SCHELER, MAX. – Philosopher, born in Munich on 22 August 1875, died in Frankfurt am Main on 19 May 1928. He first taught as a Privatdozent in Jena and Munich, and then (1919) as a professor in Cologne.
He is the principal continuator of Husserl’s (v.) phenomenological school in the ethical-social field. His theoretical position in relation to his teacher is defined as follows in the work Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode (Leipzig 1900): the unity of the form or category is superior to the processes or activities unified by it; these constitute the object of phenomenology; the categories are contemplated, in their transcendental aspect, through an inductive procedure from the lower world of experience, which recognizes them as the supramundane realm of consciousness, the world of values; and they therefore present themselves with an appearance inverse to their true nature, so that, in order to re-evaluate them ontologically, this must be reversed (not the contemplative values in themselves, as both the Nietzschean formulas and socialism proposed). These criteria inspire S.’s two fundamental works: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertetida, a new essay in the foundation of an ethical personalism (in Husserl’s Jahrbücher, 1913–16; 2nd ed., Halle 1921), and Vom Umsturz der Werte (= On the Overturning of Values, memoirs and essays, 2 vols., Leipzig 1915; 2nd ed. 1919). The definition of values as an objective, Platonic reality makes it possible to assign to phenomenal consciousness the Kantian formality of morality as its unity, and to values the metaphysics of ethics, insofar as they are real qualities and possess their own matter according to which they are recognized by us. The psychological world comes entirely to depend on these values, and to become detached from the physical world, whose parallelism S. denies. The empirical concreteness of the psyche is distinguished by the positive developments of negative principles, such as resentment (Über Resentiment und morale Wertetida, Leipzig 1912) and sympathy (Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Bonn 1923). In this, like all phenomenologists, positivism (v.). He moves away from it once more, however, with his theory of religion as having an absolute and contemplative foundation in the intuition of God. The phenomenology of religion nevertheless studies acts and objects of worship and faith, as well as the empirical knowledge of the essence of religion. Religion and morality mutually postulate one another and justify a theistic metaphysics (which, according to S., is prior a priori to pantheistic forms) and a history of humanity consistent with sacred history and with the existence of a worldly principle of evil and rebellion. These ingenious and paradoxical doctrines, however, were repeatedly bent by S. toward nationalist interests, both on the occasion of the First World War (Krieg und Aufbau, Leipzig 1916; Deutschlands Sendung u. d. kathol. Gedanke, Berlin 1918; etc.) and in favor of National Socialism and neopaganism (Vom Ewigen im Menschen, I, 1928).