VAIHINGER, HANS. - Philosopher, b. at Nehren (Württemberg) on 25 Sept. 1852, d. at Halle on 12 Dec. 1933. He taught philosophy at the University of Strasbourg (from 1884) and then at the University of Halle (from 1894); in 1906, owing to an eye disease, he retired from teaching.
His doctrine, which shows evident affinities with pragmatism, is defined by V. himself as positivistic idealism or idealistic irrationalism. At its base is a radical sensualism, but within it one can trace various influences; first, the influence of Kantian philosophy, to which V. devoted one of his most important works (Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1881–1892; 2nd ed. 1922). Then there is the influence of the neocriticism of F. A. Lange, V.’s teacher (Hartmann, Dühring und Lange, 1876). On the other hand, the emphasis on decidedly irrationalist elements in V.’s doctrine can be traced in part to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche (Nietzsche als Philosoph, 1902; 5th ed. 1930), and Bergson. With R. Schmidt he founded the journal Annalen der Philosophie (Leipzig 1919), which, later taken over by the “Vienna Circle,” assumed the title Erkenntnis in 1930.
V. denies that science can or should aim at objectively knowing the truth; it has only a utilitarian function, serving as an instrument that facilitates man’s adaptation to his environment. From a purely theoretical and logical standpoint, science presents a series of internal contradictions, which, however, do not affect its functionality. All human knowledge consists of “fictions,” which cannot be regarded as hypotheses subject to verification in reality. The fundamental categories (thing, property, causality, etc.) meet the need to order the mass of perceptions, but they do not have the power to represent reality; they merely allow one to consider experience “as if” it were composed of things endowed with properties, connected by causal relations, etc. Other general concepts, such as unity, multiplicity, existence, have instead a purely sensory origin; they are simple judgments of perception.
In his principal work (Die Philosophie des «als ob». System der theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit auf Grund eines idealistischen Positivismus, Berlin 1911; 7th and 8th ed. 1922), V. sets out to highlight, in the various sciences, those concepts that, despite their high pragmatic value, present logical contradiction; thus in mathematics the concepts of extended atom, of the infinitely small, of negative, rational, and imaginary numbers. Economics is based on the function of the “homo oeconomicus,” a subject concerned solely with material interests. Similarly, metaphysics and religion reveal a purely vital value. For V., the task of philosophy is to enable the clear recognition of fictions as such and of their practical value; philosophy itself must meet the demands of adaptation and preservation of human nature without claiming any theoretical validity.