INJURY. — From the Latin *iniuria*, it means any violation of justice: “iniuria est alieni iuris violatio” (Digest 9.2.5). In this sense, in which *i.* is synonymous with injustice, there are as many species of *i.* as there are species of justice. In a narrower and more precise sense, *i.* is the violation of commutative justice (v. JUSTICE, IV).
I. VARIOUS SPECIES OF INJURY
In its subjective aspect, *i.* can be formal or material. Material *i.* occurs whenever an action or omission violates a right; it becomes formal when the one who causes it also intends the *i.* itself.In relation to the one who receives it, *i.* is distinguished into personal and real, depending on whether the person is struck in the goods of the soul and body, or in external goods.
In relation to its effect, *i.* can be damaging or without damage. Damage occurs if, as a consequence of the *i.*, the injured party suffers any diminution in personal or material goods.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS OF EVERY INJURY
*I.* is a mortal sin in itself (*ex genere suo*), since it harms the very order indispensable to social life. Social coexistence is impossible unless the rights of each person are respected.The gravity of the matter is measured by the harm done to the one against whom it is committed and by its opposition to the common good.
*I.* can arise from an action that is in itself injurious to justice, or only from the manner in which the action is carried out.
To constitute material *i.*, the violation of another’s right, to which the other does not consent, is required and sufficient. It is assumed that the right is true and real, and already acquired by the other; it is not necessary that the other positively dissent, it suffices that they do not consent. If, however, they consent, *i.* no longer occurs, since each person can divest themselves of their own right: “Scienti et consentienti non fit iniuria aut dolus” (Rule 27 of the Liber Sextus). The consent that nullifies the *i.* must be free, not extorted, that is, neither by physical nor moral violence, nor by fraud.
Moreover, the consent of the patient is not free if awareness does not precede the violation of the right; this awareness, in turn, must be free from error “dante causam.”
Furthermore, the one who consents must be able to dispose of the right. Therefore, strictly personal rights must be distinguished from patrimonial rights. For personal rights, in addition to the subject, the one entrusted with the care of another’s person can also object; but apart from the subject, no one else can dispose of them.
For formal *i.* to be committed, it is required that it proceed from one who knows and wills it: that is, knowledge or will to harm or injure, and an effective influence of the will in the external injurious act toward another.
III. INJURY AS SIN AND AS A SPECIFIC CRIME
*I.*, as sin and as a specific crime, belongs to those various kinds of violations that encroach upon another’s right to honor and reputation, although the legal definitions in various penal laws are not always identical.1. In moral theology
Violations of another’s honor and reputation generally have a well-defined terminology in treatises on moral theology. The violation of another’s honor is properly called contumely (v. HONOR AND CONTEMPT); the violation of reputation is called detraction or defamation, which can be simple or qualified, and in the latter case takes the name of calumny (v. DETRACTION).Given that in the internal forum one can also offend another’s good reputation merely by thought, authors often include in the same classification rash judgment (v.).
How precious a good a person’s good name is, is sufficiently indicated by the attachment that an honest person has to it and by its social value (v. REPUTATION).
2. In canon law
All the various species of violations of honor and reputation (therefore, in canon law there is no distinction between reputation and honor, as is made in the moral field) are treated in the Code of Canon Law under the name of *i.* or defamation (can. 1938).It is necessary, however, to distinguish carefully between the crime of verbal *i.* and the crime of real *i.* Real *i.* is committed in the violation of another’s body, freedom, or personal dignity. The Code of Canon Law addresses this especially with respect to clerics, since real *i.* involves a violation of personal immunity or the so-called *privilegium canonis* (v. PERSONAL INJURY; ECCLESIASTICAL IMMUNITIES; PRIVILEGES OF CLERICS).
Verbal *i.*, on the other hand, is committed through words, writings, or deeds and is concretized in contumely, detraction, and calumny, which become crimes when they are not done in private but in public. The crime of *i.* already appears in Gratian’s Decree, which collects earlier legal provisions dating back to the Council of Elvira (canon 3 = c. 3 C. 5 q. 1), the Statuta Ecclesiae antiqua (canon 5 = D. 46, c. 2), St. Gregory the Great (D. 46, c. 1), and the Decretals of Gregory IX (c. 1, 23 X, 11, 27). Ecclesiastical legislation is particularly severe against the so-called *libelli famosi*, that is, against *i.* committed through writing or print, and against that particular form of *i.* which is calumny, while it is lenient toward *i.* committed through thoughtlessness or lack of consideration (c. 27, C. 23, q. 4).
It is equally severe against *i.* that oversteps into a specific crime against ecclesiastical authority. Even today, the Code of Canon Law primarily considers those *i.* that imply contempt for authority, directed either against the Roman Pontiff, cardinals, legates of the Supreme Pontiff, the Sacred Congregations and tribunals of the Roman Curia, the major officials of these dicasteries, and the Ordinary. It punishes them whether they are committed directly or indirectly, that is, through others, inciting hatred or division, etc., with suitable penalties and penances, always preceded by satisfaction for the *i.* (can. 2344). It is the Ordinary who is entrusted with imposing penalties proportionate to the gravity of the crime; in these cases, where honor and good reputation of authority are involved, he can act not only at the instance of a party but also *ex officio*. The crime of *i.*, however, in these cases often takes on the special configuration of crimes against ecclesiastical authority (v. ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITY, CRIMES AGAINST).
Nevertheless, verbal *i.* (can. 2355) is considered a crime even when directed against anyone, although laypersons can ordinarily find more readily and effectively recourse in civil courts for such crimes, which are of the *forum mixtum*. However, when a private right is violated, the crime is not prosecutable except at the instance of a party (can. 1938 § 1), unless it is a grave *i.* against a cleric or religious, or committed by a cleric or religious against others, in which case criminal action can be instituted *ex officio*, since the respect and honest life of clerics are of public interest (can. 1938 § 2), as they must be a force of cohesion and not of division in society. Although the Church recommends forgiveness of *i.* as an act often of greater merit, it nevertheless admits recourse to legal action for *i.* in order to preserve, through its moral force—if this is not possible otherwise—that minimum of respect among men indispensable to the maintenance of social coexistence. At times, although a disposition of mind inclined toward forgiveness is always necessary, extrinsic circumstances may require the continuation of criminal action for *i.* as a greater good.
The penalties imposed for the crime are not inflicted automatically (*latae sententiae*), but are left to the free assessment of the judge (*ferendae sententiae*), so that they can be adapted to the gravity of the crime; for a cleric, they can reach as far as suspension and removal from office.
BIBL.:
G. MICHONS, *De iniustitia*, Paris 1924;
A. VERMEERSCH, *De iniuria*, in *Periodica de re morali canonica liturgica* 1925, pp. 137-162;
A. VERMEERSCH, *De iniuria in foro interno*, in *Periodica* 1926, pp. 177-196.
The action for iniuria ceases: with the express or tacit condemnation, the legitimate satisfaction rendered, the retaliation of the iniuria in the same form or made in self-defense (can. 2218 § 3), the annual prescription (can. 1702, 1703), the death of the one who injures or of the one who has been injured, occurring before the dispute is brought to court. In this matter, there is abundant casuistry in the jurisprudence of the Sacred Roman Rota (cf. R. Rotae decisiones... a. 1909 sgg., e.g., IV, Rome 1946, pp. 112, 142, 478).
3. In Italian criminal law
All offenses injurious to honor and reputation are classified into two categories: iniuria and defamation, which, however, unlike the provisions of the CIC, are distinct crimes from one another. The main criterion for distinguishing between the two classes of crimes is drawn from the presence or absence of the offended person (v. FAMA).Iniuria injures the honor or decorum of the person present (art. 594); defamation, the reputation of an absent person (art. 595). For iniuria, it is emphasized that the presence (physical or moral) of the interested party is necessary, as well as the latter’s perception of the act that impinges upon his honor, reputation, or decorum. Moreover, there must be the intent to offend on the part of the one committing the act, so that the intention to joke (provided the jest remains within proper limits) or the intention to correct, in one who has the duty to correct (always provided the manner of correction is reasonable), excludes iniuria. The injurious act may consist in either an act or an omission. Another difference between iniuria and defamation is drawn from the legal good violated: iniuria offends the formal honor of the person; defamation offends the reputation that the victim has acquired among others. As a consequence of what has been said, the aggravating circumstance of publicity (even through the public press) cannot apply to iniuria, which by definition must be committed in the presence of the victim, but only to defamation. In this respect, Italian law aligns with moral concepts rather than current canonical ones. Both iniuria and defamation are punishable only upon complaint by the offended party (art. 597); not, however, if there has been provocation; and if the offenses are reciprocal, the judge may declare one or both offenders not punishable (art. 599).
Regarding the exception of truth (exceptio veritatis) as a liberatory proof from the crime of iniuria and defamation, the Zanardelli Code followed an intermediate system: excluding the exception of truth as a rule, but admitting it in exceptional cases (art. 394); the Rocco Code completely excluded it (art. 596); but a legislative decree of 14 Sept. 1944, no. 288 restored the institution of the exceptio as a ground for excluding punishability in these crimes.
The right to reputation does not expire with death; it therefore passes to the next of kin, the adopter and adopted, the right to bring a complaint for iniuria against the memory of a deceased person (art. 597), although Italian penalists, unjustly no longer recognizing the deceased as a subject of rights in this case, disagree over whether the legal provision was enacted for the benefit of the living (Manzini), or whether the memory of the deceased is treated as a legal person by fiction (Rende).
In Italian criminal law, it is also questionably—and still unjustly—whether a moral person can be the subject of the right to honor and reputation, and thus whether a violation in their regard constitutes a crime (Manzini).