VIRTÙ - Enciclopedia Cattolica, Vol. XII, p. 924

Machine translation of the 1948–1954 Italian original. The original text is authoritative.

VIRTUE. —

I. GENERAL CONCEPTS

Virtue is a quality that perfects an operative faculty, disposing it well in relation to its activity and the attainment of the end toward which the subject tends or is destined. Thus, we speak of intellectual virtues and moral virtues to indicate the good dispositions of the intellectual faculty in relation to theoretical-practical knowledge, or of the appetitive faculty in relation to right action. Under the name of virtue, therefore, there is generally designated an intermediate reality between the faculty and the operation, and more properly only a perfective quality of the rational powers in relation to their proper operation.

1. Habit and the operative faculty

Already Aristotle characterized this disposition as a habit (ἕξις) or acquired disposition, which adds to the idea of a simple disposition (διάθεσις) the specification of a stable and permanent disposition (Nicomachean Ethics, bk. II, ch. 6, 1106 b). Not every disposition of the faculties is therefore a habit or acquired disposition. It must be that the disposition is stable and difficult to remove (difficile mobilitas) to constitute a habit (cf. Boethius, In categ. Arist., I, III; PL 64, 242 D - 243 A). The phenomenological and vitalist positivist currents of the late century cannot rise to the classical idea of habit, given the leveling they establish between the operative behaviors of brute animals and man, reducing the latter’s activity to a phenomenological complex or to a mechanism governed by biological, physical, and chemical laws. The constancy of the determination of the faculty to a given act is in fact a factor of a spiritual nature. It is, indeed, like a second nature in man, a new state with respect to his proper operation, rooted in his very being, and which in some way imposes itself on his original being; but this imposition does not consist in a tyrannical determinism over the faculties, as if habit imposed action with the force of automatic necessity, entirely substituting itself for the spontaneity of the purely natural faculty. On the contrary, the faculty and the habit become almost connatural, in a mutual adaptation that leaves absolutely unchanged the proper nature of the faculties and their subjection to the control of reason and will in operation. Far from creating determinism, the Scholastic habitus renders the faculty more subject to reason and more manageable by the will, facilitating activity through a stable disposition to execution.

2. Habit and virtue

Not every habit, therefore, is a virtue, but only that which: a) disposes well, that is, gives facility to act according to the nature of the subject disposed; b) disposes the power to operation, and in this it is distinguished from other permanent dispositions or substantial and entitative habits, which are immediately subject in the substance or nature, and only indirectly in the faculties rooted in it; it does not dispose every power, but those of a rational order: that is, those of rational nature or those connected with them, such as the sensitive powers; and finally, and above all, in which resides the Christian and spiritual sense of virtue, the habit disposes the faculties not only to their own operation but above all to the right exercise and good employment of it (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 55, a. 4; Lombard, Sent., bk. 2, d. 17, ch. 5).

3. The moral order and virtue

Virtue in the strict sense is not an innate habit, but either acquired or supernaturally infused. Only in these can the moral aspect connected with the concept of virtue be found, namely, the stable disposition “quae recte vivitur et qua nullus male utitur”; the innate habit is a simple tendency, which entity-wise is confused with the powers themselves, and therefore does not merit the name of true virtue (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 49, a. 3).

The salient point, or, as Duns Scotus says, the “formal element” of virtue, is above all (but not exclusively) the relation between faculty, activity, and the ultimate end to be attained. Thus, a habit, to be a principle of moral action, must not only dispose to the perfect exercise of the faculty, but it rises to moral value insofar as the good disposition to operation makes easier the use and direction of the faculty to operate in view of the end to be attained.

II. THE VARIOUS KINDS OF VIRTUE

4. Diversity of virtues according to the faculties informed

From this point of view, intellectual virtues are commonly distinguished from moral virtues: the former are habits disposing the intellectual faculties, and the latter those disposing the appetitive faculties. But beyond this rather external difference, there is a deeper one, by which moral virtues, influencing the will, ensure that it, besides acting perfectly, also uses itself well in relation to the end and to what leads to the end (the specifically human acts); intellectual habits, on the other hand, are only ordered to the perfection of the act in itself, but not to the right use of the faculty, because the use or application of this to the act depends solely on the will, that is, on another faculty that directs II. This disposition of the intellectual faculty acquires moral value insofar as it renders it more manageable to control, and thus to the moral direction impressed by the will.

Moreover, the reduction of the speculative order to the moral order is required by another, more general consideration. Since the moral order embraces the end and all that leads to the end (human acts), the acts of the intellect cannot definitively be excluded from this consideration, both because the intellect, its habits, and its object are an efficient cause of subjective beatitude (contemplation) or of the very objective beatitude (God, the highest object of speculation), and insofar as intellectual acts, under the direction of the moving effect, can merit in view of the attainment of the end, and finally because even contemplation in this life is like the embryo of that of the future life (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 56, a. 3). It should also be noted that the virtue of faith is an intellectual virtue and, despite this, is a true virtue, and prudence is a true moral virtue, even though it resides in the intellect. It is the connection of the faculties themselves, and the extension of their fields of action, that causes intellectual and moral virtues to be linked in a solid moral structure; the mutual influence of the faculties—the intellect in rectifying the will and the will in applying the intellect and directing activity toward the moral end—gives the seal of morality even to intellectual habits, whose acts would not properly have perfect moral value, given that in themselves they do not adequately fulfill the concept of a human act, and also because they proceed from purely speculative habits, which do not have the power to apply and direct them to moral or immoral use.

In conclusion, for the morality of human acts it is required that they conform to right reason and proceed from an affection well-ordered in relation to man’s end. Now if it is true that the intellectual virtue, e.g., prudence, is not sufficient for the goodness of such an act, inasmuch as it serves only to direct the will in the choice and determination, and must itself be moved by the will to apply itself to its directive act (the act of prudence), on the other hand it is also true that the will needs to be directed by intellectual prudence in order to be morally upright in directing man to the human act. From this it follows that for that which is interior in the human act there are required in equal measure the intellect and its virtues (to judge the rationality of the act to be performed), and also the will which, inasmuch as it pertains to the act as good, orders it to the right end. As for the exteriority of the act, however, it is only the will that moves to its execution. The speculative virtue, therefore, for that part of the act which is interior, is a true virtue or operative habit, which participates in the morality of the act in the same proportion as the internal act must correspond to the external act (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 57, a. 3, ad 1).

5. Diversity of virtues as to their origin: innate, acquired, and infused virtues

a) If the habit is a permanent disposition brought about by the very specific and individual nature of the subject, there is the innate or natural virtue, which is nothing other than the predisposition of each faculty to develop in its primordial acts. b) The acquired virtue, on the other hand, is that which man himself procures for his faculties, whether by the repetition of acts or by bending them through exercise to full submission. It is like the result of a training of the spirit in its field of activity. In this formative task of virtue it is clear that the personal will represents the principal part above all external factors influencing the faculty, causing the innate predisposition or habit to pass from unconscious spontaneity to personal mastery, so as to direct itself autonomously throughout the vast network of activity opened before its possibility, in a full determination of the individual act to be performed and of its actual exercise. This is realized above all in the case of acquired moral virtues or of the rational appetite, but implicitly (secundum quid) also in the intellectual virtues and in the habits of the sensitive appetite. c) Infused virtues are those produced by God Himself in the operative faculties of man. They differ from acquired virtues first of all because they do not necessarily entail a power in man to determine the faculty to operation (facility of acting well), and consequently do not facilitate activity by disposing the faculties to produce the act, which is proper to virtues acquired through human activity. This difference follows from the very manner in which infused virtues originate, which is not an autonomous perfecting of nature in its specific natural faculties, but a gratuitous addition that surpasses every natural specific power, and is therefore simply a new power given to the human faculty in order to a new act connatural to a new being, rather than a gratuitous facility to produce such an act.

III. THE INFUSED VIRTUE

6. Christian virtue is infused virtue

The general concept of virtue thus far expounded applies commonly to acquired virtue and to infused virtue, with the difference that the former is originated through human activity, and the latter is produced by God immediately in man. Here, according to the Scholastics, lies the specific difference of infused virtue.

In the general concept of virtue there must be distinguished a twofold element: one material, which is the habit or constant quality disposing the faculty, and the other formal, which is a relation between faculty, act, and ultimate end. Examining these two elements in acquired virtues, while it is easy to see that they consist in an operative habit, it is very difficult instead to establish their relation to the moral end or ultimate end. If this end to be attained lies beyond human activity and is beyond the natural exigencies of man, it is clear that no human activity can be proportioned to such an end, and therefore the operative habit of acquired virtues, being of natural origin, can never transcend to a power that leads to the supernatural end. But since the Christian knows from Revelation that his destiny is supernatural, virtue is truly such for him when it makes him act in that direction. Such virtue cannot

be other than of supernatural origin, independently of his activity.

7. Existence of infused virtues

To prove the existence of infused virtues, it must be shown that there exist in man stable qualities, operative yet distinct from the operative faculties and from the operation itself, which confer on man the power to operate in order to attain a supernatural end, qualities acquired not through human activity but infused directly by God.

From the standpoint of reason, presupposing the revelation of the supernatural vocation, a proof of a moral or fitting order may be adduced. The manner of divine Providence generally requires that God’s action upon man be exercised gently (Wis 8:1); hence the supernatural activity of man presupposes that God already grants operative principles proportionate to such a vocation and consequent activity, through which man, as it were by means of the operative habits referred to in V. ACQUASANTIERA, is inwardly strengthened and perfected in his faculties to act connaturaliter with respect to the higher end. Furthermore, granted the influence of grace as a permanent habit inherent in the substance or nature of the human soul (substantial habit), there follows a certain necessity also of operative habits consequent thereto and concomitant with it, so that the nature thus elevated may produce acts connatural to it through operative habits that are likewise infused and supernatural. This proof of fittingness is corroborated by Revelation. The messianic gifts, in fact, are described in the Old Testament as superior qualities that will enable man to act with justice and equity (Isa 11:2–4), and as an interior renewal (Ezek 36:25–31). This will not be the fruit of human industry, but solely of God (Isa 26:12). This kingdom of men, docile and in contrast to legal externalism (Jer 31:33), entails, as is more fully expressed in the New Testament, an interior holiness akin to that of God (Matt 5:48). This perfection is truly a participation in the divine nature (2 Pet 1:3–11), a new nature superimposed upon the old man (Rom 6:6); it is the very life of Jesus engraved upon our mortal flesh (2 Cor 4:10–11). It stands opposed to natural life as light to darkness (Eph 5:8–9), as a living stone to a dead stone (1 Pet 2:4–5); it is a life sprung from the word of truth (Jas 1:16–18), which is identified with truth itself (1 John 3:19). All this implies in the soul a new entitative form, a radical habit, namely sanctifying grace (v.), which permeates the very being of the soul, imparting to it a newness of life. Yet this life would not be such unless it possessed the principles whereby it could act in conformity with itself. It is for this reason that Christian preaching always joins the exaltation of interior renewal with virtuous activity. Such is the revelation contained in the Sermon on the Mount. The new covenant foretold by Jeremiah (31:33) entails a new law, entirely interior (Matt 5:6–7), which demands many virtues and the exercise of vigilance from those who wish to “enter into life” (Matt 19:17), since narrow is the way that leads thereto (Matt 7:1–14). The good, the blessed, are characterized by virtuous life: purity, mercy, humility, simplicity, fidelity, constancy (Mark 5:2–12); their life is like the anxious quest for a transcendent “treasure,” the kingdom of God and its justice (Mark 6:20 and 33). The law of life, as Jesus conceives it, is summed up in a constant will to love, to embrace all that is the love of God and of neighbor (Matt 25:37–40), and whose quality and intensity is of a divine character: “Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”

That these are indeed true virtues is clear from the characteristics that accompany these gifts of God: 1) they are stable qualities, that is, operative habits: a) “without faith it is impossible to please God” (Heb 11:6): in this text, it is not a matter of an act, but of a habitual quality, otherwise children incapable of activity could not possess it and could not please God; b) three virtues, says St. Paul, “remain” always (1 Cor 13:13), an expression that indicates the presence of habits rather than acts; c) above all, charity “never fails” (ibid. 8): a permanent and abiding quality that affects the operative principles of man who seeks to please God. 2) These qualities are infused by God into our hearts (2 Cor 5:5); charity comes from God and is the communication of the Holy Spirit who works within us (Rom 5:5; Eph 3:16–19). 3) The character of true virtues in these stable and divinely infused qualities is given by the fact that through the activity exercised by means of them, the new life in man is realized, and through their use in this life, man walks in conformity with his “heavenly calling”: such is the virtue “which, once received, no one misuses.”

Already the apologetic Fathers, in contrasting Christian life with pagan life, noted the superiority of the former by reason of the Christian virtues that guide and order man to the true good. Virtue enables the Christian to live in holiness and justice (Aristides, Apol. 15; Italian trans. by C. Vona, Rome 1950, pp. 105–10), whereas pagans are not good because they have abandoned it (Lactantius, Div. instit., bk. 5, chaps. 5–6; PL 6, 564–69); science alone is not enough, but the practice of good through virtue is also required (ibid., chaps. 16–17; PL 6, 599–604). The Fathers of the early centuries insist especially on inculcating what Christian perfection must be, namely, the imitation of Jesus through a virtuous life and the practice of self-denial. St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and later St. Gregory the Great, in their works, take up definitions and arguments from the Stoics and other pagan philosophers, but they always emphasize the supernatural character of Christian virtue: 1) it is a gratuitous gift of God (cf. St. Polycarp, Ad Eph. 3:2; St. Augustine, In Ps. 55, enarr. 19; PL 36, 695); 2) it is a habit of the soul (id., De moribus Eccl. cath., bk. 1, no. 9; PL 32, 1314); 3) it is a good habit, one that leads to God (id., Sermo 235, no. 1; PL 38, 1293; De Civ. Dei, bk. 4, chap. 21; bk. 9, chap. 4, no. 1); it is a supernatural habit because its end is eternal life (id., Ep. 140, no. 9; PL 33, 670), and because it is infused directly by God (id., De Civ. Dei, bk. 20, chap. 25; De lib. arbitrio, bk. 2, chap. 19; PL 32, 1267 ff.).

In the revealed documents of Sacred Scripture and Tradition examined, an implicit distinction is noted between the state of Christian life and the exercise of such life: man is called to a higher life and already participates in the divine nature; he must walk in a manner worthy of his vocation, so as to attain the end and receive the “imperishable crown”; he is blessed on condition that he walk the “narrow way,” the only one that leads to life; for this reason he receives from God many gifts through the Spirit who dwells permanently in him, to infuse into him charity, faith, and hope, which “remain.” The Fathers therefore speak of Christian virtues as gratuitous gifts of God, through which the Christian is good. In all these determinations, one may discern an embryonic distinction between certain permanent gifts infused by God into man and distinct from activity and operative faculties, and which are the proximate principles of these activities.

BIBL.:

The distinction between virtuous life and infused virtues, under the influence of certain scholastic controversies, begins in the Middle Ages to make its way even into ecclesiastical documents.

a) Innocent III, in his letter to Ymbert of Arles (1201), alludes to this controversy: opposing the opinion of those who maintain that in Baptism theological and other virtues, and even grace itself, are not infused into children because they are incapable of making free use of them, he sets forth another view according to which the influence of these gifts in baptized children is certain, since those virtues are conferred upon them “as habits,” not as their actual use (Denz-U, 410).

b) Clement V, at the Council of Vienne (1311–12), takes up this latter opinion and explicitly adopts it “as more probable” and more in conformity with the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, and by virtue of conciliar approval (Denz-U, II, 483). These decrees certainly teach that there exist infused, permanent gifts distinct from acts: operative habits, that is; that they are infused by God, as is clear from the very words used and from the context, since they are given with grace to baptized children incapable of acquired virtues.

c) The Council of Trent (Session 6, chap. 7), after describing the preparatory acts for justification—among which faith must be noted—affirms that justification is not only the remission of sins but also the sanctification and interior renewal of man through the reception of grace and gifts; these gifts, inasmuch as they are distinct from grace and from the acts of faith prior to justification, represent something permanent in the just, and, like grace itself, are inherent in the soul. They are “faith, hope, and charity”: all three true habits, since: 1) it is that charity which “is poured into the heart of the just and becomes inherent in him”; 2) it is that faith which “catechumens ask of the Church,” distinct therefore from the actual faith which they already have in preparing for justification, and of which baptized children are incapable. When the documents cited speak of the existence of infused virtues, a twofold assertion may be distinguished therein: a) the existence of permanent gifts, distinct from the acts produced by them; b) these gifts are true virtues or rather operative habits. The first assertion is to be held as a matter of faith, in view of the explicit wording, especially in Trent with regard to faith, hope, and charity (B. Beraza, *De virtutibus infusis*, Bilbao 1929, n. 24). The second assertion, which concerns rather the terms and corresponding philosophical concepts, is to be held as theologically certain and even proximate to faith according to Suárez (*De gratia*, I. VI, cap. 8, n. 15), and some others.

IV. Subdivision of infused virtues.

1. Infused virtues “per se” and “per accidens”: the former are virtues which man cannot in any way procure for himself, since they dispose him to a end that surpasses every natural possibility; the latter are virtues which God, the author of all nature, sometimes infuses into man, although man can procure them by his own activity (acquired virtues). It is clear that in theology only the proper infused virtues (per se) are considered, since these alone are intrinsically supernatural.

8. Infused theological and moral virtues

The virtue must lead to the ultimate end, which, objectively, is God; now, virtuous habits can attain God either immediately and directly in Himself, or mediately through an intermediate activity between man and the end. In the first case we have the theological virtues, in the second the moral.

a) Theological virtues are recognized by their object, origin, and knowability. Their object is God, which they attain immediately through their acts that unite the agent directly with the object of his end. This immediacy must be, as to its material aspect, objective and not merely reductive, as in the moral virtue of religion. God is the principal material object of the theological virtues, since there are, e.g., many other objects of faith that are not God (the Sacraments, the Church...), but which are believed because of their connection with the principal object believed. Moreover, the formal object of the theological virtues must be God immediately as God, or some divine attribute. The origin of the theological virtue is through a true and proper infusion. Theological virtues are known only through divine revelation, as has been said of infused virtues in general.

b) The infused moral virtues of which we speak here are not the moral virtues infused accidentally: these are possible, and God sometimes grants them to some of His privileged ones, but they are not necessarily required for justification. Here we are dealing with properly infused moral virtues, which differ from the corresponding acquired ones both in the ultimate end to which they direct their possessor and in their proper object: for they lead indeed to eternal life, whereas the acquired virtues aim only at the good order of human life; the proper or formal object of acquired moral virtues is the good according to human reason, which establishes their consonance with human nature, whereas the object of infused virtues is the good established by a “divine rule,” which posits the goodness of this object from a transcendent point of view (St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1, 4, ad 2.; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 63, a. 4). The existence of infused moral virtues has been denied by some theologians, but this seems little in conformity with Holy Scripture and the doctrine of the Fathers (cf. C. Mazzella, *De virtutibus infusis*, Rome 1884, p. 30).

V. Theology of infused virtues.

9. The intimate nature of infused virtues

The Aristotelian conception of virtue as a habit was taken up and handed down to the scholastics through Boethius. For him virtue is a habit or “a permanent disposition to choose, remaining in the mean, as determined by reason, as the wise man fixes it” (*In categ. Aristot.*, 1. III: PL 64, 242 D–243 A). In the same line of thought, Abelard defines virtue as “a quality naturally impressed upon the soul... and difficult to move... which raises us to the merit of true beatitude” (*Dial. inter philos. iudaeum et christ.*: PL 178, 1651–52). Abelard’s definition echoes in the schools, with some slight variation (cf. O. Lottin, *Les premières definitions et classifications des vertus au moyen âge*, in *Rev. d. sciences philos. et théol.*, 18 [1928], pp. 369–89). St. Augustine, even while gathering and commenting on definitions given by philosophers, speaks of virtue as a “habit” (*Div. quaest.*, 83, q. 31: PL 40, 20); but what characterizes his doctrine, against Pelagianism, is the insistence on declaring its divine origin (*De civ. Dei*, 1. XX, cap. 25: PL 41, 762). This characteristic will be especially emphasized by another scholastic current headed by Lombard (*Sent.*, I, II, d. 17, cap. 5); the virtue thus defined is distinguished from the virtuous act, inasmuch as it is a help to it, while the act is rather the external work of the virtue (cf. also ibid., cap. 6).

Becoming conscious of these two ways of speaking, the scholastics distinguish two kinds of virtues: the one natural or political, the other Catholic, distinguished by the end to which they lead (Simon of Tournai).

The Angelic Doctor united the two conceptions into one. Accepting in his Commentary the definition of Lombard as the most complete (*In II Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2 and ad 9m), he insists there in defining virtue as a habit added to the faculty of the soul and which enables it to act well (a. 4). This Lombardian formula is re-examined and summarized in the *Summa* (*I-II*, q. 55, a. 4), with the sole variant of *habitus* instead of *qualitas*: habit in relation to action, and therefore inherent in the operative faculties (a. 2) and which renders them capable of acting well (a. 3).

Just as grace is not a new substance juxtaposed to the substance of the soul, so infused virtues cannot be conceived as new faculties or powers added to the natural ones. It is true that there is a great similarity between the two (cf. Sum. Theol., 1^2^2^, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1), but infused virtues always remain simple qualities that enhance, qualitative habits and not powers; because a power immediately informs the substance, while virtues or habits inform the faculties; because powers are indifferent to good or evil, whereas habits are determined to one or the other.

Infused virtues can therefore also be called powers, but incomplete ones, since they presuppose the radical powers of the soul. The supernatural act proceeds from the faculty of the soul insofar as it is informed by the infused virtue, so that both the will and the virtue exert a real concomitant influence on the supernatural act. This does not mean that the natural faculty influences the act only through the virtue that informs it; on the contrary, it influences directly by itself, inasmuch as it makes the act free and vital. Once informed by the supernatural habit, the natural faculty is a true proximate and immediate cause, in its own degree, of the supernatural act. In short, it can be said that infused virtues are operative habits that enable the faculties of the soul to be immediate principles of supernatural activity (cf. Sum. Theol., 1^2^2^, q. 110, a. 3; De verit., q. 27, a. 2).

If the infused virtue fully realizes the concept of an operative habit, as a permanent perfective quality of a faculty to act connaturaliter, it seems, as experience shows, not to correspond to the other property of operative habits, which is to act with ease and enthusiasm. It is known that acquired virtues confer this ease of action precisely because of their origin: the repetition of the act, in fact, creates a habitual inclination in the faculty to act in a certain way and to avoid the opposite. This does not seem to be the case with infused virtues; the inclusion of these does not remove contrary inclinations. It is easy to observe that the lukewarm, even though they receive continuous infusions and increases of virtue through the Sacraments, do not feel any greater ease in the practice of virtue (cf. Ripalda, De ente supernat., disp. 118, n. 16).

Some theologians admit an "intrinsic ease" given by infused virtues, inasmuch as they dispose the faculties to their respective acts (F. Suárez, De gratia, l. VI, cap. 9, n. 9; cf. S. Thomas, De verit., q. 24, a. 4, 1 m). This ease, however, does not remove external obstacles; this would be the object only of the future exercise of the infused virtues, by which man "acquires" the ease to exercise supernatural virtue. This ease is explained in different ways.

Among the many opinions of theologians, that which teaches that the ease in question is entirely given by a natural habit acquired through the activity of the infused virtue seems preferable. This acquired habit does not give true ease regarding the formal objects of the infused virtues, but only regarding the common material object of both. It is therefore a merely dispositive natural habit, inasmuch as it renders the faculty truly disposed to operate in a given matter, which is in fact executed only by the infused virtue, which attains it under its formal aspect (cf. J. G. Gonet, Clypes teologi, tr. 4, disp. 4, n. 25). Knowing that repeated natural acts generate in the corresponding faculty an acquired habit of the same nature, it is obvious to ask whether the same can be said of the generation of supernatural habits through repeated supernatural acts corresponding to them. The problem concerning these acts is above all whether they are true causes concurring with God in the formation of infused virtues, and namely whether they are causes not only moral-meritorious that move God to infuse the habits, but also physical, concurring with a true physical influence in such formation. All theologians firmly deny this causality; some note that the contrary opinion is at least rash. It must therefore be affirmed: a) that God alone is the efficient physical cause of supernatural virtues; b) that supernatural acts of man are only dispositive causes of them: a disposition that can be either a simple removal of obstacles (dispositive material cause), or a positive moral direction and appeal to infusion (dispositive moral cause, also of a material order; e.g., perfect contrition in the sinner).

This common doctrine is supported by the explicit Tridentine affirmations (sess. VI, can. 6-7; "disponimur") and by all anti-Pelagian struggles. Moreover, it seems contradictory to affirm that acts which, by their very nature, should proceed from a connatural habit, could, by their very nature (physically, therefore), cause those habits (F. Suárez, op. cit., l. VIII, c. 4, n. 10). And if this were possible by absurdity, it should also happen in sinners even before they are justified.

10. Increase of infused virtues

The Council of Trent canonizes repeatedly the doctrine of the "incrementum iustitiae," explicitly condemning those who deny it (sess. VI, can. 10, 24 and 32). In these Tridentine definitions it is dogmatically established that justice increases "through good works"; these indeed are "the cause of the increase of justice" (can. 24), and "merit the increase of grace" (can. 32). Regarding the nature of this increase, it must be observed that it cannot consist in a mere widening of the field of operation, since such an increase would not be intrinsic and habitual, but only limited to the duration of the virtuous act. Nor is it sufficient to say that the habit becomes stronger, since this could not apply to the theological virtues, which cause the subject to adhere to their object in a superlative way (super omnia). It remains therefore to say that the increase of the habit must be conceived more as a greater intensity of the habitual quality itself, which, remaining the same in number and in the faculty it informs, becomes intrinsically more perfect.

This doctrine, which refers both to the increase of "justice" as defined by Trent and to the constitution of "justice" through entitative habits (grace) and operative habits (infused virtues), and to the philosophical principle that the true intrinsic increase of a quality must be intensive, has the value of a theological-dogmatic conclusion. As for the degree of increase, the Council of Trent (sess. VI, can. 7, 10) seems to draw a perfect parallel between the increase of justice and of virtues, and from this it can be deduced that virtues increase with the increase of grace and vice versa; and this in the same degree of intensity.

All this is certain. But what is the concrete degree of increase is difficult and impossible to say. On the basis of the words of the Council of Trent, this measure depends on the will of the Holy Spirit and "according to the disposition and cooperation of each" (sess. VI, can. 6). It is therefore from these two causes that the increase depends: from God, the principal efficient cause, from man, the dispositive material cause, insofar as by acting supernaturally he has titles to merit from God the increase of infused habits.

As is clear, beyond divine good pleasure, the degree of increase depends in large measure also on man’s cooperation through the supernatural order’s dispositive activity. What then can man contribute to increase his infused virtues? It is here that all the preceding doctrine finds full application in Christian life.

a) The Sacraments are the channels of grace and of the infused virtues which they confer anew (Baptism, Penance) or increase, either unconditionally (Eucharist), or in view of a special social need (Holy Orders, Matrimony), or of an individual need (Confirmation, Extreme Unction). Even here, although the effect is infallible (ex opere operato), the degree of infusion and increase depends also, though not efficiently but only dispositively, on the subject’s spiritual preparation.

b) The influence which even supernatural works have in increasing infused virtues cannot be physical influence (reserved to God alone), but only moral influence, in the measure of merit “de condigno.”

11. Loss of infused virtues

Since the perfection of infused virtue is conditioned by that of grace and vice versa, it is legitimate to ask whether with the loss of grace through mortal sin infused virtue is also lost. In the light of Church doctrine and theological principles, a distinction must be made here regarding the behavior of the different virtues. Infused charity is lost with the loss of grace; faith and hope remain after the loss of grace; infused moral virtues are lost with the loss of grace.

a) Charity is lost with the loss of grace through mortal sin, since where there is mortal sin there is no love of God (Sum. Theol., 2a2ae, q. 24, a. 12). The Council of Trent (sess. VI, can. 7) teaches that only he who has charity is “a living member of the body of Christ”; whoever therefore does not have sanctifying grace, being dead supernaturally, does not have the life-giving charity. This doctrine is certain.

b) Hope is not always lost with the loss of grace. This conclusion, more than a doctrine of faith (Medina), is only certain and based on the common sense of theologians (Suárez). Hope, however, can be lost through a contrary act or through the loss of faith.

c) Faith is not always lost with the loss of grace. Contrary to the Protestant principle of justifying faith, the Council of Trent (sess. VI, can. 28) asserts that in the sinner faith can remain (v.), already infused in justification, i.e., habitual faith. This doctrine is held to be of faith by many theologians. It is clear that faith can be lost only through a contrary act of infidelity, which suffices to make one an unbeliever.

d) Infused virtues are lost with the loss of grace, since they stand to grace as properties to essence; and it is fitting to affirm that just as these virtues are given to man so that he may act in conformity with his state of grace, so too they are lost when that state is lost. This doctrine is less certain than the others, given also that many theologians deny the existence of these infused moral virtues.

12. Diminution of infused virtues

Venial sin can certainly bring about an improper diminution of virtue, namely, the loss of facility in acting and a disposition to its total loss. But a true intrinsic diminution, according to the common opinion of theologians, must be denied. Indeed, there seems to be no connection between the effect of venial sin and the diminution of supernatural habits, because they are compatible, and because ordinarily the just man cannot escape them; above all because, although venial sin is outside the supernatural moral order, it is not contrary to it, whence it does not of itself entail a relaxation of the infused habit, nor does it seem to merit that God should resort to this to punish man, otherwise he would go backward rather than forward on the path of perfection, given that the effect of good works on infused habits would often be annulled by that of frequent venial sins.

13. Connection of virtues among themselves

An extrinsic connection is certainly given by the supernatural end, with respect to which grace and virtues are imposed on us as a necessary whole for attaining II. But can one speak of an intrinsic bond, emanating from their very nature?

The principal answers are four: 1) the connection is such that not even the omnipotence of God can make one grow or disappear without the others; 2) the connection is given by God’s legislative will, which willed it; 3) only charity and infused moral virtues are connected among themselves by their very nature; but with grace, faith, and hope they are connected only by privilege of God; 4) all infused habits (entitative and operative) are connected in themselves, but by divine will faith and hope can remain without the other infused habits. The first opinion has no foundation, especially for infused moral virtues, which depend on grace as its promotion and exigencies: as effects of grace, God can supply its causality; as exigencies, God can, absolutely speaking, dispense with any exigency of the creature. The second opinion cannot be taken into consideration, since it denies the problem. The other two opinions have equal probability and valid defenders, and for practical purposes they have almost the same value.

14. Connection between moral virtues and grace

It is like that between nature and the proximate principles of connatural acts. Man, elevated by grace to the state of a new creature, must have principles or faculties that enable him to act in conformity with this new state. Some carry this comparison to its extreme, affirming that virtues derive from grace itself, while others, insisting that they reside in man’s natural faculties and not in grace, prefer to say that they are a simple exigency of grace. Just as moral virtues are bound to grace, so too they are bound to charity, since grace and charity are inseparable. Moreover, since moral virtues must be directed by prudence and are inseparable from it, and since prudence cannot exist without charity which disposes it well to the ultimate end, it follows indirectly that moral virtues are connected with charity.

Theologians have different opinions on the bonds between faith and hope on the one hand, and grace and charity on the other: a) they are infused simultaneously in justification; b) they grow, of themselves, to the same degree, and only accidentally could one admit a superiority of faith and hope, in one who, after sinning, recovers charity and grace to a lesser degree than the faith and hope that remained as before, though informing; c) faith and hope remain when charity and grace are lost.

BIBL.: cfr. i manuali di teologia morale, di teologia dogmatica e di teologia ascetica; hanno tutti secondo il loro particolare punto di vista un trattato di virtutibus. Tra l'altro, cfr. Sum. Theol., 1-2a6, q. 50, 55-56; J. Waffelaert, De virtutibus cardin., Bruges 1889; L. Billot, De virtutibus inf., Roma 1921; H. D. Noble, L'amitié avec Dieu, Parigi 1932; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Les vertus morales dans la vie intérieure, in La vie spirituelle, 41 (1934), pp. 225-36; R. Bernard, La vertu acquise et la vertu infuse, ibid., 42 (1935); Suppl., pp. 525-31; F. M. Utz, De connexione virtutum moral. inter se secundum doctrinam s. Thomae Aq., Oldenburg 1937; A. Lanfranco, La necessità delle V. s. Tommaso, Casale Monferrato 1942; Th. Graf, De subiecto psychico virtutum cardin. sec. doct. scholasti-corum usque ad medium sac. XIV, estr. Studia Annalia, II, Roma 1944; A. Michel. Vertu, in DTHC, XV, coll. 2739-90; O. Vignetti, Origine e connessione delle V. cardin. sec. s. Bonaventura, Roma 1947; O. Lottin, La connexion des vertus morales acquises au dernier quart du XIIIe siècle, in Rech. de théol. anc. et médiéval., 15 (1948), pp. 107-51; V. Iankelevitch, Traité des vertus, Parigi 1949.

V. LE

V. NELL'ARTE

Le raffigurazioni delle v., che ebbero tanta parte nell'iconografia sacra dal tardo medioevo all'Ottocento, ripetono le loro origini letterarie da s. Tommaso, da fra' Bartolomeo da S. Concordio, ma soprattutto dalla Psychomachia, poema di Prudenzio, scritto agli inizi del sec. V.
Molto spesso esse erano personificate da vergini guerriere, che abbattevano i vizi in forma demoniaca; in altri casi, apparivano contrapposte ad essi. Singolari esempi di sculture romaniche e gotiche, in cui i vizi appaiono vinti dalle v., si trovano nelle chiese francesi; per il sec. XII, sono da citare i rilievi in un portale di Aulnay e un capitello del coro di Notre-Dame du Port a Clermont, dovuto ad un maestro Roborto; per il sec. XIII, risultano tipiche le sculture nel portale maggiore di Notre-Dame a Parigi. Durante il periodo romanico, in Italia, assumono particolarmente importanza le figurazioni leggiade, scolpite nell'imbott: dell'arco mediano, sulla porta maggiore della basilica di S. Marco a Venezia. Fra gli esemplari basati sulla contrapposizione ai vizi emergano quelli scolpiti nella cattedrale di Chartres (sec. XIII), a cui si aggiungono le figure di dodici V. correnti (dolcezz, be-nevolenz), pizzenz, ecc.), e gli altri, dipinti in affresco a chiaroscuro da Giotto, nella cappella Scrovegni a Padova (1305 ca.). Queste sette figurazioni denotano talvolta reminiscenze di classicismo romano e particolarmente apprezzabili appaiono la Speranza alata, con le mani protese a ricevere la corona, la Fede, dal fermo e solenne atteggiamento frontale, e la Temperanza, simile ad una mite sacerdotessa arcaica.

Ma più frequenti e note sono quelle del successivo periodo gotico nel Trecento. Basterà citare l'originale acquasantiera marmorea di S. Giovanni Fucorvitas a Pistoia, dove Giovanni Pisano colloca le figure delle V. teologali a sostenere la vasca, da cui sporgono a mezzo busto le V. cardinali; le otto V. modellate con squisita eleganza da Andrea Pisano per una delle porte in bronzo del battistero di Firenze e, nella medesima città, quelle del Tabernacolo di Orsanmichele, dovute ad Andrea Orcagna, o dell'arca di S. Pietro Martire in S. Eustorgio a Milano (opera di Giovanni di Bulduccio da Pisa) e delle tombe degli Angioini nelle chiese di Napoli, con influssi d'arte senese. Notevoli in questo periodo anch'è rifigurazioni offerte dalle miniature, come quelli di Niccolò da Bologna. Nel Quattrocento, ad opera di Antonio e Piero del Polliolo abbiamo le meraviglie bronze che ornano i sepolcri di Sisto IV e di Innocenzo VIII, nella Basilica Vaticana, e il ciclo pittorico, ora alla Galleria degli Uffizi, che mostra le sette V. in trono (la Fortezza, di spirito sognante, è di Sandro Botticelli). Su cartoni di questo ultimo maestro, Baccio Pontelli esegui le tarse delle V. cardinali nello studiolo del Palazzo ducale, a Urbino, e Domenico di Paris gli stucchi policromi di analogo soggetto in un soffitto dell'estense Palazzo Schifano, a Ferrara. E Andrea Mantegna offriva un'originale versione di codeste alle-gorie con la tela del Trionfo delle V. vizi, oggi al Museo del Louvre. Agli albori del sec. XVI, nella Sala del Cambio a Perugia si trovano affrescate dal Perugino le V. cardinali, ma la bellissima Fortezza è stata attribuita a Raffaello diciassettenne. Più tardi, il sommo maestro urbinate dipingeva le V. teologali (fra cui stupenda la Carità) nella predella, conservata alla Pinacoteca Vaticana, della Deposizione nella Galleria Borghese e creava uno dei suoi capolavori nelle V. della Temperanza, della Fortezza e della Prudenza in una lunetta della Sala della S. Signatura in Vaticano, mentre un tondo di quel soffitto è del Sanzio dedicato all'immagine austera della Giustizia. Altre figurazioni pittoriche memorabili, nel Cinquecento avanzato, sono la tela ottagonale della Sapienza, eseguita da Tiziano per la Biblioteca Marciana di Venezia, e i due

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