MORAL THEOLOGY. - It is that part of Catholic theology which directly considers specifically human action, directed toward its ultimate end, which, known through Revelation, becomes concretely attainable through Grace.
I. MATERIAL AND FORMAL OBJECT
It follows that the material object of moral theology is the action of man as conscious and free. Its formal object lies in the supernatural character of its principles, in its conclusions and in the whole systematic development of its doctrines, in relation to man's final end, which is his eternal beatitude (v.) and which is known through Revelation (v. FINE ULTIMO). And in relation to this supernatural end it sets forth the whole doctrine of the laws, known and illustrated also by Revelation; it treats of the moral virtues destined to be informed by caritas; of the Sacraments, which are the essentially supernatural means. The material object of moral theology also includes indifferent acts (v. ATTO UMANO). For it cannot be doubted that all human action, even that which is considered indifferent, can saltem intentionaliter be referred to God as final end, and therefore be meritorious and thus fall under the control of moral theology; as likewise omissions that have a relation to the final end. The Scholastics enclosed the whole object of moral theology in the general precept: «Declina a malo et fac bonum» (Ps. 36, 27), that is: negative precepts and positive precepts.
Certainly moral theology, even though it rests essentially on Revelation and therefore on the truths of faith, rationally deduces its conclusions (v. CONCLUSIONE TEOLOGICA), always under the control of the ecclesiastical magisterium; but when it avails itself of precepts and principles of the natural or positive-human order it does not lose its character of supernaturalness, because those very principles receive from it the light of Revelation and are thus directed to the final end, which is known only through Revelation and attainable only by supernatural means.
In relation to the subjects, that is, to the men whose action moral theology must regulate, the same theological principles hold that concern the subjects of Revelation in general (v. RIVELAZIONE).
II. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER SCIENCES
By reason of its formal object, moral theology is closely linked with dogmatics (v.), both because the truths taught by the latter are fundamental and necessary premises for moral theology, and because both, while remaining within their specific field, fully agree in their formal object, that is, in the character of supernaturalness. For this reason the great Scholastics rightly treated dogmatics and morals together in their Summae, according to the famous principle so often repeated in the sources, by which the whole of theological discipline is contained in fide et in moribus. Nevertheless, by reason of its material object, dogmatics is distinguished from morals, in that the former does not directly consider specifically human action, which is proper instead to moral theology. Conversely, moral theology has relations of affinity with ethics, both in that it does not destroy nor disregard the moral principles of the natural order, and because both directly consider specifically human action. But they are in turn distinguished by their formal object. Therefore moral theology essentially surpasses ethics, which is directed only to man's natural end. Accordingly, for the relations that obtain between moral theology and ethics, the discussions that arise concerning the relations between philosophy and theology may also hold, and therefore concerning the problem of whether a Christian philosophy exists (v. FILOSOFIA) and consequently whether a Christian ethics exists (v. ETICA). In any case, ethics cannot proclaim as legitimate and true those moral doctrines that are in contrast with the certain principles of moral theology. On the other hand, it is necessary that, because of the affinity between the two disciplines, the moral theologian also be versed in ethics. As for the relations between moral theology and civil law, philosophers of law strive, according to their various tendencies, to find a fundamental reason for the distinction (v. DIRITTO). It may be held that moral theology, by reason of its material object, certainly has relations of affinity and connection with civil law, not only in that the latter too regulates human action, albeit within the limits of sociality and of the external forum, but also because civil laws themselves, if legitimate and just, bind in conscience (v. LEGGE, III. L. civile) and therefore have a relation to the ultimate end, which is the proper object of moral theology. But by reason of its formal object, moral theology is at the same time distinguished from civil law. For while the end of civil law is directly the temporal bonum sociale, the end of the so-called theology of law is the bonum sociale aeternum, controlled also by the internal forum, that is, it is the same bonum sociale, but sub specie aeternitatis and under the light of Revelation. For this reason human positive law does not consider all the rights of man, because, as St. Augustine says, «videtur multa reliquere impunita, quae per divinam Providentiam vindicantur» (De libero arbitrio, c. 5, n. 15: PL 32, 1228); whereas moral theology considers all the rights of man not only as a member of a civil society, but also of a supernatural society, which begins in this life and is perfected in the next (v. CORPO MISTICO). Hence, where the judge of civil law does not reach, the judge of moral theology reaches, that is, the confessor, for whose upright and just judgment moral theology sets out with particular care the treatise De iustitia.
Canon law is closely connected with moral theology by reason of its formal object, in that the canons presuppose for juridical personality a subject elevated to the supernatural order through Baptism (can. 87) and therefore under the vision of the ultimate end to be attained; whence the close connection of canon law with dogmatic and moral truths. Nevertheless canon law is distinguished from moral theology in that it does not, like moral theology, control all human activity in relation to the ultimate end («de internis non iudicat Ecclesia»), and the question is raised whether the Church can command merely internal acts (v. DIRITTO, III. Diritto canonico). Moral theology in its casuistry does indeed consider also the canonical laws, because it must judge in the concrete all human activity in all its circumstances of the licit and the illicit, whatever the law may be; however, speculative moral theology should not concern itself with them. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth, there are many interferences between it and moral theology, which easily explains the manner in which moralists and canonists conduct themselves in treating their disciplines.
More strongly felt today, on the other hand, is the tendency not to wish to distinguish essentially ascetical theology from moral theology, so as not to minimize the latter. For moral theology by its very nature cannot be merely the science of the illicit or of mortal sin alone, but of all human activity, in all its gradations of good and evil, up to all the degrees of the perfect and therefore up to the even heroic exercise of the virtues. The contrary is not justified and would make moral theology itself something less estimable in the eyes of those souls who practically do not love this distinction. For every soul, under the inspiration of Grace and with its help, is bound to perfect itself always in view of the ultimate end and of eternal beatitude, which will not be equal for all. Less distinct, on the other hand, is moral theology from those things that are considered its parts: such as pastoral theology, casuistry (v.), etc.
III. SOURCES OF MORAL THEOLOGY
There is no doubt that, given the nature of moral theology itself, its primary source is divine Revelation itself, in its two sources of Sacred Scripture (v.) and Tradition (v.); its secondary and subordinate source is human reason.
IV. DIVISIONS AND METHODS OF MORAL THEOLOGY
Although moralists are rather in agreement in distinguishing and dividing moral theology into two parts: fundamental and general on the one hand, and special on the other, they nevertheless do not agree on the subdivisions of these two parts. With regard to fundamental moral theology, some place the treatise on laws before that on conscience, others do the opposite; some again study sin before the laws, others divide differently. O. Lottin (op. cit. in bibl.) proposes that, once the psychological notions of the human act have been premised, three treatises follow in succession: in the first place the very norm of morality should be considered; in the second place the objective application of these norms to the human act; in the third place the subjective application of these norms, through the judgment of conscience (conscientious life) and through prudential judgment (virtuous life); and finally the necessary consequences in the meritorious life. With regard to special moral theology, a great difference is also noted in the way of dividing it. Some indeed divide it into the two great treatises De praeceptis and De Sacramentis; others into the treatises De virtutibus and De Sacramentis; others finally into individual and social, considering in the first the obligations that refer to the individual and in the second those that have a social relation. Indeed, there is no lack of those who are beginning to speak and write of social morality as a science in its own right (cf. R. Lortal, Principes de morale sociale, Lyon 1946).
Regarding the methods of treating and teaching moral theology, traditionally there used to be talk of a positive method, which takes account predominantly of the sources of Revelation with particular attention to the historical-doctrinal development of the same moral principles. In the second place, the speculative method is recognized, which rather insists on illustrating the moral principles also rationally and on deducing new conclusions, harmonizing them among themselves. The apologetic method, moreover, takes pleasure in controversies, vigorously attacking error and demonstrating its falsity. The casuistic method, after briefly setting out the principles, insists on their application to practical cases. Today new tendencies are noted that concern precisely method (for only in this sense can one speak of new tendencies in moral theology). They have their major exponents in Germany (with Tillmann), in Belgium (with Mersch, Leclercq), and elsewhere others (v. bibl.) who, in the teaching of moral theology, prefer new ways to the old manualistic methods. Whatever the development of these new tendencies of method may be, in treating moral theology one must always bring to light its character as a theological science and as an art moderating the customs of the individual and collective man. Considering, in fact, the very nature of moral theology, it is not enough to organize its principles (speculative morality) under the theological vision of the Mystical Body (Mersch), of the imitation of Christ (Tillmann), of Caritas (Gilleman); but a wise application of its principles to the concrete man (casuistic morality) is also necessary, so that he may concretely form a judgment not only on the gradual perfection of human actions, but also on the greater or lesser gravity of the faults that man so often commits.
V. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
During the patristic period and the one following it, down to beyond the golden age of scholasticism, the treatment of moral theology did not develop separately from theology generally speaking (v. above); in the great Summae (v.) moral theology is treated alongside dogmatics, even if some writers set out some specifically moral subject in separate treatises. After the Council of Trent, alongside certain authors who wished to remain still on the ancient line (for example, Bartolomé de Medina, Fr. Toledo, D. Báñez, G. Vázquez, John of St. Thomas, Fr. Suárez), there begins a fruitful period of moral theology, treated as a part of its own, in the texts of T. Sánchez, G. Argor, V. Reginaldo, Fr. de Castro Palao, M. Bonacina, P. Laymann, H. Busenbaum, and in the more particular treatises restricted to some moral subject by L. Molina, L. Lessius, G. de Lugo, etc. Nor should one forget the simultaneous evolution of casuistry (v.), which in some degenerated into the disorder of laxism (v.).
With the work of St. Alphonsus Liguori, proclaimed by Pius XII protector of moralists, there came a salutary turning point, and little by little moral theology was restored to the theoretical and scientific plane that is its due. Once the field had indeed been freed from the errors of Jansenism, Gallicanism and Josephinism, moral theology was reborn with J. Gury, A. Ballerini, D. Palmieri, G. d'Anniola, F. Carrère, G. Frassinetti, and it continues to flourish in the numerous modern manualists: A. Lehmkuhl, A. Vermeersch, E. Génicot-Salamans, G. Noldin, D. Prümmer, B. Merkelbach, F. Tillmann, L. Fanfani, F. Aertyns-C. A. Damen, O. Schilling, A. Piscetta - A. Gennaro, G. Pighi - A. Grazioli, A. Lanza, T. A. Iorio, etc. But more important from the scientific standpoint are the modern historical-systematic monographs and the numerous articles in theological journals on particular themes and problems of moral theology.
Bibliography39 works
Ermenegildo Lio