HONOR and INSULT. — H., from Lat. honor or honos (that is, honor, respect, esteem), is the external recognition of another’s excellence.
I. THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF O
O. in itself is a legitimate social good, insofar as it leads one to seek tokens of others’ esteem to the extent that this is useful for the good relations that ought to exist with others. One may and certainly ought to esteem whatever good God has placed in man: virtue, learning, offices, and dignity. And, assuming uprightness of intention, one may also desire that others should see these goods and acknowledge them socially by tokens of esteem: all this fosters good relations among men. Consequently, one may also licitly demand from others the respect that is due, and repel, within proper limits, any lack of consideration shown. This may be a duty if required by the social interest.In any case, this is a right; and that it is not unlawful for a Christian to protect it, and that in certain specific cases he ought to do so, is documented by the conduct of the Divine Saviour himself, who rejected as insulting the assertion by which he was described as possessed by a demon and as a Samaritan (Io. 8, 49); he corrected, calling it blasphemy, the assertion of the Pharisees who had declared demonic the miracle of the possessed man whom he himself had freed (Mt. 12, 21 sgg.); and he publicly reproached the servant of the high priest who had struck him on the cheek (Io. 18, 23).
Nevertheless, O., like good reputation, always remains an individual good; therefore, when a possible social responsibility is not compromised, the individual may renounce every token of o. and may not demand its restoration in the event of violation; this is a mark of inner superiority and holy freedom. In this sense the Lord’s exhortation to offer the other cheek when one has been struck on the right (Mt. 5, 39), and other similar exhortations (Io. 5, 41; 8, 54), are to be understood. Thus one attains the serenity of the person who has placed his own O. in God’s hands and esteems him immeasurably more than any human glory (ibid., 12, 43), drawing closer to the example of Him who «maledetto non malediceva» (I Pt. 2, 21-23).
The Christian also knows that he must honour those to whom honour is due (Rom. 12, 10). In family society the stronger party, the husband, will be exhorted to honour the weaker party, his wife (I Pt. 3, 7); in society, subjects will be invited to render o. to kings and to persons exercising authority (ibid. 2, 17), and the young to honour the elderly (I Tim. 5, 17). Whoever fails in this duty makes himself guilty of sin and, in a well-ordered society, also of a crime.
II. INJURED O.: CONTUMELY. — More precisely, c. may be defined as an expression of contempt against someone. In a broader sense it also includes contempt expressed not only in words but also through actions, signs, gestures, and writings.
The mere omission of the signs of o. due to a person is not in itself c., but it may become so when, from the intention and the circumstances, the animus contemnendi is apparent. Also included in the concept of c. are reproach or a curse, or curses, hurled against a person who is present (maledictio). C. may be directed not only against a person who is present but also against one who is absent.
No one may claim to be honoured beyond what his honourability warrants, but everyone has a right to a minimum of o., insofar as he is a human person. Therefore it is not lawful to offend anyone. Even if moral vices, dishonourable or disgraceful physical defects exist in a person, it would be an insult (c.) to reproach him with them, unless there were a reason of correction, legitimate investigation, objection, or punishment. It is also contumelious to remind one’s neighbour, without reason, of services rendered to him when he was in poverty.
C. is in itself (ex genere suo) a grave sin; this is also clear from Jesus’ words: «Chi avrà detto al suo fratello, stolto, è reo del fuoco della geenna» (Mt. 5, 22), and from the fact that s. Paul numbers those guilty of c. committed against their neighbour among those whom God has handed over to their own reprobate sense (Rom. 1, 20-30). Naturally, its gravity depends on whether the material element of the sin is in itself capable of seriously injuring O., even if the effect does not necessarily follow, or whether the acts are inspired by grave hatred or contempt. Lightness of matter may arise either from the slightness of the offence or from other mitigating circumstances.
III. SATISFACTION FOR INJURED HONOR, AND VARIOUS EXCEPTIONS
Even when in reality his reputation among others has not suffered on account of the contumely, the offended party may, by natural right, demand reparation.Such satisfaction is provided by the rendering of new signs of esteem, in public or in private, in accordance with the nature and circumstances of the offense itself. If the offended party is superior, it is his due that forgiveness be sought from him; if equal or inferior, signs of particular appreciation will ordinarily suffice. In every case, if the contumely has caused damage of another kind, foreseen at least in a general way, reparation is also owed for this.
The following are excused from reparation for injured honor: 1) anyone who may reasonably presume that the other party waives it; 2) anyone who has been judicially punished for the insult; 3) when the offended party has taken revenge; 4) when the insult was reciprocal.
For the protection of injured honor, ecclesiastical or civil law ordinarily intervenes only following a complaint by the injured party. In the CIC, offenses against honor or reputation are designated by the name of iniuria. Italian criminal law likewise makes no distinction between reputation and honor, and offenses in this area are classified into two categories: insult and defamation. Questions concerning the protection of one’s name are often connected with the protection of honor. In Italian criminal law (and also in ordinary usage), one speaks of a cause of honor or of an offense against honor in sexual matters where, in theological-moral language, it would be more proper to speak of an offense against good reputation in sexual matters or of criminal actions (e.g., abortion) inspired by the protection of the latter. A woman’s reputation is diminished by an illicit relationship which, in the common view, also brings disgrace upon persons connected with her by bonds of consanguinity or affinity.
The act of erasing evidence of the illicit act originating from this extramarital relationship is said, in Italian criminal law, to be inspired by a cause of honor. Thus it is said with regard to abortion (art. 551), the abandonment of newborn infants (art. 592), and infanticide (art. 578). In a situation of this kind, under Italian criminal law, are homicide or personal injury perpetrated against the persons of the alleged guilty parties in a state of anger caused by the discovery of an illegitimate carnal relationship existing with one’s spouse, daughter, or sister (art. 587). In these circumstances the law punishes the offense less severely, considering that the perpetrator is in a state of justified indignation. But in such cases the criminal resorts to an act of bloodshed rather because of the tenacious, though false, conviction rooted in society that such crimes can and must be erased with blood. These false convictions are obeyed, in the so-called chivalrous world, duel (v.), which extends the alleged defense of honor into every sphere and is instead an absurdity in the legal and moral fields.
IV. INJURED HONOR AND THE SUPREME PONTIFF: V. INGIURIA; PATTI LATERANENSI.
V. L'O. LESO E IL CAPO DELLO STATO. — Art. 278 of the Italian Penal Code, following the amendment introduced by Law no. 1317 of 11 November 1947, provides: “Anyone who offends the honor or prestige of the President of the Republic shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of one to five years.”
This offense is always prosecuted ex officio, subject, for reasons of expediency and propriety, to the authorization of the Minister of Justice to proceed with the criminal action, also in the case of an offense against the honor or prestige of the pope.
The concept of offense encompasses all those crimes committed by means of words, writings, or positive or omissive acts that immediately and exclusively cause injury to the legal interest consisting in the honor or prestige of the President of the Republic. The offense therefore cannot consist in injuries concerning exclusively other legal interests, such as, for example, property—a principle also followed in the intermediate law. The offense must be immediate, in the sense that it must refer to the person of the Head of State, even if committed indirectly (for example, against statues, postage stamps, coins, etc.). The offense against honor, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 2 of title XII of the Penal Code, includes insult, defamation, and outrage, that is, all those injuries that affect the moral person more than the physical person. In the view of legal doctrine, prestige means a higher form of honor, determined by the quality of the person protected; offenses against prestige consist less in an actual impairment of the President’s moral personality than in irreverence, lack of respect, and so forth, toward the Head of State. But this does not mean that one should go so far as to consider punishable every unfavorable opinion concerning the Head of State, even when expressed respectfully and taking into account the status of the person who stands at the summit of the state hierarchy. For the purposes of criminal prosecution, the person acting in place of the President of the Republic is assimilated to the President (art. 290 bis).
VI. THE INSULTED [OFFENSE AGAINST THE] HEAD OF STATE AND FOREIGN HEADS OF STATE
Unlike the abrogated Penal Code, which regarded offenses against the Heads of foreign States as ordinary crimes, aggravating only the penalty (Arts. 128–130), the current Code extends to such offenses the treatment applied to o. against the Head of the Italian State, while imposing a lesser penalty (from one to three years’ imprisonment). The principle underlying this new arrangement is that these offenses do not merely attack the personal interests of an individual, in a way that would affect only the internal affairs of the State, but endanger the international security of the State itself.With regard to protection under the CIC for representatives of the supreme ecclesiastical authority, V. INGIURIA.