SUBJECT. - The term s. has several acceptations. In current usage one speaks of the s. of a proposition, of a discussion, of a work, of a science, as that with which they deal; it derives in fact from the Latin subiectum: that which underlies, which is subjected (to reflection, discussion, etc.).
The Latin term translates the Greek ὑποκείμενον, which already in Aristotle takes on a complex reference, having at once a logical and a metaphysical value; logically it is that of which a predicate is affirmed or denied, metaphysically it is both indeterminate matter and the determinate being that supports qualities and affections (cf. Phys., I, 2, 185 a 32; Met., VII, 3, 1029 a 1). This latter meaning, together with the logical one, passed directly into the tradition as the specific meaning of s. Aristotle himself (Cat., 2) clarifies and distinguishes these two uses of the word, showing how the logical s. of a proposition does not always coincide with the real s., or s. of inherence; for it is one thing to affirm or deny the attribute of a s., as in the case in which the genus is predicated of the species or the species of the individual (in Socrates man is predicated of Socrates in general, but is not in Socrates), and another thing to refer to the s. a quality which, even without being its essential attribute, is in the s. itself (e.g., Socrates is wise). One must further note the distinction between the logical s. and the grammatical s.; the latter is determined only by the form of the proposition and does not always coincide with the former.
The fundamental meaning of s. in post-Aristotelian philosophy, down to the modern age, is that deriving from its value as substantial being, in opposition to the attributes or accidents that are referred to it. It thus becomes equivalent to substance (v.), essence (v.), hypostasis, etc. In scholastic terminology esse subiective means to exist for oneself, esse obiective to subsist only in thought. Even Descartes defines as "subjective" that which is proper to things, formaliter in se ipsis, and as "objective" that which is precisely the object of thought, which exists idealiter in intellectu (cf. Medit., III).
Only from the 17th century onward does there come to be accentuated that meaning of s. which derives from its being also a s. of activity, besides of quality, and in particular of cognitive activity. Initially consciousness itself was considered as one of the qualities of a s.; then, with the new formulations of the gnoseological problem, it increasingly takes on the value of an activity proper and essential to the s., until it coincides with the s. itself. On the contrary, the term "object" (v.) comes to signify reality in itself, independent of thought. This inversion of meanings is definitively sanctioned by Kantian philosophy (Kritik d. r. Vernunft passim) and idealistic philosophy. S. and object undergo the same oscillations of value and the same distinctions (e.g., transcendental s., empirical s., etc.).
The primitive meaning of s., which has remained in common usage, is often confused with the now established meaning of "object"; a distinction is nevertheless possible: s. is in general that with which one actually deals, "object" more precisely that which a discussion, a scientific investigation, etc. set out to attain.
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M. Elena Reina