INGIURIA. — From the Latin iniuria, it means any violation of justice: «iniuria est alieni iuris violatio» (l. 5, D. IX, 2). In this sense, in which i. is synonymous with injustice, there are as many kinds of i., distinct from one another, as there are kinds of justice. In a narrower and more precise sense, i. is the violation of commutative justice (v. IV).
I. VARIOUS KINDS OF I
In its subjective aspect, i. may be formal or material. Material i. exists whenever an action or omission injures a right; it becomes formal when the person who causes it also intends the i. itself.With regard to the person who receives it, i. is distinguished as personal or real, according as it affects the person herself in the goods of soul and body, or in external goods.
In relation to its effect, i. may be harmful or without harm. Harm exists when, as a consequence of the i., the injured person suffers any diminution in the goods of the person or of fortune.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS OF EVERY I
I. is a sin in itself (ex genere suo) mortal, since it violates the very order indispensable to social life. Social coexistence is impossible unless everyone’s rights are respected.The gravity of the matter is measured by the harm suffered by the person who is wronged and by the opposition to the common good.
I. may arise from an action that is in itself injurious to justice, or from an action that is injurious only because of the manner in which it is carried out.
To constitute material i., the violation of another’s right, without that person’s consent, is required and sufficient. It is assumed that the right is genuine and real, and has already been acquired by the other person; it is not necessary that the other positively dissent— it is enough that he does not consent. If, however, he consents, there is no longer any i., since each person may renounce one of his own rights: «Scienti et consentienti non fit iniuria aut dolus» (reg. 27 of the Liber VI). The consent that nullifies i. must be free and not extorted, that is, obtained neither through physical or moral violence nor through fraud.
The consent of the person who suffers the act is not free if awareness does not precede the violation of the right; that awareness, in turn, must be free from an error «dante causam».
Moreover, consent must be given by the person who is able to dispose of the right. Personal rights must therefore be distinguished from patrimonial rights. With regard to personal rights, in addition to the subject himself, the person entrusted with the care of another’s person may object; but, apart from the subject, no one may dispose of them.
For formal i. to be committed, it must proceed from one who knows and wills it: that is, knowledge or will to harm or to wrong, together with the effective influence of the will upon the external act injurious to another.
### III. I. AS SIN AND AS A SPECIFIC OFFENCE.
I., as sin and as a specific offence, belongs to those various forms of injury that encroach upon another’s right to honour and reputation, although the meanings of the term in this matter are not always identical in the various criminal laws.
1. In moral theology. — Violations of the honour and reputation of one’s neighbour generally have a well-defined terminology in treatises on moral theology. Injury to another’s honour is properly called contumely (v. ONORE E CONTUMELIA); injury to reputation is called detraction or defamation, which may be simple or qualified, in which case it is called calumny (v. DETRAZIONE).
Since, in the internal forum, one may offend the good reputation of one’s neighbour even by thought alone, authors often include classification (v.).
The precious nature of a person’s good name is sufficiently indicated by the attachment that the honest person has to it and by its social value (v. FAMA).
2. In canon law. — All the various forms of injury to honour and reputation (there is therefore no distinction in law between reputation and honour, as is made in the moral sphere) are designated in the CIC by the name of i. or defamation (can. 1938).
A clear distinction must nevertheless be made between the offence of verbal i. and that of real i. Real i. consists in injury to another’s body, freedom, or personal dignity. The CIC deals with it chiefly in relation to clerics, insofar as real i. entails violation of personal immunity or of the so-called privilegium canonis (v. LESIONE PERSONALE; IMMUNITÀ ECCLESIASTICA; PRIVILEGI dei CHIERICI).
Verbal i., on the other hand, is committed by words, writings, or actions and takes the form of contumely, detraction, and calumny, which become offences when they are committed not privately but publicly. The offence of i. already appears in the Decretum Gratiani, which gathers earlier legal provisions dating back to the Council of Elvira (can. 3 = c. 3 C. 5 q. 1), the Statuta Ecclesiae antiquae (can. 5 = D. 46, c. 2), and s. Gregorio Magno (D. 46, c. 1); and in the Decretali of Gregorio IX (c. 1, 23 X, II, 27). Ecclesiastical legislation is particularly severe against the so-called libelli famosi, that is, against i. committed through writing or print, and against that particular form of i. which is
calumny, while it is lenient toward i. committed through levity or thoughtlessness (c. 27, C. 23, q. 4).
It is likewise severe against i. that crosses over into the specific offence against ecclesiastical authority. Even today the CIC has in the first place in view i. that imply contempt for authority, whether directed against the Roman Pontiff, cardinals, legates of the Supreme Pontiff, the S. Congregations and tribunals of the Roman Curia, the senior officials of these dicasteries, or the Ordinary. It punishes them whether they are committed directly or indirectly, that is, through others, by inciting hatred, divisions, etc., with suitable penalties and penances, always preceded by satisfaction for the i. (can. 2344). The imposition of the penalties is entrusted to the Ordinary, in proportion to the gravity of the offence: in these cases, in which the honour and good reputation of authority are involved, he may act not only at the request of a party but also ex officio. In these cases, however, the offence of i. often assumes the special character of offences against ecclesiastical authority (v. AUTORITÀ ACCLESIASTICHE, DELITTI contro le).
Verbal i. is nevertheless considered an offence (can. 2355) when directed against anyone, although laypersons may ordinarily obtain protection against such offences, which are mixi fori, more readily and effectively in the civil courts. Since, however, it involves the violation of a private right, the offence may be prosecuted only at the request of a party (can. 1938 § 1), unless it concerns serious i. against a cleric or religious, or i. committed against another by a cleric or religious; in that case, criminal proceedings may also be instituted ex officio, since the respect and upright life of clerics are matters of public interest (can. 1938 § 2), and they ought to be a force for cohesion, not discord, in society. Although the Church recommends forgiveness of i., often as an act of greater merit, it nevertheless permits legal action for i. in order, through its moral authority, to preserve—if no other means is available—that minimum of respect among human beings indispensable for maintaining social coexistence. At times, although a disposition of mind inclined toward forgiveness is always necessary, external circumstances may require the continuation of criminal proceedings for i., as a greater good.
The penalties prescribed for the offence are not imposed automatically (penalties latue sententiae), but are left to the free judgment of the judge (ferendae sententiae), so that they may be adapted to the gravity of the offence; in the case of a cleric, they may extend to suspension and removal from office.
An action for i. is extinguished by express or tacit remission, by legitimate satisfaction having been rendered, by retaliation for the i. in the same form, or by an act undertaken in self-defence (can. 2218 § 3), by the one-year limitation period (cann. 1702, 1703), or by the death of the person who committed the wrong or of the person who was wronged, if it occurred before the joinder of issue. There is abundant case law on the subject in the jurisprudence of the S. R. Rota (cf. R. Rotae decisiones... a. 1909 agg., e.g., IV, Roma 1946, pp. 112, 142, 478).
3. In Italian criminal law. — All offences injurious to honour and reputation are classified in two categories: i. and defamation, which, unlike what the CIC provides, are distinct offences. The principal basis for distinguishing between the two classes of offences is drawn from whether or not the offended person is present (v. FAMA).
The injury harms the honor or dignity of the person present (art. 594); defamation, the reputation of an absent person (art. 595). With regard to injury, it is emphasized that the interested party must be present (physically or morally) and must perceive that the act impinges upon his honor, reputation, or dignity. Furthermore, the person performing the act must have the intention to offend; consequently, the intention to jest (provided that the joke remains within due limits), or the intention to correct on the part of one who has the duty to correct (provided that the manner of correction is reasonable), excludes injury. The injurious act may consist either in a commission or in an omission. Another difference between injury and defamation derives from the juridical interest violated: injury offends the formal honor of the person, whereas defamation offends the reputation that the victim has acquired among third parties. As a consequence of what has been said, the aggravating circumstance of publicity (including through the public press) cannot concern injury, which by definition must be committed in the victim’s presence, but only defamation. In this respect, Italian law follows current moral, rather than canonical, concepts. Both injury and defamation are punishable upon complaint by the offended person (art. 597); not, however, when there has been provocation; and, if the offenses are reciprocal, the judge may declare one or both offenders not punishable (art. 599).
With regard to the exception of truth (exceptio veritatis), as an exculpatory defense against the offenses of injury and defamation, the Zanardelli Code followed an intermediate system: it excluded the exception of truth as a rule, while admitting it in exceptional cases (art. 594); the Rocco Code excluded it entirely (art. 596); but a lieutenant-general’s decree of 14 September 1944, no. 288 restored the institution of the exceptio as a ground excluding punishment for these offenses.
The right to reputation does not expire upon death; hence the right to lodge a complaint for injury to the memory of a deceased person passes to the deceased’s next of kin, and to the adoptive parent and adopted child (art. 597), although Italian criminal-law scholars, no longer—and unjustifiably—recognizing the deceased in this case as a subject of rights, disagree as to whether the statutory provision was enacted in the interest of the living (Manzini), or whether the memory of the deceased is elevated to the status of a person by legal fiction (Rende).
In Italian criminal law, it is likewise questioned, again unjustifiably, whether a juridical person may be the subject of the right to honor and reputation, and therefore whether their violation constitutes an offense (Manzini).
Pietro Palazzini
#### INGIUSTIZIA : V. GIUSTIZIA.