CIVILTÀ. — The idea of c. refers to an object so complex, in whose composition so many disparate elements of different natures concur, that the existence of often conflicting definitions cannot cause surprise. In their formulation, in fact, ideological presuppositions carry predominant weight: from these, consciously or unconsciously, one proceeds to the analysis of the given datum, and they determine the choice of one element or another in preference to others. In order, therefore, to grasp the essence of c. and at the same time establish a hierarchical order among the values of which it is composed, one must insist preferably upon objective analysis, incorporating into it just so much rational speculation as may help facilitate the ascent from the purely empirical order to that of the more universal values.
If one considers the etymological origin (from civis or civitas), the term explicitly indicates an indelible relationship between every form of progress and social man or society, from which it develops and in which it resides. In this sense c. is equivalent to the material and spiritual condition of life attained by man within collective coexistence in a given historical period, and is generically opposed to barbarism. It is not easy, however, to establish an exact line of separation between civilized and barbarous peoples, in order to determine where barbarism ends and c. begins, since it is beyond doubt that even among societies considered barbarous there are certain elements, especially moral ones, that belong to the soul of true c. This observation underlies the usage of the etymological sciences, which attribute the name c., without distinction as to concept or scope, to the social condition of peoples, distinguishing the various phases of their political and economic organization as primary, secondary and mixed c., according to the prevalence or otherwise of certain characteristics considered original to a given culture. Nevertheless, although adherence to the etymological meaning may be useful for classifying primitive peoples according to an empirical criterion derived from the development of their social institutions, it cannot suffice for forming the adequate concept; to reach this, one must refer to its proximate cause. That cause, as etymology itself suggests, is social man. The idea of c., in fact, has an essential relationship with the rational creature, insofar as the latter is ordered to conduct its life within a collective organism, necessary to its full development. The end toward which the progress of civilization tends is man: he is the subject upon whom the well-being of c. is poured; it is collective life, from which it then flows back to its first and original source, the human person. Such is the dependence of the concept of c. upon the person insofar as he is part of a human aggregate that progress cannot be conceived without stable relationships, nor c. separated from man. Social man is at once its producer and its bearer. In keeping with this relationship, c. could be defined with Sombart as «the creation of man, which stands opposed to the divine creation of nature», or with Guizot as «the development of social and individual activity in the progress of society and humanity», or again, with a more recent author, Maritain: «the organically determined whole, possessing its own form and physiognomy, of social values communicable in themselves». These are very vague expressions, to which it is nevertheless possible to attribute a content insofar as they generically signify that c. refers to social man, who evolves and fulfills himself through the achievements of science, the applications of technology, the creations of art, the formation of traditions, and the construction of institutions, codes and laws.
To obtain a somewhat more determinate and at the same time gradual concept of c., according to a precise hierarchy of the values of which it is composed, one must refer to something more objective and scientifically analyzable. Keeping firm the fact that c. indicates a relationship to collective coexistence, this element may be discovered in the common good; and then, with Taparelli, one may say that c. is nothing other than social perfection, that is, the perfection of the common good. The perfection of every being consists in tending toward its proper end, attaining it and actualizing it within itself, so that it will be the more perfect the more fully it has actualized the end toward which it naturally tends. Now the natural end of the social aggregate consists in the common good, and consequently social life may be called perfect only when it corresponds to all or nearly all the requirements of the common good. The common good, moreover, insofar as it represents the end to be attained, requires the union of the wills and efforts of individuals; insofar as it is a good already acquired, it demands the greatest possible extension and expansion. A society, then, according to the accepted objective concept, will be civilized when social unity is firm, activity effective, and progress natural and peaceful. This is essentially the conclusion reached by Romagnosi, who defines c. as the best and most cultivated coexistence attained by a State.
To know the elements combined in the composition of a cultivated coexistence, it is enough to analyze the fundamental needs and requirements of human nature, to whose satisfaction society is ordered. Man naturally moves toward the good, in which the operative faculty finds its fulfillment and repose. It will therefore assume different aspects according to the various human tendencies and faculties. In the spiritual order, the intellect tends toward the good under the aspect of truth, whereas the will is concerned with the good that is essentially human, namely, moral good. In the sensible order, the common object of the various faculties is the pleasurable good, toward which they tend with no further purpose than their own satisfaction. The elements, therefore, that enter into the composition of c., understood as the perfection of the common good, are truth, moral good and pleasurable good. A society may then be called civilized when there have been realized within it the broadest expansion of truth in its manifold forms—religious, speculative, scientific and practical—the most undisputed dominion of moral good in private and public life, with observance of the laws of nature and of positive norms inspired by justice, and the widest diffusion of material well-being, which at the same time facilitates the pursuit of truth and the triumph of morality. To these three orders of good—intellectual, moral and material—all other means that enhance the splendor and well-being of associated life can and must be reduced, as well as all the varied forms of civil life in which the tendency toward society is actualized according to the character, needs and aptitudes of each people.
Within c. one must distinguish constant elements from variable elements; upon the latter depends the particular physiognomy it assumes as times and circumstances change. The constant elements are represented by the goods mentioned above, which, being its essential components, must necessarily be found in every particular form of civil life. The variable elements depend either upon the degree of perfection attained by different peoples in possessing them, or upon accidental superstructures deriving from the environment, from the character and psychological aptitude of those who operate them, or from cultural contacts with other peoples. Every people reacts differently to external stimuli and assumes a different posture in expressing truth, goodness and beauty. Hence the great variety in the forms assumed by thought, art, laws and customs, traditions and institutions.
The hierarchy among the values composing c. is thereby also implicitly determined. At the highest level stand the spiritual values, which constitute its soul; at the level
