NEOCRITICISMO

NEOCRITICISM – A term used to designate philosophical currents that revive and develop the motifs of Kantian philosophy (*v.* CRITICISM; KANT); it is therefore considered equivalent to the lens of Neo-Kantianism. Neo-criticism constitutes a vast and complex movement that spread, in the 19th century, especially in Germany, France, and Italy. Everywhere it presents the character of a reaction against post-Kantian idealism and tends to overcome positivistic materialism, although for the most part the aim of the Neo-Kantians consists in attempting to reconcile the critical stance with the presuppositions of positivism.

In Germany, properly speaking, Neo-criticism begins around 1860; its precursors may be considered J. Fries (*v.*) and F. Benecke. In the second half of the century, a new fervor for historical and philosophical studies arises, contributing to the diffusion of Kant’s works and to a deeper understanding of them. Especially important are K. Fischer (1824–1907) and O. Liebmann (1840–1912; *Kant und die Epigonen*, Stuttgart 1864), who gave the decisive impetus to the Neo-critical movement. Seven fundamental directions are usually distinguished within German Neo-criticism. The first is called physiological Neo-criticism, inasmuch as the a priori forms are reduced to mere physiological conditions of knowledge. The physicist H. V. Helmholtz (1821–94) holds that representations are signs or symbols, which do not prove the existence of external objects, while F. A. Lange (*v.*), opposing materialism, considers, following Kantian lines, matter as a mere representation, yet excludes any possibility of transcendental deduction, reducing both the forms of sensibility and the categories to the form of psychophysical organization. The second direction, called metaphysical Neo-criticism, directly gathers the impetus given to the movement by O. Liebmann’s work; it includes the thought of E. Zeller (*v.*), one of the foremost advocates of the return to Kant, and of J. Volkelt (*v.*). Despite their empiricist and relativistic bases, they maintain the possibility of a critical metaphysics. The realistic Neo-criticism, on the other hand, tends toward the complete exclusion of any metaphysical inquiry; its leading exponent is A. Riehl (*v.*), who rigorously upholds the reduction of philosophy to a scientific theory of knowledge; he accepts the thing-in-itself and Kantian apriorism, attributing to the latter a social value.

Toward the end of the 19th century, a phase of Neo-criticism is determined by the so-called Marburg School (*v.*), founded by H. Cohen (*v.*), with a logistic-methodological orientation. For Cohen, the task of philosophy is to bring to light the logical structures of knowledge, which is essentially a mathematical science of nature; intuition is assimilated to conceptual thought, which identifies itself with its own content. Aesthetics, morality, and religion fall within the domain of conceptual knowledge. P. Natorp (*v.*) also advocates a logical intellectualism with a Platonic tone; he emphasizes the unity of thought and being, understood as the construction of being by thought; mathematics is the example of a constructive cognitive process that can extend to an indefinitely wider field. M. E. Cassirer (1874–1943), who deals with the problem of knowledge especially from a historical standpoint, belongs to the Marburg School. Parallel to methodological Neo-criticism, there develops axiological Neo-criticism, proper to the school founded by W. Windelband (*v.*), known as the Southwestern or Baden School. From Kantian ethics, Windelband takes the concept of “duty,” unifying within it all branches of philosophical speculation. Even thought is subject to an ought-to-be, which constitutes the criterion of truth; philosophy does not create but must discern the values proper to normal consciousness, which constitute human culture. M. H. Rickert (*v.*), a disciple of Windelband, develops his master’s theories in the sense of a transcendental idealism; he distinguishes the natural sciences from the cultural sciences, which have as their object the individual in its relations with value, which, in its logical priority, transcends both subject and object. Similarly, H. Münsterberg (1863–1916) opposes to the objectified truth of science a system of values independent of temporality. Neo-criticism in this form cannot give rise to any deduction of the categories. This is evident in the work of M. B. Bauch (b. 1877), for whom the system of categories, that is, according to his conception, of natural laws, is capable of continual growth.

Also in Italy the term "neophyte" reflects the attempt to reconcile trust in the positive sciences with the need to safeguard the world of spiritual and cultural values. Concerned by this movement was A. Testa (1784-1860), who strove to make Kantian thought known in Italy, opposing it to the prevailing currents of the time. However, it was only in the second half of the 19th century that numerous Italian scholars, having come into contact with representatives of the German movement, devoted themselves to spreading and deepening the knowledge of Kant. Among them, C. Cantoni (q.v.) provided a broad exposition of Kantian philosophy (*E. Kant*, 3 vols., Milan 1879-84), one of the most complete works on the subject. Cantoni saw in criticism, which he developed in a realistic sense, the possibility of closely linking philosophy with the sciences and all spheres of human spirituality. F. Masci (q.v.), considered the leading representative of Italian neophytism, instead emphasized the subjective value of the a priori, which nonetheless remains fully valid for objective reality, insofar as matter and spirit constitute a single psycho-physical substance evolving toward a progressive strengthening of the spirit.

Other figures belonging to Italian neophytism include: F. Tocco (q.v.), A. Chiappelli (q.v.), G. Barzellotti (q.v.), S. Turbiglio (1842-1901), G. Zuccante (q.v.), A. Faggi (b. 1868), L. Credaro (1860-1939), F. De Sarlo (q.v.), and P. Martinetti (q.v.).

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**NEOPHYTE** — From the Greek *néos phýsis* (new plant), hence a tender shoot. The term appears once in Holy Scripture, though there are many related comparisons, as Christian life is likened to a plant and grafting. St. Paul (1 Tim 3:6) uses *neophyte* to refer to recent converts from paganism; this meaning persisted in the Church, later including converts from any non-Christian sect after baptism. The term also denoted individuals recently admitted to religious or clerical life (cf. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistolae*: PL 77, 784; 1030-37, 1051). These two meanings were adopted by Gratian (I, 2, D. 48) but later distinctly separated. Those akin to neophytes, even in disciplinary norms, are the *clinici* (q.v.).

For many centuries, neophytes were numerous, as evidenced by funerary inscriptions, the Fathers, and history: strict discipline and prudent observance of grave Christian duties delayed baptism, despite the Church’s efforts, not only for many pagans but also for catechumens. Nonetheless, they received special care, e.g., the solemn baptismal rite on the vigils of Easter and Pentecost, with the bishop’s invitation or sermon, the *traditio legis Christianae*, the white tunic for the entire octave, the kiss of peace, Confirmation, and the Eucharist. Of the celebrated Victorinus, Augustine writes (*Confess.*, I, 8, n. 2): *“Senex non rubuit esse puer Christi et infans fontis Dei.”*

St. Paul (loc. cit.) prescribed that a neophyte not be ordained bishop for fear of ordaining someone insufficiently instructed and formed. The Constantinian peace (313) led to the inclusion of some neophytes among the clergy, driven partly by the latent ambition of some neophytes or the people’s desire to have a renowned convert as bishop. This abuse was condemned by the First Council of Nicaea (325) and others, extending the prohibition to the presbyterate and later to tonsure, creating an impediment or, according to others, an irregularity. The reasons, beyond that cited by St. Paul, are explained by St. Jerome (*Ad Oceanum*: PL 22, 663), Gregory of Nazianzus (*In laudem s. Athanasii*: PG 35, 1090 ff.), Gregory the Great (loc. cit.), and summarized by Gratian (loc. cit.).

Exceptions occurred, as in the cases of Ambrose, Nectarius of Constantinople, and Augustine, but they were always scrutinized with severity. After Gratian, no further innovations were made; the *Codex Iuris Canonici* (can. 987 n. 69) confirms the previous discipline, considering the neophyte merely impeded, not irregular, and leaving the resolution of the impediment to the bishop’s discretion over time. Regarding neophytes, extensive applications are also found in the Pauline Privilege (q.v.).

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