NEOCRITICISM. — A term customarily used to designate the philosophical currents that take up and develop the themes of Kantian philosophy (v. CRITICISMO; KANT); it is therefore regarded as equivalent to neo-Kantianism. Neocriticism constitutes a vast and complex movement that spread, in the nineteenth century, especially in Germany, France, and Italy. Everywhere it displays the character of a reaction against post-Kantian idealism and tends to overcome positivistic materialism, although for the most part the aim of the neo-Kantians consists in attempting to reconcile the critical demand with the presuppositions of positivism.
In Germany, neocriticism properly so called began around 1860; J. Fries (v.) and F. Benecke may be considered its precursors. In the second half of the century, a renewed fervor for historical and philosophical studies developed, contributing to the dissemination of Kant’s works and to a deeper understanding of them. Particularly important were K. Fischer (1824–1907) and O. Liebmann (1840–1912: Kant und die Epigonen, Stuttgart 1864), who gave the decisive impetus to the neo-critical movement. Seven fundamental tendencies are customarily distinguished within German neocriticism. The first is called physiological neocriticism, insofar as the a priori forms are reduced to mere physiological conditions of knowledge. The physicist H. V. Helmholtz (1821–94) holds that representations are signs or symbols, which do not prove the existence of external objects, while F. A. Lange (v.), opposing materialism by considering, in Kantian fashion, matter as mere representation, excludes, on the other hand, any possibility of transcendental deduction, reducing both the forms of sensibility and the categories to forms of psychophysical organization. The second tendency, called metaphysical neocriticism, directly takes up the impetus given to the movement by the work of O. Liebmann; it customarily includes the thought of E. Zeller (v.), one of the foremost advocates of a return to Kant, and of J. VOLKELT, JOHANNES (v.). Although proceeding from empiricist and relativist bases, they maintain the possibility of a critical metaphysics. Realist neocriticism, by contrast, tends toward the complete exclusion of any metaphysical inquiry; its foremost representative is A. RIEHL, ALOIS (v.), who rigorously advocates the reduction of philosophy to a scientific theory of knowledge. He accepts the thing in itself and Kantian apriorism, attributing to the latter a social value. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, one phase of neocriticism was Marburg School (v.), founded by H. Cohen (v.), with a logistic-methodological orientation. For Cohen, the task of philosophy is to bring to light the logical structures of knowledge, which is essentially mathematical science of nature; intuition is assimilated to conceptual thought, which is identified with its own content. Aesthetics, morality, and religion fall within the domain of conceptual knowledge. P. NATORP, PAUL (v.) likewise advocates a logical intellectualism of Platonic inspiration; he emphasizes the unity of thought and being, understood as the construction of being by thought; mathematics is an example of a constructive cognitive process that can be extended to an indefinitely broader field. M. E. Cassirer (1874–1945) also belonged to the Marburg School; he concerned himself with the problem of knowledge chiefly from a historical standpoint. In parallel with methodological neocriticism, axiological neocriticism developed, characteristic of the school founded by W. WINDELBAND, WILHELM (v.), known as the South-West German or Baden school. From Kantian ethics, Windelband took the concept of “duty,” unifying in it all branches of philosophical speculation. Thought, too, is subject to an ought to be, which constitutes the criterion of truth; philosophy does not create values, but must discern the values proper to normal consciousness, which constitute human culture. M. H. RICKERT, HEINRICH (v.), a disciple of Windelband, developed his teacher’s theories in the direction of transcendental idealism; he distinguished the natural sciences from the cultural sciences, whose object is the individual in his relations with value, which, in its logical priority, transcends both subject and object at once. Similarly, H. Münsterberg (1863–1916) opposed to the objectified truth of science a system of values independent of temporality. In this form, neocriticism cannot give rise to any deduction of the categories. This is evident in the work of M. B. Bauch (born in 1877), for whom the system of categories, that is, according to his conception, of natural laws, is capable of continuous expansion and is integrated with the system of cultural values.
Among W. Windelband’s pupils, E. Lask (1875–1915) should also be remembered; among the pupils of M. H. Rickert, W. Metzger (1879–1910). The relativism of G. SIMMEL, GEORG (v.) may also be considered part of the neo-critical movement, since it transposes the Kantian doctrine of the a priori into the fields of history, sociology, social psychology, and ethics. One final current, which draws its fundamental themes from Fries’s doctrine, interprets criticism in a psychological sense; its representatives are H. Cornelius (born in 1863) and, above all, L. Nelson (1882–1927).
In France, the foremost representative of neocriticism is Ch. RENOUVIER, CHARLES (v.): he takes up the foundations of Kantianism in order to transform them into a radical phenomenalism; he decisively rejects things in themselves, understanding representation as a relation between subject and object, such that they exist only in and through the relation. The categories, whose list Renouvier renews, belong neither to the subject alone nor to the object alone, but are modes of representation itself; the series of representations constituting the universe is finite; the infinite concerns only the possible, not the real. In this sense the Kantian antinomies are resolved; Renouvier accepts only their theses, rejecting the antitheses as illusory; the world is discontinuous, and within it a free causality is conceivable. Freedom, the indispensable foundation of moral action, leads man to opt for recognition of universal contingency, since judgment too has the character of an act of will. Among Renouvier’s disciples are V. Brochard (1884–1907), G. Milhaud (1858–1918), who emphasizes the distinction between logical certainty, necessarily limited and relative, and intuitive certainty, which does not shrink from contradiction and lies at the basis of all knowledge, and O. Hamelin (v.), who reconstructs the table of categories on rational foundations, according to the schema of Hegelian dialectic.
In Italy too, neocriticism responds to the intention of reconciling confidence in the positive sciences with the need to safeguard the world of spiritual and cultural values. A. Testa (1784–1860) is regarded as a precursor of the movement; he endeavored to make Kantian thought known in Italy, setting it against the currents then prevailing. But only in the second half of the nineteenth century did Italian scholars become numerous who, coming into contact with representatives of German neocriticism, devoted themselves to disseminating and deepening knowledge of Kant. Among them, C. ANTONIA (v.) provided an extensive exposition of Kantian philosophy (E. Kant, 3 vols., Milan 1879–84), one of the most complete works on the subject. Cantoni sees in criticism, which he develops in a realist sense, the possibility of closely linking philosophy with the sciences and with all spheres of human spirituality. F. ASCI (v.), regarded as the foremost representative of Italian neocriticism, instead emphasizes the subjective value of the a priori, which nevertheless remains fully valid for objective reality, since matter and spirit constitute a single psychophysical substance that evolves in the direction of a progressive strengthening of the spirit. The following also belong to Italian neocriticism: F. Tocco (v.), A. Chiappelli (v.), G. Barzelotti (v.), S. Turbiglio (1842–1901), G. Zuccante (v.), A. Faggi (born in 1868), L. Credaro (1860–1939), F. De Sarlo (v.), P. MARTINETTI, PIERO (v.).