DUEL. — Today, a duel (duellum = bellum, according to the meaning of ancient sources, a general or single combat) refers to any agreed-upon combat between two or more persons on equal terms, for a private cause, conducted according to certain norms established by chivalric custom. Such a duel, when conducted in this manner, is also punished as a crime under ecclesiastical legislation. In the agreement for the duel, which is ordinarily preceded by a challenge or declaration of intent to fight, the place, time, and weapons to be used are determined.
In the preparation for and execution of the duel, when it is a formal affair, a whole entourage of people is involved, such as those who deliver the challenge, seconds (i.e., arbiters of the duel and of the observance of chivalric norms), physicians to attend to the wounded, and other accomplices, such as those tasked with sounding the alarm in case of possible police intervention.
Thus, the duel is distinguished from a brawl, which is an impromptu fight without pre-established rules. It is distinguished from war, which is a clash or series of clashes between two armies, and also from that form of combat between two or few soldiers to decide the fate of a war more simply than by a clash of armies—such as the combat of David with Goliath in sacred history, or that of the Horatii and the Curiatii in classical history: a form of combat undoubtedly lawful, just as war is lawful under certain conditions. It is also distinguished from boxing, which is not a true combat with inherently lethal weapons, although this form of fighting often becomes illicit if prolonged until the complete stunning of the opponent (to knock out).
Perhaps deriving from trial by ordeal, the duel is a product of a barbaric era, in which wrongs, not redressed by the intervention of public force, were left to private vengeance; preserved and revived by a society not permeated by the spirit of the Gospel and in opposition to the refinement of morals produced by Christianity; legitimized by false conceptions of honor and esteem. The duel can take various forms and employ various weapons. A very common distinction is made between a formal and a simple duel, or between a duel to the first or to the last blood, i.e., until the death of at least one of the combatants. The so-called American duel does not fit the definition of a duel as a crime, though it always merits moral reprobation: in this form, the challenged party must choose between two weapons, one of which is loaded and the other not, and between two pills, one of which is poisoned and the other not, thus fighting under unequal conditions. On the other hand, the test of strength (Bestimmungsmensur) used among students of German universities does correspond to the concept of a duel mentioned above, inasmuch as it is not merely an exercise in fencing but a true agreed-upon combat between two persons, even if only to first blood (cf. Sacred Congregation of the Council, 9 Aug. 1890; 23 Jan. 1904; 10 Feb. 1923; 13 June 1925).
The duel is contrary to natural law, which forbids killing or injuring others, as well as exposing one’s own life to serious danger. The duel partakes of the malice of both murder and suicide: murder insofar as it is an attack on another’s life; suicide insofar as it recklessly exposes one’s own life to serious danger without any plausible reason. Even if the intention of the two combatants does not persist to the point of fighting to the death, the duel still violates natural and divine law, which forbids not only deliberate murder but also that to which one may, without intending it, give a remote occasion, and forbids any voluntary injury to one’s neighbor. Nor is it valid to argue that there is a balance between the two parties, since both are equally assailed and neither runs a greater risk than the other. Granted that they are assailed, they are also assailants, and thus both are guilty. And even if the danger in itself is small, events sometimes exceed expectations. In any case, to wound or attempt to wound is always forbidden by divine and human law.
Moreover, the duel is contrary to social order, because it substitutes personal vengeance or justice for the authority of the State and the majesty of the law. The false maxims about honor that are invoked to justify it are of no avail. The offended party, or one who believes himself offended, challenges the offender and imposes an act to which he himself is also subject with the same risks and duties.
Where is the reparation, if the offended party must pay the same price and render the same satisfaction as the offender?
To these observations is joined the opinion and judgment of the majority. So long as the matter is discussed theoretically, it is not difficult to find consensus condemning the duel as a portentous inconsistency, a fierce prejudice, a remnant of feudalism and barbarism. In practical cases, however, prejudice often prevails over everything else.
Duels are fought and accepted (our chronicles know of very recent examples), albeit against conscience, out of fear of being called cowards, i.e., out of fear of having fear.
The united efforts of religion and civilization have succeeded in exposing the absurdity of the practice, but have not yet succeeded in eradicating II. The law codes impose sanctions, but trials are not held, sentences are not passed, and sentences are not carried out. Unlike other crimes, the duel, according to preconceptions, brings dishonor upon those who do not commit II.
Something was hoped for in the last century from the anti-dueling movement, which arose following a double scandal involving the Austrian general staff, which, despite military and civil codes condemning duels, struck from the list of officers a Catholic (Marquis Taccoli) for refusing to accept a duel, and another (Count Leodocchovski) for advising that the matter be referred to a military court of honor.
The movement was promoted by Prince Don Alfonso of Bourbon and Austria d’Este, and under his initiative anti-dueling leagues were formed with the program of reforming legislation and promoting the establishment of councils of honor intended to replace the use of arms, thus supporting the condemnation reiterated by the Holy See in the letter of Leo XIII to the bishops of Germany (Pastoralis officii, 22 Sept. 1891). But hopes were miserably dashed.
While the duel remains illicit in itself for the reasons stated above, and given the persistence of these social prejudices, moralists ask whether it is lawful to accept a duel in the case that, by refusing the challenge, one would lose one’s position to the detriment of one’s dignity and of substantial economic advantages. Opinions are divided, so that one could not consider a person guilty of grave fault who, in such circumstances, yields to prevailing prejudices about honor and chivalry after having done everything possible to avoid II. This is a rather rare case, which in Italy, for example, where the duel is also proscribed by civil law (Italian Penal Code, arts. 394–401), would hardly occur.
It is, however, forbidden to join those academic societies that, such as those established in German universities, require members to give satisfaction, in other words to accept a duel to first blood if challenged. It is also forbidden to submit to a jury of honor to have it decide whether the duel should take place or not. Indeed, the Pontifical Commission for the Interpretation of the Code of Canon Law holds that even in that case the crime is committed and the penalties are incurred (Pontifical Commission, 26 June 1947: AAS, 39 [1947], p. 374).
Nor may one challenge to a duel a false accuser, even if this is the only means of avoiding a death sentence, since in this case the conditions for legitimate defense are not met (v. LEGITIMATE DEFENSE).
Sin is not only and exclusively the duellists’ but all those who in any way intervene are to be regarded as cooperators in the sin (v. COOPERAZIONE). Such are the bearers of the challenge, the seconds, the physicians who by agreement remain nearby so as to be able to render their services at once; the umpires, whoever supplies money, weapons, vehicles, a place; whoever mounts guard and even the mere spectators, inasmuch as this constitutes encouragement for the duellists and approval of the deed.
A form of cooperation is also the writing of books that propose the liceity of duelling, reinforcing prejudices.