Honor and Contumely

HONOR AND CONTUMELY. - H., from Lat. honor or honos (that is, homage, respect, esteem), is the external recognition of another's excellence.

I. THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF HONOR

Honor in itself is a social good, legitimate, insofar as it leads one to seek the tokens of others' esteem as far as is useful for the good relations that one ought to have with others. One certainly can and ought to esteem whatever good God has placed in man: virtue, knowledge, offices, dignity. And, supposing rectitude of intention, one may also desire that others see these goods and acknowledge them socially with tokens of esteem: all this fosters good relations among men. Consequently one may also lawfully demand from others the respect that is due; and check, within due limits, the slights that may be committed. This may be obligatory, if required by the social interest.

In any case this is a right, and that it is not unlawful for a Christian to protect it, and that in certain specific cases he must do so, is documented by the very conduct of the Divine Savior, who repudiated as insulting the assertion by which he was pointed out as possessed by a demon and a Samaritan (Jn. 8:49); he rectified, qualifying it as blasphemy, the Pharisees' statement that had defined as a demonic work the miracle of the possessed man whom he himself had freed (Mt. 12:21 ff.); he publicly rebuked the servant of the high priest, who had struck him on the cheek (Jn. 18:23).

However, honor, like good repute, always remains an individual good; therefore when no eventual social duty is compromised, the individual may renounce every token of honor and need not demand rehabilitation, in case of violation; which is a mark of interior superiority and of holy freedom. In this sense is to be interpreted the Lord's exhortation to offer the other cheek, when one is struck on the right (Mt. 5:39), and other similar exhortations (Jn. 5:41; 8:54). Thus one has the serenity of him who has placed his own honor in God's hands, and esteems him immeasurably more than any human glory (ibid., 12:43), drawing closer to the example of Him who "when he was reviled, did not revile" (1 Pt. 2:21-23).

The Christian knows, moreover, that he must honor those to whom honor is due (Rom. 12:10). In the family society the stronger party, the husband, will be exhorted to honor the weaker party, the wife (1 Pt. 3:7); in society subjects will be invited to render honor to kings and to persons exercising authority (ibid. 2:17) and the young to honor the aged (1 Tim. 5:17). Whoever fails in this duty makes himself guilty of sin and, in a well-ordered society, also of a crime.

II. HONOR INJURED: CONTUMELY

More precisely, contumely can be defined as a manifestation of contempt against someone. In a broader sense it also includes contempt manifested not only by words but also by deeds, signs, gestures, writings.

The mere omission of the tokens of honor due to a person is not in itself contumely, but it can be so when, from the intention and the circumstances, the animus contemnendi appears. Also included in the concept of contumely is the reproach or the curse or curses hurled against a person present (maledictio). Contumely can be committed not only toward a person present, but also absent.

No one can claim to be honored beyond his own honorableness, but everyone has a right to a minimum of honor, insofar as he is a human person. And therefore it is not lawful to offend anyone. Even if there exist in a person moral vices, physical defects that are little honorable or dishonorable, it would be an injury (contumely) to taunt him with them, unless there be a motive of correction, of legitimate investigation, or of contestation or of punishment. It is also contumelious to remind one's neighbor, without reason, of services rendered to him when he was in misery.

Contumely is a sin grave in itself (ex genere suo); this also follows from Jesus' words: "Whoever shall say to his brother, thou fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna" (Mt. 5:22), and from the fact that St. Paul enumerates those guilty of contumely committed against their neighbor among those whom God has delivered up to their own reprobate mind (Rom. 1:20-30). Naturally, the gravity is subordinate to the fact that the material element of the sin is in itself capable of gravely injuring honor, even if the effect does not necessarily follow, or that it is inspired by hatred or grave contempt. Paucity of matter can occur either through the slightness of the offense or through other attenuating circumstances.

III. SATISFACTION FOR THE INJURED PARTY, AND VARIOUS EXCEPTIONS

Even when in reality he has not suffered in the reputation he enjoys among others because of the contumely, the offended party may by natural right demand reparation.

Such satisfaction is given by the offering of new signs of esteem, in public or in private, in accordance with the nature and the circumstances of the offense itself. If the offended party is a superior, it is a duty to ask his pardon; if he is an equal or an inferior, signs of particular appreciation will ordinarily suffice. In any case, if from the contumely damages of another kind have arisen, foreseen at least in a confused way, reparation is due for these as well.

Excused from reparation for injured honor are: 1) one who can reasonably presume that the other party waives it; 2) one who has been judicially punished for the insult; 3) when the offended party has taken revenge; 4) when the insult was mutual.

For the protection of injured honor, ecclesiastical or civil law ordinarily intervenes only following a complaint by the party. In the CIC offenses against honor or reputation come under the name of iniuria. In Italian criminal law too, every distinction between reputation and honor is absent, and offenses in this matter are classified in two categories: insult (ingiuria) and defamation. Questions relating to the protection of one's name are many times connected with the protection of honor. In Italian criminal law (and also in ordinary language) one speaks of a cause of honor or of an offense against honor, in sexual matters, where, in theological-moral language, it would be more proper to speak of an offense against good reputation in sexual matters or of criminal actions (e.g., abortion) inspired by the protection of that same reputation. A woman's reputation is diminished by an illicit relationship which, in common estimation, brings disgrace also upon persons bound by ties of consanguinity or affinity.

Acting to erase the proof of the illicit act, which had its origin in this extra-marital relationship, is said, in Italian criminal law, to be inspired by a cause of honor. Thus with regard to abortion (art. 551), abandonment of newborns (art. 592), infanticide (art. 578). In a situation of this kind there stands, before Italian criminal law, homicide or personal injury perpetrated upon the persons of the supposed guilty parties in the state of rage caused by the discovery of an illegitimate carnal relationship existing with one's spouse, daughter or sister (art. 587). The law in these circumstances punishes the crime with less severity, considering that the one who acts is in a state of just indignation. But the criminal in these cases has recourse to a bloody deed rather because of the tenacious, and equally false, persuasion, rooted in society, that such offenses can and must be wiped out with blood. These false persuasions are obeyed, in the so-called world of chivalry, by recourse to the duel (v.), which extends the alleged defense of honor into every branch and is instead an absurdity in the juridical and moral field.

Pietro Palazzini

IV. INJURED HONOR AND THE SUPREME PONTIFF: V. INGIURIA; PATTI LATERANENSI.

V. INJURY TO THE HONOR OF THE HEAD OF STATE

Article 278 of the Italian Penal Code, after the amendment made by Law No. 1317 of 11 November 1947, provides: "Whoever offends the honor or the prestige of the President of the Republic shall be punished with imprisonment from one to five years."

For this crime, proceedings are always instituted ex officio, subject, for reasons of expediency and convenience, to the authorization of the Minister of Justice for the continuation of the criminal action, including in the case of an offense against the honor or prestige of the pope.

The concept of offense encompasses all those crimes committed by means of words, writings, positive or omissive acts that immediately and exclusively produce an injury to the legal interest of the honor or prestige of the President of the Republic. The crime therefore cannot consist of offenses concerning exclusively different legal interests, such as, for example, property, a principle also followed in intermediate law. The offense must be immediate, in the sense that it must refer to the person of the Head of State, even if made indirectly (for example, against statues, postage stamps, coins, etc.). The offense against honor, in accordance with what is established in chapter 2 of title XII of the Penal Code, includes insult, defamation, and outrage, that is, all those injuries that strike the moral person more than the physical one. By prestige, according to doctrine, is meant a higher form of honor, determined by the quality of the protected person; offenses against prestige consist, more than in the actual impairment of the President's moral personality, in irreverence, lack of regard, etc., toward the Head of State. But one must not for this reason reach the excess of considering punishable every unfavorable assessment with regard to the Head of State, even if expressed in a respectful form that takes into account the quality of the person who stands at the top of the state hierarchy. For the purposes of criminal prosecution, the person who acts in his stead is equated with the President of the Republic (art. 290 bis).

VI. THE INJURED PARTY AND FOREIGN HEADS OF STATE

Unlike the repealed penal code, which treated crimes against the heads of foreign states as ordinary offenses, aggravating only the penalty (arts. 128-30), the code currently in force extends to such crimes the treatment used for offenses against the Italian Head of State, while still imposing a lesser penalty (from one to three years of imprisonment). The governing concept of this new arrangement is that these crimes do not merely attack the personal goods of a man, such as to have an effect only within the State, but endanger the international security of the State itself.

As regards the protection of the representatives of the supreme ecclesiastical authority in the CIC, v. INGIURIA.

Francesco Ercolani