SCHELER, MAX. - Philosopher, b. in Munich on 22 Aug. 1875, d. in Frankfurt am Main on 19 May 1928. He first taught as a Privatdozent in Jena and Munich, then (1919) as a professor in Cologne.
He is the principal continuer of Husserl’s phenomenological school (v.) in the ethical-social field. His theoretical position in relation to his master is thus defined in the work Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode (Leipzig 1900): the unity of form or category is superior to the processes or activities unified by it; these form the object of phenomenology; the categories are contemplated, in their transcendental aspect, through an inductive process from the lower world of experience, which recognizes them as the supra-sense of consciousness, the world of values; and thus they present themselves with an aspect inverse to their true nature, so that, in order to ontologically re-evaluate them, this must be reversed (not the contemplative values in themselves, as proposed by Kantian formulas and socialism). These criteria inspire the two fundamental works of Scheler: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, a new essay in the foundation of ethical personalism (in Husserl’s Jahrbücher, 1913-16; 2nd ed. Halle 1921) and Vom Umsturz der Werte (On the Reversal of Values), memoirs and essays, 2 vols., Leipzig 1915; 2nd ed. 1919. The definition of values as an objective, Platonic reality allows the phenomenal consciousness to be assigned the formal Kantian morality as its unity, and to them the metaphysics of ethics, inasmuch as they are real qualities and have their own matter according to which they are recognized by us. The psychological world comes entirely to depend on these values and to detach itself from the physical world, of which S. denies parallelism. The empirical concreteness of the psyche is distinguished by positive developments of negative principles, such as resentment (Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil, Leipzig 1912) and sympathy (Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Bonn 1923). In this, as with all phenomenologists, he draws near to positivism (v.). He then distances himself from it with his theory of religion as having an absolute and contemplative foundation in the intuition of God. The phenomenology of religion, however, studies acts and objects of worship and faith and empirical knowledge of the essence of religion. Religion and morality reciprocally postulate and justify a theistic metaphysics (which, according to S., is a priori and precedes patentistic forms) and a history of humanity in conformity with sacred history and the existence of a worldly principle of evil and rebellion. These brilliant and paradoxical doctrines were, however, repeatedly bent by S. to nationalist interests, both on the occasion of the First World War (Krieg und Aufbau, Leipzig 1916; Deutschland und der katholische Gedanke, Berlin 1918; etc.) and in favor of National Socialism and neopaganism (Vom Ewigen im Menschen, I, 1928).