CASUISTRY. — In its verbal sense, this term derives from the Latin casus, meaning a case or particular fact, whether real or hypothetical.
In general, casuistry is the name given to the method of treating a given science in order to find the rule applicable to a particular case; but more commonly it refers to the method of teaching moral theology, whereby the Christian theologian, having established the principle of revealed moral science, illustrates it by proposing questions, examples, and practical cases (mostly real or at least plausible) with the aim of teaching students or readers how to apply moral doctrine. Thus one arrives at the resolution of the most varied and difficult cases of conscience.
Casuistry, therefore, in its true theological concept, is like an applied science, based on the principles and conclusions already solidly established by the foremost moralists and by apologetic moral theology, which primarily demonstrates the foundation of natural and supernatural morality as a revealed principle of obligation. Hence, true casuistry is grounded chiefly in the authority of Holy Scripture and Catholic tradition, to demonstrate whether our actions (in a particular case or "casus") are or are not in conformity with the divine rules inwardly manifested by conscience, and thus to conclude the lawfulness or unlawfulness of particular actions.
In this vast and at the same time highly refined science of application (for it is not always easy to descend from principles to particular cases), the casuist must possess, in addition to a perfectly balanced reason, an uncommon knowledge of moral theology and not only ecclesiastical but also civil laws, as well as particular and local rights and privileges: in short, a perfect knowledge of all the obligations of man and of the Christian, so as to be able to dispel doubts that may arise in the consciences of the faithful regarding their own moral conduct and state.
The term casuistry itself is an index of its distinction from purely speculative moral theology; it is therefore improperly, indeed erroneously, used to signify the corpus of theological works by those authors who treated moral theology after the 15th century.
Casuistry, not as a term but in fact, is as old as the Church. Like all other sacred and profane sciences and disciplines, it developed gradually and progressively. Without mentioning Sacred Scripture, in which (as, for example, in the Letters of St. Paul) true casuistic prescriptions are found here and there, it is certain that the Fathers of the Church, when consulted on particular practical questions, responded with care and practicality. Such were, for instance, the questions of the early Church: whether Christians might serve in the armies of pagan or infidel emperors; whether they might hide or flee in times of persecution; whether they might kill in just self-defense against an unjust aggressor; whether lying might ever be permissible, and so on. It is known, for example, that St. Augustine, in two complete works, De mendacio and Contra mendacium, written in a clearly casuistic form, investigates and explains what constitutes a lie; whether it can ever be a jest or a figure of speech; whether good intention excuses the guilt of lying; whether it is permissible to lie to avoid an evil, to relieve a need, or to aid the sick, and so forth. Casuistic elements are also found in many decrees of various councils or rather regional synods held in the early centuries: those of Carthage (251), Elvira (306), Ancyra (314), and Arles (314); and they abound in the penitential books of the 7th, 8th, and 9th centuries.
In the 13th century, matters pertaining to casuistry were partly incorporated into the study of law and partly into the general teaching of theology. Among the first to treat these subjects were St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure, from whom later casuists drew copiously. In this period, St. Raymond of Peñafort (d. 1275), an eminent master in both the theory and practice of the sacrament of Penance, wrote a Summa de casibus poenitentiae in four books, which, as he himself attests, he compiled from the works of distinguished authors so that it might be useful to priests in resolving the most difficult cases encountered in confession.
The 16th century was then rich in similar casuistic summae, some arranged alphabetically, others systematically, all intended to serve priests in administering the sacrament of Penance. Thus there gradually arose that clear division between moral theology and dogmatic theology which took full hold in the following centuries.
In the 17th century, the treatment of moral theology became less scientific, neglecting to deal extensively with the principles of the Christian life and the practical means for acquiring and preserving the various virtues, and focusing instead on what is required to avoid sin. The rise of Jansenism and the controversies surrounding probabilism led not a few writers to reduce the study of Catholic moral theology almost to a mere problem of "grave or light," "prohibited or tolerated," leaving the acquisition and exercise of Christian virtues to the domain of the masters of "ascetical theology."
Thus reduced, moral theology became little more than a skeletal catalogue of sins and cases, and the very name casuistry became odious, since in some quarters it was discovered to be almost an ignorance or an oblivion of Holy Scripture, tradition, and conciliar decisions, as though the moral theologian and the confessor could be content with nothing more than the simple use of common sense and human reason. Yet this is no reason to praise those excessively rigorous censors (led by B. Pascal, around the mid-17th century) who persecuted the overly facile moral teaching of a few obscure casuists. Even in the century that might at first glance seem to have been one of decline in moral theology through the abuse of casuistry, there were eminent authors who knew how to remain within the bounds of what is just and right, employing a suitable and sound casuistic method without in the least slipping into those excesses with which casuistry is so often charged. It is enough to recall Francesco Toledo (d. 1596), whose Summa casuum conscientiae was recommended to his clergy by St Francis de Sales himself; Emmanuel Sa, greatly esteemed by Pius V, whose Aphorismi confessariorum went through thirty editions in thirty years; and later Giovanni Azor, Martino Bonacina, Beniamino Elbel, and very many others whom St Alphonsus places among the weighty and classic authorities.
It is true that the casuistic method presents its difficulties; but on the other hand, a true and solid grasp of moral principles cannot and should not be divorced from the balanced criterion that is formed through the practical resolution of cases (whether real or hypothetical), without allowing the confessor to be swayed by the ipse dixit of whoever first pronounces a judgment. Thus, following the example of the true masters—among whom St Alphonsus stands first—uniting theory with practice in the ministry of the confessional, the name casuistry need not be regarded as contemptible, since it serves to denote the traditional method of the Church, alive and operative in all modern authors who in the schools serve as textbooks for the study of moral theology.