MORAL THEOLOGY. — It is that part of Catholic theology which directly considers specifically human action directed toward its ultimate end, which, known through Revelation, becomes concretely attainable through Grace.
I. MATERIAL AND FORMAL OBJECT
From this it follows that the material object of moral theology is the action of the conscious and free human being. Its formal object consists in the supernatural character of its principles, its conclusions, and the entire systematic development of its doctrines, in relation to the ultimate end of man, which is his eternal beatitude (q.v.) and which is known through Revelation (q.V. ULTIMATE END). In relation to this supernatural end, it expounds the entire doctrine of laws, known and illuminated also by Revelation; it treats of the moral virtues destined to be informed by charity; of the Sacraments, which are essentially supernatural means. The material object of moral theology also includes indifferent acts (q.V. HUMAN ACT). It cannot, in fact, be doubted that all human action, even that which is considered indifferent, can intentionally be referred to God as its ultimate end, and thus be meritorious and therefore subject to the control of moral theology; likewise, omissions that have a relation to the ultimate end. The scholastics summarized the entire object of moral theology in the general precept: “Declina a malo et fac bonum” (Ps. 36:27), that is, negative precepts and positive precepts.Certainly moral theology, even while basing itself essentially on Revelation and thus on truths of faith, rationally deduces its conclusions (q.V. THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION), always under the control of the ecclesiastical magisterium; but when it makes use of precepts and principles of natural or positive-human order, it does not lose its character of supernaturality, because these same principles receive from it the light of Revelation and are thus directed toward the ultimate end, known only through Revelation and attainable only by supernatural means.
With regard to its subjects, that is, the men whose actions moral theology must regulate, the same theological principles apply that concern the subjects of Revelation in general (q.V. REVELATION).
II. RELATION TO OTHER SCIENCES
By its formal object, moral theology is closely connected with dogmatic theology (q.v.), both because the truths taught by the latter are fundamental and necessary premises for moral theology, and because both, while remaining within their specific fields, fully converge in their formal object, namely, in the character of supernaturality. For this reason, the great scholastics, in their Summae, rightly treated dogmatic theology and moral theology together, in accordance with the famous principle repeatedly stated in the sources, according to which the entire theological discipline is contained in fide et in moribus. Nevertheless, by reason of its material object, dogmatic theology is distinguished from moral theology, inasmuch as the former does not directly consider specifically human action, which is instead the proper concern of moral theology. Conversely, moral theology has affinities with ethics, both in that it does not destroy or disregard the moral principles of natural order, and because both directly consider specifically human action. Yet they are in turn distinguished by their formal object. Therefore, moral theology essentially surpasses ethics, which is concerned only with the natural end of man. Hence, with regard to the relations between moral theology and ethics, the discussions concerning the relations between philosophy and theology may also apply, and thus the question of whether a Christian philosophy exists (q.V. PHILOSOPHY) and consequently whether a Christian ethics exists (q.V. ETHICS). In any case, ethics cannot proclaim as legitimate and true moral doctrines that are in contrast with the certain principles of moral theology. On the other hand, it is necessary that, due to the affinity between the two disciplines, the moral theologian be also well-versed in ethics. As for the relations between moral theology and civil law, jurists endeavor, according to various tendencies, to find a fundamental reason for distinction (q.V. LAW). It may be held that moral theology, by its material object, certainly has affinities and connections with civil law, not only insofar as the latter also regulates human action, albeit within the limits of sociality and the external forum, but also because the same civil laws, when legitimate and just, bind in conscience (q.V. LAW, III. Civil Law) and thus have a relation to the ultimate end, the proper object of moral theology. Yet by its formal object, moral theology is at the same time distinguished from civil law. For while the end of civil law is directly the temporal social good, the end of the so-called theology of law is the eternal social good, controlled also by the internal forum, that is, it is the same social good, but sub specie aeternitatis and under the light of Revelation. For this reason, positive human law does not consider all the rights of man, because, as St. Augustine says, “videtur multa reliquere impunita, quae per divinam Providentiam vindicantur” (De libero arbitrio, c. 5, n. 15: PL 32, 1228); whereas moral theology considers all the rights of man not only as a member of a civil society, but also of a supernatural society, which begins in this life and is perfected in the next (q.V. MYSTICAL BODY). Hence, where the judge of civil law cannot reach, there arrives the judge of moral theology, that is, the confessor, for whose right and just judgment moral theology carefully expounds the treatise De iustitia.Canon law is closely connected with moral theology by its formal object, inasmuch as the canons presuppose for juridical personality a subject elevated to the supernatural order by Baptism (can. 87) and thus under the vision of the ultimate end to be attained; whence the close connection of canon law with dogmatic and moral truths. Nevertheless, canon law is distinguished from moral theology in that it does not control, as moral theology does, all human activity in relation to the ultimate end (and the Church does not judge internal matters: de internis non iudicat Ecclesia), and the question arises whether the Church can command merely internal acts (q.V. LAW, III. Canon Law). Moral theology in its casuistry does indeed consider canon laws, because it must judge in concreto all human activity in all its circumstances of the licit and the illicit, whatever the law may be; yet speculative moral theology should not concern itself with them. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated, there are many points of intersection between the two, which easily explains the manner in which moralists and canonists approach their respective disciplines.
More keenly felt today, however, is the tendency not to make a fundamental distinction between ascetical theology and moral theology, so as not to minimize the latter. Moral theology, in fact, by its very nature cannot be merely the science of the illicit or of mortal sin alone, but of all human activity, in all its gradations of good and evil, up to all degrees of perfection and thus even to the heroic exercise of the virtues. The contrary is unjustified and would render moral theology something less estimable in the eyes of those souls who do not practically favor this distinction. Every soul, in fact, under the inspiration of Grace and with its aid, is bound to perfect itself ever more in view of the ultimate end and eternal beatitude, which will not be the same for all. Less distinct, instead, is moral theology from those disciplines considered as its parts, such as pastoral theology, casuistry (q.v.), etc.
III. SOURCES OF MORAL THEOLOGY
It is beyond doubt that, given the nature of moral theology itself, its primary source is divine Revelation, in its two sources of Sacred Scripture (q.v.) and Tradition (q.v.); its secondary and subordinate source is human reason.IV. DIVISIONS AND METHODS OF MORAL THEOLOGY — Although moralists are fairly agreed in distinguishing and dividing moral theology into two parts—fundamental and general on the one hand, and special on the other—nevertheless they are not in agreement regarding the subdivisions of these two parts. With regard to fundamental moral theology, some place the treatise on laws before that on conscience, others do the opposite; some study sin before laws, while others divide differently. O. Lottin (op. cit. in bibliography) proposes that, after first presenting the psychological notions of the human act, three treatises should follow: first, the norm of morality itself should be considered; second, the objective application of these norms to the human act; third, the subjective application of these norms, through the judgment of conscience (conscientious life) and through the prudential judgment (virtuous life); and finally, the necessary consequences in meritorious life.
With regard to special moral theology, a great difference is also noted in the way it is divided. Some divide it into the two major treatises *De praeceptis* and *De Sacramentis*; others into the treatises *De virtutibus* and *De Sacramentis*; still others into individual and social, considering in the first the obligations that pertain to the individual and in the second those that have a social relation. Indeed, there are those who begin to speak and write of social morality as a science in itself (cf. R. Lortat, *Principes de morale sociale*, Lyon 1946).
Regarding the methods of treating and teaching moral theology, it is traditionally said that there is a positive method, which primarily takes into account the sources of Revelation with particular attention to the historical-doctrinal development of moral principles themselves. Secondly, the speculative method is recognized, which rather insists on rationally illustrating moral principles and deducing new conclusions in harmony with one another. The apologetic method further delights in controversies, vigorously attacking error and demonstrating its falsity. The casuistic method, after briefly expounding the principles, insists on their application to practical cases. Today new tendencies are noted precisely with regard to method (for only in this sense can one speak of new tendencies in moral theology). They have their chief exponents in Germany (with Tillmann), in Belgium (with Mersch, Leclercq), and elsewhere others (v. bibliography) who, in teaching moral theology, prefer new methods to the old manualistic ways. Whatever the future development of these new methodological tendencies may be, in treating moral theology its character as a theological science and as an art of moderating the conduct of individual and collective man must always be brought to light. For, considering the very nature of moral theology, it is not enough to organize its principles (speculative moral theology) under the theological vision of the Mystical Body (Mersch), of the imitation of Christ (Tillmann), of charity (Gilleman); it is also necessary to apply its principles wisely to concrete man (casuistic moral theology), so that he may be able to form a concrete judgment not only on the gradual perfection of human actions, but also on the gravity or otherwise of the sins that man so often commits.
V. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW — During the plastic period and the one that followed, down to beyond the golden age of Scholasticism, the treatment of moral theology did not have a separate development from theology in general (v. above); in the great Summae (v.) moral theology is treated alongside dogmatic theology, even though some writers expound in particular treatises certain specifically moral topics. After the Council of Trent, alongside some authors who wished to remain on the old path (e.g., Bartolomeo da Medina, Fr. Toledo, D. Bañez, G. Vasquez, Johannes a S. Thoma, Fr. Suárez), there begins a fruitful period of moral theology treated as a separate discipline, in the works of T. Sanchez, G. Argor, V. POLE, REGINALD, Fr. da Castro Palao, M. Bonacina, P. Laymann, H. Busembaum, and in the more particular and restricted treatises on some moral topics by L. Molina, L. Lessio, G. da Lugo, etc. Nor should the simultaneous development of casuistry (v.) be forgotten, which degenerated in some into the disorder of laxism (v.).
With the work of St. Alphonsus Liguori, proclaimed by Pius XII as the patron of moralists, there came a salutary turning point, and little by little moral theology was restored to the theoretical and scientific plane that is proper to II. Freed, in fact, from the errors of Jansenism, Gallicanism, and Josephinism, moral theology flourished again with J. Gury, A. Ballerini, D. Palmieri, G. d'Annibale, F. Carrère, G. Frassinetti, and continues to flourish in the numerous modern manualists: A. Lehmkuhl, A. Vermeersch, E. Génicot-Salmans, G. Noldin, D. Prümmer, B. Merkelbach, F. Tillmann, L. Fanfani, F. Aertnys-C. A. Damen, O. Schilling, A. Piscetta-A. Gennaro, G. Pighi-A. Grazioli, A. Lanza, T. A. Iorio, etc. But more important from the scientific point of view are the modern historical-systematic monographs and the numerous articles in theological journals on particular themes and problems of moral theology.
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