**HONOUR** and Insult. – H., from the Latin *honor* or *honos* (i.e., honour, respect, esteem), is the external recognition of another’s excellence.
I. THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF HONOUR
Honour in itself is a legitimate social good, inasmuch as it leads one to seek the attestations of others’ esteem insofar as this is useful for maintaining good relations with them. One may and indeed should esteem whatever good God has placed in man: virtue, knowledge, offices, dignity. And, provided that the intention is upright, one may also desire that others see these goods and acknowledge them socially through signs of esteem; all this fosters good relations among men. Consequently, one may also licitly demand from others the respect due to them, and, within due limits, repel breaches of consideration that may occur. This may even be a duty, if required by social interest.In any case, this is a right, and it is not illicit for a Christian to safeguard it; nor is it illicit in certain specific cases, as is documented by the very conduct of the Divine Saviour, who rejected as injurious the assertion by which He was called demoniac and Samaritan (Jn 8:49); He corrected, calling it blasphemy, the Pharisees’ claim that the miracle of the possessed man He had freed was a demonic work (Mt 12:21 ff.); He publicly reproached the high priest’s servant who had struck Him on the cheek (Jn 18:23).
Yet honour, like good repute, remains always an individual good; hence, when a possible social duty is not compromised, the individual may renounce any attestation of honour and not demand its restoration in case of violation—a mark of inner superiority and holy freedom. In this sense are to be interpreted the Lord’s exhortation to offer the other cheek when struck on the right (Mt 5:39), and similar exhortations (Jn 5:41; 8:54). Thus one attains the serenity of him who has placed his own honour in God’s hands and values it incomparably more than any human glory (ibid., 12:43), drawing nearer to the example of Him who “when He was reviled, reviled not again” (1 Pt 2:21-23).
The Christian knows moreover that he must honour those to whom it is due (Rom 12:10). In family society, the stronger party, the husband, is exhorted to honour the weaker, the spouse (1 Pt 3:7); in civil society, subjects are invited to render honour to kings and those exercising authority (ibid., 2:17), and the young to honour the aged (1 Tim 5:17). Whoever fails in this duty renders himself guilty of sin and, in a well-ordered society, even of crime.
II. INJURED HONOUR: INSULT
More precisely, insult may be defined as a manifestation of contempt against someone. In a broader sense, it includes contempt manifested not only in words but also in deeds, signs, gestures, or writings.The mere omission of the signs of honour due to a person is not in itself an insult, but it may be when, by intention and circumstances, the *animus contemnendi* is evident. The concept of insult also includes reproach, cursing, or imprecations hurled against a person present (*maledictio*). Insult may be directed not only at a person present but also at one absent.
No one may claim to be honoured beyond his own honourworthiness, yet everyone has a right to a minimum of honour as a human person. Hence it is not licit to offend anyone. Even if a person has moral vices, physically unbecoming or dishonourable defects, it would be an insult (*contumelia*) to reproach him with them, unless there is a motive of correction, legitimate inquiry, or just contention or punishment. It is likewise contumelious to remind another, without reason, of services rendered when he was in need.
Insult is a grave sin in itself (*ex genere suo*), as is evident also from the words of Jesus: “Whoever says to his brother, ‘Raca,’ shall be liable to the hell of fire” (Mt 5:22), and from the fact that St Paul lists the reproaches made to one’s neighbour among those to whom God has delivered them over to a debased mind (Rom 1:20-30). Naturally, the gravity is conditioned by whether the material element of the sin is in itself capable of gravely injuring honour, even if the effect does not necessarily follow, or whether it is inspired by hatred or grave contempt. The *parvitas materiae* may arise either from the triviality of the offence or from other mitigating circumstances.
III. SATISFACTION FOR INJURED HONOUR, AND VARIOUS EXCEPTIONS
Even when, in fact, one’s reputation among others has not suffered through the insult, the offended party may, by natural right, demand reparation.Such satisfaction is rendered by the offering of new signs of esteem, in public or in private, according to the nature and circumstances of the offence itself. If the offended party is a superior, it is obligatory to ask his pardon; if equal or inferior, ordinary signs of particular appreciation will usually suffice. In any case, if the insult has resulted in other kinds of damage, even if foreseen only vaguely, reparation is due for these as well.
One is excused from making reparation for injured honour:
1) when one may reasonably presume that the other will waive it;
2) when one has been judicially punished for the insult;
3) when the offended party has taken vengeance;
4) when the insult was reciprocal.
To safeguard injured honour, ecclesiastical or civil law ordinarily intervenes only upon the complaint of the party. In the *Codex Iuris Canonici*, offences against honour or reputation are treated under the heading of *iniuria*. In Italian penal law as well, no distinction is drawn between reputation and honour, and offences in this matter are classified under two headings: insult and defamation. The protection of honour is often connected with questions concerning the protection of one’s name. In Italian penal law (and in common speech) one speaks of a “cause of honour” or an offence against honour in sexual matters, where in theological-moral language it would be more proper to speak of an offence against good repute in sexual matters or of criminal actions (e.g., abortion) inspired by the defence of the same. A woman’s reputation is diminished by an illicit relation, which in common estimation also brings discredit upon those connected to her by ties of blood or affinity.
The act of removing evidence of an illicit act originating from an extra-marital relation is said, in Italian penal law, to be inspired by a “cause of honour.” This applies, for example, to abortion (art. 551), to the abandonment of newborns (art. 592), and to infanticide (art. 578). In such a situation, according to Italian penal law, homicide or personal injury perpetrated upon the persons of supposed accomplices in a state of rage caused by the discovery of an illegitimate carnal relation with one’s spouse, daughter, or sister (art. 587) is punished less severely, inasmuch as the agent is considered to be in a state of just indignation. Yet in these cases the criminal resorts to bloodshed rather out of the tenacious, albeit false, persuasion deeply rooted in society that such crimes can and must be expiated with blood. Obedience to this false persuasion is found in the so-called chivalric world through recourse to the duel (q.v.), which extends the alleged defence of honour into every sphere and is in fact absurd both juridically and morally.
IV. THE OFFENSE WHEN INJURED AND THE SUPREME PONTIFF: V. INGIURIA; PATTI LATERANENSIS.
V. THE OFFENSE WHEN INJURED AND THE HEAD OF STATE
Article 278 of the Italian Penal Code, after the amendment made by Law No. 1317 of 11 Nov. 1947, provides: “Whoever offends the honor or the prestige of the President of the Republic shall be punished with imprisonment from one to five years.”
For this offense, prosecution is always initiated ex officio, subject, for reasons of expediency and propriety, to the authorization of the Minister of Justice for the continuation of criminal proceedings, even in the case of an offense against the honor or prestige of the Pope.
The concept of offense encompasses all those crimes committed through words, writings, positive acts, or omissions that produce an immediate and exclusive injury to the legal good of honor or the prestige of the President of the Republic. Therefore, the offense cannot consist of injuries concerning exclusively different legal goods, such as, for example, property, a principle also followed in medieval law. The offense must be immediate, in the sense that it must refer to the person of the Head of State, even if done indirectly (e.g., against statues, stamps, coins, etc.). The offense against honor, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title XII of the Penal Code, includes insult, defamation, and outrage—i.e., all those injuries that strike more at the moral person than the physical one. Prestige, according to scholarly opinion, is understood as a higher form of honor, determined by the quality of the protected person; offenses against prestige are realized less in the actual diminution of the moral personality of the President than in irreverence, lack of respect, etc., toward the Head of State. Yet this does not mean going so far as to punish every unfavorable judgment regarding the Head of State, even if expressed in a respectful manner that acknowledges the dignity of the person at the summit of the state hierarchy. For the purposes of criminalization, the President of the Republic is equated with those who act in his stead (Article 290 bis).
VI. THE OFFENSE WHEN INJURED AND HEADS OF FOREIGN STATES
Unlike the abrogated penal code, which treated offenses against the Heads of Foreign States as common crimes, merely aggravating the penalty (Articles 128-30), the current code extends to such offenses the treatment applied to injuries against the honor of the Italian Head of State, though imposing a lesser penalty (imprisonment from one to three years). The guiding principle of this new arrangement is that these offenses do not merely harm the personal goods of an individual, which would affect only the internal order of the State, but rather endanger the international security of the State itself.
Regarding protection for representatives of the supreme ecclesiastical authority in the *Codex Iuris Canonici*, see INGIURIA.