BOEZIO, ANICIO MANLIO TORQUATO SEVERINO

BOETHIUS, ANICIUS MANLIUS TORQUATUS SEVERINUS. —

I. LIFE

B. was born in Rome from the noble Anician family around the year 480, when the kingdom of Odoacer was about to succumb to the blows of the Ostrogoths. Having lost his father at a tender age, he was probably educated in the home of his friend Aurelius Memmius Symmachus, the consul, whose daughter Rusticiana he later married. Having entered public life at a young age, at 25 he was already a senator, and in 510 he became consul without a colleague, an honor rather rare even for a protégé of Theodoric. In 522, his two very young sons, Symmachus and Boethius, were also elevated to the dignity of consul. Despite the demands of public office, B. passionately devoted himself to studies, particularly of Greek philosophy, to which he had dedicated himself since his youth. Political events unfortunately cut short this life, already so fruitful and still full of great promise. In 523, for having defended the senator Albinus, accused of secret dealings with Emperor Justinus to the detriment of Theodoric, B. was implicated in the same accusation, exiled, imprisoned, and finally tried and condemned to death on 23 October 524. This tragedy seems not to have been unrelated to national and religious motives, since Theodoric was a barbarian and Arian, while B. was a champion of Catholicism and Romanitas. Tradition has always revered B. as a martyr. Leo XIII approved his cult for Pavia with a decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites on 25 December 1883. His feast is celebrated on 21 July in Pavia, where he was killed, and in Rome at the church of Santa Maria in Portico in Campitelli, which, according to legend, has special ties to B.’s family, having been endowed by his sister-in-law Saint Galla.

II. WORKS

B., a true scholar of noble temperament and enamored of classical culture, though he never studied in Athens as some have erroneously claimed, left a large number of writings despite the distractions of politics and the brevity of his life. Among his works are treatises on arithmetic, music, and a dubious Institutio geometrica, though it is certain, as attested by his contemporary and friend Cassiodorus, that B. also wrote on geometry. He also produced translations of Porphyry’s Isagoge and various logical treatises by Aristotle, as well as commentaries on Porphyry himself, on Aristotle, and on Cicero’s Topics. But above all, his original works deserve attention: five treatises and questions on logic, theological pamphlets, and the masterpiece *De consolatione philosophiae*. The theological pamphlets, which enjoyed immense popularity throughout the Middle Ages, are: 1) *Liber de sancta Trinitate*, or *Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres Dii*; 2) *Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur*, in the form of a letter to the deacon John; 3) *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint, cum non sint substantialiter bonae*, a response to a question from the deacon John regarding the goodness of substances. This is the well-known pamphlet called by the scholastics *De hebdomadibus* due to B.’s allusion there to a lost work of his on the *Settimane*; 4) *De Fide catholica*, though today this is not considered authentic; and 5) finally, *Liber contra Eutychem et Nestorium*, also known in the Middle Ages as *Liber de persona et duabus naturis*. The Boethian authorship of these pamphlets cannot reasonably be doubted, both because of the unanimous tradition of the manuscripts and because of Cassiodorus’s testimony, who explicitly attributes to B. a book *“de sancta Trinitate et capita quaedam dogmatica et librum contra Nestorium”* (*Ancedoton Holderi*, ed. H. Usener, Bonn 1877, p. 4). The chronology of these writings is very uncertain; however, they seem to belong to the last period of B.’s life and probably to the year 520. The text can be found in PL 64; critical editions, after the general one of Venice (1491–92), include that of Leipzig edited by R. Peiper in the Teubner series (1871) and that of H. F. Stewart (London 1926), with an English translation on facing pages.

A particular work of immense importance is *De consolatione philosophiae*, to which B.’s name and fame are linked through the centuries. *Consolatio philosophiae*, or rather *Philosophiae consolationis libri V*, is a philosophical poem, a blend of prose and verse, which B. composed in prison (523–24) as solace for his misfortunes. Already in *De hypotheticis syllogismis*, B. had declared that he placed the supreme consolation of life in the pursuit of philosophy. Now he develops this thought as follows.

In Book I, B. bitterly laments his misfortunes to Philosophy, who appears to him as a most beautiful matron. In Book II, Philosophy shows B. that he is wrong to complain about Fortune, whose nature is instability. Moreover, in Book III, Philosophy argues that true happiness does not consist in earthly goods and cannot be fully experienced here below. The highest Good is God alone, and He alone is true beatitude; therefore, we must turn our gaze to heaven. Books IV and V are devoted to resolving the main objections that B. raises to Philosophy, concerning the existence of evil and free will.

*Consolatio*, which has enjoyed immense success, with countless commentaries and translations down to our own day, is a work sui generis that bears the strong imprint of its author’s rich personality. Neither exclusively philosophical nor exclusively literary, it weaves together the most varied motifs—philosophical, artistic, intellectual, moral—and harmonizes them in a uniquely Boethian manner. It is therefore incorrect to regard *Consolatio* as a synthesis of B.’s philosophical thought. Rather, it is a synthesis of his entire scientific ideal, which naturally extends beyond philosophy alone and includes a noble practical intent. In short, *Consolatio* is B. himself, with his culture, his learning, his love of art and philosophy, his mind, his heart, and his moral integrity. Contrary to Usener, who reduces this masterpiece to little more than a compilation, one must affirm that *Consolatio* is original; its originality lies precisely in having fused together in a highly personal way the most disparate elements to produce an organic, varied, and coherent whole that has withstood the test of centuries and is still read today with genuine spiritual delight. *Consolatio* is thus an original work without precedent and has had few and unsuccessful imitators.

This cannot be said of B.’s philosophy. First, one cannot speak of a Boethian philosophical system or even of a properly Boethian philosophy. B. is rather a syncretist who sought to reconcile, as he himself tells us in his commentary on Aristotle’s *De interpretatione*, the two great currents of Greek philosophy: Plato and Aristotle. *“Plato noster, Aristoteles meus”* is a phrase B. often puts into Philosophy’s mouth with evident satisfaction. Plato, who occasionally assumes (if not the spirit, then at least) the Neoplatonic coloring, prevails in *Consolatio*, while Aristotle dominates in B.’s logical and theological works. Yet a more distinctly Latin leaven is also present, and this emerges especially in B.’s ethics, which has a historical-Roman backdrop.

Of Plato one may note Boethius’ insistence on the ineffability of the First Principle, but above all his doctrine of participation, according to which all things participate in divine goodness and return to II. This participation, however, despite expressions that bear a Neoplatonic flavour, is realized according to the Christian doctrine of creation and not according to the emanatism of Plotinus. Panteism is expressly rejected by Boethius in several places. Far more numerous and substantial are the Aristotelian elements that Boethius employs in his synthesis.

In logic, there is the problem of universals, of which Boethius became acquainted through Porphyry’s Isagoge; yet the solution he offers, however hesitant and obscure, remains oriented toward Aristotelian realism. Another celebrated Boethian theory, famous throughout the Middle Ages, is the metaphysical distinction between *esse* and *quod est*, whose genuine meaning is still today the subject of lively debate. In any case, upon this binomial of *esse* and *quod est* Boethius bases his metaphysical thesis of the simplicity of God (*ipsum esse*, pure form, simple, the form of being) and of the composition of creatures, which are not pure being, pure form, but all include parts: either matter and form in bodies, or something similar in angels (Liber de sancta Trinitate, II, 30; Stewart, p. 10).

Creatures, therefore, are more an image, a diminution of being, than being itself. Boethius’ gnoseology is likewise Aristotelian, though here and there Plato reappears, as in the fourth poem of the first book of the *Consolation*, where innate ideas surface. Boethius’ Platonism is also evident in the marked sympathy and mental affinity he demonstrates for St Augustine, whose star was already high in the philosophical firmament. Minor influences come from the Stoics and Pythagoreans, though of the latter Boethius makes more use of them as ornamental and illustrative motifs than as building materials.

As one can see, Boethius is no mere compiler or repeater, but an intelligent treasurer of all previous culture, which he has thoroughly assimilated and handles with ease, giving it an unmistakable imprint that secures him a notable place in the history of culture and thought.

Boethius was venerated and highly regarded throughout the Middle Ages. For the scholastics, including St Thomas Aquinas, who commented on his *De hebdomadibus* and in part on his *De Trinitate*, he was a true authority; and for centuries his works were, in the West, almost the sole source from which ancient Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy was drawn. Boethius was also the first to teach the scholastics how to make use of Aristotle, especially in his logic, for a rational synthesis of the Faith. Some of his definitions (those of beatitude, eternity, and person) are indeed classical and still alive today. The Angelic Doctor takes pride in citing Boethius often; according to some, Dante would call him his teacher in *Inf.*, V, 123. Cf. the high praise he receives in *Par.*, X, 121 ff.

At the beginning of the 18th century, certain criticism, especially German, sought to cast doubt on Boethius’ Christianity because in the *Consolation* he is entirely silent about Christ and does not appeal to the consolations of faith, as might naturally be expected from a Christian facing death. Moreover, Boethius’ poem would openly betray a pagan spirit. But it is easy to reply that Boethius’ intention was well determined and precise: to show what philosophy (not faith and theology) can achieve in the face of life’s misfortunes. Boethius’ paganism, if it exists at all, is merely superficial, cultural, and formal, not substantial. Finally, and this is the principal and conclusive argument, the non-Christianity of Boethius, or a merely apparent Christianity, has no positive historical basis whatsoever and is the product of shortsighted and prejudiced criticism. Today, moreover, no one seriously entertains such a thesis after the thorough refutation offered by Semeria in his valuable work, unfortunately almost unobtainable, *Il cristianesimo di S. B. rivendicato* (Rome 1900).

Umberto Degl’Innocenti