BENE COMUNE

Machine translation of the 1948–1954 Italian original. The original text is authoritative.

The concept of the common good (*bene comune*) holds fundamental importance in Catholic sociology, which recognizes it as the essential and immanent end of society and the supreme criterion for determining the scope of private and public duties as well as the limits of state power. To adequately develop this crucial point, it is necessary to proceed methodically, first addressing the preliminary question of whether the social organism has a natural end, and then establishing the elements and ultimate subject to which it refers. Four distinct aspects of the problem must therefore be partially considered: 1) the existence of a natural social end; 2) the determination of this end in the common good; 3) the elements that constitute it; 4) the ultimate subject for whose benefit it must redound.

### I. EXISTENCE OF A NATURAL SOCIAL END

The fundamental importance of the question regarding the ends that public society is called to pursue was grasped by Jellinek, who writes: “Without knowledge of these purposes, a complete science of the state is impossible. A purely formal definition of the state, which entirely disregards its purpose, can never provide us with a perfect image of the state” (*La dottrina generale dello Stato*, p. 453). However, the same author does not hesitate, a few pages earlier, to affirm that there does not exist an intrinsic, natural, and objective end of the state, and that a question in this regard would be idle, as no answer could be given to it through empirical investigation.

Both the theorists inspired by idealism, such as Jellinek, and those who construct their theory on materialistic or mechanistic principles agree in excluding an objective end of the state. In the idealist conception, it is impossible to determine a purpose for the state, since it would be absurd to assign to the absolute—however the state is conceived by every idealist—a goal outside itself toward which it is obligated to strive. Hegel warns that one must not confuse the state with civil society, nor place “its determination in the security and protection of property and personal freedom,” assigning as its ultimate end the interest of the individual, for since the state is objective spirit, truth, and ethical life, it must not serve the individual, but rather the individual must serve the state (*Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto*, p. 211).

Positivism and materialism arrive at the same conclusion. For all theories conforming to the principles affirmed by these two currents, social life would be nothing more than an effect of natural forces operating with the necessity of cosmic elements, devoid of any finalism; and even if such a finalism existed hypothetically, it could not be the object of positive science, which is alien to all metaphysical questions. “The problem,” Jellinek rightly notes, “of whether an organism has any purpose for something outside itself, from an empirical-naturalistic point of view, is inadmissible” (*La dottrina generale dello Stato*, p. 431). This opinion is shared by theorists of absolutism such as Machiavelli and Treitschke.

All the trends that, beginning in the 18th century, undertook the re-elaboration of the doctrine of the state on new foundations are then in agreement in affirming that no natural, objective, universal end can be assigned to it, for such an admission would, on the one hand, revive the much-opposed natural law, now definitively set aside, and on the other, prove incompatible with evolutionary historicism and radical relativism, to which modern mentality has surrendered. Ranelletti, one of the exponents of this mentality, asserts that to the question of what the purpose of the state is, no answer can be given, since the state “in the force of its sovereign power can include within the sphere of its action every human activity and regulate and dominate with its will the entire life of the people. Its purposes, therefore, can vary from country to country and from time to time according to the tasks it believes it must assume in each society, in relation to the collective needs of the historical period in question” (*Istituzioni di diritto pubblico*, p. 31).

Yet a theory of the state that disregards every finalistic element is impossible, as Jellinek himself notes, and thus every form of empiricism always runs up against the necessity of establishing some point of reference toward which the activity of the social entity is directed.

This necessity has given rise to two currents, one that might be called maximalist and the other minimalist. According to the former, to which both idealism and historicism, biologism, and positivism of all shades belong, the state justifies itself by its own nature, possessing the ultimate reason for its existence in its own intrinsic constitution, and thus can have no end other than itself, its power, and its affirmation and expansion, to which all aspects of social life must be subordinated. The latter, chiefly represented by the liberal conception, restricts the end of the state to a minimum, assigning to public society the exclusive task of safeguarding the legal order to ensure the spontaneous interplay of conflicting freedoms. This is the theory of Kant and the “night-watchman state” of Lassalle.

The Catholic conception stands in diametrical opposition. The authoritative teaching of the recent Popes follows the essential points of traditional doctrine, insisting on the existence of a natural end of civil society and identifying this end in the common good of the community. Pius XII, in his Christmas message of 1944, expresses it thus: “Reason, illumined by faith, assigns to individuals and particular societies within the social order a worthy and noble place; and it knows—speaking only of the most important—that all the activity of the state, political and economic, serves the lasting realization of the common good, that is, those external conditions which are necessary for the whole body of citizens for the development of their qualities and offices, of their material, intellectual, and religious life.” According to Leo XIII, in the encyclical *Immortale Dei*, it is the specific task of the state to provide man “with all that is necessary for a perfect life,” since “the ultimate reason for the power of those who govern is the protection of the common good.” Pius XI has insisted on the same concept more extensively. In *Divini Redemptoris*, he teaches: “God has at the same time ordained man for civil society, which is required by his very nature. In the plan of the Creator, society is a natural means which man can and must use to attain his end, for human society exists for man, and not vice versa.” And in *Mit brennender Sorge*: “Society is willed by the Creator as a means for the full development of individual and social faculties, which man must employ, now giving, now receiving, for his own good and that of others.” The same thought recurs in Pius XII’s *Summi Pontificatus*, where it is stated that “civil sovereignty was willed by the Creator to regulate social life, to make easier for the human person, in the temporal order, the attainment of physical, intellectual, and moral perfection, and to assist in the attainment of the supernatural end.”

The propositions in which Catholic doctrine is condensed are easily demonstrable. No one today doubts that social life is an effect of natural forces inherent in the rational being. The differences found among the various schools do not concern this principle, which is universally accepted after the definitive demise of contractualism. Now, such forces cannot be physical, biological, or merely environmental, nor can they press upon man in a deterministic way, since the rational being, which constitutes the matter to be reduced to political unity, is a spiritual entity that does not move to action except through the prior exercise of its higher faculties. The social entity is, therefore, a natural effect that proceeds from the spiritual activity of its components. Once this principle is established—one that only vulgar materialism can deny—the existence of an immanent and essential end follows as a logical and necessary consequence.

First, nature in all its works manifests an inner rationality to which all beings instinctively or reflectively obey, each operating according to its own principles toward the attainment of an end. But if nature obeys an immanent finalism in all its operations and manifestations, and if, on the other hand, the social entity is an effect of its forces, it follows that society too must have an essential end, which will be natural and objective. This conclusion gains greater prominence when related to the subject who, following the inclination of nature, must initiate social life. This subject is man, who does not move to action until his intelligence has known and weighed an end as the object and term of his will. The instinct of sociability, therefore, could exert no influence upon man unless it were elevated to the plane of the spirit, becoming an impulse and motion of which the ultimate end is fully grasped, and it would remain ineffective if the light of its intrinsic finality did not illuminate the field of action where the free will of the human subject must intervene. It must therefore be concluded that, just as every natural entity has its own end, so too does civil society.

This end is essential inasmuch as it arises from the intimate constitution of social reality, of which it is a constituent element—an essential part of its adequate concept and a specific note distinguishing it from any other necessary or free human association. For this very reason, it is also universal, that is, proper to any political aggregate. Moreover, it is intrinsic and immanent, inasmuch as it is designated by the laws of being as a principle of action that, through the voice of nature, necessarily and obligatorily determines the guiding directives of social activity.

II. THE SOCIAL END CONSISTS IN THE COMMON GOOD. This is the traditional doctrine of Catholic thought, consistently reaffirmed, as already noted, in the latest papal documents of Leo XIII, Pius XI, and Pius XII.
Looking back beyond the centuries of rationalism and positivism, the same doctrine dominates among professional philosophers and jurists. The democratic conception of power, which prevailed until the appearance of modern state-worship theories, implicitly carries the idea that public life serves the human person and thus the common good. Even in the concept of sovereignty elaborated during the age of royal absolutism—for example, by Bodin—the soul of traditional thought is revealed in the subordination of power to natural law. What is said of Bodin holds true for the vast majority of theorists, with the exception of Machiavelli and Guicciardini.

In the Catholic sphere, Suárez, in the fullness of the 16th century, assigns to legislative power as its aim “the natural happiness of the perfect human community of which it has care, and of individual men insofar as they are members of such a community” (*De Legibus*, III, ch. 2, no. 7). St. Thomas, addressing the same topic, states that the first principle and source of law concerns the order for the common good, and that it belongs to its nature and essence to be ordered to that same good (*Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 90, a. 3). Thus, tracing back through Aquinas, we arrive at the social doctrine already upheld in antiquity by Aristotle (q.v.).

The Catholic conception rests upon certain objective data of indisputable probative value. First, inquiry into human nature reveals how the rational being, unlike other living creatures, is born in need of assistance that must continue for a long period before he attains full physical, intellectual, and moral maturity. To supply this deficiency, nature first organizes domestic society and then public society, to integrate and empower him.

This necessity of integration is not adequately met by family society. Neither the individual nor the family is capable of organizing even a moderately human existence, for man does not merely wish to live but also to perfect himself, to progress, to expand his dominion over the earth, and to improve his living conditions. It is this motive that induces both the individual and the family to emerge from isolation and enter into social aggregation. At the root of every social movement lies the desire to provide for one’s needs, to find conditions of greater well-being, and to facilitate the path to the attainment of perfection. These objective data, furnished by inquiry into human nature and its fundamental aspirations, suggest the inevitable conclusion that social life tends to nothing other than the integration of man, providing him with the means necessary for his full development—which is equivalent to saying that society has as its essential end the common good.

Having demonstrated the rationality of the theory that posits the end of the state as the common good, it is fitting to define the concept more precisely. To do so, one need only turn to the moving cause of the instinct of solidarity and deduce its consequences. From its analysis, it emerges, first, that the common good is a universal good in a twofold sense: in the sense that it must be equitably distributed among all members of the body politic, in proportion to their contribution to its realization, without privileges of caste, party, or faction; and in the sense that it embraces all particular goods useful and necessary to create that perfect sufficiency of life which enables man to achieve his own perfection. The impulse of solidarity is indeed stimulated by the pressing needs of human life, which each seeks to satisfy by collaborating to create the conditions favorable thereto. The good that results is a collective effect and belongs to each individual member, who possesses the inalienable right to feel it reverberate upon himself in proportion to his contribution to its creation.

Moreover, social life is destined to integrate man in his natural deficiencies, reaching with its providence and action where individual and family action cannot. Society must therefore possess all the means necessary to fulfill this office.

In the second place, the same analysis reveals the common good as an integrative good. Its function is to assist the members of the social unit in what they cannot achieve through private activity, supplementing their inability only within the sphere in which it manifests itself and no further. As has been said, nature produces the social being, because only through collaboration is it possible to obtain certain particular goods necessary for the full development of man. The common good, therefore, is not sought as a substitute for individual and family action, but as a supplementary element that strengthens man and others without paralyzing them, and consequently remains confined to the sector where neither the family nor the individual is sufficient.

A third characteristic of the common good, which is deduced from the same source, consists in the fact that such a good is temporal and external, inasmuch as it is confined solely to present life, to earthly happiness and material prosperity of man. The transcendent end is the work of the free will of each individual, who is the direct builder of his ultraterrene future and of his interior perfection in the supernatural order, in the attainment of which he is assisted by forces other than purely human ones. Social activity can only indirectly influence this sector, removing obstacles, defending moral principles and religious conceptions, but never directly as the creator of such transcendent values.

Finally, the common good is subordinate to morality, to whose supreme directives it must conform. With social life, nature does not intend to subvert the order of values; on the contrary, it aims to uphold it, facilitating for each individual the acquisition of those moral habits that will make it easier to fulfill his duties. Nor does man, by becoming part of the political organization, intend that his dignity be diminished; this dignity is affirmed above all in acting according to the dictates of reason and the principles of moral conscience. Just as morality is the distinctive mark of every human good, so it is an integral feature of the concept of the common good, which must remain subordinate in all its aspects and implementations in favor of the person and the community.

The common good is a universal good in a twofold sense: in the sense that it must be equitably distributed among all members of the body politic, in due proportion to their contribution to its realization, without privileges of caste, party, faction, or the like; and in the sense that it embraces all particular goods useful and necessary to create that perfect sufficiency of life which enables man to attain his own perfection. The impulse of solidarity is indeed stimulated by the pressing needs of human life, which each seeks to satisfy by collaborating to create the conditions favorable thereto. The good that results from this is a collective effect, and belongs to every individual member who possesses the inalienable right to feel it reverberate upon himself to the extent that he has contributed to its creation.

Finally, the common good is a subordinate good subject to morality, to whose supreme directives it must conform. Social life does not aim to overturn the hierarchy of values; rather, it seeks to uphold it, facilitating for each individual the acquisition of those moral dispositions that will make it easier to fulfill their duties. Nor does man, by entering into political organization, intend that his dignity be diminished; this dignity is affirmed primarily in acting according to the dictates of reason and the principles of moral conscience. Just as morality is the distinguishing mark of every human good, so too is it an integral feature of the concept of the common good, which must remain subordinate in all its aspects and applications in favor of both the individual and the community.

The common good is a universal good in a twofold sense: first, in that it must be equitably distributed among all members of the body politic, in proportion to their contribution to its realization, without privileges of caste, party, faction, or similar divisions; second, in that it encompasses all particular goods that are useful and necessary to create that perfect sufficiency of life which enables man to attain his own perfection. The impulse of solidarity is indeed stimulated by the pressing needs of human life, which each person seeks to satisfy by contributing their part to the creation of conditions favorable to this end. The resulting good is a collective effect, belonging to every individual member who possesses the inalienable right to experience its benefits in proportion to their contribution to its creation.

Second, the same analysis reveals the common good as a supplementary good. Its function is to assist the members of the social unit in those things they cannot achieve through private activity, supplementing their limitations only to the extent that these limitations manifest themselves and no further. As has been said, nature produces the social being because only through collaboration can certain particular goods necessary for the full development of man be obtained. The common good, therefore, is not sought as a substitute for individual and family action but as a supplementary element that strengthens man and others without paralyzing them, and consequently remains confined to the sphere where neither the family nor the individual is sufficient.

A third characteristic of the common good, derived from the same source, is that it is temporal and external, being confined solely to this present life, to earthly happiness and material prosperity. The transcendent end is the work of the free will of each individual, who is the direct architect of his own ultraterrene future and inner perfection in the supernatural order, in the attainment of which he is aided by forces other than purely human ones. Social activity can influence this sphere only indirectly, by removing obstacles, defending moral principles and religious conceptions, but never directly as a creator of such transcendent values.

In the second place, the same analysis reveals the common good as an integrative good. Its function is to assist the members of the social unit in those things which they cannot achieve through private activity, supplementing their inability only within the limits in which it manifests itself and no further. As has been said, nature produces the social being, because only through collaboration is it possible to obtain certain particular goods necessary for the full development of man. The common good, therefore, is not sought as a substitute for individual and family action, but as a supplementary element that strengthens man and others without paralyzing them, and consequently remains confined to the sector where neither the family nor the individual is sufficient.

A third characteristic of the common good, which is deduced from the same source, consists in the fact that such a good is temporal and external, inasmuch as it is confined solely to present life, to earthly happiness and material prosperity of man. The transcendent end is the work of the free will of each individual, who is the direct builder of his ultraterrene future and of his interior perfection in the supernatural order, in the attainment of which he is aided by forces other than purely human ones. Social activity can only indirectly influence this sector, removing obstacles, defending moral principles and religious conceptions, but never directly as the creator of such transcendent values.

Finally, the common good is a good subordinate to morality, to whose supreme directives it must conform. With social life, nature does not intend to subvert the order of values; on the contrary, it aims to uphold it, facilitating for each individual the acquisition of those moral habits that will make it easier for him to fulfill his duties. Nor does man, by entering into political organization, intend that his dignity be diminished; this dignity is affirmed principally in acting according to the dictates of reason and the principles of moral conscience. Just as morality constitutes the characteristic note of every human good, so too it is an integral note of the concept of the common good, which must remain subordinate in all its aspects and implementations in favor of the person and the community.

The common good is a universal good in a twofold sense: in the sense that it must be equitably distributed among all members of the body politic, in proportion adequate to their contribution in bringing it about, without privileges of caste, party, faction or the like; and in the sense that it embraces all particular goods useful and necessary for creating that perfect sufficiency of life which enables man to attain his own perfection. The impulse of solidarity is indeed stimulated by the pressing needs of human life, which each person seeks to satisfy by contributing his share to the creation of favorable conditions. The resulting good is a collective effect, and belongs to each individual member who possesses the inalienable right to feel it reflected upon himself in the measure in which he has contributed to its creation.

Finally, the common good is a subordinate good subject to morality, to whose supreme directives it must conform. In social life, nature does not intend to overturn the order of values; rather, it aims to uphold it, facilitating for each individual the acquisition of those moral habits that will make it easier to fulfill their duties. Nor does man, by becoming part of the political organization, intend for his dignity to be diminished; this dignity is affirmed primarily in acting according to the dictates of reason and the principles of moral conscience. Just as morality is the distinguishing feature of every human good, so too is it an integral aspect of the concept of the common good, which must remain subordinate in all its aspects and implementations in favor of the person and the community.

The common good is a universal good in a twofold sense: first, in that it must be equitably distributed among all members of the body politic, in proportion to their contribution to its realization, without privileges of caste, party, faction, or similar distinctions; and second, in that it encompasses all particular goods—useful and necessary—to create that perfect sufficiency of life that enables man to attain his own perfection. The impulse of solidarity is indeed stimulated by the pressing needs of human life, which each person seeks to satisfy by contributing their part to the creation of conditions favorable thereto. The resulting good is a collective effect and belongs to every individual member, who possesses the inalienable right to feel it reflected back upon themselves in proportion to their contribution to its creation.

Secondly, the same analysis reveals the common good as a supplementary good. Its function is to assist the subjects of the social unit in those things they cannot achieve through private activity, supplementing their inability only within the scope in which it manifests and no further. As has been said, nature produces the social being because only through collaboration can certain particular goods necessary for the full development of man be obtained. Therefore, the common good is not sought as a substitute for individual and family action, but as a supplementary element that strengthens man and others without paralyzing them, and consequently remains confined to the sector where neither the family nor the individual is sufficient.

A third characteristic of the common good, which is deduced from the same source, is that this good is temporal and external, inasmuch as it is confined solely to present life, to earthly happiness, and to man’s material prosperity. The transcendent end is the work of the free will of each individual; indeed, the relationships that men form within the collective entity are relationships between equal subjects who render services and receive reciprocation according to a well-known balancing law called justice. It is therefore essential to the common good that there be a legal order to determine, impose, and protect this right. Moreover, man brings with him, intimately connected to his being as a person, certain innate rights that he neither intends nor can alienate by joining a social aggregate; rather, he wishes to preserve them and, indeed, to see them protected in their possession and use. Otherwise, social life would not be a desirable good for him but an evil to be avoided. Therefore, the common good cannot exist if these fundamental rights are not recognized, preserved, and duly protected, whence arises the necessity of a legal order endowed with coercive power.

Among the subjective rights that the legal order must protect, the most important and fundamental is that of liberty, for without liberty all other rights become meaningless, as they cannot be exercised by the subject who possesses them. Furthermore, liberty—and its exercise within the limits of moral law—renders human life worthy, for without it life would not be worth living in a human way.

However, to have the full panorama upon which the common good is spread fully in view, it is necessary to extend the scope still further. One must not forget, in fact, that one of its principal features consists in being a supplementary good of the human person. Precisely because of this, its characteristic cannot be restricted, as has been noted, to the protection of rights alone, but extends to many other goods necessary for the proper fulfillment of the human person.

These goods can be summarized in a comprehensive formula by saying that the common good consists in public property, sufficiency of life, and temporal happiness, for the realization of which social life must be able to provide the necessary means. This well-being—and the relative temporal happiness it entails—is the effect of various particular elements, a description of which, even if incomplete, would be lengthy and superfluous. Among other things, it will be the task of the State to aid private initiative, provide for the health of the public economy, improve the sanitary conditions of the country, offer greater opportunities for profitable work, facilitate the employment of labor, build roads, bridges, canals, reclaim uncultivated lands, provide public shelters for the indigent and asylums for the suffering, and strive in every way so that the standard of living of the people may reach a degree of well-being in keeping with the general progress of civilization.

Understood in the sense described thus far, the common good is not that abstract concept against which empiricist and relativist theories are wont to rail, but a very concrete reality, multifaceted in its aspects and yet such as to direct social action—assigning it immediate aims to which it must be directed and precise boundaries to its influence—so that it may prove fruitful for the community.

IV. SUBJECT OF THE COMMON GOOD — The subject for whose benefit the common good must redound is the human person, who, as it stands at the beginning of social life—of which it is the conscious and free cause—so too stands at the ultimate end of its activity. Modern theories do not share this view; by hypostatizing the public society, conceiving it as an entity-person in itself, they have then denied the intrinsic and transcendent value of the person, reducing it to a mere instrument or means in the service of the ends of the collectivity. In such conceptions—varied as they are in their systematic structure but united in the hypertrophic swelling of the State and its power—the good which society should provide would be merely the selfish interest of the State, for which nothing would prevent the individual and even entire generations from being sacrificed, without any justification other than the good of the abstract entity called State, nation, or class.

The gross error that lurks in such ideologies is laid bare as soon as the mind turns to human reality and draws the necessary conclusions therefrom. For if one considers real, full, and normal life, it, as a subjective disposition, desires and seeks in the common good the fulfillment of private good. Man, in feeling drawn toward society, regards it first and foremost—and instinctively—from the aspect that touches him most closely and interests him, seeing an intimate correlation between social good and his own self, whereby the good of society is above all his own, and for this reason he seeks II.
The human person thus begins to love and desire society, initially for the good he expects from it, for the increase in means he can obtain from it, and for the greater ease with which he can attain perfection and happiness. Only in a second phase does this self-interested love rise to a higher plane, transforming itself into a disinterested love and pursuit of the common good for its own sake. Now, this natural desire of man to be completed by the social body would be in vain if the common good were not destined to flow back upon him, satisfying his innate aspirations that lead him spontaneously to social life. When, therefore, it is said that the individual exists for the common good of society, the formula must immediately be supplemented by adding that the common good exists for the human person.

The common good cannot, therefore, be an abstract good of an abstract entity, nor the selfish good of the social entity arbitrarily severed from its members; it cannot consist in the realization of ends entirely foreign to individuals, nor can it ever result in their total sacrifice. Rather, it must and should be a concrete good that permeates the entire social organism, giving to each cell oxygen and nourishment and stimulating life and activity. This is all the more evident when one reflects, even briefly, that the agents of the common good are, in the final analysis, all members of the community—intelligent beings united in a communion of purpose and a fusion of wills, directed toward the same end, which mobilizes the physical and spiritual energies of its subjects, who reserve their contribution in the common treasury. If the person is the true creator of the common good, it seems entirely obvious that it should return to its productive cause, to the extent that this cause has cooperated in its production. The common good, at least in its preponderant part, is destined to flow back into the generation that brings it about and collaborates in II.
At all times, the individual and the social, the needs of man and the demands of society, must coexist and harmonize in a just equilibrium, which consists in the preeminent value of the person. While, as a part of an organic whole, the person is bound to contribute his services to the creation of public prosperity and its progressive increase, as a rational being with an end that transcends temporal limits, he subordinates the common good to himself and to this end. In this way, the social circle is closed: man, who is the immediate source, the artisan, and the indefatigable builder of the common good, is also its proximate end—the noble, spiritual, and immortal subject upon whom it is poured out, crowning his aspirations and satisfying the needs that impelled him toward the ideal of social life.

BIBL.:** F. Suárez, *De legibus ac de Deo legislatore*; *Defensio fidei*; G. Hegel, *I fondamenti della filosofia del diritto*, Bari 1913; V. CATHREIN, VIKTOR, *Filosofia morale*, 2 voll., trad. it., Firenze 1920; G. Jellinek, *La dottrina generale dello Stato*, Milano 1921; L. Taparelli, *Saggio teorico di diritto naturale*, 2 voll., Roma 1928; J. Leclercq, *L'Etat ou la politique*, Namur 1929; M. Defourny, *Aristote. Études sur la politique*, Paris 1932; E. Ranelletti, *Istituzioni di diritto pubblico*, Padova 1934; G. Gentile, *I fondamenti della filosofia del diritto*, Firenze 1937; B. Schwalm, *La société d'Etat*, Paris 1937; G. Gonella, *La nozione di b. c.*, Milano 1938; I. Nuñez Guirnaldes, *Principia iuris politici*, 2 voll., Roma 1938-39; A. Brucculeri, *Lo Stato e l'individuo*, 1938; D. Del Bo, *Il b. c.*, Firenze 1942; A. Messineo, *Monismo sociale e persona umana*, Roma 1943.