DE SARLO, FRANCESCO. - Philosopher, b. at S. Chirico Raparo (Potenza) on 13 Feb. 1854, d. at Florence on 14 Jan. 1937. He began as a physician, but soon turned to philosophy and psychology. It was the period of triumphant positivism, and De Sarlo’s merit lay in opposing the conclusions which were being drawn in the moral and religious sphere by the method of positive research. He openly proclaimed himself a spiritualist and theist, though he intended his spiritualism to rest exclusively on a psychological basis, and his theism to be presented merely as a hypothesis—not demonstrable by reason, but supported by considerations which made it more probable than others (cf. Metafisica, scienza e moralità, Rome 1898).
In 1900 he was appointed to the chair of theoretical philosophy at the Istituto di studi superiori in Florence, and in 1903 published I dati dell’esperienza psichica; in the same year he founded in that institute a laboratory of experimental psychology, the first in Italy. From this laboratory there appeared, in 1906-1907, the two volumes of Ricerche di psicologia, containing his own work and that of his pupils. He promoted these studies outside the school with great zeal. But he did not neglect the moral problem, as is evident from the two volumes published in 1907: L’attività pratica e la coscienza morale e principio di scienza etica. With these works De Sarlo moved ever further from positivism by adopting the principle of value, which has meaning only for consciousness and demands a spiritual standpoint. In the same year he founded a journal, La cultura filosofica, which enjoyed a prosperous decade, containing many writings by him and his most distinguished pupils. An important feature of La cultura filosofica was its opposition, not only to positivism, but more especially to the idealism which was then arising and spreading rapidly in Italy. In his opposition to idealism De Sarlo consistently upheld two main points: the dualism of subject and object, i.e., the existence of the external world as other and independent of consciousness; and the individuality of consciousness, that is, its concrete existence in the multiplicity of subjects, though in relation to one another. In this opposition to idealism De Sarlo increasingly emphasized his affinity with positivism, inasmuch as, for him too, philosophy, like every other science, must be based on experience, while having its own task of reflecting on the epistemological and logical principles presupposed by science, which for him were always centered in the study of human psychological activity. On this point cf. the two volumes of Psicologia e filosofia (1918), and more especially, as a comprehensive exposition of his thought, Introduzione alla filosofia (Rome 1928); cf. also Esame di coscienza: quarant’anni dopo la laurea (Florence 1928). For his polemic against idealism, the arguments are summarized in the volume Gentile e Croce: lettere filosofiche di un superato (Florence 1935). The consequence of this dual polemical stance, anti-positivist and anti-idealist alike, was in metaphysics a mild agnosticism, by which, while recognizing the necessity of positing an absolute principle and the legitimacy of problems transcending experience, he held that it was not the task of philosophy to discuss such questions: it could at most advance conjectures and seek to grasp some glimmer or fragment of the rational order governing the world; the rest was entirely a matter for religious faith, which, though responding to an ineradicable need of the human spirit, could dispense with demonstrations. Also noteworthy is the interest he showed and promoted in his school for the knowledge of contemporary thought: see among others his volumes Il pensiero moderno (Palermo 1915) and Filosofi del tempo nostro (Florence 1916). For his position in the ethical-political question, cf. the volume L’uomo nella vita sociale (Bari 1931).