PRUDENCE. - I. NATURE. - It was defined by Aristotle (Ethics, I, VI, ch. 5; Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃ, q. 47, a. 2, arg. Sed contra) as right discernment concerning what is to be done. Now, if what one intends to do is directed to a particular end, for example the victory of arms, the well-being of the people, the p. will be particular (military, governmental, etc.). But if the end of acting is the ultimate end of the whole life of man, then there will be p. par excellence, an intellectual and moral virtue that judges and commands what in individual cases must be done or omitted in order to act honorably. St. Augustine, following Cicero (De offic., III, 47), speaks of p. as the cognitio rerum appetendarum et fugiendarum (Lib. de diversis quaest., q. 614; PL 40, 51).
In mythology and in art p. is symbolized by a charioteer (charioteer of virtue) who, standing upright on the chariot, scans the road and urges on the horses, representing the other virtues (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃ, q. 58, aa. 4-5). Insofar as he scans, it is an intellectual virtue; insofar as he guides and keeps to the right path, it is a moral virtue (ibid., a. 3 ad 1; 2ᵃ-2ᵃ, q. 181, a. 2 ad 3). To this virtue, the most remote antiquity, both pagan (Cicero, De invent., II, ch. 53; De officis, I, ch. 5) and Hebrew-Christian (Sap. 8, 7; St. Ambrose, Exposit. in Luc., I, V, nn. 49, 62; PL 15, 1738), has looked as to one of the fundamental virtues. Holy Scripture (Prov. 3, 13-14; 4, 5-9; Sap. 6, 9; Eccl. 6, 18-37) exalts the prudent man and identifies p. with wisdom, since it is proper to the wise man to order his whole life in relation to the ultimate end, as indeed the prudent man does. Naturally in Holy Scripture attention is directed above all to the infused virtue (see below), and true p. is contrasted with a prudentia carnis, which pursues carnal goods as the ultimate end of life (Rom. 8, 6-8).
As an intellectual virtue, p. belongs to practical reason and directs it in regulating our acts according to moral norms: it must therefore not be confused with shrewdness or calculation in attaining the useful, the beautiful or the true, which can indeed be called p. in an improper sense (cf. Mt. 10, 16; Lc. 16, 8); it directs to the ultimate end. Nor must it be confused with the other intellectual virtues: not with wisdom, which has as its object the highest and divine and absolute causes, nor with science, whose subject is likewise universal and absolute: that of p., on the other hand, is the singular and relative. Moreover, wisdom and science, as also understanding, another intellectual virtue, aim at the true; p. at the good. It is then distinguished from art, because art tends to the beautiful and directs actions, especially external ones, in their physical being and not insofar as they are moral and make man morally good. As a virtue of practical reason, p. entails knowledge of universal moral truths and, in an absolute manner, of those closest to action. It is also distinguished from moral conscience (v.) although it has in common with it the practical judgment that conscience must emit guided by p.; conscience is an act or a faculty, not a virtue. P. is the virtue of the government and discipline of the whole moral life, which orients and governs action, because it knows the supreme principles of the practical order and knows how to apply them to practical life. The act, moreover, by which, in the face of a practical case, a judgment is emitted concerning the morality of the act is conscience; and for this act to be performed well, practical reason must be perfected by the habit of the virtue of p. Conscience too is therefore an act of the virtue of p.
P. is a true moral virtue, both because it requires moral predispositions and because of its object. This is constituted by human acts, intrinsic to the agent, whether he be a physical person or a community, insofar as they must be done or omitted in order to act honorably. Its object is also the moral virtues, which it directs as moderator and to which it is so bound that neither can it exist in a perfect degree without all the other moral virtues, nor these without p. Thus the act of any other virtue belongs to it not insofar as it is an act of fortitude, chastity, etc., but insofar as it is to be placed hic et nunc, that is, in those determined circumstances of time and environment, and in relation to the due end. The aspect that in such an act is taken as its aim by p. is its practical truth, that is, its rectitude or direction to the ultimate end. However, the virtue of p. does not attend only to the extreme circumstances of the act of virtue to be performed, but determines further in what manner and measure the act must be performed (medium virtutis), the mean in which the moral virtues consist, the mean between excess and defect, between too much and too little. Because of this characteristic of its own it is called the measure and rule of the other virtues and therefore is rightly considered the first cardinal virtue. Whoever has p. possesses in some way also the other virtues, but whoever does not have p. has neither fortitude, nor justice, nor temperance, because it is impossible without p. to choose rightly the means for the attainment of the end (Sum. Theol. 1a-2ae, q. 65, a. 1).
Psychologically p. acts by examining the different means for attaining the ultimate end in concreto, judges which among them are to be carried out or omitted, and finally commands the execution that follows; it is said therefore that its acts are deliberating, judging and especially commanding («actus imperandi est principalis et proprius actus prudentiae»: ibid., 2a-2ae, q. 47, a. 8).
II. SPECIES
Besides natural prudence, considered up to this point (acquired prudence), acquired through experience and with the effort of the mind directed toward the good, there also exists, if one is in a state of grace, infused prudence, which extends also to supernatural acts and directs also the theological virtues, to which it is likewise subordinate, indicating when their acts must be performed.
To be perfect, prudence, insofar as it is an intellectual virtue, requires experience, moral tact, docility, sagacity and good use of reason; insofar as it is a moral virtue: foresight, circumspection and precaution. These virtues, which in traditional Latin terminology are called memoria, intellectus, docilitas, solertia, ratio, providentia, circumspectio and cautio, are called by the scholastics "integral" parts of prudence (ibid., 2a-2ae, q. 48, a. unic.).
Its specific or subjective parts are: personal (or monastic) prudence, which guides one to direct oneself well, and social prudence, which directs the acts of society toward the common good and which is subdivided into military, economic or domestic, and legislative or political prudence, according to the different communities and forms of government. Among these, personal prudence is prudence in the full sense; legislative prudence is the most perfect (ibid., 2a-2ae, q. 50, a. 2).
The "potential" or complementary parts are moral good sense (synesis), moral skill (eubulia) and moral discernment (gnome) (ibid., 2a-2ae, q. 51, a. 2, ad 1).
III. GENESIS AND REMOTE SUBJECT
Natural prudence can be favored by psychic and biological predispositions and by environment, but in fact it is acquired through the repetition of prudent acts: for this reason it does not exist, as a rule, in the young, who lack experience, and it is lost when the passions, especially lust, avarice and pride, disturb the intellect or the will and, indirectly, through forgetfulness and disuse. Infused prudence is received and lost with sanctifying Grace.
IV. OPPOSING VICES
By defect, imprudence is opposed to prudence, and it is subdivided into numerous vices such as docility's opposite, negligence, improvidence, the lack of precaution, of circumspection, of memory and of the other subjective or integral parts of prudence, as well as into temerity (against eubulia) and into inconsiderateness, contrary to good sense and to moral perspicacity. By excess there are the vices of the prudence of the flesh (Rom. 8:6), cunning and deceit both through signs and words (dolus) and through actions (fraud).
The vices against prudence, observes St. Thomas, if they exceed by defect, have lust as their source; if by excess, avarice (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 55, a. 8). Therefore effective means for attaining prudence are: 1) fervent prayer to the God of every light; 2) the control of disordered passions and especially of avarice and lust; 3) the consideration of events sub specie aeternitatis.
V. GIFT OF COUNSEL
In certain difficult cases, to act with prudence one needs a very special help, which is had through the gift of counsel (v. GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT). - See table V.
