TRIBUTI. – In the broad sense, t. (Latin tributum, from tribuo) are the taxes that the State requires of the citizen to cover its own expenses. In this sense, they also include fees, which the State imposes on the individual for a particular service rendered to that same citizen. In a narrower and proper sense, however, t. are payments of money that the State demands from its subjects without their receiving any particular and immediate counterperformance in return. Since there are two parties involved in this question, the State and the citizen, its moral aspect is necessarily twofold as well.
I. THE STATE AND TAXES
It is not difficult for historians of financial law to prove that the State has always exercised this right of its own. Its foundation lies in the very natural necessity of the State’s existence: since the State’s common good (v.) of its citizens, it must possess the means, including economic and financial means, to achieve it in practice. And if the State cannot obtain these means in any other way, or if the other avenues are insufficient, it logically follows that it also has the right to demand taxes from its citizens.The celebrated texts of Revelation—«Reddite Caesari, quae sunt Caesaris» (Lc. 20, 26) and «Cui tributum, tributum, cui vectigal, vectigal» (Rom. 13, 1-7)—positively confirm this natural right. Indeed, although the texts cited refer directly to the citizen, they nevertheless implicitly and indirectly confirm the authority of the State to impose taxes within the limits of justice. Patristic thought amply confirms the legitimacy of this right; likewise, scholasticism, headed by St Thomas, recognizes its legitimacy as founded upon the common good. Modern theologians and sociologists, while acknowledging that in practice many States abuse this right, nevertheless do not depart from tradition in recognizing its legitimacy.
Since taxes are intended for the common good, it follows that it does not seem just to enact tax laws that fail to take account of the contributions in activity and beneficence that citizens already offer for the benefit of society, treating such citizens on the same footing as those who make no such contributions to the common good. Thus it would be contrary to the justice of taxation to impose burdens upon institutions whose very nature already serves a social purpose. In this way, it is considered contrary to justice in the State to insist, in the pursuit of a certain social utilitarianism, more heavily upon so-called indirect taxes than upon direct ones. Thirdly, the very use of the taxes collected also falls under moral scrutiny, even though juridically there is no authority outside the State. In present-day democratic governments, oversight is exercised by parliaments; yet only the moral law and conscience can scrupulously supervise the use made of taxes by government officials. In this sense, it is evident that it is not lawful to use taxes for merely particular benefits (cf. St Thomas, De regim. princ., Parma edition, XVI, p. 294). And even in subsidies for public-order needs funded by taxes, it is morally required that the order of social charity be observed, giving precedence to the satisfaction of primary necessities (water, sewers, housing) over those that are less urgent, and priority to the places most in need. To act otherwise contradicts the proper order that every form of justice must observe if it is to remain justice.
II. CITIZENS AND T
The State’s right to impose t. is correspondingly matched by a duty on the part of citizens. Indeed, each person’s contribution to the common good is primarily an obligation of natural law, insofar as every citizen is also naturally a member of society. Since fiscal laws have a foundation in natural law, they cannot be regarded as purely civil laws, still less as purely penal laws. For this reason, authors are increasingly inclined to hold that, provided the fiscal law is just, it necessarily binds also in conscience.A great many modern moralists agree in holding that the fiscal obligation is connected with that form of justice directed toward the common good which was formerly called legal justice and which many today wish to call, with the same meaning, social justice (v.). Indeed, since t. have the common good as their formal object, they can derive only from that general justice which is concerned with the common good and which is «architectonice in principe» but «executive in subdittis». In this sense, since the person to whom restitution is owed is not determined, one is not bound to restitution in the event of a violation (Noldin, Mausbach, and many others).
Other moral considerations are usually made concerning the case of so-called fraud in t.; it is worth noting that, in this regard, some of the more recent authors also speak of fraud existing only in intention (cf. Scaliteur), with the express condemnation of others (cf. Janssen). Moreover, it is not uncommon that not only those who defend the thesis of strict justice speak, as is obvious, of fraud involving t. in the strict sense, together with an obligation of restitution, but also that some who admit an obligation of legal justice demand a certain reparation in the so-called fraud involving t. (cf. Mausbach, Saedler).
With regard to the declaration of items subject to t., it may be said that, since today this is a necessary condition for a just distribution of fiscal burdens, it partakes of the same moral nature as fiscal law; consequently, the explanations given by moralists, with their differing opinions, apply also to declarations. The same must, in principle, be held with regard to the other related question: whether a citizen is obliged to pay his t. before being requested to do so by the public official. Indeed, as a matter of logical consistency, this is denied by those who maintain the view that the law is purely penal, whereas it is affirmed by those who admit a prior obligation in conscience, grounded in the obligation—already one of natural law—to cooperate in the common good. Accordingly, fiscal laws, like other laws, bind from the very beginning of their promulgation, unless the legislator has determined otherwise.
III. TAXES IN PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE
Finally, it must be acknowledged that in practice States abuse their right to impose taxes, raising them excessively without an adequate reason of the common good; consequently, citizens readily become convinced that taxes are unjust. Hence citizens, «tuta conscientia», violate the tax law. The State, aware of this, readily imposes taxes above actual needs, anticipating that, given the large number of offenders, only in this way will it be able to collect the necessary sum. For this reason moralists and sociologists speak insistently today of the re-education of the State and citizens regarding their responsibilities and mutual trust (cf. Scaliteur, De Marco). In this connection moralists and economists suggest various practical means. Yet even in this field not everyone agrees about the practical effectiveness, for example, of the oath imposed on citizens or of publishing declarations of income and tax payments in official publications.From the practical standpoint, it may also be added that, especially in modern States, with their social welfare provisions and assistance to those in need, citizens and Christians who pay taxes according to their means and conscience, if this leaves them nothing superfluous, may consider themselves to have fulfilled their duty to help the poor, according to the Lord’s precept (v. ELEMOSINA), and to have received the same merits, which are truly great.
The fact that in practice one is not obliged to make restitution, because of the disagreements existing among theologians concerning the meaning they assign to this term, does not exclude the possibility of sinning, even gravely, by violating the tax law.
Namur, 17 (1922), pp. 23-24; O. V. Nell-Breuning, Steuervereinheitlichung und Steuergerechtigkeit, in Stimmen der Zeit, 114 (1927-28), p. 298 ff.; id., Steuerverfassung und Steuergewissen, ibid., 118 (1929-30), pp. 254-68; O. Weit, Grundlagen der Steuermoral, in Zeitschr. für d. ges. Staatswissenschaft, 83 (1927), p. 317 ff.; A. Janssen, Le fondement philosoph. du devoir fiscal, in Ephém. theol. Lovam., 2 (1935), pp. 367-89; A. Ostojic, De fondamento et natura obligationis tributorum, Roma 1944; P. Bayart, Le devoir fiscal, in Mél. de sc. relig., 7 (1950), pp. 412-22; C. Scailteur, Le devoir fiscal, Bruges 1950; A. De Marco, Del dovere fiscale oggi in Italia, in Civ. Catt., 1952, 1, pp. 274-89; J. Delspierre, Le devoir de l'impôt devant la conscience chret., in Nouv. rev. théol., 74 (1952), pp. 400-408. Ermenegildo Lio