### TAXES
In a broad sense, taxes (Lat. *tributum*, from *tribuo*) are the levies that the State requires from the citizen to cover its expenses. In this sense, taxes also include duties, which the State imposes on individuals for a particular service rendered to the same citizen. In a narrower and more proper sense, however, taxes are monetary contributions that the State exacts from its subjects without providing them with any particular or immediate counter-service. Since two parties are involved in this matter—the State and the citizen—the moral aspect of taxes is necessarily twofold.
#### I. THE STATE AND TAXES
It is not difficult for historians of financial law to demonstrate that the State has always exercised this right. Its foundation lies in the very natural necessity of the State’s existence, which, having as its proper end the common good (q.v.) of citizens, must have the means—including economic and financial resources—to achieve it in practice. And if the State cannot obtain these means otherwise or if other avenues are insufficient, it logically follows that it also has the right to exact taxes from citizens.
The famous texts of Revelation: *«Reddite Caesari, quae sunt Caesaris»* (Lk 20:25) and *«Cui tributum, tributum; cui vectigal, vectigal»* (Rom 13:7) positively confirm this natural right. Indeed, while these texts directly address the citizen, they implicitly and indirectly confirm the authority of the State to impose taxes within the limits of justice. The patristic tradition abundantly confirms the legitimacy of this right; likewise, Scholasticism, with St. Thomas Aquinas at its head, recognizes its legitimacy on the basis of the common good. Modern theologians and sociologists, while acknowledging that in practice many States abuse this right, nonetheless do not depart from tradition in recognizing its legitimacy.
Since taxes are destined for the common good, it follows that it is not just to enact fiscal laws that do not take into account the contributions of activity and goods that citizens already offer for the benefit of society, treating such citizens on the same footing as those who do not contribute to the common good. Thus, it would be unjust in taxation to impose burdens on institutions that are by their very nature of social purpose. In this way, it is considered unjust in the State to insist, for the sake of a certain social utilitarianism, more heavily on so-called indirect taxes rather than direct ones. In the third place, the very use of collected taxes is subject to moral scrutiny, even if juridically no authority exists outside the State. In today’s democratic governments, parliamentary control exists, but only moral law and conscience can scrupulously oversee the use of taxes by government officials. In this sense, it is evident that it is not lawful to use taxes for merely particular utilities (cf. St. Thomas, *De regimine principum*, Parma ed., XVII, p. 294). Even in providing for the necessities of public order with taxes, it is morally required that the order of social charity be observed, prioritizing the satisfaction of primary needs (water, sewage, housing) over less pressing ones, and giving precedence to the most needy places. To act otherwise contradicts the right order that every just authority must observe if it wishes to remain just.
#### II. CITIZENS AND TAXES
To the State’s right to impose taxes, there corresponds a correlative duty on the part of citizens. Each person’s contribution to the common good is, in fact, first and foremost an obligation of natural law, insofar as every citizen is naturally a member of society. Since fiscal laws are founded on natural law, they cannot be considered purely civil laws, nor much less purely penal ones. For this reason, authors are increasingly inclined to hold that, assuming the fiscal law is just, it necessarily binds even in conscience.
A great number of modern moralists agree in holding that the fiscal obligation is linked to that justice for the common good which was formerly called legal justice and which many today wish to call, with the same meaning, social justice (q.v.). Indeed, since taxes formally have the common good as their object, they can only derive from that general justice which concerns the common good and which is "architectonic in principle but executive in subjects." In this sense, since the person is not determined, there is no obligation to make restitution in case of violation (Noldin, Mausbach, and many others).
Other moral considerations are often made regarding the case of so-called tax fraud; it is worth noting that on this point some modern authors speak even of fraud merely in intention (cf. Scailteur), with the express disapproval of others (cf. Janssen). Moreover, it is not uncommon for those who defend the thesis of strict justice—speaking, as is natural, of tax fraud in the strict sense with the obligation of restitution—as well as some who admit the obligation of legal justice, to claim a certain reparation in the case of so-called tax fraud (cf. Mausbach, Saedler).
With regard to the declaration of taxable goods, it may be said that, since this is today a necessary condition for a just distribution of fiscal burdens, it partakes of the same moral nature as the fiscal law itself; hence, the declarations are subject to the same explanations offered by moralists, with their differing opinions. The same must be held, in principle, regarding the related question of whether the citizen is obliged to pay taxes before being requested to do so by a public official. Indeed, by logical consistency, this is denied by those who uphold the opinion of the purely penal law, while it is affirmed by those who admit a prior obligation of conscience, based on the already natural-law obligation to cooperate for the common good. For this reason, fiscal laws, like other laws, bind from the moment of their promulgation, unless the legislator has determined otherwise.
#### III. TAXES IN PRACTICAL OUTLOOK
Finally, it must be acknowledged that in practice States abuse their right to impose taxes, raising them excessively without adequate justification in the common good, so that citizens easily become convinced of the injustice of taxes. From this arises the fact that citizens violate fiscal laws with a "clear conscience." Knowing this, the State easily imposes taxes exceeding real needs, foreseeing that, given the large number of violators, it will thus be able to collect the necessary sum. For this reason, today moralists and sociologists insistently speak of re-educating both the State and citizens in their respective responsibilities and in mutual trust (cf. Scailteur, De Marco). On this point, moralists and economists suggest various practical means. Yet even in this area, not all agree on the practical efficacy, for example, of the oath imposed on the citizen or the publicity of income declarations and tax payments in official publications.
From a practical standpoint, it may be added that, especially in modern States with their social provisions and assistance to the needy, the citizen and Christian, by paying taxes according to ability and conscience—even if nothing remains beyond what is necessary—may consider themselves to have fulfilled their duty to aid the poor, in accordance with the Lord’s precept (q.V. ALMSGIVING), and to have merited the same great rewards.