KILLING. — In the purely physical order, it is the act that deprives the body of life. One who, by a human and voluntary act, causes the death of another is called a murderer (v. HOMICIDE), a suicide if he causes his own death (v. SUICIDE).
I. KILLING AND VOLUNTARINESS
The voluntariness of the act is direct when death is, in itself (not accidentally), the effect of the lethal act; so that, when such an act is performed, death is always caused, unless another cause prevents its execution. It is indirect when the act, by its nature, does not lead to violent death, but the effect follows for another reason or other causes concurring with such an act to bring about death.The act that has a lethal effect may be positive or negative; with a positive act, a vital action of the organism is made impossible, e.g., by choking, respiration is prevented; with a negative act, the necessary elements for life are not supplied; omission occurs when some vital operation, entirely or partially, is formed by a human act that is subject to free will.
II. PRECEPT OF NATURAL LAW: “THOU SHALT NOT KILL.” DIRECT KILLING. — Perhaps no moral norm is more universal and accepted than this: thou shalt not kill. It is the norm included in the fifth article of the Decalogue ([v.] Ex. 20, 13; Deut. 5, 17). This norm agrees with the innate conscience of man, and hatred could only recall a rule already common, as is attested in the murder of Abel (Gen. 4, 8-16). If the Church has made an effort to purify morals, in our matter it was rather in the field of applications, not of the principle, universally accepted. The frequency of certain forms of homicide (e.g., abortion) among some peoples and in certain times, and the lack of reprobation that some have wished to note, do not at all imply that these acts are considered morally good.
Respect for life is a principle of natural morality, to which Revelation has added nothing.
Man does not have ownership, but only the use of life; he has, in relation to other human beings, the right to live, and only God can take back what He has given; but, in relation to God, he has the duty to live, to remain in the place assigned to him as a witness established by God, as a guardian of the sacred trust entrusted to him. It is therefore for God to choose the term. Man must accept life for as long as God grants it to him. God then acts and manifests His will through the natural order of which He is the author. Now, the equality of nature among all men finds here its strictest application. If men all have an equally strict right to tend toward their own end, this is manifested first of all in a strict equality before life. Therefore, no one may ever licitly kill an innocent person; nor may he sacrifice another’s life for his own. This holds from the very first moment of life, in the maternal womb, so that abortion is homicide (v.); and until the last moment of life, so that euthanasia is homicide (v.); even on the part of the State, because the State too is constituted by men who preexist it with their natural rights (v. GENOCIDE), and the burden on the community, even if it exists, does not deprive the physically impaired individual of his natural right to life (v. EUGENICS).
III. EXCEPTIONS. THE EXCEPTION OF THE DEATH PENALTY. — The only case of the right to kill directly is that of legitimate defense against an unjust aggressor, based on the principle of equality and on the principle of charity, which measures its own good (v. LEGITIMATE DEFENSE). This principle is fundamental, as is that which justifies, in the international sphere, killing in war, and, on the national and social level, tyrannicide and the death penalty, with the reservations and oppositions that, even within Catholic thought, exist on these last two points. One of the first duties of the State is to protect the lives of its citizens: to establish social security. This protection of life and social security entails the right to take adequate measures against those who would threaten social security, especially against the lives of other citizens.
From the most ancient times, among almost all peoples, the death penalty was in use, especially in times of war and under martial law as an extreme penalty. Its application has found constant justification in ancient practical and theoretical thought in morals, sociology, and law, with very few reactions until the middle of the 18th century, when the movement of ideas that exalted the individual at the expense of state authority imposed itself in the history of thought. A sign of the instinctive horror of the community toward capital punishment is the repulsion toward the material execution of the sentence and the judge himself. The profession of the former, especially, was always regarded as infamous, and that of the latter as incompatible with the office of a minister of worship, who is meant to be averse to any shedding of blood. In Christianity, they incur irregularity (v.) *ex defectu lenitatis*. In the theoretical field, rare ideological tendencies of an extremist nature condemning every killing, including the application of the death penalty, appeared even in antiquity (cf. Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones*, I, VI, V. 20) and then reappeared among the Waldensians (v.), Anabaptists (v.), Quakers (v.), condemned by the Church for this reason as well (Denz.-U., n. 425). In the true Catholic tradition, theologians prior to the 18th century have always considered the application of the death penalty by society as justifiable, from St. Augustine (*Epist.*, 47, n. 5) to St. Thomas and the classical moralists. They find it natural that God can delegate to other men a part of His authority over their fellow men, appointing them as instruments of just punishment. What God granted in an extraordinary way to certain persons in the Old Testament (e.g., to Judith: Jud. 7, 9 ff.), He granted in an ordinary and general way to society and constituted authority, authorizing it to defend order from the wicked, punishing them in extreme cases even with the death penalty. Thus, in the Mosaic code, the death penalty is expressly sanctioned (cf. Ex. 21, 12, 14-17, 23; 22, 3 ff.; Lev. 20, 10-18 ff.). Nor has God withdrawn this delegation given to public authorities in the New Testament, as is evident from certain texts that presuppose the death penalty (Mt. 26, 52; Rom. 13, 4). It is not, however, an unlimited power: St. Thomas holds that it is lawful to kill a wrongdoer if and insofar as such killing is ordered to the salvation of the whole community, just as it is lawful for a surgeon to cut off a member of the human body insofar as it is necessary for the salvation of the whole organism (*Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 64, a. 7). Others start from the concept of unjust aggression. If it is lawful for a private individual to repel violence with violence, even if it results in the killing of the aggressor, one does not see why such a right should be denied to society when it finds itself unable to defend itself otherwise, and other penalties are no longer effective for the prevention of crime. The right of the State to apply the death penalty is therefore very limited even in traditional Christian doctrine. There is no right to apply it, nor to all crimes, nor according to the whims of an opinion that deems this or that misdeed expiable only by blood.
The strongest argument brought against the death penalty is that of the irreparability of the sentence in case of judicial error. But even this argument remains unresolved only for those who do not see and confess an absolute and supreme Justice, capable of repairing and compensating in a future life the possible errors of human justice.
On the practical level, the current of thought hostile to capital punishment met with success, and during the 19th century some countries abolished it: thus Romania (1864), Portugal (1866), the Netherlands (1870), and Italy (1881). Italy reintroduced it in 1926, only to abolish it again in 1945. Numerous states maintain capital punishment, e.g., the United States, England, France, Spain, Russia, and even the State of the Vatican City itself. In military codes, however, capital punishment has never been abolished.
In the application of capital punishment, there were not a few examples of cruelty, both in the extension of the cases in which it was applied and in the methods of execution. Today it is carried out by hanging, firing squad, beheading, or electrocution, according to the criteria followed by the various states in which it is retained. The sentence cannot be executed until it has become irrevocable, and in its execution those measures must be observed which preserve the respect due to human dignity and, above all, to man’s eternal destiny. The Church has constantly promoted most pious charitable institutions for the final assistance of the condemned.
IV. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE POWER OF THE CHURCH
The controversies over capital punishment become even more acute when it comes to defining whether the Church, like the state, has the right to inflict capital punishment. In practice, the Church, as such, has never pronounced death sentences nor applied this penalty. The historical hints that can be found here and there in canonistic sources always refer to the civil law of the Papal States. In truth, death sentences, even for purely religious crimes, were always issued by civil tribunals, which remained such even when ecclesiastics participated in them; they were always pronounced on the basis of civil laws, even if their application was sometimes requested by the Church in virtue of its mandate as vindicator of justice. However, the non-use of a right cannot be taken as evidence against its possession. And precisely on the question of right, canonistic doctrine in this case has been divided. There is no decisive proof in Sacred Scripture, in the Fathers, or in the supreme pontiffs in favor of one or the other thesis.V. INDIRECT KILLING
Direct killing of a man, outside the case of capital punishment and legitimate defense, is, as has been said, gravely illicit. The same principle applies to the killing of oneself, i.e., suicide.Indirect killing of a man, and thus also of oneself, is also illicit, but it can become licit when there is a proportionally grave reason for not omitting an act with which, indirectly and per accidens, one causes another’s (or one’s own) death. Once the concept of indirect killing has been clarified, as has been done above, nothing remains but to apply to individual cases the principle of double effect (v. IMPUTABILITY, II, 3), which, though easy in theory, can in practice sometimes give rise to uncertainties regarding the fulfillment of the other condition. The casuistry on this subject, varied and abundant, involves problems of different kinds, such as the care of one’s own body in relation to a more or less justified shortening of life, the determination of the prevailing right in cases of conflict between individual and social good, etc. It will suffice to recall some general norms.
With regard to one’s own life, a man cannot dispose of it; but he is not obliged to desire to live: he may desire death, because he expects a greater good in the life to come. The Christian who longs for death in order to see God demonstrates a complete understanding of his faith. When a man has reached the end of his life, when age renders him incapable of working, it is reasonable that he should prefer to leave this world rather than languish in II. One may long for death: one may seek it indirectly by choosing an occupation that risks bringing about death. The moral qualification of the act will depend on the motives inspiring II. In its history, the Church has rejected the direct seeking of martyrdom, but there has always been admiration for the desire for martyrdom.
With regard to the care of health, Catholic moralists teach that one has the duty to exercise ordinary diligence in preserving life. A man afflicted by great sorrow who ceases to eat out of weariness and thus allows himself to die of hunger is guilty (v. HUNGER STRIKE); and the sick person must accept treatment as it is customary to do. But it is admitted that he is not obliged to make extraordinary efforts to save his life. And this rule applies both with regard to others and with regard to ourselves.
These same criteria can help to resolve many other cases where it is not our own life but that of another that is at stake because of an action of ours, good or indifferent, which we have the right or duty to perform. Many of these cases usually arise in matters of indirect abortion (v. ABORTION), in matters of warfare (v. WAR), etc. It is not, however, possible to apply the principle of double effect in matters of embryotomy (v.), the protection of racial superiority (v. GENOCIDE; RACISM), etc. For problems of restitution connected with killing, V. RESTITUTION.