PANTHEISM. – A very ancient doctrine, but the introduction and use of the term are relatively recent. As R. Eucken (v.) has noted, J. Toland (v.) was the first to use the word pantheist in 1705; Fay introduced the term pantheism in 1709 (A. Lalande, Vocab. techn. et crit. de la philos., II, 4th ed., Paris 1938, p. 554). Both p. monism (v.)—which in certain respects must be distinguished from the former—arise from a common fundamental demand: to reduce all beings to absolute identity, not only logical but also ontological. Or rather: to bring the multiplicity of entities back to ontological unity, which amounts to saying that the being of the world is identical with the being of God. The legitimate demand to unify principle (v.), when driven beyond the limits of observing the order of things (by which the multiplicity forms a “cosmos”), concludes in the substantial unity of things themselves and of their principle, confusing (or failing to distinguish) analogy and identity.
The pantheistic assertion—πᾶν, θεός, everything is God and God and the world are one—can be understood in two fundamental senses, to which the many and varied forms of p. can be reduced: a) reduction of the world to God, who alone is real and of whom the world is a collection of manifestations or emanations without permanent reality and lacking a substance of their own distinct from the divine substance; b) reduction of God to the world, which alone is real: God is the unity of what exists, the sum of its parts. The terms acosmism (Hegel) and pancosmism (Grote) may be used to indicate the two positions respectively. Of these, only the first characterizes p. properly speaking; the second, which designates so-called naturalistic p. (e.g., d’Holbach) or materialistic p. (e.g., Haeckel [v.]), is better regarded as a form (the fundamental form) of monism, which, although close to p., must be distinguished from II. Here monism will be discussed only insofar as necessary to demonstrate what it has in common with p. and how, in fact, through internal contradiction, it is not even p. atheism (v.); and pantheists properly so called will be treated only insofar as necessary to characterize p. in its historical development.
Monism likewise obeys the demand (a metaphysical dogma that it shares with p.) for the unity and ontological identity of reality, but its tendency to reduce God to the naturalism (v.) materialism (v.). In Greek antiquity, the philosophy of Heraclitus (v.) cannot properly be called monistic, although the “Obscure” of Ephesus seems to identify the Whole with the eternal and cyclical transformation of Fire, the sole universal and divine principle. A Stoicism (v.), a typical systematization of naturalistic p. and therefore strongly inclined toward monism: the cosmos consists of a finite and compact matter, Reason (v.), of a fiery nature, an immanent force, God, who is at once the order that holds the parts together and the sum of the parts themselves. According to Zeno, in fact, “the universe has two principles: one passive, the formless substance, matter; the other active, mind, God. The latter penetrates matter, produces the four elements, and is the artificer of all things” (Diog. Laer., VII, 134; I frammenti degli stoici antichi, edited by N. Festa, I, Bari 1932, p. 80). Zeno does not identify “the spirit that moves” with nature, but with the rational soul, “which gives life to the sensible world and makes it beautiful,” “animate and divine” (Chalcidius, In Tim., c. 292; I frammenti, cit., p. 82); but the Soul is identified with the “World,” of which he distinguishes three meanings. The World is: “1) the same divine being that derives its particular property from the universal substance; 2) the product of divine activity in the composition and distribution of the elements, in the heavenly bodies and in natural phenomena; 3) the totality of the divine being and created things” (Diogenes Laertius, 135–37 ff.; I frammenti, cit., pp. 82–83). In the first and also in the third sense, “the world is one, and is called God, mind, fate, Jupiter” (ibid.). Thus, naturalistic p.: identification of God with the natural world and a material conception of what is called Soul or Reason or Fire.
In modern times, the theory of evolution has given new impetus to the naturalistic monism of certain forms of positivism (De Bois Reymond, Spencer [v.], Ardigò [v.]) and to materialistic and biological monism (Moleschott, Huxley, Büchner, etc.). Fundamentally, this lies outside p., insofar as there is no longer any talk of an immanent God, but only of the world or nature or the universe: the term “God” no longer means anything. God does not exist; there is only the world, arising from an original matter endowed with vital energy, which evolves from itself and according to its own laws. The original being, ontologically one—a kind of embryo of the world or mother-matter—called “homogeneous” (Spencer), or “indistinct” (Ardigò), or “primitive substance” (Haeckel), progressively evolves into different forms. Similar assertions have no scientific or philosophical foundation spirit (v.) arises thought (v.) enters the world, or how intelligent substances, fundamentally irreducible, emerge through evolution; hence the pluralism of entities is not merely phenomenal but substantial. Fundamentally, materialistic monism (e.g., that of Haeckel) is a superficial contamination of evolutionary materialism and Spinozism. But when evolutionism encounters Hegelian dialecticism (the Hegelian left: Feuerbach, Marx, etc., and other later currents), the concepts of materialistic monism or p. undergo such a profound transformation that one can no longer speak either of monism or of p. Indeed, dialectical materialism denies that there is in any way an essence of man or of anything else, an immutable order, or matter in the sense of traditional materialism. Every law and every entity is the result of historical situations and corresponds to a stage of dialectical becoming; and everything in the future may be different, not only in its accidents but in its substance. Now, as has been said, p. requires the unification of the manifold, and its point of departure is the order of things, while, in common with monism, it affirms their substantial unity. Therefore, once the reality of an order and substantiality have been denied, dialectical and materialistic evolutionism, having lost the concept of entity, can be called neither monist nor pantheist. Monism and p., pushed to this point, destroy themselves: dialectical materialism is the self-criticism of their point of departure, the negation of the demand that should justify them, and therefore its ultimate outcome is the destruction of their premises.
The term “everything is God” no longer has meaning when one admits the existence only of physical beings or of a being (embryonic or not, indistinct or homogeneous, original matter that
be) purely material. P., precisely because of the essential meaning of the term, does indeed imply the unity of being, or being as one, but conceives this being as spirit or reason, even if devoid of consciousness and impersonal; indeed, it subsequently makes thought and consciousness (v.) the revelation of being to itself. It must be added that the Absolute of p. arouses a religious feeling, admiration and love, even if merely “intellectual”; in fact, the pantheist feels enthusiasm for the Being with which he feels united, whose essence he shares: p. is intoxication with the immanent divine (Spinoza). All this is absent from naturalistic and materialistic monism, which cannot in any way call purely material being God (however matter may be conceived), even if it is active and the principle of life, nor can it nourish toward it a religious feeling or intellectual love. Therefore materialistic p. is a verbal expression without meaning: the “all is God” proper to p. cannot be reduced, except by losing its substantial meaning, to the expression “all is matter.” Today, after the great commotion of the second half of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, and the wide diffusion it achieved through the popular atheistic and pseudoscientific press, materialistic monism no longer seems to possess any claim to seriousness, even among scientists and philosophers without religious interests. Nevertheless, today more than before, it is widespread among the masses through Marxist and communist doctrines, not because it has regained even the slightest speculative force or scientific consistency, but insofar as it is connected with practical problems of an economic-political-social order. Proper p. is certainly much more serious and less crudely uncritical; its most significant historical forms are indicated here.
There is an extremely ancient form of p. that continually recurs and is present in every epoch and among all peoples: that pre-philosophical, primitive p., characteristic of peoples only at the beginnings of speculation, or of poetic and mystical natures that surrender themselves to the fascination of the immediate and to the suggestive power of the vital and active forces of nature, without rational mediation, conceptual reflection, or critical elaboration. Pre-philosophical Greece is pantheistic in this sense: the forces of nature are deified and made objects of worship. In the already developed polytheism of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Pindar, etc., the distinction among the various divinities, identified with natural forces, becomes blurred; multiplicity is hierarchized and unified in a supreme god (Zeus, “head of the world”). Orphism, with its cults and its beliefs concerning the afterlife and metempsychosis, is likewise a form of primitive p. and tends to erase the substantial individuality of human persons, reducing it to appearance. One possessed by the divinity, through inspiration and ritual, feels so possessed by the god as to identify himself with him. The ontological unity of the whole, experienced immediately and as spontaneous feeling, still belongs to the phase of poetic intuition or mystical surrender. The profound sense of nature and of the identification of man with its forces is intoxication with the divine, a vital feeling of communion between man and the divinity and between the divinity and man. This form of p., which is not reflective thought but lived experience, finds its most spontaneous and luxuriant expressions either in the primitivism of peoples not yet intellectually developed or in that of powerful mystical and poetic temperaments, which possess an exuberant sense of nature and a cult of life; the non-Catholic German mystics, on the one hand, and Goethe and almost the whole of German Romantic poetry (v.), on the other, as well as certain contemporary writers, especially North American ones, etc., resound with powerful pantheistic accents. This may be called aesthetic or mystical p.: worship of “great mother nature,” which is “beautiful” even when it is “horrid,” which is the living God in all the power of its active forces, now a terrifying disturber (the storm, the earthquake, etc.), now a majestic pacifier in an infinite and almost motionless peace (the starry sky, the immense and clear horizon from an Alpine summit, etc.).
The first mature philosophical and doctrinal elaboration of this p., at once aesthetic, mystical, and profoundly religious, is Neoplatonic emanationism, one of the forms of proper p., specifically that which traces nature back to God. It does not begin from the world or from its primitive material elements, but from the One or Absolute or Substance or the like, which it identifies with God, from whom it makes the world proceed either by emanation (Plotinus), or by necessary deduction (Spinoza) and position (Fichte), or by dialectical movement (Hegel), etc. In all these doctrines the world is dissolved in God; only God really exists, and the world is a necessary manifestation of him. These various forms of p. have two general theses in common: a) the reduction of the multiplicity of beings to the ontological unity of one single and identical being, whereby the being of the world, emanating or proceeding from God, is the very being of God; b) God is therefore “chained” to the world, to this world, the only possible one, which eternally and necessarily emanates from him and returns to him in order to identify itself with him, like drops of water that, temporarily left on the shore by the ebb of a wave, are reabsorbed by the next one. The image of the tree is very well known and expressive: roots, trunk, branches, leaves—all draw life from the same seed and the same sap, which is perpetually renewed in its manifestations and is always identical with itself in the unity of substance, from seed to fruits. This image is frequent in the Enneads (it enjoyed great success in Romantic poetry: Schlegel, Schiller, Novalis, Hölderlin, etc.): “let one imagine the life of a very great tree; it flows (ἐλθῶσαν) through it, while its principle remains unmoved without being dispersed throughout the tree, since it resides in the roots” (Enn., III, 8, 10). For everything there is a unity to which one must ascend: “every being is traced back to the unity that precedes it, until one reaches the absolute One (τὸ ἀπλῶς ἕν), which refers to nothing else” (ibid.). Evidently, pantheistic affirmations, according to the degree of identification of God and World, have different nuances and greater or lesser rigidity. But the trajectory of p. is almost inevitable, demanded by the internal coherence of its presuppositions: whether one speaks of the emanation of the world from God, or of its hypostatic union with God himself (the world subsists in the divine personality), or of an immanent act, the world is ultimately reduced to an appearance or an illusion.
Plotino (v.) everything proceeds by superabundance from the One (which is “simple” and of which nothing can be predicated: neither being, nor thought, nor will, etc.) in a necessary and eternal emanative generation (Intellect, Soul, things, matter or non-being): “the One is all things and none of them; for the principle of all things is not all things, but all derive from it and will return to it” (Enn., V, 21). Therefore “all things are like a life extending in an entire and continuous straight line: each of its successive points is different, but the inner line is continuous; each point is different from the others, but the preceding one is not lost in the point that follows” (ibid., V, 2, 2). As is well known, Neoplatonism (v.) strongly influenced the Western Middle Ages, first through s. Agostino (v.), then even more through pseudo-Dionigi Massimo il confessore (v.), and finally through Muslim and Jewish thinkers (especially Avicebron; v.). Christian antiquity (and Augustine in particular) was by no means unaware of the fundamental differences between Christianity (creation, fall, redemption, end of the world) and Neoplatonism (emanation, ours being the best of worlds, the return of things to the Absolute); nor were they ignored by later Christian Neoplatonists of upright intention but heterodox doctrine, Scoto Eriugena (v.), who, through pseudo-Dionigi, reproduces Proclo’s (v.) thought in the terms of Christian doctrine. In God, the “natura quae creat et non creatur,” supreme reason of every finite being that does not possess within itself the reason for its being, every creature exists; and therefore, Scoto asserts, Creator and creature are one: “Quid si creaturam Creatori adiunxeris, ita ut nil aliud in ea intelligas, nisi ipsum qui solus vere est, nil enim extra vere essentia dicitur, quia omnia quae absunt nil aliud sunt in quantum sunt, nisi participatio ipsius, qui a seipso solus per seipsum subsistit: num negabis Creatorem et creaturam unum esse?”: De div. naturae, II, II, f. 528 A-B). Therefore everything is in God, and all reality has its reason in God: “in ipso enim immutabiliter et essentialiter sunt omnia, et ipse est divisio et collectio universalis creaturae, et genus, et species, et totum, et pars, sed haec omnia ex ipso et in ipso et ad ipsum sunt” (ibid., III, 1, p. 621 C-D). From the assertion Deus omnia facere (ibid., I, 72, f. 518 A-B), Scoto does not hesitate to pass to the further one: “Deus itaque omnia est, et omnia Deus” (ibid., III, 10, f. 650, C-D), that is, to affirm that God is the essence of everything he creates. It is true that Scoto strives (ibid., III, 7, f. 675 C) to distinguish, within God himself, as two realities of God, that which transcends every essence and that which coincides with the essence of all things; but neither this nor any other distinctions save him from p., although authoritative Catholic scholars hold a different opinion (M. Cappuyns, E. Gilson). At most, one may accept the judgment of De Wulf (Storia della filos. mediev., Italian translation, I, Florence 1944, pp. 135 ff.): in the De divisione there are texts (very numerous) that “have a pronounced monistic flavor” and others that “establish no less clearly a distinction between God and the created world.”
Other manifestations of p., besides those in the Muslim and Jewish worlds, are found throughout the Western Middle Ages, from David di Dinant and Almarico di Bena to Eccardo (v.), whose seventeen propositions John XXII condemned in 1329 as heretical and another eleven as suspect. It seems, however, despite certain rash assertions, Niccolò Cusano (v.) cannot be accused of p.; he maintains the duality between God and creatures, rejects the emanationist principle, and accepts that of creation in the Christian sense. P. flourished in Renaissance thought: traces of it are found in Pico della Mirandola (v.), CESALPINO, ANDREA (v.), in Patrizzi, etc., and an unequivocal expression of it in G. BRUGNATO (v.), for whom the Monad of monads, in which opposites coincide, manifests its active essence in the infinite and eternal universe. Bruno borrows from Neoplatonism the image of the tree (Della causa, principio et uno, II), and although he distinguishes between the “Mens super omnia” and the “Mens insita omnibus,” his conception of Nature as the explicatio of divine unity, the necessary relation between the world (natura naturae) and God (natura naturans), and expressions such as this—“all things are one single being”—leave no doubt about his Neoplatonizing p. The following passage from the Spaccio de la bestia trionfante is significant (Dial. morali, ed. G. Gentile, Bari 1927, III, 179): “That God as absolute has nothing to do with us; but insofar as he communicates himself to the effects of nature, he is more intimate to them than nature itself; so that, if he is not nature itself, he is certainly the nature of nature; and he is the soul of the soul of the world, if he is not the soul itself.”
P., which in Bruno is more lyrical effusion than speculative elaboration, finds its philosophically highest expression, rich in intense religious feeling, Spinoza (v.), whose pantheistic system is typical and, as such, possesses universal significance in the history of human thought. In it converge Jewish influences (Avicebron, the Cabala, Chasdai Crescas), those of Renaissance philosophy (Cusano, Bruno), German Protestant mysticism, etc., in addition to the influence of ancient Neoplatonism and Descartes. But in order to understand Spinozian p., one must also take account of what may be called the “mathematism” of modern thought. This is not merely a question of method (as is well known, the Ethica bears as its subtitle geometrico more demonstrato), but of substance: for Spinoza, the relation between God and the world is one of logical inherence, analogous to that between the triangle and its properties; and, by analogy with mathematics, where the quantitative criterion entails no judgment of cause or purpose, Spinoza excludes every efficient and final cause from the explanation of the world. By substance he means “id quod in se est, et per se concipitur”; by attribute, “id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam eiusdem constituens”; by mode, “substantiae affectiones, sive id, quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur”; by God, “ens absolute infinitum, hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis attributus, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit” (Eth., part 1ª, De Deo, ed. G. Gentile, Bari 1915, p. 3). Spinoza identifies God and Substance, which consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses its eternal and infinite essence and is therefore itself infinite. But just as Substance exists only in its attributes, so the attributes (thought and extension are the two known to us) exist only in their infinite modes; therefore God exists only in things as their universal essence, and things are in him as modes of his essence. God is “natura naturans” insofar as he is the universal essence of the world, and “natura naturata” insofar as he is the totality of things in which his essence is realized. God, therefore, is not different from his effects and exists only in his effects. Here, then, is p. in its most typical and perfect form: not creation of the world, but its necessary derivation from the essence of God. The world’s dependence on God is not that of an effect upon an efficient cause, but that of a sequence or consequence, just as from the definition of the triangle it follows that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles. In short, Spinoza conceives the causal relation as a logical-mathematical relation of principle and consequence. Nothing can be different from what it is: there is no place either for chance or for freedom. To know this universal necessity is the soul’s supreme blessedness (amor Dei intellectualis).
The same Leibniz (v.), who insists so much on polemicizing against Spinoza and distinguishing himself from him, from pantheistic tendencies. The accusation is far from unfounded: the determinism of the best (God cannot but create the best of all possible worlds) and the exclusively logical character of the created world are significant. His idea of creation is also highly debatable: “Created substances depend on God, who preserves and continually produces them through a mode of emanation, just as we produce our thoughts” (Discorso di metaf., § 14). The Enlightenment thought of the eighteenth century is wholly tinged with p., which mingles with deism (Shaftesbury, Toland, Diderot, Herder, Rousseau; v.). Lessing (v.) the world is God’s “consubstantial son.” Similarly, nearly all German pre-Romantic and Romantic literature is pantheistic, as is transcendental idealism in Schelling (v.); Hegel (v.) that p. finds a new and original expression of great importance: Spinoza’s intellectualistic p. is transformed into dialectical p.
Hegel, as is well known, reproaches Spinoza for making the world disappear and accuses him of “acosmism”; only the unity of God-world is real, in which God is the substance and the world the accident. Spinoza’s error is not that he is a pantheist, but that he failed to grasp the “positive character of negation,” dissolving the finite in the infinite and affirming unity at the expense of multiplicity. Dialecticism, on the other hand, makes it possible to recognize the positive character of the negative, that is, to consider the terms God-world in their dialectical relation, whereby there is no world without God, but “without the world, God is not God” (Sämtliche Werbe, ed. Lasson, XV, p. 184). The creation of the world and the eternal expression of the Word express one and the same movement. “God is the truth, the substance of the universe, and not simply an abstract ‘other.’ It is therefore the same content; it is the divine intellectual world, the divine life in itself, which develops. Now, this circle—the activity of its life—is the same thing as the life of the world, yet the latter is apparent, while the former is eternal... The Son is the truth of the finite world” (ibid., XII, p. 168). God is the absolute Spirit, which is: a) the eternal idea that develops in the world (Father); b) the idea that has attained consciousness (Son: between the world and the Son or Word, identical with the Father, there is a distinction insofar as the world expresses the fall of the idea, the moment of what is negated; ibid., XIV, p. 86); c) the idea that realizes itself in the world as the general spirit of the community. For Hegel this is absolute religion, the speculative transformation of Christianity. Hegel too defended himself in vain against the accusation of p., and authoritative interpreters of his (e.g., Th. Haering, A. Lasson, J. H. Stirling, etc.) have also maintained, without foundation, that his philosophy is not pantheistic at all. Such an interpretation can be justified only in this sense: given the essential dialecticism whereby dialectical antinomianism, the essence of thought and of reality, replaces the concepts of being and substance, one cannot speak of p., insofar as the ontological identity of beings ceases to exist—a concept that can be thought only as the dialectical term (and in which it is negated) of multiplicity. In this case, Hegel’s system may be called indifferently cosmism or acosmism; in either case, what he calls “divine life” is identified with the history of men and God with the State, in which history finds its fulfilment.
There is no need to dwell on other forms of p. (Schleiermacher, for whom God cannot exist without the world and p. is the highest form of religion, Schopenhauer, E. von Hartmann, etc.), for which the reader is referred to the corresponding entries; nor would Krause (v.) merit mention if his mediocre thought had not exerted influence in Belgium and especially in Spain, and if he had not coined the term panentheism, which in fact says nothing new: it is not God, of whom we have the infinite, who is in the world, but the world in God: “everything in God.” Consequently, philosophy is the science of God or of Essence.
For p., the world is identified with God, from whom it emanates or proceeds; hence the being of the world is the same being as God’s. On the other hand, however, p. does not deny the material character of the world, that is, that the world is also matter or something that is not spirit, and therefore that it is not of the same spiritual nature as God. The consequence is that, if one maintains the principle of the identity of the world with God, one must affirm the identity of contraries, which logically means affirming nothing.
This is the difficulty into which Spinoza’s p. seems to fall: extension (matter) and thought (spirit) are two of the attributes of the one Substance, or God, or Nature. But is duality also within the Substance? In that case there is not one original reality (Substance or God), but two realities irreducible to the unity of Substance. If Substance is one, then matter and spirit are identified in God, and the identity of contraries is affirmed, that is, the reality of both is denied. In p. it is not clear where spirit begins and matter ends, or vice versa. The distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata is of no avail, since it reproduces exactly the same difficulty. On the other hand, p. maintains that God cannot be conceived without the world, since without the world he would be unconscious: consciousness, in fact, entails alterity, that is, distinguishing oneself from something that exists and stands in opposition to oneself; hence the world is necessary to God, who makes himself, becomes, and reveals himself to himself through the world, becoming conscious of himself. This thesis, which is also characteristic of Greek and medieval p. and of German transcendental idealism, makes p. simply become atheism. A God who makes himself (Hegel’s Gott im Werden), who is a potency passing into act (v.), is not God, is not an infinite Spirit who is Pure Act. Evidently, God is denied here and something else is called by his name. Indeed, when the pantheist says that God without the world would be unconscious because consciousness, in order to apprehend itself, needs what is other than itself, he is not speaking of Absolute Consciousness or of God, but of the finite consciousness of man, who is not pure spirit like God; and God, precisely because he is pure spirit, is always consciousness in act and therefore does not necessarily need what is other than himself in order to be so. Similarly, he is perfect spirit without needing to become such, to make himself: if he had to make himself, he would always be spirit in fieri and therefore never perfect. A God who becomes is never God at any moment of his becoming, and therefore never exists as God and never will be God. It is tantamount to saying: God is not. Finally, one is not speaking of God but of something else when one argues that, if God is infinite, he can only be impersonal: whoever says person says limitation and finiteness, but God is infinite and without limits; therefore God is impersonal. It may be observed: a) the argument does not conclude that God is impersonal, but that God does not exist, since an impersonal God is not God but an abstraction (or nature or humanity, etc.); b) that the premise is correct if one understands finite human personhood, but the concept of human personhood is not the only possible concept of personhood: God is a person in a manner different from that in which man is a person, but he is so in an analogous manner (v. ANALOGIA). In other words, it cannot in any case be maintained,
because this contradicts the concept of God, that the world should “add” something to God himself. But, even if one were for a moment to assume the pantheistic thesis that the world is necessary to God, it proves contradictory in itself. If the world is necessary to God, it is absurd to say that God exists for the sake of an appearance; indeed, it is absurd to say that he exists, since, as the world is necessary for him to exist, given that the world is an appearance, God too, who needs the world in order to exist, proves to be an appearance. Thus the pantheist must concede to the world a reality of its own. But not a reality different from that of God, otherwise the principle of the unity of being, and with it the essence of p., fails. Therefore the reality of the world, which is his own reality, is necessary to God in order to exist: to God, then, is necessary... God himself in order to exist! Moreover, in pantheistic systems human freedom cannot be justified, and it is impossible to distinguish between what God wills and what he permits: good and evil are divine; God needs evil! Finally, p. suppresses the supernatural and religion (every religion is as valid as another, and all are symbolic and inadequate expressions of an inaccessible truth) and justifies as necessary all revolutions, just as it does all political tyrannies. The Church rightly condemned it in every age, in the Middle Ages as in the last century. The const. De fide catholica of 24 Apr. 1879 (chap. 1: De Deo rerum omnium creatore) presents the doctrine sanctioned by the Church (Denz-U, nos. 1782–83), and under the same title canons 3, 4, and 5 are linked (ibid., nos. 1803–1805), anathematizing p., without the slightest concession. The encyclical Pascondi (1907) likewise points out that modernist doctrines concerning symbolism and immanence lead to p.