Virtue

VIRTÙ

### I. GENERAL NOTIONS

Virtue is a quality that perfects an operative faculty, disposing it well in relation to its activity and the attainment of the end toward which the subject tends or is destined. Thus, we speak of intellectual virtues and moral virtues to indicate the good dispositions of the intellective faculty in order to theoretical-practical knowledge, or of the appetitive faculty in order to right action. Under the name of virtue, therefore, is generally designated a kind of intermediary between the faculty and the operation, and more properly only a perfective quality of rational powers in relation to their proper operation.

1. Habit and Operative Faculty – Already Aristotle characterized this disposition as a habit (ἔξις) or habitus, which adds to the idea of simple disposition (διάθησις) the specification of a stable and permanent disposition (Ethica Nicomachea, lib. II, cap. 6, 1106 b). Not every disposition of the faculties is therefore a habit or habitus. It is necessary that the disposition be stable and difficult to lose (difficile mobilis) to constitute a habit (cf. Boethius, In categ. Arist., I. III: PL. 64, 242 D - 243 A). The positivist, phenomenological, and generally vitalist currents of the late nineteenth century cannot rise to the classical idea of habitus, given the equation they establish between the operative behaviors of beasts and man, reducing the latter’s activity to a phenomenological complex or a mechanism governed by biological, physical, and chemical laws. The constancy of the faculty’s determination toward a given act is, in fact, a factor of a spiritual nature. It is, as it were, a second nature in man, a new state with respect to his proper operation, rooted in his very being, and which imposes itself in some way upon the original being; but this imposition does not consist in a tyrannical determinism over the faculties, as if the habit imposed action with the force of automatic necessity, entirely replacing the spontaneity of the purely natural faculty. On the contrary, the faculty and the habit become almost connatural, in a mutual adaptation that leaves absolutely unchanged the proper nature of the faculties and their subjection to the control of reason and will in operation. Far from creating determinism, the habitus of the Scholastics makes the faculty more subject to reason and more manageable by the will, facilitating activity through a stable disposition toward execution.

2. Habit and Virtue – Not every habit, therefore, is a virtue, but only that which: a) disposes well, that is, gives facility to act according to the nature of the disposed subject; b) disposes the power to operation, and thus is distinguished from other permanent or substantial and entitative dispositions, which are immediately subjected in the substance or nature, and only indirectly in the faculties rooted therein; c) disposes not every power, but those of a rational order: that is, the powers of rational nature or those connected with them, such as the sensitive powers; d) finally, and here especially resides the Christian and spiritual sense of virtue, the habit disposes the faculties not only to their proper operation, but above all to its right exercise and good use (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 55, a. 4; Lombard, Sent., lib. 2, d. 17, c. 5).

3. The Moral Order and Virtue – Virtue in the strict sense is not an innate habit, but either acquired or supernaturally infused. Only in them can one discern the moral aspect connected to the concept of virtue, that is, the stable disposition «qua recte vivitur et qua nullus male utitur»; the innate habit is a simple tendency, which entitatively merges with the powers themselves, and thus does not merit the name of true virtue (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 49, a. 3).

The salient point—or, as Duns Scotus says, the «formal element»—of virtue is above all (but not exclusively) the relation between faculty, activity, and the ultimate end to be attained. Thus, a habit, to be a principle of moral action, must not only dispose to the perfect exercise of the faculty, but it rises to moral value insofar as the good disposition toward operation makes it easier to use and direct the faculty to act in order to attain the end.

II. THE VARIOUS SPECIES OF VIRTUE

1. Diversity of virtues with respect to the informed faculties. – From this perspective, intellectual virtues are commonly distinguished from moral virtues: the former are habits disposing the intellective faculties, while the latter dispose the appetitive faculties. Beyond this rather external difference, there exists a deeper one, whereby moral virtues, by influencing the will, ensure that it not only acts perfectly but also uses itself well in relation to the end and to what leads to the end (specifically human acts). Intellectual habits, on the other hand, are only ordered to the perfection of the act in itself, not to the right use of the faculty, because the use or application of the faculty to the act depends solely on the will, that is, on another faculty that directs II. This disposition of the intellective faculty acquires moral value only insofar as it makes the faculty more manageable under control and thus subject to the moral direction impressed by the will.

Furthermore, the reduction of the speculative order to the moral order is required by another, more general consideration. Since morality encompasses the end and all that leads to the end (human acts), the acts of the intellect cannot be definitively excluded from this consideration, either because the intellect, its habits, and its object are either the efficient cause of subjective beatitude (contemplation) or objective beatitude itself (God, the summum speculabile), or because intellectual acts, under the direction of the moving affection, can merit in relation to the attainment of the end, or finally because contemplation in this life is like the embryo of that to come (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 56, a. 3). It should also be noted that the virtue of faith is an intellectual virtue and, nevertheless, a true virtue, and prudence is a true moral virtue, even though it resides in the intellect. It is the interconnection of the faculties themselves and the permeation of their fields of action that allows intellectual and moral virtues to unite in a solid moral structure. The mutual influence of the faculties—the intellect in rectifying the will and the will in applying the intellect and directing its activity toward the moral end—imparts the seal of morality even to intellectual habits, whose acts would not properly possess perfect moral value, since they do not fully correspond to the concept of a human act in themselves, and also because they proceed from purely speculative habits, which lack the power to apply and direct them in moral or immoral use.

In conclusion, for the morality of human acts, it is required that they conform to right reason and proceed from an affection well-ordered toward the end of man. Now, while it is true that intellectual virtue, e.g., prudence, is not sufficient for the goodness of such an act, since it serves only to direct the will in choice and determination and must in turn be moved by the will to apply itself to its directive act (act of prudence), it is also true that the will needs to be directed by intellectual prudence to be morally right in applying man to the human act. The result is that, for the interiority of the human act, both the intellect and its virtues (to judge the rationality of the act to be performed) and the will, which, by desiring the act as good, orders it to the right end, are equally required. As for the exteriority of the act, only the will moves to its execution. Speculative virtue, therefore, insofar as it pertains to the interior part of the act, is a true virtue or operative habit, which participates in the morality of the act in the same proportion as the internal act must correspond to the external act (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 57, a. 3, ad 1).

2. Diversity of virtues with respect to origin: innate, acquired, and infused virtue. – a) If habit is a permanent disposition arising from the specific and individual nature of the subject itself, one has innate or natural virtue, which is nothing other than the predisposition of each faculty to develop in its primordial acts. b) Acquired virtue, on the other hand, is that which man himself procures for his faculties, either through the repetition of acts or by bending them through exercise to full submission. It is like the result of a training of the spirit in its field of activity. In this formative task of virtue, it is clear that personal will represents the principal part above all external factors influencing the faculty, ensuring that the innate predisposition or habit passes from unconscious spontaneity to personal mastery, directing itself autonomously across the vast network of activities presented to its possibility, in full determination of the single act to be performed and its actual exercise. This occurs especially for acquired moral virtues or those of the rational appetite, but implicitly (secundum quid) also in intellectual virtues and habits of the sensitive appetite. c) Infused virtues are those produced by God Himself in the operative faculties of man. They differ from acquired virtues primarily because they do not necessarily entail a power of man to determine the faculty to operation (ease of acting well) and, consequently, do not facilitate activity by disposing the faculties to produce the act, which is proper to acquired virtues through human activity. This difference follows from the very mode of origin of infused virtues, which is not an autonomous perfection of nature in its specific natural faculties but a gratuitous addition that surpasses all its natural specific power and is therefore simply a new power given to the human faculty in relation to a new act connatural to a new being, rather than a gratuitous ease in producing such an act.
### III. INFUSED VIRTUE

1. Christian virtue is infused virtue

The general concept of virtue outlined thus far applies commonly to acquired virtue and infused virtue, with the difference that the former originates through human activity, while the latter is produced by God immediately in man. Here, according to the Scholastics, lies the specific difference of infused virtue.

In the general concept of virtue, a twofold element must be distinguished: one material, which is the habit or constant dispositive quality of the faculty, and the other formal, which is a relationship between faculty, act, and ultimate end. Examining these two elements in acquired virtues, while it is easy to ascertain that they consist in an operative habit, it is much more difficult, instead, to establish their relationship to the moral end or ultimate end. If this end to be attained through human activity lies beyond the natural demands of man, it is clear that no human activity can be proportionate to such an end, and thus the operative habit of acquired virtues, being of natural origin, can never transcend to a power that leads to the supernatural end. But since the Christian knows from Revelation that his destiny is supernatural, virtue is truly such, for him, when it makes him act in that direction. Such virtue cannot be other than of supernatural origin, independent of his activity.

2. Existence of infused virtues

To prove the existence of infused virtues, it must be shown that there exist in man stable, operative qualities, distinct however from operative faculties and operation, which confer upon man the power to act in order to attain a supernatural end, qualities acquired not through human activity but infused directly by God.

On the part of reason, presupposing the revelation of the supernatural vocation, a proof of moral order or of fittingness can be adduced. The manner of divine Providence generally requires that God’s action upon man unfold gently (Sap. 8:1); therefore, the supernatural activity of man postulates that God grant him operative principles proportionate to such a vocation and consequent activity, and through which man, as through the operative habits of acquired virtues, is intrinsically empowered and perfected in his faculties to act connaturaliter in order to the higher end. Moreover, admitting the infusion of Grace as a permanent habit inhering in the substance or nature of the human soul (substantial habit), a certain necessity is deduced also of operative habits consequent or concomitant to it, so that the intrinsically elevated nature may also produce acts connatural to it through connatural operative habits, that is, infused and supernatural as well. This proof of fittingness is corroborated by Revelation. The messianic gifts, in fact, are described in the Old Testament as superior qualities that will make man act with justice and equity (Is. 11:2-4); as an interior renewal (Ez. 36:25-31). This will not be the fruit of human industry, but only of God (Is. 26:12). This Kingdom of men inwardly docile, in contrast to legal externalism (Jer. 31:53), entails, as better expressed in the New Testament, an interior holiness similar to that of God (Mt. 5:48). This perfection is a true participation in the divine nature (II Pt. 1:3-11), is like a new nature superimposed upon the old man (Rom. 6:6); the very life of Jesus engraved in our mortal flesh (II Cor. 4:10-11). It stands in opposition to natural life as light to darkness (Eph. 5:8-9), as a living stone to a dead one (I Pt. 2:4-5); it is a life blossomed from the word of truth (Iac. 1:16-18), which identifies itself with truth (I Io. 3:19). All this entails in the soul a new entitative form, a radical habit, that is, sanctifying Grace (v. GRACE) which pervades the very being of the soul, giving it newness of life. But this life would not be such if it did not have the principles to act in conformity with itself. It is for this reason that Christian preaching always conjoins the exaltation of interior renewal with virtuous activity. Such is the revelation contained in the Sermon on the Mount. The new covenant foretold by Jeremiah (31:33) entails a new law, entirely interior (Mt. 5:6-7), which requires many virtues and the exercise of renunciation from those who wish to “enter into life” (Mt. 19:17); for narrow is the way that leads to it (Mt. 7:1-14). The good, the blessed, are characterized by virtuous life: purity, mercy, humility, simplicity, fidelity, constancy (Mt. 5:2-12); their life is like the anxious search for a transcendent “treasure,” the Kingdom of God and His justice (Mt. 6:20 and 33); a law of life that is summarized, in the thought of Jesus, in a constant will to love, to embrace all that is love of God and neighbor (Mt. 25:37-40), and whose quality and intensity is of divine character: be perfect, as your Father is perfect.

That these are true virtues is clear from the characteristics that accompany these gifts of God: 1) they are stable qualities, that is, operative habits: a) “without faith it is impossible to please God” (Hebr. 11:6): in this text, it is not a question of an activity, but of a habitual quality, otherwise children incapable of activity could not have it and could not please God; b) three virtues, says St. Paul, “remain” always (I Cor. 3:13): which expression indicates the presence of habits, more than of acts; c) above all, charity “never fails” (ibid. 8), a permanent and enduring quality that affects the operative principles of the man who wishes to please God. 2) These qualities are infused by God into our hearts (II Cor. 5:5); charity comes from God and is a communication of the Holy Spirit who works in us (Rom. 5:5; Eph. 3:16-19). 3) The character of true virtues of these stable qualities infused by God in man is given by the fact that through explicit activity by means of them, the new life in man is realized, and with their use in this life, man walks in conformity with his heavenly “vocation”: such is the virtue “qua recte vivitur, et qua nullus male utitur.”

Already the apologist Fathers, in contrasting Christian life with pagan life, noted the superiority of the former due to the Christian virtues that lead and order man to the true good. Virtue makes the Christian live in holiness and justice (Aristides, Apol. 15: Italian trans. by C. Vena, Rome 1950, pp. 105-10), while pagans are not good because they have abandoned it (Lactantius, Div. instit., bk. 5, chaps. 5-6: PL 6, 564-69); knowledge is not enough, but the practice of good through virtue is also necessary (ibid., chaps. 16-17: PL 6, 599-604). The Fathers of the first centuries insist above all on inculcating what Christian perfection must be, that is, the imitation of Jesus, with a virtuous life and the practice of self-denial. St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and later St. Gregory the Great reprise in their works definitions and arguments of the Stoics and other pagan philosophers: but they always highlight the supernatural character of Christian virtue: 1) this is a gratuitous gift of God (cf. St. Polycarp, Ad Eph. 3, 2; St. Augustine, In Ps. 55, enarr. 19: PL 36, 695); 2) it is a habit of the soul (id., De moribus Eccl. cath., bk. 1, n. 9: PL 32, 1314); 3) it is a good habit, that is, one that leads to God (id., Sermo 235, n. 1: PL 38, 1293; De Civ. Dei, bk. 4, chap. 21; bk. 9, chap. 4, n. 1); it is a supernatural habit, because the end to which it orders is eternal life (id., Ep. 140, n. 9: PL 33, 670), and because it is infused directly by God (id., De Civ. Dei, bk. 20, chap. 25; De lib. arbitrio, bk. 2, chap. 19: PL 32, 1267 ff.).

BIBL.:
Per la dottrina generale: S. Tommaso, Summa theol., I-II, qq. 55-67; J. de Guibert, De virtutibus theologicis, Roma 1946; A. Michel, in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, XV, coll. 3001-3060; J. Mausbach, Die katholische Moral und ihre Gegner, Köln 1921; J. Tonneau, De virtutibus infusis, Roma 1947; A. Gardeil, La structure de l'âme et l'expérience mystique, Parigi 1927; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Perfection chrétienne et contemplation, Parigi 1923; J. Maritain, Les degrés du savoir, Parigi 1932; A. Stolz, Teologia della mistica, Brescia 1947.

A. Piolanti

In the revealed documents of Sacred Scripture and Tradition under examination, an implicit distinction is noted between the state of Christian life and the exercise of that life: man is called to a higher life and already now participates in the divine nature; he must walk in a manner worthy of his vocation, to reach the end and perceive the "unfading crown"; he is blessed on the condition that he walks along the "narrow way," the only one that leads to life; for this reason, he receives from God many gifts through the Spirit who dwells in him permanently, to infuse charity, faith, and hope that "remain." The Fathers thus speak of Christian virtues, gratuitous gifts of God, by which the Christian is good. In all these determinations, an embryonic distinction can be discerned between certain permanent gifts infused by God into man and distinct from activity and operative faculties, which are the proximate principles of these activities.

The distinction between virtuous life and virtuous habits, under the influence of certain scholastic controversies, begins in the Middle Ages to emerge in ecclesiastical documents themselves. a) Innocent III, in his letter to Ymbert of Arles (1201), alludes to this controversy: to the opinion of those who hold that in Baptism the theological virtues and other virtues, and even Grace, are not infused into children because they are incapable of freely using them, he opposes another view, according to which the infusion of these gifts into baptized children is certain, because those virtues are conferred upon them "as habits," not as their actual use (Denz-U, 410). b) Clement V, at the Council of Vienne (1311-12), reaffirms this latter opinion and explicitly adopts it "tamquam probabiliorem" and more in conformity with the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, also relying on conciliar approval (Denz-U, II, 483). These decrees certainly teach that there exist permanent infused gifts distinct from acts: that is, operative habits; that they are infused by God, as is clear from the very words used and from the context, since they are given with Grace to baptized children incapable of acquired virtues. c) The Council of Trent (sess. 6, c. 7), having described the preparatory acts for justification—among which the act of faith must be noted—affirms that "justification is not only the remission of sins, but also the sanctification and interior renewal of man through the reception of grace and gifts"; these gifts, insofar as they are distinct from Grace and from the acts of faith preceding justification, represent something permanent in the just, and, like Grace itself, are inherent in the soul. They are "faith, hope, and charity": all three true habits, since: 1) it is a question of that charity which "is poured into the heart of the just and becomes inherent in him"; 2) it is a question of that faith which "catechumens ask of the Church," thus distinct from the actual faith they already possess in preparing for justification, and of which baptized children are incapable. When the aforementioned documents speak of the existence of infused virtues, a twofold assertion can be distinguished: a) the existence of permanent gifts, distinct from the acts produced by virtue of them; b) these gifts are true virtues or rather operative habits. The first assertion is to be considered a matter of faith, given the explicit words, especially in Trent regarding faith, hope, and charity (B. Beraza, De virtutibus infusi, Bilbao 1929, n. 24). The second assertion, which concerns rather the terms and corresponding philosophical concepts, is to be considered theologically certain and even proximate to faith according to Suárez (De gratia, l. VI, cap. 8, n. 15), and some others.

IV. CLASSIFICATION OF INFUSED VIRTUES

1. Infused virtues «per se» and «per accidens»: the former are virtues that man cannot in any way acquire for himself, as they dispose him toward an end that surpasses all his natural capacity; the latter are virtues that God, the author of all nature, sometimes infuses into man, although man could acquire them for himself through his own activity (v. acquired virtues). It is clear that in theology only the properly infused virtues (per se) are considered, as these alone are intrinsically supernatural.

2. Theological and moral infused virtues. — Virtue must lead to the ultimate end, which, objectively, is God; now, virtuous habits can enable man to attain God either immediately and directly in Himself, or mediately through an intermediate activity between man and the end. In the first case, we have the theological virtues; in the second, the moral virtues.

a) The theological virtues are recognized by their object, their origin, and their knowability. Their object is God, whom they enable man to attain immediately through their acts, which unite the agent directly with the object of his end. This immediacy must be, in its material aspect, objective and not merely reductive, as in the moral virtue of religion. God is the principal material object of the theological virtues, for there are, e.g., many other objects of faith that are not God (the Sacraments, the Church...), but which are believed because of their connection with the principal object believed. Furthermore, the formal object of the theological virtues must be immediately God as God, or some divine attribute. The origin of the theological virtue is through a true and proper infusion. The theological virtues are known only through divine revelation, as has been said for infused virtues in general.

b) The infused moral virtues discussed here are not the moral virtues infused per accidens: these are possible, and at times God grants them to some of His privileged ones, but they are not necessarily required for justification. Here we speak of properly infused moral virtues, which differ from their corresponding acquired virtues both in the ultimate end to which they direct their possessor and in their proper object: the end to which they lead is eternal life, whereas acquired virtues intend only to lead to good human order; the proper or formal object of acquired moral virtues is the good according to human reason, which establishes its consonance with human nature, whereas the object of infused virtues is the good established by a "divine rule," which posits the goodness of this object from a transcendent perspective (s. Tommaso, In III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1, 4, ad 2.; Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 63, a. 4). The existence of infused moral virtues has been denied by some theologians, but this seems scarcely in conformity with Sacred Scripture and the doctrine of the Fathers (cf. C. Mazzella, De virt. infusi, Roma 1884, p. 30).

V. THEOLOGY OF INFUSED VIRTUES

1. Intimate Nature of Infused Virtues. — The Aristotelian conception of virtue as a habit was received and transmitted to Scholasticism through the work of Boethius. For him, virtue is a habit or "a permanent disposition to choose, remaining in the mean determined by reason, as the wise man establishes it" (In categ. Aristot., l. III: PL 64, 242 D-243 A). In the same vein, Abelard defines virtue as "a quality naturally imprinted in the soul... and difficult to change... which elevates us to the merit of true beatitude" (Dial. inter philos. iudaeum et christ.: PL 178, 1651-52). Abelard’s definition finds an echo in the schools, with some slight variations (cf. O. Lottin, Les premières définitions et classifications des vertus au moyen âge, in Rev. d. sciences philos. et théol., 18 [1928], pp. 369-89). St. Augustine, while also gathering and commenting on the definitions given by philosophers, speaks of virtue as a "habit" (Div. quaest., 83, q. 31: PL 40, 20); but what characterizes his doctrine, in opposition to Pelagianism, is his insistence on declaring its divine origin (De civ. Dei, l. XX, cap. 25: PL 41, 762). This characteristic is particularly emphasized by another Scholastic current led by Lombard (Sent., 1, II, d. 17, cap. 5); virtue thus defined is distinguished from the virtuous act, in that it is an aid to it, whereas the latter is rather the external work of virtue (cf. also ibid., cap. 6).

Taking cognizance of these two ways of speaking, the Scholastics distinguish two kinds of virtues: some, natural or political, and others, Catholic, distinguished by the end to which they lead (Simone di Tournai).

Aquinas unites the two conceptions into one. Having accepted in his Commentary Lombard’s definition as the most complete (In II Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2 and ad 9m), he insists there in defining virtue as a habit added to the faculty of the soul that enables it to act well (a. 4). This Lombardian formula is reexamined and summarized in the Summa (1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 55, a. 4), with the sole variant of habitus instead of qualitas: a habit in relation to action, and thus inherent in the operative faculties (a. 2) and rendering them apt to act well (a. 3).

Just as Grace is not a new substance juxtaposed to the substance of the soul, so infused virtues cannot be conceived as new faculties or powers placed alongside the natural ones. It is true that between the two there is a great similarity (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1), but nevertheless infused virtues always remain simple potentiating qualities, qualitative habits and not powers; because power informs the substance immediately, whereas virtues or habits inform the faculties; because powers are indifferent to good or evil, whereas habits are determined to one or the other.

Infused virtues can therefore also be called powers, but incomplete ones, since they presuppose the radical powers of the soul. The supernatural act proceeds from the faculty of the soul insofar as it is informed by the infused virtue, so that the will and the virtue both influence the supernatural act by real concomitance. This does not mean that the natural faculty influences the act only through the virtue that informs it; on the contrary, it influences it directly by itself, insofar as it makes the act free and vital. Once informed by the supernatural habit, the natural faculty is the true proximate and immediate cause, in its own order, of the supernatural act. In short, it can be said that infused virtues are operative habits that confer upon the faculties of the soul the capacity to be immediate principles of supernatural activity (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 110, a. 3; De verit., q. 27, a. 2).

If the infused virtue fully realizes the concept of an operative habit, as a permanent perfective quality of a faculty for acting connaturaly, it seems, as experience shows, not to correspond to the other characteristic of operative habits, which is to make acting with ease and enthusiasm. It is known that acquired virtues confer this ease of acting precisely because of their origin: the repetition of the act, in fact, creates a habitual inclination in the faculty to act in a certain way and to avoid the opposite. The same cannot be said of infused virtues; with their infusion, opposite inclinations do not vanish. It is easy to observe that the lukewarm, even while receiving continuous infusions and increases of virtue through the Sacraments, do not feel greater ease in the practice of virtue (cf. Ripalda, De ente supernat., disp. 118, n. 16).

Some theologians admit an "ease" intrinsic to infused virtues, insofar as they dispose the faculties to their respective acts (F. Suárez, De gratia, l. VI, cap. 9, n. 9; cf. St. Thomas, De verit., q. 24, s. 4, 1 m). This ease, however, does not remove external obstacles; this will be the object only of the daily exercise of infused virtues, through which man "acquires" the ease of exercising supernatural virtue. Such ease is explained in various ways.

Among the many opinions of theologians, that which seems preferable teaches that the ease in question is entirely given by a natural habit acquired through the activity of the infused virtue. This acquired habit does not confer true ease regarding the formal objects of infused virtues, but only regarding the material object common to both. It is therefore only a dispositive natural habit, insofar as it renders the faculty truly disposed to act in a given matter, which in reality is performed only by the infused virtue, which grasps it under its own formal aspect (cf. J. G. Gonet, Clypena theol., tr. 4, disp. 4, n. 25). Knowing that repeated natural acts generate in the corresponding faculty a habit acquired by nature itself, it is obvious to ask whether the same can be said of the generation of supernatural habits through repeated supernatural acts corresponding to them. The problem concerning these acts is above all whether they are true concurrent causes with God in the formation of infused virtues, that is, whether they are not only moral-meritorious causes that move God to infuse the habits, but also physical causes, concurring by true physical influence in such formation. All theologians resolutely deny this causality, and some note that the contrary opinion is at least temerarious. It must therefore be affirmed: a) that God alone is the efficient physical cause of supernatural virtues; b) that the supernatural acts of man are only dispositive causes of them: a disposition that can be either a simple removal of obstacles (material dispositive cause), or a positive direction and moral appeal to infusion (moral dispositive cause, also of material order: e.g., perfect contrition in the sinner).

This common doctrine is supported by the explicit Tridentine affirmations (sess. VI, cann. 6-7: "disponimur"), and by all the anti-Pelagian struggles. It seems, moreover, contradictory to affirm that acts which, by their very nature, should proceed from a connate habit, can by their own nature (and thus physically) cause those habits (F. Suárez, op. cit., l. VIII, c. 4, n. 10). And if this were possible by absurdity, it should also occur in sinners even before they are justified.

3. Increase of Infused Virtues

The Council of Trent repeatedly canonizes the doctrine of the "incrementum iustitiae", explicitly condemning those who deny it (sess. VI, cann. 10, 24, and 32). In these Tridentine definitions, the increase of justice "per bona opera" is dogmatically established; these works are indeed "causa dell'aumento della giustizia" (can. 24) and "meritano l'aumento della Grazia" (can. 32). Regarding the nature of this increase, it must be noted that it cannot consist in a mere expansion of the field of operation, for such an increase would not be intrinsic and habitual but only limited to the duration of the virtuous act. Nor is it sufficient to say that the habit becomes stronger, for this could not apply to the theological virtues, which unite the subject to their object in a superlative manner (super omnia). It remains, therefore, to say that the increase of the habit must be conceived not so much in terms of its augmented power over the faculty but rather as a greater intensity of the habitual quality itself, which, remaining the same—that is, one in number and in the informed faculty—becomes intrinsically more perfect. This doctrine, which draws upon the increase of "giustizia" as defined by Trent, the constitution of "giustizia" through entitative (Grace) and operative (infused virtues) habits, and the philosophical principle that the true intrinsic increase of a quality must be intensive, holds the value of a theologically certain conclusion. Regarding the degree of increase, the Council of Trent (sess. VI, cann. 7, 10) seems to establish a perfect parallel between the increase of justice and of virtues: from this, it may be deduced that virtues increase with the growth of Grace and vice versa, and in the same degree of intensity.

All this is certain. But what, in concrete terms, is the degree of increase? It is difficult, indeed impossible, to say. Based on the words of the Council of Trent, this measure depends on the will of the Holy Spirit and "secondo la disposizione e cooperazione di ognuno" (sess. VI, can. 6). Thus, the increase depends on these two causes: from God, the principal efficient cause, and from man, the dispositive material cause, insofar as, acting supernaturally, he acquires titles to merit from God the increase of infused habits.

As is clear, beyond divine good pleasure, the degree of increase also depends in large part on man’s cooperation through dispositive activity of a supernatural order. What, then, can man do to increase his virtues? It is here that all the preceding doctrine finds full application in Christian life. a) The Sacraments are the channels of Grace and of the infused virtues, which they confer ex novo (Baptism, Penance) or increase, either unconditionally (Eucharist) or in relation to a special social (Holy Orders, Matrimony) or individual (Confirmation, Extreme Unction) need. Here, too, although the effect is infallible (ex opere operato), the degree of infusion and increase also depends—though not efficiently but only by disposing the subject—on man’s spiritual preparation. b) The influence that supernatural works have on the increase of infused virtues cannot be physical (reserved to God alone) but only moral, by reason of merit "de condigno".

4. Loss of Infused Virtues

Since the perfection of infused virtue is conditioned by that of Grace and vice versa, it is legitimate to ask whether, with the loss of Grace through mortal sin, infused virtue is also lost. Based on the doctrine of the Church and theological principles, a distinction must be made here regarding the behavior of the different virtues. Infused charity is lost with the loss of Grace; faith and hope remain after the loss of Grace; infused moral virtues are lost with the loss of Grace. a) Charity is lost with the loss of Grace through mortal sin, for where there is mortal sin, there is no love of God (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 24, a. 12) nor friendship with God (ibid., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 65, a. 5). The Council of Trent (sess. VI, can. 7) teaches that only he who has charity is a "membro vivo del corpo di Cristo"; therefore, he who lacks sanctifying Grace, being supernaturally dead, does not possess vivifying charity. This doctrine is certain. b) Hope is not always lost with the loss of Grace. This conclusion, rather than a doctrine of faith (Medina), is only certain and based on the common consensus of theologians (Suárez). Hope, however, can be lost through a contrary act or through the loss of faith. c) Faith is not always lost with the loss of Grace. Against the Protestant principle of justifying faith, the Council of Trent (sess. VI, can. 28) asserts that in the sinner, faith (v. FAITH) may remain, that is, the habitual faith already infused in justification. This doctrine is held as de fide by many theologians. It is clear that faith can be lost only through the contrary act of infidelity, which suffices to render one unfaithful. d) Infused virtues are lost with the loss of Grace, being related to Grace as properties to essence; and it is fitting to affirm that just as these virtues are given to man so that he may act connatural to his state of Grace, so too they are lost when that state is lost. This doctrine is less certain than the others, given that many theologians deny the existence of these infused moral virtues.

5. Diminution of Infused Virtues

Venial sin can certainly entail an improper diminution of virtue, that is, the loss of facility in acting and a disposition toward its total loss. However, a true intrinsic diminution, according to the common opinion of theologians, must be denied. Indeed, there seems to be no connection between the effect of venial sin and the diminution of supernatural habits, for they are compatible, and because ordinarily the just cannot avoid them; above all, because although venial sin lies outside the supernatural moral order, it is not contrary to it, whence it neither entails by its nature a relaxation of the infused habit nor seems to merit that God resort to this as a punishment for man, for otherwise man would go backward rather than forward on the path of perfection, given that the effect of good works on virtuous habits would often be nullified by that of frequent venial sins.

5. Connection of Virtues Among Themselves. – An extrinsic connection is certainly given by the supernatural end, with respect to which Grace and virtues impose themselves as a necessary complex for its attainment. But can one speak of an intrinsic nexus, arising from their very nature?

The principal answers are four: 1) the connection is such that not even God’s omnipotence can make one grow or disappear without the others; 2) the connection is given by God’s legislative will, which willed it; 3) only charity and the infused moral virtues are connected among themselves by their very nature, but with Grace, faith, and hope, they are so only by divine privilege; 4) all infused habits (entitative and operative) are connected in themselves, but by divine will, faith and hope can remain without the other infused habits. The first opinion lacks foundation, especially regarding infused moral virtues, which depend on Grace as its emanation and exigencies: as effects of Grace, God can supply its causality; as exigencies, God can, absolutely speaking, disregard any exigency of the creature. The second opinion cannot be taken into consideration, as it denies the problem. The other two opinions have equal probability and valid defenders, and for practical purposes, they hold nearly the same value.

6. Connection between Moral Virtues and Grace. — This connection is analogous to that between nature and the proximate principles of connatural acts. Man, elevated by Grace to the state of a new creature, must possess principles or faculties that enable him to act in accordance with this new state. Some theologians carry this comparison to its fullest extent, asserting that virtues derive from Grace itself, while others, insisting that they reside in man’s natural faculties rather than in Grace, prefer to say that they are a mere exigency of Grace. Just as moral virtues are linked to Grace, so too are they linked to charity, since Grace and charity are inseparable. Furthermore, since moral virtues must be directed by prudence and are inseparable from it, and since prudence cannot exist without charity, which disposes it well toward the ultimate end, it follows indirectly that moral virtues are connected with charity.

Theologians hold differing opinions on the bonds between faith and hope on the one hand, and Grace and charity on the other: a) they are infused simultaneously in justification; b) they grow, in themselves, to an equal degree, and only accidentally could one admit a superiority of faith and hope in someone who, after sinning, recovers charity and Grace to a lesser degree than the faith and hope that remained as before, though unformed; c) faith and hope remain when charity and Grace are lost.

The depictions of the virtues, which played such a significant role in sacred iconography from the late Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, trace their literary origins to St. Thomas Aquinas, Fra Bartolomeo da San Concordio, but above all to the Psychomachia, a poem by Prudentius written at the beginning of the fifth century.

Very often, they were personified as warrior maidens who overthrew vices in demonic form; in other cases, they appeared in opposition to them. Notable examples of Romanesque and Gothic sculptures, in which vices are shown vanquished by the virtues, are found in French churches. For the twelfth century, the reliefs on a portal at Aulnay and a capital in the choir of Notre-Dame of Port in Clermont, attributed to a master named Roberto, should be mentioned. For the thirteenth century, the sculptures on the main portal of Notre-Dame in Paris are typical. During the Romanesque period in Italy, the graceful depictions carved into the archivolt of the central arch above the main door of the Basilica of San Marco in Venice hold particular importance. Among the examples based on the opposition to vices, those sculpted in the cathedral of Chartres (thirteenth century) stand out, to which are added the figures of twelve "current" virtues (gentleness, benevolence, patience, etc.), as well as others painted in chiaroscuro fresco by Giotto in the Scrovegni Chapel in Padua (c. 1305). These seven depictions sometimes reveal reminiscences of Roman classicism, and particularly noteworthy are the winged Hope, with hands outstretched to receive the crown, Faith, with its firm and solemn frontal stance, and Temperance, resembling a gentle archaic priestess.

However, the most frequent and well-known representations belong to the subsequent Gothic period of the fourteenth century. It suffices to mention the original marble holy water font of San Giovanni Fuorcivitas in Pistoia, where Giovanni Pisano places the figures of the theological virtues supporting the basin, from which the cardinal virtues emerge in half-bust form; the eight virtues modeled with exquisite elegance by Andrea Pisano for one of the bronze doors of the Baptistery of Florence; and, in the same city, those of the Tabernacle of Orsanmichele by Andrea Orcagna, or of the area of San Pietro Martire in Sant'Eustorgio in Milan (a work by Giovanni di Balduccio da Pisa), and of the tombs of the Angioni in the churches of Naples, influenced by Sienese art. Also noteworthy in this period are the representations found in miniatures, such as those by Niccolò da Bologna. In the fifteenth century, Antonio and Piero del Pollaiolo created the marvelous bronze works adorning the tombs of Sixtus IV and Innocent VIII in St. Peter’s Basilica, as well as the pictorial cycle now in the Uffizi Gallery, which depicts the seven virtues enthroned (the Fortitude, with a dreamy spirit, is by Sandro Botticelli). Based on cartoons by the latter master, Baccio Pontelli executed the intarsia of the cardinal virtues in the studiolo of the Ducal Palace in Urbino, and Domenico di Paris created the polychrome stuccoes of the same subject on a ceiling in the Este Palace of Schifanoia in Ferrara. Andrea Mantegna offered an original version of these allegories with the canvas Triumph of the Virtues over the Vices, now in the Louvre Museum. At the dawn of the sixteenth century, in the Sala del Cambio in Perugia, the cardinal virtues were frescoed by Perugino, though the beautiful Fortitude has been attributed to the seventeen-year-old Raphael. Later, the supreme Urbinate master painted the Theological Virtues (among which the Charity is stunning) in the predella, preserved in the Vatican Pinacoteca, of the Deposition in the Borghese Gallery, and created one of his masterpieces in the virtues of Temperance, Fortitude, and Prudence in a lunette of the Stanza della Segnatura in the Vatican, while a tondo of that ceiling by Raphael is dedicated to the austere image of Justice. Other memorable pictorial representations in the advanced sixteenth century include the octagonal canvas of Wisdom, executed by Titian for the Marciana Library in Venice, and the two panels by Paolo Veronese, depicting Virtue rewarded and Victory pursuing Vice in the ceiling of the Sala dei Tre Capi in the Doge’s Palace. Among the sixteenth-century sculptural representations, the figures of Justice and Prudence, modeled by Guglielmo Della Porta for the tomb of Paul III in St. Peter’s Basilica, stand out; there, too, the allegories by Bernini enhance the tombs of Urban VIII and Alexander VII.
In a singular pictorial cycle of the cardinal virtues, accompanied by emblems of the Borromeo family, Domenichino painted in dazzling colors for the church of San Carlo ai Catinari in Rome. During the eighteenth century, Giacomo Serpotta modeled lively and soft stucco figures in the oratories of the confraternities of Palermo, while the Venetian Antonio Corradini reached the height of virtuosity with the veiled marble figure of Pudicitia in the Sansevero Chapel in Naples.

At the dawn of eighteenth-century Neoclassicism, Antonio Canova executed, for the monument to Clement XIV in the church of the SS. Apostoli in Rome, the tender Temperance and the composed Mansuetude, and toward the mid-nineteenth century, an artist mindful of certain realistic qualities of his Tuscan forebears, Lorenzo Bartolini, sculpted a most balanced Mercy for the Demidoff monument in Florence and a harmonious and affectionate Charity as Educator, preserved in the Palazzo Pitti in Florence. See also the illustrations for the entries on the individual virtues. - Vedi tav. CXLVII.