TEOLOGIA NATURALE (TEODICEA)

**NATURAL THEOLOGY (THEODICY).** — It is the knowledge that man can have of the existence and nature of God (v.) by means of reason (v.).

It is distinguished from revealed and supernatural theology because the latter proceeds from the principles of Revelation (v.), whereas natural theology is based on the principles of reason and starts from the data of experience (v.). This division into two theologies (natural and supernatural) is rather recent because the so-called natural theology, inasmuch as it expounds the rational knowledge of the First Principle of things, belongs to metaphysics (v.) as its completion. The main object of natural theology can be indicated in three groups of questions in the following order: a) the existence of God; b) the nature of God and knowledge of the attributes of God; c) providence or the solution to the problem of evil (v.). Clearly, these are problems that are interrelated, so that it is not permissible to stop at one while excluding or ignoring the other; moreover, it is well known that the most frequent reason for theoretical and practical atheism (v.) is the difficulty of reconciling the existence of a personal God, and thus His goodness and providence, with the existence of physical and moral evil. The term "theodicy," in fact, which in Neoscholasticism often equates to natural theology, was adopted by Leibniz (v.) to address the difficulty of the problem of evil, Kant (v.).

I. TERMINOLOGY

II. HISTORICAL OUTLINE

The term theology (θεολογία) is applied by late Hellenism (Damascio) to Orpheus, who "made the first Principle derive from Night" (frg. B 12: H. Diels, *Fragm. d. Vors.*, I, 5th ed., Berlin 1934, p. 10, 27). Plato, in the outline of natural theology in the *Republic*, warns poets to adhere to suitable schemes when they must represent divinity (οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας), namely that God, as He is (οἷς τύχοιεν ὡς θεός ἐστιν), is essentially good and cannot be the cause of any evil: evil comes from other causes (Resp., II, 18, 379 a-c). Aristotle’s θεολογία can indicate both poetic-mythical speculation (cf. *Meteor.*, II, 1, 353 a 35) and the concluding part of theoretical philosophy that deals with the First Principle "separate and immobile" (ἐπιστήμη θεολογίας): *Met.*, XI, 7, 1064 a 33 ff.). In the first sense, Aristotle opposes those early poets (οἱ πρώτοι θεολογήσαντες) who indulged in anthropomorphic images to those who first set out to truly philosophize (οἱ πρώτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες), i.e., he sets up the opposition between those who catered to popular mentality and those who instead followed the rigorous discipline of thought (cf. ibid., I, 2, 983 b 6, 11, 28). To this first category belong Orpheus, Pherecydes, Homer, Hesiod... (ibid., III, 4, 1000 a 9. For the texts, V. H. Diels, *Fragm. d. Vors.*, ed. cit. III, Index, 204 b. 23-26). Then Xenophanes can be considered the first "metaphysical theologian" who expressly affirms the unity of God (the One), the most excellent and noble nature of all: τό δὲ πάντα χρῆται καὶ ἄριστον θεός (H. Diels, A 31; ed. cit., I, p. 121, 31) and the fundamental ontological opposition between God and the world: God is the One, the Almighty, the Immutable, the Eternal, who rests in Himself... (ibid., B 26, p. 135, 10). Parmenides seems to take a step further by focusing on the mystery of being and presenting the One as an object of religious veneration, and even if God is not expressly endowed with personality, the concreteness of his language about the expression of truth reveals a genuine religious experience (cf. frg. B 6, 6; H. Diels, ed. cit., I, p. 233, 4). Heraclitus celebrates the epiphany of God in the activity of nature: He is "day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger" (frg. B 67; ibid., I, p. 165, 8 ff.), present everywhere, but has fire as His abode (Aristotle, *De part. anim.*, I, 5, 645 a 17). It should be noted that most of the Sophists, accused of "atheism" (v.), in reality rather criticized the crude anthropomorphic conceptions of the poets and the self-interested State religion of politicians (cf. the trial of Socrates). One must therefore recognize a continuity in the development of theology in Greek thought, which from the beginning appears dominated by the problem of God. In the great Socratic systems, the problem of the relationship between divinity and evil explicitly arises, but in reality God is ignorant of evil: for Greek thought, God represents the sphere of rationality. Evil is referred, if physical to matter and if moral to ignorance (Plato) and to contingency (Aristotle). It is with Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy that natural theology obtains its systematic foundation. The Stoic treatment of natural theology rests on the principle of having indicated in God the actuality as λόγος of nature, while passivity belongs to matter. The principle of activity is the "artisan fire" (τὸ τεχνικόν) that penetrates throughout nature; it is not fire that burns and consumes, but vital fire that preserves, nourishes, sustains everything and gives it meaning, according to the saying of Virgil: "Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus / mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet" (*Aeneid*, VI, vv. 726 ff.). This omnipresent and omnipotent fire is God, the supreme mind: it holds within itself the "seminal reasons" (λόγοι στερματικοί) according to which all things, by necessary preordination (καθ’ εἱμαρμένην), are generated; and it is spirit (πνεῦμα) that extends throughout the universe and takes various names in the whole of matter (Aetius, *Placita*, I, 7, 33; H. Diels, *Dox. gr.*, 2nd ed., 305, 15 ff.). Therefore, the Stoics identify

God with the reality of the world. He is an “immortal, rational, perfect animal, that is intellectual in the possession of happiness, as far as possible removed from all evil, who has providence over the world and the things that are in the world.” But He has “no human form” (ἀνθρωπόμορφος); He is the craftsman (ἀνθρωπός) of the whole and like the father of all (ὥσπερ πατὴρ πάντων: Diogenes Laertius, VII, ch. 1); He is called Δία (Jupiter), because through (διά) Him all things are, and Zeus (Ζῆνα) inasmuch as He makes all things live (ζῆν). Therefore, Zeno asserts, the substance of God is the universe-all and the sky. This physical immanence of the deity constitutes the perfect rationality of the cosmos: which in turn explains the Stoic conception of “fate” as the foundation of the sage’s imperturbability. This metaphysics of natural theology had its opening in the theory of knowledge. The Stoics place the starting point of knowledge in the first “inset cognitions” (ἐμπορεῖ προληψεῖ): these are not innate ideas, but derive immediately from experience through a “natural disposition” that renders man akin to God, and hence the notion of God and religion belong to the essence of man. At this point the unity of the human race is forged: all, Greeks and barbarians, believe by virtue of the same notions in divinity, offer sacrifices, pray, and direct vows. The principal arguments for the existence of God, according to Cleanthes, are the predictions of oracles, the beauty of the stars, the order and hierarchy of beings which are seen to be guided by an immanent finality. The corruption of the concept of God in polytheism arose from the personification of natural forces, from passions, from the morbid fantasy of poets... and in general from the inability to rise to the contemplation of God in the Whole of the Universe (cf. Aetius, Placita, I, 6: πῶς ἐννοῶν ἔχων ἔχον ἕδω ἂν θρῶσιν; H. Diels, Dox. gr., 2nd ed., 295 ff.).

In this grand speculation Poseidonius occupies a place of privilege; his lost treatise Ἡρώ τῷ Θεῷ ἐν τῇ στάσει is the source of Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus mathematicos III 1, of Cicero’s De natura deorum, and of Virgil already cited (cf. K. Reinhardt, Poseidonios, Munich 1921, pp. 208 ff.). Poseidonius synthesizes the theology of Plato and Aristotle with that of the Stoa, also incorporating Pythagorean elements: “God is an intelligent and fiery spirit (πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες) that has no figure (corporeal), that turns to what He wills and communicates a likeness of Himself to all things” (H. Diels, Dox. gr., 2nd ed., p. 302 b).

A characteristic doctrine of Poseidonius’ anthropological theology is the conception of man as a “connection” (συνδεσμός) and circle of all things; man is like the bond between corruptible reality and divinity so that all things are in a single and unbroken bond (the “cosmic sympathy”) from the inorganic world, through plants and animals, up to God: this is the most splendid historical form of natural theology in its original sense (cf. K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie. Neue Untersuchungen über Poseidonios, Munich 1926, esp. pp. 111 ff.). Poseidonius’ influence is also notable on the Hellenistic Jew Philo (v.) and on Christian writers such as Origen, the Cappadocians, Nemesius of Emesa, and Chalcidius, who seem to develop the richness of the Christian conception upon the framework of the Stoic conception (cf. H. Koch, Pronoia u. Paideutis, Studien über Origenes u. sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus, Berlin and Leipzig 1932, appendix, pp. 216 ff.). The speculations of Neoplatonism, from Plotinus to Proclus, constitute a natural theology that absorbs the entire philosophy: the “divine” is there considered not only in static form (as Plato’s “ideas”) but with respect to the becoming of the real which is articulated in the process of emanation of the hypostases (the One, Intellect, Soul... in Plotinus; the Unparticipated, the participations and the participants in Proclus). The hidden and mystical side of Greek theology unfolded in parallel with philosophy, and with alternating movements of approach and repulsion toward it, in the Orphic-Pythagorean doctrines on the “theogonies” (cf. M.-J. Lagrange, Critique historique. I. Les mystères. L’orphisme, Paris 1937, pp. 119 ff.).

Natural theology reaches its fulfillment under the influence of Revelation in patristic and medieval thought. Recent researches into Stoic and Neoplatonic sources have shown the close continuity between Greek philosophy and Jewish-Christian speculation. A place of honor belongs to the Alexandrian Jew Philo who, in conformity with Ex. 3:14, names God solely τό ὄν, excluding every determination (ἄποιος; cf. Leg. Alleg., I, 15; ed. Cohn-Wendland, I, Berlin 1896, p. 73, 27). Natural theology is called “wisdom” (σοφία), the knowledge of God “cult of God,” the “way that leads to God” (H. A. Wolfson, Philo, I, Cambridge, [Mass.] 1948, p. 148). Philo, like the Stoics, attributes to God the care of the entire human race and of the universe (cf. De Prov., II, 44), without mentioning individuals: yet these are not excluded from Providence, for he defends the truth of miracles that concern particular situations and persons. These uncertainties, however, vanish in Christian writers: God is not only transcendent Spirit but is intelligence, life, and love, not only in Himself but also toward creatures (free creation) and in particular toward man (Incarnation). In the Fathers, natural theology is not cosmological or political speculation, as in classical antiquity, but is oriented toward man and considers the individual. Natural theology is therefore a reflection of the certainty of the teaching of faith regarding the existence and nature of God, the creation and preservation of things, the divine dignity of man, and the origin and final resolution of the problem of evil... it is by this positive influence of Revelation upon patristic philosophy that the providence of individuals stands as the starting point of the divine economy (parable of the lost sheep). In particular, from Neoplatonism patristic theology took its caution in the use of “divine names”: thus St. Basil affirms a twofold class of divine names, the one with positive meaning, names that “indicate the perfections proper to God,” as when we call Him good and just, creator and judge and the like; the others, however, indicate Him with respect to things that do not belong to Him, e.g., incorruptible, invisible, immortal... (Contra Eun., I, 10; PG 29, 536). A distinguished example of natural theology is St. Gregory Nazianzen’s Oratio theologica II (τρεῖς θεολογικά; PG 36, 25 ff.) which develops the following points: 1) (§§ 1-12): the absolute incomprehensibility of the divine nature in itself. Yet it is possible to demonstrate by reason the existence of God as creator and preserver of all, perfectly “incorporeal” (ἀσώματος): in saying that God is “incorporeal,” we do not show that we know what He is, but what He is not, and so for the other attributes taken from creatures. 2) (§§ 13-16): the surest way to know God is that of Holy Scripture which calls Him “spirit and fire, light and charity and wisdom and justice and intelligence and Word...,” in contrast to unworthy polytheism. 3) (§§ 17-21): the surest way is to ascend (with the guidance of Scripture) from our mind which is “something divine and godlike” (τὸ θεοειδές τοῦτο καὶ θεῖον) to God as from “the image to its archetype”: thus did Enoch, Elijah, St. Paul. 4) (§§ 22-31): the spectacle of order and harmony which is shown in the world and especially in the realm of living beings attests the existence of the Creator.

One cannot, however, speak among the Fathers of a natural theology as a distinct discipline, since this presupposes a classification of knowledge that will only emerge toward the end of the patristic era (with St. JOHN DAMASCENE) through the assimilation of Aristotelian logic, as well as an extension of theological reflection by adopting precise concepts from classical philosophy (Platonic, Stoic, etc.). The first explicit controversies regarding the autonomy of metaphysical natural theology in relation to theology properly so-called are to be found in the Muslim world between two currents of philosophical rationalism (falsafah), culminating in AVERROES, and of theology (kalām), the mystical fideism of AVICENNA and especially of AL-GHAZALI (cf. L. Gardet - M. M. Anawati, *Introd. à la théol. musulmane*, Paris 1948, esp. pp. 133 ff., 316 ff.). The Arabic polemic would nourish the formation of natural theology in the Middle Ages, especially from the 13th century onward, when the translations of AVERROES and AVICENNA entered the West, to which must be added two Jews, AVICEPBRON and MOSES MAIMONIDES, advocates of agnosticism and theological occasionalism, criticized by St. THOMAS.

Latin Scholasticism, in its orthodox orientation, remained faithful to the patristic magisterium, especially that of St. AUGUSTINE, the Pseudo-DIONYSIUS, St. GREGORY THE GREAT, and the Damascene, who most directly inspired medieval theology. Progress concerned at most the method, which was taken from Aristotle with the contribution of the Arabs (AVICENNA, AVERROES, and MOSES MAIMONIDES). It varied according to the orientation of the different schools: Augustinianism preferred the doctrine of illumination, attempting with St. ANSELM (v.) an a priori argumentation, and thus a certain direct process; faithful to Aristotelianism, St. THOMAS developed instead the a posteriori proofs and the method of analogy (v.); nominalism (v.) distrusted both a priori and a posteriori proofs and relegated knowledge of God solely to faith, anticipating Protestant fideism.

A special mention must be made of the Lullist RAIMUNDUS SABUNDUS (d. 1432; [v.]), author of the *Theologia naturalis seu verius thesaurus divinarum considerationum ex naturae fontibus haustarum*, which would be of great benefit to theologians, philosophers, and all students of the sciences and arts (Venice 1581), whose prologue was placed on the Index in 1595 and removed by Leo XIII in 1900. The reason for the condemnation seems to have been not so much the defense of the almost exclusive authority attributed to Holy Scripture in the knowledge of faith, but rather the fact that the book of nature is presented there as a source not only for knowledge of the natural attributes of God but also with regard to salvation, perfection, and the progress of eternal life. For example, in chapter 46 (developed in chapters 47–55), creation *ad extra*... “manifests and argues another highest, hidden, and eternal production in God, which is of His nature and His own being. In this God is produced from God and through this the highest Trinity in God is shown” (op. cit., p. 33 b). In chapters 63–64, the Trinity is demonstrated with the ontological argument (pp. 52–54; cf. chap. 26, p. 286 b, the same for the mystery of the Incarnation). The work was praised by Hegel for its speculative vigor (cf. *Gesch. der Philos.*, in *Werke*, XV, Berlin 1844, p. 175) and inspired the Romantic theologian Martin DEUTINGER to attempt a synthesis between Christian thought and the modern principle of self-consciousness (cf. I. Fellerer, *Das Verhältnis von Philos. u. Theol. nach M. D.*, Bonn 1940, pp. 57 ff.). A disciple of Deutinger, SIGHART, prepared a new edition of Raimundus’s *Theologia naturalis* (Freising 1852), which in the 17th century was translated and defended by Montaigne (*Essais*, II, chap. 12; ed. Faguet, II, Paris n.d., pp. 47 ff.).

Early Protestantism, while diminishing the powers of reason, did not entirely reject natural theology, and this on the strength of Rom 1:20. According to the *Formula Concordiae*, Luther “carefully warned that there is a knowledge of God derived from the Gospel quite different from that derived from the Law, since even the Gentiles had some knowledge of God from natural law, yet neither recognized Him correctly nor worshiped Him” (J. T. Müller, *Die symbolische Bücher der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, Gütersloh 1928, p. 638 b). Starting from the same metaphysician who admitted an ethics and a natural theology, the issue was moot, as the 17th-century theologian Hutet declared: “Not only are we ungrateful toward God Himself, but we also engage in contemplation of Him, and today people would not blush to deny natural knowledge or to call its most excellent fruit, philosophy, a work of the flesh or sin” (in H. E. Weber, *Reformation, Orthodoxie und Rationalismus*, ibid. 1951, p. 17). The same could be said of the “little spark of free will” (*ein kleines Fuenc-lein der freien Willens*) that remains in man to tend toward God in some way even after the Fall, as attested by the Pietist Jo. ARNDT (cf. *Das wahre Christentum*, I, chap. 41, § 26, Leipzig 1764, p. 218 a). Ambiguous is the position of CALVIN, according to whom fallen man can still distinguish between good and evil but cannot find the way to ascend to God: indeed, although he admits that God has implanted a natural knowledge of Himself in human minds—and this explains why there is no people without a religion—this knowledge is not sufficient to ascend to God unless guided by the authority of Scripture, because the human mind is corrupted (cf. *Institutio christianae religionis*, I, 3 and 6; ed. Geneva 1569, pp. 3 ff.). Traditional, however, remains the definition of BACON: “Natural theology may rightly be called divine philosophy. It is defined as that knowledge, or rather spark of knowledge, of God that can be had through the light of nature and the contemplation of created things” (*De augmentis scient.*, II, 2; ed. Spedding-Ellis, I, London 1879, p. 544). Natural theology replaces revealed theology in the deism (v.) of HERBERT OF CHERBURY (1581–1648) through the five truths enunciated in *De veritate* of 1624: 1) there exists a supreme deity; 2) it must be worshiped by man; 3) virtue has always constituted the principal part of the worship of God; 4) vices and crimes must be expiated; 5) after this life, reward or punishment awaits (cf. M. M. Rossi, *Alle fonti del deismo e del materialismo moderno*, Florence 1942, p. 6): a TOLAND (v.), who denies the existence of any mystery transcending the human mind (cf. *Clidophorus*, in *Works*, London 1720, pp. 63 ff.).

The ambiguity of Calvin’s position regarding natural theology reappears today in the respective interpretations of EMIL BRUNNER and KARL BARTH: while the former made broad concessions to the Thomist position of natural knowledge of God, the latter denied the possibility of a “point of contact” (*Anknuepfungspunkt*) and characterized the Thomist doctrine of analogy as an “invention of the Antichrist” (*Dogmatik*, I, 5th ed., Zurich 1947, p. VIII).

Neo-Scholasticism took the term “natural theology” (*theologia naturalis*) from Wolff, who defined it as “the science of what can be understood as possible through God” and assigned to it as its object the existence, attributes, and effects of God (*Philosophia rationalis sive logica methodo scientifica practata*, §§ 57 and 96, Verona 1779, pp. 15 a, 23 ff.). But Christian philosophy, taking the term “natural theology” from the Enlightenment, rejected its method and rational spirit, in conformity with ecclesiastical teaching.

The problem of the nature and method of natural theology ultimately depends on the very notion of philosophy and the capacity of human reason to attain the absolute, as well as on the concept of divine revelation, which clarifies the relationship between reason and faith (v.).