SOCIOLOGY. — The term s. was first used by A. Comte (Cours de philos. posit., IV, lecture 47, Paris 1839, p. 252) to designate the positive study of the laws governing social phenomena.
I. EMPIRICAL OR DESCRIPTIVE S
The study of social phenomenology is already present among Greco-Roman historians and philosophers, not only as a comparative observation of human customs, but also as an ascertainment of phenomenal constants and of the social conditioning of human activity.Although Herodotus, still entangled in mythical considerations, did not arrive, despite his precious ethnological observations, at the concept of social laws, these were identified by Thucydides, who, in the light of the general law of power, attempted an explanation of the origin and development of the Peloponnesian War (cf. W. Jaeger, Paideia, translated by L. Emery, 2nd ed., Florence 1943, p. 559 ff.). In Plato too one may note “an effort to treat economic and social facts scientifically” (L. Robin, Platon et la science sociale, in La pensée hellén. dès orig. à Epicure, Paris 1942, p. 229); but it is Aristotle who makes the positive study of social matters an essential element of his philosophical-political conception: for he not only compiled a collection of 158 Greek constitutions, but in the Politica studied the morphology (II, IV, VI), the dynamism, and the pathology (I, V) of constitutions in the light of social determinants of an ethical, psychological, economic, and environmental nature (cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotele, translated by A. Spinelli, Bari 1946, p. 390 ff.).
In the modern era, the impetus toward the study of social phenomenology came from the great geographical discoveries, which aroused interest in the problem of civilization and made possible the scientific use of the comparative method. Above all, the rapid demographic, economic, and scientific development of the nineteenth century contributed to it; this development generated a broad and complex social problematic and consequently the autonomous emergence of innumerable social sciences, together with the need for a science that would study the social fact in its essential unity. This social science was called by the Saint-Simonians “new science” and by Comte first “social physics,” and later “s.” But the positivistic and naturalistic mentality that underlay the emergence of s. long prevented it from establishing itself in its scientific value as an inductive inquiry into the laws of the social fact as such, although from the first half of the nineteenth century the methodology of this inquiry had already been identified: in addition to the application of the comparative method, the statistical method (J. Quételet, Sur l'homme et le développement de ses facultés en Essai de physique sociale, Paris 1835) and the method of monographs and surveys (F. Le Play, Les ouvriers européens, ibid. 1855). For Comte, s. is the general and supreme science, whose object is social phenomena as an indivisible whole, with the aim of establishing the laws of specific human nature as it expresses itself in society (Système de polit. posit., ibid. 1851–54): he denies any scientific value to the particular social sciences because they distinguish an indivisible whole, and therefore wishes them to be completely absorbed by s. (Cours de philos. posit., V, ibid. 1852, p. 271). Spencer, on the other hand, maintains the necessity of the social sciences in order, through them, to arrive at a higher synthesis, namely s., which in itself “integrally assimilates the vast heterogeneous aggregate,” giving it a unitary meaning (Principles of sociology, I, New York 1882, p. 462). Smali holds the same view, defining s. as “an attempt to integrate and generalize all knowledge, with reference to the various influences that act upon human associations” (General sociology, Chicago 1905, p. 7). F. H. Giddings, on the other hand, makes s. a basic science whose specific purpose is to study “the nature of the socius, its habits and its activities” (Elements of sociology, New York 1898, p. 10). All these conceptions lead to a sociological absolutism in which s., as a positive science, comes to replace philosophical interpretation and to represent the explanatory meaning of the whole of human phenomenology: thus one arrives at a genuine sociologism, which finds its fullest expression in the sociological school of E. Durkheim (Division du travail, Paris 1893; Les règles de la méthode sociologique, ibid. 1895).
In opposition to this exaggerated pre-eminence of s., J. MELLO (v.) denies the necessity and even the possibility of s. as a special science (A system of logic, New York 1934, p. 547 ff.), and many modern scholars remain in a wholly empirical position, considering s. more as a method of inquiry or a “sociological spirit” than as a true science distinct from the numerous social sciences (cf. J. Lecherq, Introduction à la s., Louvain 1948, p. 199). Certainly empirical s., like every science concerned with human activity, cannot be considered a perfect science, since it is unable to arrive at an interpretation of social phenomenology and at a certainty comparable to that of the natural sciences. But the question is whether s. has an object of inquiry of its own that distinguishes it from the other social sciences: the majority of contemporary sociologists, especially in the United States of America, affirm this, without any longer claiming to grant it particular pre-eminence over the others (H. E. Barnes-H. Becker, Social thought from love to science, I, New York 1938, p. x). The Dictionary of sociology (ibid. 1944, p. 302) considers the proper object of s. to be “the phenomena that arise from the group relations of human beings,” or also “man and his human environment in their reciprocal relations.” The task of empirical or descriptive s. is to study that complex social conditioning in which all human activity must be concretized, both in its totality and in its particular aspects. In this way it makes use of all the data of the various social sciences, while also reconsidering them all from its own point of view, thereby establishing an intimate interdependence of the greatest value for an adequate knowledge of the whole of social phenomenology. Avoiding every philosophical postulate and every attempt to arrive at unscientific interpretations or generalizations, empirical s. must remain on the plane of systematic observations and methodical verifications of phenomenal hypotheses, in order to establish the laws of social conditioning.
II. RATIONAL SOCIOLOGY
The interpretation of social concreteness can be founded only on hypotheses drawn from philosophy, which alone, by establishing the nature of man and of his activity, can comprehend the entire social phenomenology in its intimate human meaning. Positivism (v.), which claimed to replace philosophy with empirical sociology as the positive science interpreting society and the whole of human life, did nothing more than apply philosophical presuppositions to a more or less valid scientific investigation.The emergence of rational sociology is intimately connected with the formation, in the eighteenth century, history (v.) and of the problem of the origin of civilization and progress. G. B. Vico (v.), who may be regarded as its first representative, indicated its nature by observing that «aver mancato per metà così i filosofi che non accertarono le loro ragioni con l'autorità de' filologi, come i filologi che non curarono d'avverare le loro autorità con la ragion de' filosofi» (Scienza nuova seconda, I, sez. 2, cv. 140, Bari 1942, p. 77). Whereas Hegelian idealism denied every possibility of sociology, reducing the whole historical-social reality to a moment in the rational dialectic of the Idea, Marxism, with its theories of the preponderance of the economic factor, of ideal superstructures, and of class struggle, laid the foundations for a veritable sociological doctrine interpreting all social and historical facts in the dialectical materialism (v.) (cf. F. Engels, Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigenfahms und des Staats, Zurigo 1884).
Naturalistic sociological theories proceed from a twofold philosophical premise: human activity is bound by a natural determinism; and society is conceived either atomistically, as the resultant of individual energies, or realistically, as a totality prior to individuals. Naturalistic conceptions, both those based on nominalist atomism and those based on totalitarian realism, are concerned with determining the predominant natural factors by which to explain the whole of social phenomenology, not only on the morphological plane but also on the dynamic plane. Naturalist sociologists, in conformity with the philosophers of history, sought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to establish the laws of an evolutionary progress proceeding in a straight, constant, uniform, and universal line (cf. P. T. Sorokin, Social and cultural dynamics, I, Nuova York 1937, cap. 4); in the course of the twentieth century, however, rejecting the linear theory, they became increasingly interested in studying processes of social transformation, in order to establish the laws of their constants, variations, and cyclical repetitions. The representatives of the physico-mechanistic or dynamic school (E. Solvay, W. Ostwald, W. Bekheteref) and of the geographical school (W. S. Jevons, H. L. Moore) proceed from cosmosocial factors; those of the biological schools (E. G. Conklin, F. Galton, K. Pearson, H. S. Chamberlain, C. Lombroso), in order to establish the determining biosocial factor, have recourse evolution (v.), natural selection or adaptation, heredity, and race; those of the innumerable psychological schools (v. SOCIETÀ) explain the psychosocial factor through the various theories of instincts, feelings, desires, attitudes, behaviors, reactions, imitation, etc.; finally, those of the properly sociological school (Durkheim) aim to establish the specifically and exclusively social solidarity (v.) and in the mechanism of the collective consciousness.
W. Diltey (Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, Lipsia 1883) rightly opposed positivist sociology, asserting that the sciences of the spirit cannot be treated in the same manner as the natural sciences. To this end he had recourse to inner experience (Erlebnis), rejecting every attraction arising from the crude analysis of facts, since only vital intuition can provide the intimate meaning of historical-social reality: the study of history and society must be carried out through categories by which the individual becomes an interpreter of the reality vitally united to him (Lebensseinheit). From these principles German sociology developed, in opposition to naturalism, though often in hybrid confusion with II. F. Tönnies (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 1887) attempts to establish a «pure sociology» whose object is social bonds (Verbundenheiten), according to the two fundamental categories (op. cit., 2ª ed., ivi 1912) of «community» and «society», derived from the psychological experience of the forms of human willing, whether spontaneous or vital, and reflective or rational (cf. J. Leif, La s. de Tönnies, Parigi 1946). G. Simmel is the initiator of purely «formal» sociology (Sociologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, Lipsia 1908); leaving the study of social «content» to the social sciences and to empirical sociology, he intends to devote himself exclusively to social «forms», resulting from possible interindividual relations determined by psychological analysis (Le problème de la s., in Rev. métap. 2 [1894], p. 497). Max Weber, aligning himself more closely with Diltey and Rickert, conceives the social fact as essentially historical and therefore comprehensible only through subjective intuition: he establishes «comprehensive sociology» (verstehende Soziologie), whose task is to identify the «Idealtypus», establishing a «Zweckrationales Schema» that makes it possible to attain the subjectively conceived meaning of social forms, and hence the inner motive of all
social acts (Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgesch., Tubinga 1924). In O. Spann (Gesellschaftslehre, Lipsia 1914; Der wahre Staat, ivi 1921), sociology rises to a veritable metaphysics of the Platonic type. O. Spengler (Der Untergang des Abendlandes, Monaco 1918-22) likewise seems to give society, understood as culture, a metaphysical meaning, to which he strangely links that of a living body with its life course, turning sociology into a metaphysical novel with a pessimistic background. Historicist sociology was developed above all by A. Weber (Kulturgesch. und Kultursoziologie, Leyda 1935), who views the entire historical-social process according to the fundamental concepts of society, civilization, and culture; and by K. Mannheim (Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus, ivi 1935).
Much more important is phenomenological sociology, whose principal representatives are Max Scheler (Versuche zu einer Soz. des Wissens, Monaco 1924; Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Lipsia 1926), A. Vierkant (Gesellschaftslehre, 2ª ed., Stoccarda 1928), and Th. Litt (Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3ª ed., Lipsia 1926). To exclude the danger of totalitarianism into which many representatives of German sociology had fallen, G. Gurvitch elaborates the doctrine of «social pluralism», viewing sociology as the expression of various fixed and immutable social forms which, by being linked together in different ways, constitute the social complex amalgamated in the unity of «social control» (various authors, Le contrôle social, in La sociologie au XXe siècle, I, Parigi 1947, p. 271 sgg.).
All these sociological theories, founded on formal categories, abstract forms of relationships, and the purely phenomenological analysis of consciousness, cannot interpret the concrete reality of society, but can only construct arbitrary hypotheses. Rational sociology can be founded only on hypotheses derived from the metaphysics of the human person. For Christian sociologists, therefore, it must be founded on the consideration that all social activity, including that proper to the social complex, is essentially the enduring expression of individual rationality and freedom, which, although conditioned by biological, physical, psychological, and sociological natural laws, asserts itself in social «collaboration» for the realization of its eternal end through the attainment of finite goods.
The object of rational sociology is the positive study of society in concrete terms, in its immanent meaning as a historical process, with the aim of establishing the laws that determine its formation and development. Its purpose is not to make value judgments, but to interpret the historical-social reality. Nevertheless, through the verification of hypotheses and the determination of social laws, it makes possible a full understanding of the social nature of man and consequently the subsequent formulation of value judgments, which will become criteria for practical activity through philosophy and social policy. L. Sturzo, linking his position to that of Vico (G. Marchello, Storicismo e spiritualismo, in Riv. intern. di scienze sociali, 22 [1950], fasc. 1), attempts to establish a historicist sociology on these principles, applying the historicist method to the positive study of society in concrete terms (La società: sua natura e sue leggi, Bergamo 1949, p. 28).
He also defends the necessity of a sociology of the supernatural, since only through theological hypotheses can an adequate interpretation be given of the social reality in which the supernatural life of individuals and of the Church operates (cf. La vera vita, Rome 1947).
Contemporary thought, despite the negative attitude of idealism and relativism and the justified distrust of the majority of spiritualist philosophers, feels the need to arrive at an exact formulation of rational sociology, as a positive science distinct from descriptive sociology and social philosophy.
metodo sociolog., there 1950; A. Cullivier, Manuel de s., 2 vols., Paris 1950; V. J. Mc Gill, La tendance dominante des doctr. soc. en Amérique, in various authors, L'activité philos. contemp. en France et aux États-Unis, I, there 1950, p. 382 ff.; B. Magnino, S., Brescia 1953. Tullio Piacentini