speaking, one could not speak of doubtful conscience, since by definition it is a practical judgment of reason and thus excludes doubt, which is the suspension of judgment. Therefore, this aspect of conscience is only briefly mentioned here, and the related questions are referred to the entry **SISTEMI MODALI**.

In relation to obligation, conscience can be commanding, prohibiting, permitting, or counseling, according to whether it imposes, prohibits, permits, or advises a particular action.

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### 5. The duty toward conscience

Here is the attitude that must be maintained toward the various states of conscience.

**True and erroneous conscience:**
a) First, the agent is bound to exercise due diligence so that his conscience may truly conform to the objective norm of morality and thus be true (*Necessaria est inquisitio rationis ante iudicium de eligendis*: Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 14, a. 1). Indeed, since conscience is the proximate norm of action, it is evident that the subject must derive it from the objective norm as its primary source. If the subject does not exercise due diligence, thereby causing the subjective norm to diverge from the objective norm, it is clear that he becomes guilty *in causa*, that is, indirectly responsible for the action.

b) A person is bound to follow a commanding or prohibiting conscience, whether such conscience is true or invincibly erroneous. For if the conscience is true, since it is nothing other than the application of the law to a concrete case, it clearly possesses the same obligatory force as a just law. And equally obligatory is invincibly erroneous conscience: *“Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est”* (Rom. 14, 23), a text commonly interpreted, not so much with regard to supernatural faith, but in relation to conscience, in the sense that when a person acts against his own conscience, he commits sin (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 19, a. 5); hence the saying of Innocent III: *“Quidquid fit contra conscientiam aedificat ad gehennam.”*

Reason clearly indicates that acting against conscience is not licit, because the morality of an action is not derived from the object *in itself*, but *“ut proponitur a conscientia”*; if therefore conscience, even through invincible error, proposes an act to be done or omitted, whoever acts against such conscience would act against the moral order. And the specific transgression must be judged in kind and gravity as if the subject had acted, in the same matter, against right conscience (St. Thomas, *Quaest. disp. de veritate*, q. 17, a. 4, ad 9). It is evident, however, that if such a conscience, instead of commanding or prohibiting, merely permits or counsels an action, there would be no obligation to follow such a judgment.

It follows that it is not licit to act with vincibly erroneous conscience; in such a case, the error must be dispelled through the due diligence that one is obligated to exercise before acting, unless the action in question does not place the agent in danger of violating the ethical norm. It is clear that whoever acts with vincibly erroneous conscience acts against the moral order, realizing the object even in the hypothesis that it is evil; thus, he voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of violating the moral law, which is to be judged dishonest.

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### 6. Certain and doubtful conscience

Certainty can be defined with St. Thomas: *“Firmitas adhaesionis virtutis cognoscitae in suum cognoscibile”* (cf. *In III Sent.*, dist. 26, q. 2, a. 4); and, as is well known, certainty is the effect of intrinsic evidence (when it arises from the force of reason itself) and extrinsic evidence (when it is based on human or divine testimony). However, from the fact that certainty arises from the evidence of truth, it cannot be concluded that certain conscience must also be true conscience, for due to ignorance or error, conscience may well be false or erroneous even while being certain, as noted above.

Certainty can be metaphysical, physical, and moral (v. **CERTEZZA**): here we deal only with moral certainty, which occurs when *“omnem formidinem errandi, attento ordine morali rerum”* can be excluded. Such certainty, considering the gravity of the arguments capable of excluding the danger of error, is perfect if it absolutely excludes any reasonable doubt of error; it is imperfect if, while resting on solid arguments, it does not exclude some slight fear of error. Certainty can also be speculative (if it concerns only an objective truth without reference to a practical case) or practical (if it involves judging a case in its particular circumstances); thus, there can be direct certainty (if it arises from clear and secure internal principles) or indirect certainty (if it is obtained on the basis of indirect, i.e., reflected, principles) (v. **SISTEMI MORALI**).

Given this premise, it is evident that only certain conscience (whether direct or indirect) is the true proximate rule of the morality of human acts. For in order to act, a person is bound to exercise due diligence so that his acts may conform to the objective norm of morality; until he firmly believes that such conformity is realized (certain conscience), the agent remains in doubt and thus exposed to the danger of violating the moral law; which is to say that, if he acts, he virtually intends its violation.

However, moral action ordinarily requires only moral certainty, and even an imperfect one. Indeed, absolute certainty in human acts is often impossible. This principle is demonstrated by the condemnation issued by Alexander VIII against the following proposition: «Non licet sequi opinionem vel inter probabiles probabilissimam» (Denz-U, 1293). But since even the most probable opinion is not absolutely certain, if it is permissible to follow the most probable opinion, it must be concluded that imperfect moral certainty is sufficient for human action.

It is also undisputed that moral action does not require speculative moral certainty (which is sometimes impossible to attain, since controversial moral questions are very frequent from a speculative standpoint), but rather practical moral certainty suffices.

7. The education of conscience — Everyone understands how grave the problem of educating conscience is: grave for each individual as well as for anyone who, by mission or office, engages in educational activity. By raising the question of the education of conscience, we are addressing the problem of the practical honesty of human actions, the attainment of the ultimate end, and the true good—both individual and social. As has been said, the child, as soon as he reaches the age of reason, gradually begins to know the highest moral concepts and principles on his own and spontaneously adopts them as the norm of his actions. But from this first appearance of moral life to the possession of a truly virtuous life, there is a long journey ahead. All of man’s faculties cooperate in his moral life, and especially reason, will, and sensitive appetite.

Reason perceives the law; the will is bound to engage victoriously with the good to be done; the sensitive appetite must adhere to the command of the will. Reason perceives, with evident clarity, that good is to be done and evil avoided; but to form an honest man, it is necessary to enrich the mind with knowledge of moral order, to instill in the adolescent a firm conviction of the value of reason in relation to duty; above all, through sound education, it is necessary to strengthen the will so that it may be capable of containing within the bounds of moral order the passions that continually resurface and are often impetuous.

In short, man possesses all the faculties necessary to do good, but in reality, acting according to moral order is the fruit of a struggle between right reason and the contrary tendencies of human nature. For the honest man is not one who sometimes performs good acts, but one who has acquired the habit of acting according to a right conscience. Just as a man is distinguished by the intellectual, volitional, and affective qualities he has acquired, so too can it be said that a man is distinguished by his conscience. And whoever wishes to educate his conscience according to Christian morality cannot stop at the virtues of an honest man; he must enrich his mind with the teachings of the Gospel and conform his entire private and public life to the sense of Christian conscience: he must acquire the supernatural virtues. To the obligations of the honest man in individual, family, and social life, the Christian adds the obligations that flow from a life-conception based on supernatural love.

For freedom of conscience: V. LIBERTÀ.

COSENZA, ARCHDIOCESE OF — Cosenza, an ancient metropolis of Bruttium, stands on the northernmost foothills of the Sila, at the confluence of the Crati and Busento rivers, dominating the historic Crati valley, the scene of memorable events.

Before the Roman conquest, it maintained its original character against the predominance of Hellenism, which was prevalent in the coastal cities. In the Roman era, although it was an important stop on the Via Popilia, it held little significance. In the Middle Ages, it was long contested by the Byzantines and the Lombards, but it managed to preserve its Latin character. Under the Normans, its upward trajectory began. The Swabians built the grand Hohenstaufen fortress on the hill of San Pancrazio. The Angevins granted it notable privileges, which were later expanded by the Aragonese. In the 16th century, it participated in the European cultural movement through the influence of some of its men who contributed to Humanism. Among them were Aulo Giano Parrasio, founder of the Accademia Cosentina; Bernardino Telesio; Bernardino and Coriolano Martirano; Cardinal Paolo Parisio; and Sertorio Quattromani.

As a diocese, Cosenza is certainly among the oldest in the region, even if there is no evidence to trace it back to apostolic times or to justify the claims of local writers who assign its first bishop to Suere, a companion of St. Stephen of Nicea, left by St. Paul in Reggio. There is also no evidence to identify it with either of the two bishops, Maximus and Severus, “episcopi per Bruttios,” to whom Innocent I wrote in 416. The first bishop whose name appears authentically at the end of the 6th century is Palumbo, mentioned three times by St. Gregory the Great.

In the various Byzantine *Notitiae*, it is listed as a suffragan of Reggio under the name κονστάτεια (Costa-stanza), while in contemporary Latin documents it is included among the suffragans of Salerno, to which it was assigned by John XV in 994. In reality, this was only a nominal dependency. Cosenza, equidistant from Reggio and Salerno, eventually gained its own autonomy. Indeed, in 1055 it is recorded as an archdiocese, and its first archbishop is the Peter mentioned by Lupus Protospatharius, who records his death in 1056.

In the 12th century, particularly in the *Provinciale vetus* of Albinus, it appears as a metropolitan see, with the diocese of Malvito under its jurisdiction (suppressed in 1816; since then, Cosenza has had no suffragans).

Among its prelates, Cosenza counts men renowned for piety, zeal, and learning. Notable among them are: the Cistercian Luca Campano (1203–24), who wrote the life of Joachim of Fiore and rebuilt the cathedral; Bartolomeo Pignatelli (1254–67), the “shepherd of Cosenza,” mentioned by Dante; Pirro Caracciolo (1452–81), who approved and fostered the Order of Minims; Nicola Gaddi (1533–35), later a cardinal; Taddeo Gaddi (1561–66), nephew of the former and also a cardinal, as was Evangelista Pallotta, who founded the seminary in 1587; Giovan Battista Costanzo (1591–1617), who greatly benefited Cosenza by promoting the Accademia; the canonist Antonio Ricciullo (1641–42); Giuseppe Maria Sanfelice (1650–52), a cardinal; and Genaro Sanfelice (1661–94).

Of C. are the two Cardinals Paolo Parisio, a distinguished jurist, and Giovan Battista Salerno, a Jesuit; Daniele Sersale, abbot general of the Vallombrosans; Tommaso Sersale and Francesco Antonio Cavalcanti, preposits general of the Theatines, the latter of whom was also archbishop of C. (1744–48); Bruno Guzzolini, general of the Minims, in the second half of the 18th century. Moreover, the following were born there: FIORE, IL (v.) of the hamlet of Celico, immortalized by Dante in Canto XII of *Paradiso* (vv. 140–41); the hermit Telesforo, who lived in the 14th century; the blessed Matteo Vitari, Gerardo, Pellegrino, and Bonazio of the Florense Congregation; the blessed Angelo and Zaccheo of the Observant Franciscans; the Jesuits Fulvio Caputo, slain by Indians, and Francesco Sembiase, apostle to China, and others.

Many illustrious men were born in the diocese, among them: St. Ugolino da Cerisano, one of the seven Franciscans martyred at Ceuta in 1227; St. PALA (v.), founder of the Order of Minims, canonized by Leo X in 1519; the blessed Bernardo Milizia da Bogliano, founder of the Augustinian Congregation of Collereto; the blessed Francesco da Zumpano, founder of another Augustinian Congregation known as the “Zumpani”; Gaspare del Fosso da Rogliano, general of the Minims, who died as archbishop of Reggio in 1592; the venerable Francesco Lembo da Paola, Paolo Rendace da Paterno, and Bernardo Maria Clausi da S. Sisto, Minims whose beatification processes exist; Sertorio Caputo da Paterno, a Jesuit who died in a reputation for holiness at L’Aquila in 1608; Bernardino Plastina da Fuscaldo, general of the Minims and later bishop of Oppido in 1696, and others.

C. preserves a magnificent cathedral, with naves in Romanesque-Norman style and apses in Cistercian Gothic style, built by Archbishop Luca Campano and solemnly inaugurated in 1222 with the attendance of Frederick II, who on that occasion donated to it a precious and artistic Byzantine enamelled statuary collection; it was largely rebuilt in 1750. Also worthy of mention are the churches of S. Domenico, with its dome and Gothic prothyrum recently restored to their original forms; S. Francesco d’Assisi, with a 15th-century cloister; S. Agostino, S. Francesco di Paola, S. Gaetano, and others. In the diocese one may admire the Florense archicenobium of S. Giovanni in Fiore, coeval and of the same style as the cathedral; the sanctuary of S. Francesco di Paola, with a 16th-century Renaissance façade; the sanctuary of the Madonna della Catena at Laurignano, with a modern refacing in polychrome marbles, and others.

The archdiocese of C., covering an area of 1,100 sq km, has 120 parishes, 135 diocesan priests and 71 regular clergy, and 340,656 inhabitants, of whom 306 are non-Catholic (1948). — See pl. XXXVIII.

COSIMO I, II and III de’ MEDICI: V. MEDICINA, FAMIGLIA.