HOMICIDE. — From the Latin *homicidium*, in general it is the killing of a man. However, not every killing constitutes homicide; in ordinary language, the term "homicide" refers to killing resulting from unlawful conduct, and this is the only acceptable legal meaning. Homicide is, in fact, a crime and, as such, consists of various elements: the conduct (action or omission) of a person, the death of another person (event), a causal link between conduct and event (causality), the absence of any justification (exercise of a right, fulfillment of a duty, legitimate defense, necessity, and uncodified causes such as medical-surgical treatment and sports activities), and the voluntariness of the act. The latter, representing the degree of psychological participation of the agent in the act, can take three forms: intent, negligence, or preterintention, depending on whether the death was intended or occurred due to imprudence, negligence, incompetence, or as a consequence of intentional assault or injury.
I. SYSTEMATICS OF THE CURRENT ITALIAN CODE
The Italian Penal Code, following an almost universally accepted system, places homicide among crimes against the person and, more precisely, among crimes against individual life and safety (Chapter I of Title XII of Book II). In homicide, the object of penal protection is the interest that every individual and the State have in the respect for human life.Homicide, understood as the unlawful killing of a man, is provided for in the Italian Code in various forms, each constituting autonomous crime figures, depending on the different attitudes that the subjective element can assume in the killer. In the discipline of this subject, several innovations have been introduced compared to the previous code: the main ones are the provision for homicide with consent and for feticide for reasons of honor, which has been equated entirely with infanticide for reasons of honor. In addition to the aforementioned legal object, there are various common elements among the different forms of homicide. In this regard, it should be emphasized that homicide is in any case a result crime: for its consummation, the occurrence of that natural event which is the death of the victim is required. This event is so typical that for none of the forms of homicide has the legislator specified the elements of the conduct, contenting itself with indicating the material element of the crime with the formula "causing the death of a man." This formula highlights the requirement of a causal link between the conduct of the active subject and the event, meaning that the particular manner of the conduct is irrelevant for the realization of homicide; this conduct can manifest in any way (including omission, as, for example, in the case of a mother who withholds nourishment from her child) and by any means, though this does not imply that the manner of conduct is entirely irrelevant: it may have weight in the application of certain aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
As for the attempt, it is conceivable for every form of homicide, except naturally in the case of negligent or preterintentional homicide. If, while remaining at the stage of an attempt, injuries are caused to the victim, these would be absorbed into the more serious case of attempted homicide.
For reasons of political convenience, attacks on the life of the President of the Republic, the Supreme Pontiff, and heads of foreign states are configured separately (arts. 276, 295) as crimes against the personality of the State.
II. VOLUNTARY HOMICIDE
According to art. 575 of the Penal Code, "whoever causes the death of a man is punished with imprisonment not less than 21 years." That this article provides for the case of voluntary (i.e., intentional) homicide is derived both from the general provision of art. 42 and from a comparison with the subsequent provisions of arts. 584 and 580, which, by autonomously providing for preterintentional and negligent homicide, obviously restrict the scope of art. 575 to the case where the subjective element of homicide takes the form of intent. Voluntary homicide thus occurs when the active subject has acted with conscious will to cause the death of a man.By "man" must be understood any living human being, including the fetus during childbirth, i.e., the being in the process of being born. Nor is it necessary that the newborn or the fetus be viable: just as the civil code (art. 1) does not require viability for the existence of a person, so the penal code protects the newborn and the fetus simply because they are alive. The existence of life is generally ascertained through the simple fact of breathing.
The extensive interpretation that leads to including within the term "man," and thus within the configuration of homicide, even the fetus during childbirth has been reached by the prevailing doctrine on the consideration that otherwise there would be the repugnant result of leaving feticide unpunished when committed for a reason other than honor: feticide is in fact expressly provided for by the Italian Code only when committed for reasons of honor. Nor could the crime of abortion be recognized in such a case, since the prerequisite of abortion is the interruption of pregnancy.
For voluntary homicide, numerous special aggravating circumstances are provided, some of which entail the penalty of life imprisonment (homicide committed against an ascendant or descendant — see the entry PARRICIDE —, with premeditation, by poisonous substances or other insidious means, with torture, for vile motives, etc.), and others the penalty of imprisonment from 24 to 30 years (homicide committed against a spouse, brother, sister, adopter, adoptee, or a lineal relative by affinity).
III. INFANTICIDE OR FETICIDE FOR REASONS OF HONOR
Art. 578 provides: "Whoever causes the death of a newborn immediately after birth or of a fetus during birth, to save his own honor or that of a close relative, is punished with imprisonment from 3 to 10 years."The significant reduction in penalty, which cannot be justified on moral grounds given the abjection of one who destroys a new life, is explained by the particular emotional state of the offender compared to the common murderer.
The active subject can be the mother or a close relative. The passive subject is either the newborn immediately after birth (infanticide) or the fetus during birth (feticide), provided they were conceived illegitimately. If the killing of the newborn is not committed immediately after birth (and "immediately" must be understood not in the sense of "without interruption," but in the sense of "short term"), the reason of honor can only be evaluated as a mitigating circumstance of the crime of homicide. The psychological element consists of the will to kill the newborn or the being in the process of being born (generic intent), for the purpose of saving the mother's honor (specific intent). For this purpose to exist, there must be certainty of the illegitimacy of the conception, mere suspicion not being sufficient, and moreover there must be an honor to save. This cannot be the case, for example, with regard to a prostitute.
IV. HOMICIDE FOR REASONS OF HONOR
This is provided for in art. 587: "Whoever causes the death of a spouse, daughter, or sister, at the moment of discovering their illicit carnal relations and in the state of mind determined by the offense to his or her honor or that of the family, is punished with imprisonment from 3 to 7 years. The same penalty applies to whoever, under the aforementioned circumstances, causes the death of the person who is in illicit carnal relations with the spouse, daughter, or sister."Homicide
### I. **Homicide of a Consenting Party**
According to Article 579, “whoever causes the death of a man with his consent is punished with imprisonment from 6 to 15 years.”
The good of life is inalienable: its violation can never be consented to, since the consent of the victim justifies the crime only when it concerns an alienable right. In any case, whoever kills a consenting party commits a socially less harmful act than in ordinary homicide; hence a lighter penalty is provided for him.
For consent to be relevant, it must be valid, i.e., given by one capable of acting. The same Article 579 specifies that the provisions on voluntary homicide apply when the following are killed:
a) a minor under 18 years of age;
b) a person of unsound mind or in a state of mental deficiency due to another illness or to the abuse of alcoholic or stupefying substances;
c) a person whose consent has been extinguished by the offender through violence, threats, suggestion, or deception.
The criminalization of homicide of a consenting party excludes, under current Italian law, the legitimacy of “autothanasia” (v.), i.e., the merciful killing of an incurably ill person with his consent. Indeed, when the illness has placed the patient in a condition of mental deficiency, the penalty for voluntary homicide must be applied, since the validity of consent is excluded by Article 579 itself. The legislator has thus upheld the ethical principle that no one may anticipate, even slightly, the death of another human being. At most, one who has killed for euthanasia may be granted the mitigating circumstance of motives of particular social value (Article 61, no. 1).
### II. **Preterintentional Homicide**
According to Article 584, preterintentional homicide consists in the act of one who, by acts directed at committing one of the crimes envisaged by Articles 581 and 582 (assault or personal injury), causes the death of a man; it is punished with imprisonment from 10 to 18 years.
Preterintention, which is a particular mode of the subjective element, is generally provided for by Article 43, which defines a crime as preterintentional when a more serious event than that intended by the agent results from the action or omission. Preterintentional homicide thus features the characteristic of imputing the event of death to one who has dolously caused only assault or personal injury, provided that the death occurred as a consequence of the assault or injury.
Preterintentional homicide essentially falls within the category of crimes aggravated by the event. Among these, several others are listed in which the aggravation of penalty is likewise brought about by the event of death, not intended but resulting from conduct already constituting the elements of a dolous crime. Thus, by express statutory provision, the legal outcome aggravates the crimes of abortion, abandonment of a newborn, abuse of correctional means, failure to render aid, etc. Moreover, Article 586 generally provides that when a death results as an unintended consequence from an act envisaged as a dolous crime, the offender is liable for the unintended event on a culpable basis. Naturally, this article applies to cases in which no special provision is applicable.
### III. **Culpable Homicide**
Article 589 provides that “whoever causes, through culpability, the death of a man is punished with imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years.” Here the act is not intended, but occurs through negligence, imprudence, inexperience, or failure to observe regulations, orders, or discipline. Culpable homicide likewise occurs when the killing of a man results from an inexcusable error: as in the case of a hunter who carelessly mistakes the movement of another person for that of an animal and shoots, killing him; or of a person who, believing himself attacked, kills the supposed aggressor; or again of an individual who kills a petty thief caught stealing in his orchard.
### IV. **Canon Law**
Homicide is a *delictum mitti fori*, against which, in ancient times, both Church and State imposed their own penalties, reserving the actual application to whichever of the two powers first assumed jurisdiction over the crime (*ius praeventionis*). Currently, the repression of homicide committed by a layperson is remitted to civil authority. That committed by a cleric would, in principle, fall under ecclesiastical jurisdiction; but since, in practice, clerics are likewise judged by state tribunals, the ecclesiastical judge must take into account any penalty already imposed by the lay judge (can. 2223 § 3, no. 2) so as to avoid excessive cumulation.
Canon law does not punish culpable homicide. For voluntary homicide, the penalties established are exclusion from legitimate acts and from any ecclesiastical office for laypersons; degradation for clerics (can. 2354); the commission of homicide also entails irregularity *ex delicto* (can. 985, 4°).
For moral questions V. UCCISIONE.