Casuistry

CASUISTRY. - In its verbal meaning this name comes from the Latin "casus" in the sense of a case or particular fact, true or supposed.

C., in general, is the name usually given to the manner or method of treating a given science in order to find the rule applicable to a particular fact; but more commonly it means that method of teaching moral theology by which the Christian treatise-writer, having established the principle of revealed moral science, illustrates it by proposing questions, examples and practical cases (for the most part true, or at least plausible) in order to teach students or readers how moral doctrine must be applied. Thus one arrives at the resolution of the most varied and difficult cases of conscience.

C., therefore, in its true theological concept, is like an applied science, which is based upon the principles and upon the conclusions already solidly proved by the greatest moralists and by apologetic morals, which demonstrates first of all the basis of natural and supernatural morals as the revealed principle of obligation. Hence true c. is founded principally upon the authority of Sacred Scripture and of Catholic tradition, in order to prove how our acts (in the particular fact or "case") are or are not conformable to the divine rules intimately manifested by conscience, and then to conclude as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of particular actions.

In this applied science, so vast and at the same time so excellent (because it is not always easy to descend from principles to particular cases), it is necessary that the casuist, besides a perfectly balanced reason, have an uncommon knowledge of moral theology and of the laws not only ecclesiastical but also civil, and likewise of particular and local rights and privileges: in short, that he know perfectly all the obligations of man and of the Christian, in order to be able to remove the doubts that may arise in the conscience of the faithful concerning their own moral direction and state.

The term c. is in itself an indication of diversity and distinction from purely speculative moral theology: it is therefore improperly, indeed erroneously, used to signify the whole body of theological works of those authors or writers who treated of moral theology after the 15th century.

C., not as a name but in fact, is as ancient as the Church. Like all the other sciences and disciplines, both sacred and profane, it came to be formed little by little and gradually. Without saying anything of the Sacred Scriptures, in which (as for example in the Letters of St. Paul) there are already encountered here and there true casuistic prescriptions; it is certain that the Holy Fathers answered with care and practicality the particular practical questions on which they were consulted. Questions of this kind, for example, were in the early times of the Church: whether it was lawful for Christians to serve in the army of the pagan or unbelieving emperors; to hide or flee in time of persecution; to kill in just defense the unjust aggressor; whether lying is ever lawful, etc. etc. Thus it is known that St. Augustine in two complete works, De mendacio and Contra mendacium, written in a clearly casuistic form, investigates and explains what a lie is; whether it can ever be a joke or a figure; whether a good intention excuses from the guilt of lying; whether it is lawful to lie in order to avoid an evil, to succor a needy person or a sick person, and so on. Casuistic elements are likewise found in many decrees of the various councils or rather regional synods celebrated here and there in the first centuries: of that of Carthage (251), of Elvira (306), of Ancyra (314), of Arles (314); and they abound in the penitential books of the 7th, 8th, 9th centuries.

In the 13th century the matters pertaining to c. were united in part to the study of law, in part to the general doctrine treated in theology. First in treating these matters shone above all St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and from them later casuists drew copiously. In this period St. Raymond of Peñafort (d. 1275), a distinguished master in the theory and practice of the sacrament of Penance, wrote a Summa de casibus poenitentialibus divided into four books, which, as he himself attests, he compiled from the works of distinguished authors, so that it might be useful to priests in resolving the more difficult cases occurring in hearing confessions.

The 16th century was then very rich in similar casuistic summae, some of them in alphabetical form, others in systematic form: all having the purpose of serving priests in administering the sacrament of Penance. Thus there gradually came to be established that clear division of moral theology from dogmatics, which gained full ground in the following centuries.

In the 17th century the treatment of moral theology becomes less scientific, ceases to occupy itself extensively with the principles of the Christian life and with the practical means for the acquisition and the custody of the various virtues, and revolves especially around what is required to avoid sin. The rise of the Jansenist heresy and then the struggles around probabilism brought it about that not a few treatise-writers made the study of Catholic morals almost a simple problem of "grave or light," of "forbidden or tolerated," leaving whatever concerned the acquisition and exercise of the Christian virtues to the treatment of the masters of "ascetics."

Reduced therefore to little more than a skeletal catalogue of sins and cases, the very name c. became odious, because in reality there was discovered in some "casuists" almost an ignorance or a forgetfulness of the Sacred Scriptures, of tradition and of conciliar decisions, as if the simple use of good sense and of human reason sufficed for the moral theologian and the confessor. Not for this, however, must those excessively rigorous censors (led by B. Pascal, toward the middle of the 17th century) be said to be worthy of praise, who persecuted the too easy morals of a few or very obscure casuists. Even in the century that would seem, at first glance, to be that of decadence in moral theology through abuse of c., there were great and pious authors who knew how to stay within the limits of the just and the right, using a suitable and sound casuistic method, without in the least slipping and falling into those excesses of which c. is accused. It suffices to recall a Francisco Toledo (d. 1596), whose Summa casuum conscientiæ was recommended by St. Francis de Sales himself to his clergy; an Emmanuel Sa, greatly esteemed by Pius V, whose Aphorismi confessariorum had thirty reprints in 30 years. Then subsequently a Giovanni Azor, a Martino Bonacina, a Beniamino Elbel, and very many others whom St. Alphonsus places among the grave and classic authors.

It is certain that the casuistic method has its difficulties; but on the other hand the true and solid knowledge of moral principles cannot and must not be separated from the balanced criterion that is formed through the practical solution of cases (whether they be real or imaginary) without the confessor being allowed to be carried away by the "ipse dixit" of whoever first pronounces a judgment. Following therefore the example of the true masters, among whom the first is St. Alphonsus, uniting theory with practice, in the ministry of the confessional, the name c. will not deserve to be considered contemptible, since it serves to indicate the traditional method of the Church, alive and in force in all the modern authors who in the schools serve as texts for the study of moral theology.

Igino Tarocchi