Autonomy

AUTONOMIA. – From the Greek αὐτονομία, it is, in general, the ability to govern oneself by one’s own laws.

I. SOCIAL A

Rousseau’s system and the consequent social and economic liberalism are founded on the a. of the will. The Social Contract opens with a phrase that is the epitome of the philosophy of rationalistic Enlightenment: “man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” A consequence of this principle is the pre-social state of nature, in which, according to Rousseau’s conception, man would have been subject only to the law of his will and instincts. The contract, in turn, by which social life would have begun, is merely an expedient intended to preserve man’s original a. The problem that Rousseau intended to solve through it consisted in finding a type of association in which man would obey no one but himself and remain as free as before. Popular sovereignty, too, was imposed by the same theoretical presupposition. Since the general will is the arithmetical sum of individual wills, it does not diminish the a. of its subjects, since, in obeying it, they would be obeying themselves.

Kant’s social thought follows the same line, as the more systematic advocate of the autonomist principle, from which he derives his concept of law, understood as the totality of conditions under which the arbitrary will of one person can coexist with that of others, according to a general law of freedom. For Kant, the social problem is reduced to the preservation of the original a. of the will; this leads him to conceive of law as a means intended to regulate the coexistence of contrasting freedoms and to establish the following universal norm of associated life: “act in such a way that the free exercise of your own freedom may coexist with the freedom of every other.” From these premises arose Lassalle’s theory of the police state or “night-watchman state” and the liberal conception in all its nuances.

An opposing current, however, constructed State absolutism upon the same principle. It replaces atomistic individualism with an organic conception of society, but distorts its meaning. Both positivism and materialist sociologism, as well as spiritualist idealism, conceive of society either as the effect of fatal cosmic and biological laws or as the final stage of the necessary evolution of absolute spirit; and they attribute to it a superior will, perfectly distinct from that of individuals, to which they subject without remainder the cells of the organism or the transitory phenomena of the spirit.

The will of this abstract entity is, in turn, conceived as entirely autonomous, intolerant of any external law and a law unto itself. Hence the dogma prevailing in modern social and juridical doctrine concerning the unlimited nature of the will of the State, elevated into the sole source of law, including the law which it is called upon to observe. The transfer of the autonomist principle from the individual to the State is clearly shown in Jellinek’s theory of self-limitation, evidently constructed by applying the Kantian schema to the State. The ultimate consequence, however, is diametrically opposed, since the absolute a. of the will of the State leads to oppression and tyranny. The a. of the will thus appears as a double-edged sword which, in the hands of the individual, severs every bond of subjection to authority and, in the hands of the State, cuts off man’s head, suppressing his freedom.

The two opposite consequences already demonstrate the falsity of the principle, further revealed by the order of nature, the testimony of conscience, and the concept of law and obligation. Objective experience teaches that every entity is guided by an internal law in the exercise of its activity; since it is a law of nature, this law is at once immanent and transcendent, insofar as nature postulates a supreme creator as its sufficient reason. Although man is the noblest part of the visible cosmos, he is no exception to this incontrovertible fact of experience and therefore bears, even more deeply embedded in his rational nature, a law of his own being, at once immanent and transcendent, with which the a. of the will is incompatible.

The immediate testimony of conscience confirms this conclusion. Among the most universal and profound convictions of the human race is that according to which man is not the author of the law, since he feels not only that he cannot change it, but also that he must observe it as a categorical prescription. The dictate of conscience is, in fact, absolute, expressing an inescapable ought, inexplicable on the supposition of the total a. of the will. Law, moreover, is not advice, a directive, or an ideal, but a precept, a command, an injunction. It therefore essentially presupposes a dualism of wills: a will from which the command proceeds and a will to which it is addressed, since it is entirely self-evident that no one can command himself. The total a. of the will could be upheld only on the absurd supposition that no law exists, whether moral or juridical.

The considerations set forth retain all their force with respect to the State, which, being a natural moral entity, likewise bears, connected with its own being, a law that is at once immanent and transcendent; it does not create this law, but finds it already constituted and must acknowledge it, subjecting its own will to its prescriptions. Otherwise, social life would be abandoned to arbitrariness, and the ethical essence of law would be inexplicable.

castroparano, Trani 1892; G. Jellinek, La dottrina generale dello Stato, Milan 1921; N. Bobbio, La persona e la società, Naples 1938; B. Magnino, Storia della sociologia, there 1939; A. Messineo, Autorità e libertà, Rome 1945. Antonio Messineo
II. A. ETHICS. — In the broadest sense, “moral a.” is the independence of human reason and will from every extrinsic norm or law, as regards the foundation and constitutive principles of morality. Hence the expression “autonomous ethics,” used to designate any system of morality founded solely on human nature, affirmed as the first source of ethical law and the ultimate norm of good and evil. The author of moral a. in modern philosophy is Kant. For Kant, a. is that character of the will, absolutely necessary to morality, whereby it determines itself solely by virtue of the universal form of the law that it bears within itself. For if, in its action, the will were to allow itself to be determined by any extrinsic motive, following the impulse and activity of empirical good, or submitting to a law coming from outside, then, in one way or another, it would act for hedonistic or eudemonistic ends, and morality itself would fail along with a. The sole source of obligation and determination is, and must remain, practical reason, which posits the unconditional moral law and makes it felt through the categorical imperative. “The a. of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties corresponding to them”; “The sole principle of morality consists in independence from all matter of the law”; “The moral law expresses nothing other than the a. of pure practical reason” (Critica della Ragione Pratica, I, 1, § 4, Bari 1924, p. 40). Kantian a. is taken up and strengthened in Fichte’s idealism, in which the moral law is the reason and stimulus of the development of the I; and the I itself, in its free activity and expansion, is essentially self-determination, moral a.

After Kant, while on the one hand positivist-materialist currents dissolve ethics into utilitarianism, moral a., variously understood according to the different metaphysical interpretations of human nature, becomes the common conception of rationalist systems that claim to find, in every subjection of the human will to an extrinsic or transcendent law, an insatiable corruption of the purity and independence of morality, which can arise and flourish only from the root of the purest human a. But it is not difficult to see that a. in the Kantian and rationalist sense also leads, by another route, to the consequences of utilitarianism, since it is unable to preserve the absoluteness of moral values. Indeed, no true and unconditional necessity can accompany the moral law if, outside the individual and human reason—which certainly cannot be identified with the Absolute except by lapsing into pantheistic systems—there is no eternal value of truth and order in which good and evil, and therefore the moral law, find their ultimate reason and foundation.

Nor, in this conception of Christian ethics, which places in God the supreme reason for morality, is that true a. which rightly claims the human person thereby annulled. For the moral law, in its principles and in all its particular determinations, is not posited as extrinsic to man; rather, it is an expression of the order and value of human nature in its intrinsic relation to the Absolute, and thus truly becomes the law that man bears within himself, in the deepest interiority of his moral being. Therefore, obeying the law does not mean submitting to a norm imposed from outside, but ultimately bringing free action into accord with the most immanent demands of rational human nature. And even when the morality of an action undertaken for the sake of reward and happiness is defended—against the formal rigidity of Kantian morality, and, earlier still, of Stoic morality—one does not thereby fall into a heteronomy destructive of the purity of morality, since the end of reward is affirmed as essential and intrinsic to the moral order, as it is and is concretely determined in the relations of the human creature (v. ETICA).

IBEL: E. Kant, Critica della Ragione pratica, Bari 1924, especially part 1, chaps. 1 and 3. — L. Ihmels, Theonomie und Autonomie im Lichte der christlichen Ethik, Leipzig 1903; G. Windelband, Storia della filos. moderna, II, Florence 1942, p. 283 ff.; P. Martinetti, Kant, Milan 1943, chaps. 13, 14, pp. 161–201. The question is also discussed, more or less extensively, in the various treatises on ethics: cf., among others, Fr. Tillmann, Die philosophische Grundlegung der katholischen Sittenlehre, II, Düsseldorf 1938, pp. 236–41. Ugo Viglino
III. JURIDICAL AUTONOMY. — In juridical language, autonomy also denotes the power possessed by an entity to establish, through its own organs, the rules governing its organization and internal activity, even if such rules must be submitted for approval to a higher authority, or must, in order to be valid and effective, not conflict with the rules or other measures issued by a higher entity or authority. As can therefore be seen, autonomy is a very broad concept admitting of various degrees, since sovereignty may also fall within II. The broad and unitary notion of autonomy dates back to the first decades of the last century.

It may be said that autonomy belongs, to some extent, person (v.), given that all have at least the ius statuendi vel condendi statuta; but, excepting sovereign societies (primary or original juridical orders, perfect societies), such as the Catholic Church and the State, the autonomy of all juridical persons is limited at least in this respect: that the statutes and other rules issued by them have no validity unless they do not conflict with the juridical order of the perfect society to whose sovereignty the juridical person is subject.

In canon law, autonomy is recognized in a particularly marked way (and generally was recognized to a greater extent in past centuries) in cathedral or collegiate chapters, monasteries, religious associations, universities and faculties, and associations of the faithful. But, excepting exempt clerical religious institutes, the autonomy possessed by these entities does not appear to include the power to issue genuine juridical rules, but at most rules of a nature not unlike that of contractual provisions.

Each chapter must draw up its own statutes (through a collegiate decision of the chapter’s members), which are nevertheless subject to the approval of the bishop (can. 410). The statutes regulate the chapter’s internal affairs, such as: the number and duties of its various members and auxiliary offices; the time, place, and various procedures for the acts of the chapter and the religious functions to be performed by the chapter; the administration of property and the distribution of revenues, and so forth. Although chapter statutes may not derogate from pontifical or diocesan laws, some of the CIC’s provisions concerning chapters nevertheless have a supplementary character, that is, they are binding only if the chapter statutes do not provide otherwise (can. 397).

Religious institutes (religious associations), and often, in monastic orders, individual monasteries as well (autonomous or sui iuris monasteries), must have their own statutes or constitutions, to which the CIC repeatedly refers (cf. cann. 489, 500 § 2, 501, 504, 505, 507, 509 § 2 n. 1, 532, 593, 612, 618 § 2 n. 1, and many others); these constitutions are subject, according to the circumstances, to the approval of the Holy See or the ordinary. In addition, religious superiors and Chapters or councils may issue rules governing the internal life of the religious institute; in exempt clerical religious institutes, these rules may also constitute genuine legislative provisions (cf. can. 501); in these same institutes, certain superiors also possess judicial powers (cf. cann. 654 agg., 1579, 1594 § 4).

As regards statutes, what has been said concerning religious institutes also applies to associations of common life without vows (cf. cann. 673 § 1, 675 § 1, 676 § 3, 677, 679, 681), and to secular institutes (cf. apostolic constitution Provida Mater, 2 February 1947, in AAS, 37 [1947], pp. 114-24, and Instruction of the S. Congregation of Religious, 19 March 1928, in AAS, 40 [1948], pp. 293-97).

Every ecclesiastical university or faculty has its own statutes, which must be approved by the Holy See (can. 1376 § 2, arts. 5 and 20 of the apostolic constitution Deus scientiarum Dominus, 25 May 1931, in AAS, 23 [1931], pp. 241-62; S. Congregation of Seminaries, Ordinationes, 12 June 1931, arts. 3, 40, 47 and appendix 2ᵃ, in AAS, 23 [1931], pp. 263-80), and the academic authorities of individual universities and faculties may issue other rules or measures for the proper administration of the institution.

Associations of the faithful (chiefly the Third Orders, confraternities, and pious unions) likewise have the power to establish their own statutes, which are nevertheless subject, according to the circumstances, to the approval of the Holy See or the ordinary (cann. 689, 697, 715 § 1); and they possess other limited powers of autonomy.