CASISTICA. — In its verbal meaning, this noun derives from the Latin «casus», in the sense of a particular case or fact, real or supposed.
C., in general, is the name ordinarily given to the manner or method of treating a given science in order to find the rule applicable to a particular fact; but more commonly it means that method of teaching moral theology by which the Christian treatise writer, having established the principle of revealed moral science, illustrates it by proposing questions, examples, and practical cases (for the most part real, or at least probable), in order to teach students or readers how moral doctrine is to be applied. In this way one arrives at the resolution of the most varied and difficult cases of conscience.
C., therefore, in its true theological conception, is a science of application, based upon the principles and conclusions already solidly demonstrated by the foremost moralists and by apologetic morality, which first establishes the basis of natural and supernatural morality as the revealed principle of obligation. True c. is therefore founded principally upon the authority of Sacred Scripture and Catholic tradition, in order to demonstrate whether our acts (in the particular fact or «case») conform or do not conform to the divine rules
intimately manifested by conscience, and thus to conclude whether particular actions are licit or illicit.
In this science of application, so extensive and at the same time so excellent (because it is not always easy to descend from principles to particular cases), it is necessary that the casuist, besides possessing a perfectly balanced mind, have an uncommon knowledge of moral theology and of laws, not only ecclesiastical but also civil, as well as of particular and local rights and privileges: in short, that he know perfectly all the obligations of man and of the Christian, so as to be able to remove the doubts that may arise in the consciences of the faithful concerning their own moral conduct and state.
The term c. in itself indicates diversity and distinction from purely speculative moral theology: it is therefore improperly, indeed erroneously, used to signify the totality of the theological works of those authors or writers who treated moral theology after the fifteenth century.
C., not as a name but in fact, is as ancient as the Church. Like all other sciences and disciplines, both sacred and profane, it came into being gradually and little by little. Without saying anything of Sacred Scripture, in which (as, for example, in the Letters of St. Paul) true casuistic prescriptions are already encountered here and there, it is certain that the Holy Fathers responded carefully and practically to the particular practical questions on which they were consulted. Questions of this kind in the early days of the Church included: whether Christians might lawfully serve in the armies of pagan or infidel emperors; whether they might hide or flee during persecution; whether they might kill an unjust aggressor in legitimate self-defense; whether it is ever lawful to lie, and so forth. Thus we know that St. Augustine, in two complete works, De mendacio and Contra mendacium, written in a clearly casuistic form, investigates and explains what a lie is; whether it may ever be a game or a figure of speech; whether a good intention excuses one from the guilt of lying; whether it is lawful to lie in order to avoid an evil, to help someone in need or a sick person, and so on. Casuistic elements are also found in many decrees of the various councils, or rather regional synods, held here and there during the first centuries: those of Carthage (251), Elvira (306), Ancyra (314), and Arles (314); and they abound in the penitential books of the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries.
In the thirteenth century, subjects pertaining to c. were partly joined to the study of law and partly to the general doctrine treated in theology. Foremost among those who dealt with these subjects were St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and later casuists drew extensively from them. During this period St. Raymond of Peñafort (d. 1275), an outstanding master in the theory and practice of the sacrament of Penance, wrote a Summa de casibus poenitentiaibus divided into four books, which, as he himself states, he compiled from the works of distinguished authors so that it might be useful to priests in resolving the most difficult cases encountered in hearing confessions.
The sixteenth century was then exceedingly rich in similar casuistic summas, some in alphabetical form and others in systematic form, all intended to serve priests in administering the sacrament of Penance. Thus that clear division between moral and dogmatic theology gradually became established, and it took full shape in the following centuries.
In the seventeenth century, the treatment of moral theology became less scientific; it ceased to deal at length with the principles of Christian life and the practical means of acquiring and preserving the various virtues, and focused chiefly on what is required in order to avoid sin. The emergence of Jansenist heresy and, subsequently, the controversies surrounding probabilism caused not a few treatise writers to reduce the study of Catholic morality almost to a simple problem of «grave or light», of «forbidden or tolerated», leaving the acquisition and exercise of Christian virtues to the treatment of the masters of «asceticism».
Moral theology thus reduced to little more than a skeletal catalogue of sins and cases, the name c. itself became odious, because in some «casuists» there was in fact discovered almost an ignorance or forgetfulness of Sacred Scripture, tradition, and conciliar decisions, as though the moral theologian and the confessor needed only the simple use of common sense and human reason. This does not mean, however, that those excessively rigorous censors (led by B. Pascal around the middle of the seventeenth century), who attacked the overly facile morality of a few very obscure casuists, should be considered worthy of praise. Even in the century that at first sight might seem to have been one of decline in moral theology because of the abuse of c., there were eminent and pious authors who knew how to remain within the bounds of justice and rectitude, employing a suitable and sound casuistic method, without in the least slipping into and falling into those excesses of which c. is accused. It is enough to recall a Francesco Toledo (d. 1596), whose Summa casuum conscientiæ St. Francis de Sales himself recommended to his clergy; an Emmanuele Sa, greatly esteemed by Pius V, whose Aphorismi confessariorum went through thirty editions in thirty years. Later there were a Giovanni Azor, a Martino Bonacina, a Beniamino Elbel, and very many others whom St. Alphonsus places among the serious and classical authors.
It is certain that the casuistic method has its difficulties; but, on the other hand, a true and sound knowledge of moral principles cannot and must not be separated from the balanced judgment formed through the practical resolution of cases (whether real or imaginary), without allowing the confessor to be led by the «ipse dixit» of anyone who happens to pronounce a judgment first. Following, then, the example of the true masters, foremost among whom is St. Alphonsus, and joining theory to practice in the ministry of the confessional, the name c. will not deserve to be considered contemptible, since it serves to indicate the Church’s traditional method, living and operative in all the modern authors whose works serve as textbooks in schools for the study of moral theology.