POSITIVISM. - A philosophical (scientific, historical) trend that arose in the 19th century and dominated the second half of it (classical positivism) but with subsequent revivals in the 20th century (contemporary positivism). It represents an elaboration of empiricism divergent from materialistic currents. It opposes Platonic and metaphysical idealism in favor of experimental and evolutionary science.
Its origins run parallel to the distinction in Romantic philosophy (see ROMANTICISM; SCHELLING) between the “negative,” or rational, and the “positive,” or revelatory of data. A. Comte (see) was the first to consider (in private teaching from 1826 and public teaching from 1832) negative philosophy (theologico-metaphysical) as annulled and absorbed into positive philosophy, restricting it to scientific notions and their coordination, with exclusive emphasis on sensible and phenomenal knowledge and their affective values (positive data). In this “positive method,” he was anticipated by Sophie Germain (1776–1831). Comte gave the name “positivism” to the sociological doctrine he created, intended to reform the “scientific stage” of civilization. John Stuart Mill (see) pursued a similar elaboration of empiricism, but he polemicized with Comte (A. C. and Positivism, London 1865) to reassert certain metaphysical hypotheses of a psychological and moral order. Thus there emerged a French positivism (Pierre Lafitte, E. Littré [see], H. Taine [see], E. Renan [see], F. Le Dantec), oriented toward the cult of intuitive observation and probable induction, and the development of sociology (A. Espinas, G. Tarde, E. Durkheim, L. Lévy-Bruhl), but alien to metaphysics and inclined toward religious tolerance, and an English positivism (A. Bain [see], H. T. Buckle, Herbert Spencer [see], G. K. Lewes, T. H. Huxley [see]), which sought to reconcile, through the theory of evolution (see), methodological and sociological positivism with the search for metameric principles. In Germany, positivism was developed by Ernst Laas (1837–85; Idealismus und Positivismus, 1879–84) and by the historian of ethics Friedrich Jodl (1848–1914; Kritik des Idealismus, posthumous, 1920) as realistic empiricism; by Eugen Dühring (1833–1921) as antimeta-physical actualism (see). But it soon merged with other currents, such as R. Avenarius’s empiriocriticism (see), J. H. von Kirchmann’s and Th. Ziehen’s critical realism, and Hans Vaihinger’s functional pragmatism (see). In Italy, positivism first took hold, in connection with materialism (see) and evolutionism, in the social sciences (Cesare Lombroso [see], Filippo Turati [see], Napoleone Colajanni, Achille Loria, Enrico Ferri [see], Leonida Bissolati) and in pedagogy (Pietro Siciliani, Andrea Angiulli, Saverio De Dominicis); in connection with empiricism, in moral and historical sciences (Aristide Gabelli, Pasquale Villari). But it took on a distinctive form in Roberto Ardigò (see) and his school (G. Tarozzi [see], G. Cesca, G. Dandolo, G. Marchesini, E. Bodero, G. B. Grassi Bertazzi). Closely related to positivism were the materialistic evolutionism of Enrico Morselli (Riv. di filo. scientifica, 1881–91), the spiritualistic empiricism of Angelo Brofferio (1845–94), and the phenomenism of Cosmo Guastella (see). In Russia, positivism was spread in a historical-social sense by P. Lawrow (1823–1920) and M. M. Kovalevskij (1842–1904), and reasserted in a psychological-moral sense by Bishop Nikanor (La filo. positiva e l’esistenza sovrasensibile, St. Petersburg 1875–88); Comte’s sociology was reworked by M. Kovalevskij, and English empirico-positivism by N. Grot (1852–99). In Poland, the Comtean trend penetrated with the radical positivism of the Warsaw school (Julian Ochorowicz, 1850–1917, and Jan Wl. Dawid, 1850–1914) and the conservative positivism of the historical school of Cracow (Stanisław Tarnowski, 1837–1917).
Positivism takes as its principle of knowledge the ascertainment of “facts,” whether physical or psychic, as sensible objects, through observation and experiment by a conscious subject. Scientific knowledge distinguishes the subject (see) and the object (see) within the same natural order in which they were confused in popular (mythological, theological) knowledge and from which they were abstracted in metaphysical knowledge. The “fact” is a datum of knowledge (a phenomenon [see]), the becoming or coming-to-be of which is recognized, and hence reproducible or reconstructible in its relations. Fundamental among these is the identity of the fact (A = A), which distinguishes the phenomenon from all others in its singularity and is the object of intuitive observation. Other kinds of facts, e.g., indistinct or nonidentical ones, are not knowable. Variations of facts give rise to other facts: science analyzes these changes insofar as they present constant relations and, in turn, are themselves identical (inductive and deductive laws); philosophy classifies the sciences as identical in subject (systematic synthesis). Hypotheses (see; and predictions or anticipations) about the origin and development of facts are admissible only if they lead to the ascertainment of other facts (verification) and are founded on facts themselves. General notions (definitions, laws, formulas) are summary or schematic descriptions of single or repeated, or collective, facts: the gnoseology of positivism is realistic, its logic is nominalistic, and it excludes every form of apriorism (see A PRIORI) and dogmatism (see).
The synthesis of the relations between subject and object is of a sensible and psychophysical order: experience must therefore fall within the order of sensibility and the reciprocal relativity of subject and object. Sensation-perception (see) is the experimental fact into which science must be resolved; hence Hume’s (see) critique of the idea of substance (see) is accepted, and substance is replaced by formal, conventional, or conditional hypotheses. As for the idea of cause (see), positivism instead admits that it must represent the uniformity and regularity of relations among phenomena within the limits of experience (see). Cause and effect are thus resolved into antecedent and consequent phenomena: the idea of efficient cause is excluded as a metaphysical invention, the idea of final cause does not exceed biological adaptation and utilitarian intentions, and the gnoseological foundation of causality is solely empirical induction (see). But the scientifically defined cause is an invariable antecedent of its consequent or effect and, relative to it, unconditional. The causal relation is in fact a description or deeper analysis of the very identity of the fact in two successive moments. The question may only be whether the identity of the fact through the two phenomena, thus constantly linked as cause and effect through the generalization of their relation, is to be defined proceeding from the effect (distinct) toward the cause, in which case it is determinative, necessary (Comte, Stuart Mill, Ardigò), but by induction, or from the cause (indistinct, homogeneous) toward the effect, in which case it leaves room for indeterminacy (Spencer, Tarozzi), but abandons the inductive basis.
The common doctrine of the positivists that philosophy (v.) is the synthesis of the sciences does not correspond to the classical-Scholastic concept of the *scientia scientiarum*, but is opposed to II. The former unfolds in a deductive sense from metaphysics (v.) to the particular sciences, while the latter proceeds in an inductive sense from the particular sciences to philosophy as an overview of the most general results. The philosophical conception thus proposed is limited in its principles by the abstract and nominalistic character of the systematic and methodological unity to which it aspires. If philosophy is to be scientific, it might succeed as a particular science of certain facts; as a systematic synthesis, it becomes an abstraction. The principle of the identity of facts as a methodological canon is insufficient with respect to the logic of identity from which it derives, because this would be entrusted solely to the sensitivity of the subject. If the positivistic doctrine of the scientific methods it adopts and its appeals to criticism are undermined, its sophistic aspect becomes evident in the realm of moral sciences, where the “facts” are already completed or extinct acts, and thus abstract data (v. ASTRATTO; LUSTRAZIONE).
In the moral and historical sciences, positivism claimed to renew them integrally according to experimental data, since even empiricism had been preceded in them by psychological motives. The morality of the positivists (v. ETICA) is founded on the analysis of moral facts as observed, linking the individual subject with the natural and social environment in which it operates and to which it adapts. It tends to establish laws of conscience (v.) comparable in certainty and validity to those of nature (v.) and therefore prefers determinism (v.) to indeterminism. Moral and social laws are defined by induction (from observation and inner and outer experience, and from statistics), and they define the constancy of the ways in which individuals act, on the basis of which they have the value of norms for prediction and evaluation; yet they lack their dogmatic foundation. The freedom (v.) of the individual comes to consist in its independence from a priori determinations, different from facts, and is recognized in habitual or institutional freedoms. Positivism further asserts that the ethics of humanity develops by elevating itself toward evolutionary ideals, in which abnormal or irregular facts disappear in favor of legality. From this perspective, egoistic or utilitarian hedonism (v. EDONISMO; UTILITARISMO) is condemned to give way to social institutions and the formation of an altruistic conscience as capable of greater overall happiness. The highest positive ideal is that of justice (v.), namely, individual and collective life in conformity with laws. Moral sciences thus culminate in sociology (v.), which studies the genesis and ordering of human society in the forms given by experience and according to their realistic exigencies; its ideal coincides with its law, that is, with the continuous progress of civilization (v.). Even education (v.) must lead the biological and psychological individual to act in conformity with its social relations and vocations and to conform its attitudes accordingly. These theories of positivism were vaunted as sufficient to replace the corresponding theories of idealism and spiritualism (v.); yet, apart from the uncritical naivety of the “positive” ideals, they lack sufficient universality and are merely observed aspirations, not ideals in themselves.
In the juridical world, positivism achieved more lasting successes through its conceptions of penal law and special law. The “positive school of law” is founded on the identification of the “legal fact” with the idea of a crime: because the fact in its singularity is ex-lege. Consequently, the individual is initially a delinquent with respect to the constituted law and customary society; when it fails to obey, it becomes a criminal by virtue of its own biopsychic individuality (hereditary taints, congenital and acquired deficiencies and diseases). The punishment (v.) imposed on it must therefore be reformative and correlative in nature, not vindictive. The same applies to insanity in comparison with normal and social conscience. The administration of justice and the formulation of laws should be founded on the observation of the “facts” subject to them and on the results of statistics (v.), following reasonings parallel to the behaviors and habits of juridical persons.
In the historical sciences (v. STORIA), the “positive method” gave the greatest importance to the collection and certainty of “facts” through documentation and oral and written tradition, to the reconstruction of events in their empirical objectivity, and to the elimination of transcendent causality and providential finality. Positivism admits historical causes only inductively and limited by probability, and by natural and economic factors, and bases knowledge of the past on analogy with socially phenomena studied experimentally. Historiography thus developed does not in practice surpass erudition and narrative and descriptive exposition, to which it reduces even the most brilliant and heroic moments and the manifestations of spiritual life. Positivism thus relegated religion to the order of human things as a complex of beliefs belonging to prescriptive epochs and proposed to replace it either with the so-called religion of humanity (v. COMTE) or with certain philosophical principles of a theistic nature (v. STUART). Toward the end of the 19th century, however, positivists almost all inclined toward anticlericalism and secularism (v.).
Contemporary positivism has presented some tendencies distinct from the preceding, or “classical,” ones, due to the progress of the sciences it was obliged to accept. Thus, in the 20th century, there arose “relativistic positivism” and “neopositivism” (v.).
“Relativistic positivism” derives from VAIHINGER, HANS (v.) through the adoption of the theory of physical relativity into epistemological and moral doctrines. Its founders (Joseph Petzoldt, *Das Weltproblem vom Standpunkte des positivistischen Positivismus aus hist.-krit. dargest.*, Leipzig 1906; Heinrich Gomperz, *Weltanschauunglehre*, Jena 1905–1908) extended scientific relativity to the theory of sensations and feelings, with the intent of restoring philosophy from every absoluteness of the given and of reinstating protagonistic subjectivism (Pa-thermiprimus).
Neopositivism accepts the Kantian critique as the observation and description of the formal data of knowledge in the order of sensibility. The universality and necessity of cognitions derive from their not being contradicted in fact; they thus have intuitive value. The facts of experience are objective actions perceived in relation to a subjective reaction (or feeling), from which the “name” or expression of them derives. The underlying datum of the “name” is called the “bearer,” and science verifies whether it is present, not present, or still to be found (if possible). If the name lacks a datum, it is abstract and gives rise to truths of formal logic (“tautologies”). Human knowledge can thus arrange and reorder the whole of verified knowledge and coherent expressions into non-contradictory systems and move from one to another by “translation” (logical syntax); but it cannot surpass the subjectivity of the feeling from which it begins in the observation of data. Hence, the rational possibility (not contradicted in fact) of a proof of the existence of God (v.) is lacking, because it would surpass subjectivity. For a further exposition V. POSITIVISMO.
As can be seen from these last two manifestations, positivism, despite its claim to accord
Philosophy, in its objective scientific aspect, cannot go beyond a formal reorganization of a temporary system of empirical truths and expedient methods. Its cultural contribution has been to emphasize the significance of the "positive" (the position of the individual [V. INDIVIDUAL] and of the given, the determination of sentiment), of which both idealism and spiritualism are aware. V. also: CONCETTO; CONOSCENZA; EMPIRISMO; INDUZIONE; LOGICA; NOMINALISMO; UNIVERSALI.
With regard to conscience, that is, the moral factor, the positivism of good faith indicates that the subject has the conviction that the object is legitimately possessed by him, without prejudice to the rights of others. The Italian Civil Code expressly states: "He who possesses in good faith is one who possesses in ignorance of injuring another's right" (art. 1147) and adds that: "Good faith does not avail if the ignorance is due to gross negligence" (ibid., para. 2); which evidently and a fortiori applies to canon law and Christian morality.
Generally, every good that, in its kind, possesses its own and distinct individuality, whether corporeal or incorporeal, can be the object of possession. This latter possession is very often also and more specifically called quasi-possession, whose classical examples are found in usufruct, emphyteusis, active servitude, etc. In itself, every good so described could be the object of possession; however, society, whether civil or ecclesiastical, has justly imposed very limited restrictions upon this, excluding from it those goods which it has declared to be outside commerce.
II. ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF POSSESSION, EFFECTS, PRESUMPTIONS
Since possession is not a right but a simple juridical relationship based on a factual datum, its acquisition requires only that the two essential factors which constitute it be realized, however this may occur. When a person has realized these two elements, whether through his own autonomous act of seizing the object or through delivery by others, with the intention of being its possessor, whether this occurs through a lawful or unlawful act, e.g., theft, robbery, violence, possession is acquired: which, however, does not imply that the subject is a legitimate possessor. The norms governing the acquisition of possession are referred to in arts. 1141 et seq. of the Italian Civil Code. Art. 1141 para. 2 establishes that a mere detainer of an object does not become its possessor unless by virtue of a different and new title deriving from others or by his own direct opposition, even if unlawful, against the possessor. In the second place, it is expressly established that "acts performed with another's tolerance cannot serve as the basis for the acquisition of possession" (art. 1144); which certainly applies equally to acts performed on an object granted out of courtesy by the possessor or through his desire to avoid disputes and live in peace. Finally, it should be noted that, although possession is a factual datum, yet, but only in favor of heirs, it is admitted that it continues in them without interruption, such as it was in the deceased, including defects (art. 1146, para. 1); and that it passes to particular successors under the same conditions, provided they so desire and have an interest in doing so (art. 1146, para. 2). Therefore, the acquisition of possession is due either to an original cause, the seizing of an object not possessed by another, or to a derivative title, i.e., by contract, succession, violent acts, clandestine taking.Possession is lost when both essential elements or even only one of them cease to exist. It must be understood, however, with regard to the corporeal element, that it is not required for the maintenance of possession that it be materially exercised by the possessor, nor that he hold it personally and without interruption, provided that, due to a lasting obstacle, he is not practically prevented from disposing of it according to common social understanding and according to the nature of the object: already the Romans held that, although possession is not acquired merely by intention, it can, however, be retained merely by intention, provided that one can control the object.
The law protects possession equally, whether legitimate or illegitimate; however, this protection does not prejudice the rights of others over the object of possession, which must therefore be proven elsewhere. The fact that a person is certainly an unjust possessor does not confer upon anyone the right to violate his possession except in accordance with the law. In the second place, possession is protected, at least in Italian legislation, even if it has as its object a good placed outside commerce; however, this protection is granted only against third parties, not against the authority that oversees such goods (art. 1145 para. 2). Of particular importance is also the question of possession with regard to the fruits (v. FRUTTI) produced by the possessed object and the expenses incurred for its maintenance. With regard to these, art. 1150 para. 3 provides (in relation to the general norm which imposes the reimbursement of expenses upon the possessor by the claiming owner, art. 1150 para. 1) that said indemnity "must be paid in proportion to the increase in value resulting from the improvements," which does not occur, at least in the same proportion, for the possessor in bad faith. In cases of additions made by the possessor in good faith to the thing (art. 936), if said additions constitute improvements, he has the right to an indemnity in proportion to the increase in value resulting from the thing" (art. 1150 para. 5). Moreover, and the norm is of particular favor to the possessor in good faith, art. 1152 para. 1 establishes that he may retain the thing until the indemnities due to him are paid; and also "until the guarantees ordered by the judicial authority have been provided" (ibid., para. 2). The possessor is entitled to reimbursement for improvements made to the thing, always provided that these exist at the time of restitution (ibid., para. 2), but only up to the "lesser amount between the expense incurred and the increase in value." All expenses which the possessor had to bear during the period to which the fruits now to be surrendered to a third party, even if the latter is the legitimate owner, are also due to any possessor.
In matters of possession, certain presumptions must be borne in mind. It is presumed, first of all, that whoever exercises factual control over an object also has true possession of II. Secondly, the law presumes intermediate possession, in the sense that “the current possessor who has possessed for a longer period is presumed to have also possessed during the intervening time” (art. 1142). Like the other presumptions, this one obviously yields to a different truth if proven, but the current possessor is legally relieved from proving intermediate possession merely by proving that they currently possess and possessed at the beginning of a given period. However, there is a presumption that counterbalances the foregoing: “current possession does not presume prior possession, unless the possessor has a title upon which their possession is based; in that case, it is presumed that they have possessed since the date of the title” (art. 1143). Finally, there is a presumption regarding the possessor’s awareness. This is obviously a presumption that does not alter the state of affairs in any way, nor does it excuse the possessor, before conscience, from restoring the object of possession if it does not in fact correspond to the truth; yet it does confer, before the law, the status of a legitimate possessor. Article 1147, paragraph 3, states: “good faith is presumed, and it suffices that it existed at the time of acquisition”; and although it is established that good faith is of no avail if ignorance of another’s right violation stems from gross negligence (ibid., para. 2), nonetheless, when such grossly culpable ignorance cannot be proven, good faith remains thereby presumed.
III. USUCAPION AND POSSESSION — The Italian Civil Code clearly provides that “possession acquired through violent or clandestine means does not contribute to usucapion until the violence or clandestinity has ceased” (art. 1163); therefore, although this is indeed true possession protected as such by the law, it is not sufficient to acquire ownership. Likewise, Article 1164 stipulates that “whoever has possession corresponding to the exercise of a real right over another’s property cannot usucapt the ownership of the property itself.” Nevertheless, such a person may still usucapt these goods if the title of their possession is altered through the intervention of a third party or by their own opposition to the owner, and only from the moment the title itself arises. It is also expressly provided that interruption of possession during the period required for usucapion occurs only if the possessor has been deprived of possession for more than a year and provided that they have not brought a recovery action if they in fact regained it (art. 1167).
Given the foregoing, possession, whether in good or bad faith, depending on the length of time required by law, produces the effect of transferring ownership or title to the possessor. Specifically:
a) A possessor in good or bad faith acquires ownership of immovable property and other real rights of enjoyment over it solely by continuous possession for twenty years. The rule is general and operates before the law without possibility of objection by third parties, including prior owners (art. 1158). However, both with regard to this rule and to what will be said later concerning good and bad faith in relation to conscience and morality, it is essential to keep in mind what is stated under the heading FEDE, BUONA (E CATTIVA) [GOOD (AND BAD) FAITH];
b) A possessor in good faith, or rather one who in good faith has acquired from a non-owner an immovable or another real right of enjoyment over immovable property by virtue of a title capable in itself of transferring ownership and duly transcribed, acquires ownership upon the expiration of ten years from the date of transcription (art. 1159), even if during this period the possessor later falls into bad faith;
c) The two preceding rules apply equally to the acquisition of universality of movables or real rights of enjoyment over them, with twenty and ten years of possession respectively, depending on whether the possessor is in bad or good faith (art. 1160);
d) In the case of movables, provided there are no suitable titles capable in themselves of transferring ownership, Article 1161 also deems sufficient twenty years of possession for a possessor in bad faith and ten years for one in good faith;
e) If, however, in the acquisition of movables registered in public records, a person receives, by a suitable title to transfer ownership, the object duly transcribed, they acquire ownership in three years from the date of transcription if the acquisition occurs in good faith from a non-owner, and in ten years if any of these conditions is lacking (art. 1162);
f) Nevertheless, “whoever has possession corresponding to the exercise of a real right over another’s property cannot usucapt the ownership of the property itself unless the title of their possession is altered by a cause arising from a third party or by opposition made by them against the owner’s right. The time necessary for usucapion runs from the date on which the title of possession was altered” (art. 1164). According to the Italian Civil Code, therefore, the twenty-year usucapion of immovables or real rights over them does not require good faith even at the beginning of possession; whereas good faith is required, but only at the beginning, for the ten-year usucapion; similarly, this applies in the usucapion of other goods with three-year or ten-year possession.
IV. DEFENSE OF POSSESSION — It is not without purpose to recall the reasons that first led Roman law, then canon law, and subsequently all legal systems in general to protect a mere factual state that does not necessarily entail a right and is sometimes positively opposed to it: suffice it to consider possession in bad faith, which the law protects in its extreme form even against the owner himself. The reasons are of public and private order. It is evident that, since proof of ownership is often devilishly difficult, as jurists have said, if there were no adequate means that dispensed with such proof for one who peacefully has mere factual possession of a thing, the owner would very often be practically unable to exercise their right unless it sufficed to allege the fact of possession. The social order likewise demands, for obvious reasons, that citizens not take the law into their own hands. The law has therefore sought to reconcile, as far as possible, the rights of the owner with those of the possessor. Moreover, it is logical that in cases of uncertainty the legal norm should attribute to whoever actually possesses the title of true possessor until the contrary is proven. Furthermore, the purpose of possessory actions is by their nature essentially provisional, and in reality they favor both the owner or proprietor of the thing and the possessor or mere detainer (in cases even for the latter). It goes without saying, however, that in addition to legal protection of possession, everyone retains intact the right of legitimate defense in the case of actual violence against what they in fact possess.
### Action of Reintegration
Whoever has been violently or clandestinely deprived of their possession may bring the action of reintegration or spoliation. The principle *spoliatus ante omnia restituendum*, which has become classical in canon law, is recognized. To prevent subtle delaying maneuvers, both the Italian Civil Code (art. 1168, last paragraph) and the Code of Canon Law (cc. 1699 § 2 and 1700) impose an urgent and informal procedure, requiring only the notoriety of the fact for immediate restitution of what was taken from the possessor without delay. The action of reintegration also belongs to the detainer, not the possessor, of an object, except in the case of a detainer by reason of service or hospitality (art. 1168, paragraph 2; CIC, can. 1694). In Italian law, unlike the CIC—which permits the action against any detainer of the thing (can. 1698 § 1)—the action is admitted only against the author of the spoliation or against one who, with knowledge of the spoliation, succeeded to the possession by particular title (art. 1169). Both codes, however, substantially agree in determining the time period within which this action may be brought, namely within one year from the spoliation or from the moment the possessor became aware of it, especially in cases of clandestine spoliation (art. 1168, paragraphs 1 and 3; can. 1698 § 2); the CIC, however, admits the exception of spoliation that is by its nature perpetual. The action is also admitted against the owner of the thing, except in the case of an administrator or mandatary who detains the thing in the interest of their principal.
### Action of Maintenance
This action is directed to guarantee and defend the possessor in the enjoyment of their possession against any kind of disturbance by third parties. In the Civil Code, it has a narrower scope, in the sense that, unlike the previous action—which protects all kinds of goods—this action can only be brought in the case of possession of immovable property or real rights over immovable property or universality of movable goods (art. 1170, paragraph 1). The action is admitted against anyone, provided the possession has lasted for more than one continuous and uninterrupted year and was not acquired violently or clandestinely (ibid., paragraph 2); however, it is also admitted in favor of possession acquired violently or clandestinely, provided the action is brought after one year from the day when the violence or clandestinity ceased (ibid., paragraph 2); whereas the CIC admits it against any disturber except the person from whom the possessor obtained the thing violently or clandestinely or from whom they received it precariously (can. 1696 § 1).
For other means of defense of possession, see DENUNCIA DI NUOVA OPERA E DI DANNO TEMUTO.