DUELLO. – The d. (duellum = bellum, according to the meaning of the ancient sources, combat in general or single combat) is today understood as any agreed combat between two or more persons in equal numbers, arising from a private cause and conducted according to certain rules established by the chivalric tradition. The d., when conducted in this manner, is also punished as a crime in ecclesiastical legislation. The agreement for the d., ordinarily preceded by a challenge or communication of the intention to fight, establishes the place, time, and weapons with which the combat is to take place.
In the preparation for the d. and in its execution, when the d. is formal, an entire entourage of persons is involved: bearers of the challenge; seconds, that is, arbiters of the d. and of compliance with the rules of chivalry; physicians to attend to the wounded; and other auxiliaries, such as those assigned to raise the alarm in the event of police intervention.
The d. is therefore distinguished from a brawl, which is a sudden combat without pre-established rules. It is distinguished from war, which is a clash or series of clashes between two armies; and it is further distinguished from that form of combat between two or a few soldiers intended to determine the outcome of a war more simply than by the clash of two armies, such as the combat of David with Golla in sacred history and that of the Horatii and Curiatii in classical history: a form of combat that is undoubtedly licit, just as war is licit under certain conditions. It is also distinguished from boxing (boxing), which is not a true combat conducted with weapons that are intrinsically lethal, although this form of fighting too often becomes illicit if continued until the opponent is completely stunned (to knock out).
Perhaps derived from the judgments of God, the d. is the product of a barbarous age in which wrongs not repaired through the intervention of public authority were left to private vengeance; it was preserved and revived by a society not permeated by the spirit of the Gospel and opposed to the refinement of morals produced by Christianity; and it was legitimized by false conceptions of honour and esteem. The d. may be conducted in various forms and with various weapons. A very common distinction is that between the formal and the simple d., and between the d. to first blood and that to the last blood, that is, until the death of at least one of the contestants. The American-style d. does not correspond to the legal definition of the crime of d., although it always merits moral condemnation: in it, the accepting party must choose between two weapons, one loaded and the other unloaded, and between two pills, one poisoned and the other not, and thus fight with unequal weapons. By contrast, the test of strength (Bestimmungsmensur) practised among students at German universities does correspond to the concept of d. outlined above, since it is not a simple exercise in fencing but a genuine agreed combat between two persons, even if it is to first blood (cf. S. Congregation of the Council, 9 Aug. 1890; 23 Jan. 1904; 10 Feb. 1923; 13 June 1925).
The d. is contrary to natural law, which prohibits killing or wounding others, as well as exposing one’s own life to grave danger. The d. shares in the malice of both homicide and suicide: homicide, insofar as it constitutes an attack upon another’s life; suicide, insofar as it recklessly exposes one’s own life to grave danger without any plausible reason. Even if the intention of the duelists excludes persisting in the d. until the last blood, it nevertheless runs counter to the natural and divine law, which prohibits not only deliberate homicide but also homicide to which one may, even without intending it, provide a remote occasion, and which prohibits every voluntary injury to one’s neighbour. Nor does it help to say that there is compensation between the two parties, since both are equally attacked and neither runs a greater danger than the other. Let it be granted that they are attacked; they are also attackers, and therefore both are guilty. And even if the danger in itself is small, events sometimes exceed all predictions. In any case, wounding or attempting to wound is always forbidden by divine and human law.
Moreover, the d. is also contrary to the social order, because it substitutes vengeance or personal justice for the authority of the State and the majesty of the law. The false maxims concerning honour that are invoked to justify it do not achieve their purpose. The offended party, or the person who believes himself offended, challenges the offender and imposes upon him an act to which he himself is also subject, with the same risks and obligations.
Where is the reparation, if the offended party must pay the same price and provide the same satisfaction as the offender?
The opinion and judgment of the majority support these observations. So long as the matter is discussed theoretically, it is not difficult to find agreement with the judgment condemning the d. as a monstrous inconsistency, a ferocious prejudice, and a remnant of feudalism and barbarism. In the practical case, however, prejudice often prevails over everything else.
D. are fought and accepted (our chronicles know examples of very recent date), indeed against conscience, for fear of being called cowards—that is, for fear of being afraid.
The combined efforts of religion and civilization succeeded in revealing its absurdity, but have so far failed to eradicate II. The codes establish sanctions, but proceedings are not instituted, judgments are not condemnatory, and sentences are not served. Unlike other crimes, this crime, according to prevailing prejudices, brings dishonour upon the person who does not carry it through.
Some hope was placed in the previous century in the anti-duelling movement, which arose following a double scandal caused by the Austrian General Staff. Contrary to the military and civil codes, which condemned the d., it struck from the list of officers a Catholic (the marquis Taccoli), guilty of having refused the d., and another (Count Leodochowski), guilty of having advised that the dispute be referred to the military court of honour.
The movement was promoted by Prince don Alfonso di Borbone and d’Austria d’Este, and on his initiative anti-duelling leagues arose with a programme of reforming the legislation and promoting the establishment of councils of honour intended to replace the use of weapons, thereby supporting the condemnation renewed by the Holy See through the letter of Leone XIII to the bishops of Germany (Pastoralis offici, 22 Sept. 1891); but the hopes collapsed miserably.
While the d. remains illicit in itself for the reasons set out above, in view nevertheless of these persistent social prejudices moralists ask whether it may be licit to accept a genuine d. in the event that, by refusing the challenge, one would lose one’s position, to the detriment of one’s dignity and of economic advantages of considerable importance. Opinions differ, so that a person who, in such circumstances, yields to prevailing prejudices concerning honour and chivalry, after having done everything possible to avoid doing so, could not be considered guilty of grave fault. This is a relatively rare case, which in Italy, for example, where the d. is also prohibited by civil law (Italian Penal Code, arts. 394–401), could scarcely arise.
It is prohibited, however, to enrol in those academic societies which, established in German universities, for example, oblige their members to give satisfaction—in other words, to accept, if challenged, a d. to first blood. It is also prohibited to submit the matter to a jury of honour in order that it may decide whether or not the d. should take place. Indeed, the Pontifical Commission for the Interpretation of the CIC holds that even in that case the crime exists and the penalties are incurred (Pontifical Commission, 26 June 1947: AAS, 39 [1947], p. 374).
Nor may one challenge a false accuser to a d., even if this is the only means of avoiding a death sentence, since in this case the conditions for legitimate self-defence are not present (v. DIFESA LEGITTIMA).
Il peccato non è solo ed esclusivo dei duellanti, ma anche tutti coloro, che in qualsiasi maniera ci intervengono, sono da considerarsi come cooperatori al peccato (v. COOPERAZIONE). Tali sono i portatori del biglietto di sfida, i padrini, i medici, che dietro convenzione si trattengono nelle vicinanze allo scopo di poter prestare subito la loro opera; gli arbitri, chi mette a disposizione denaro, armi, veicoli, luogo; chi monta la guardia ed anche i semplici spettatori, in quanto ciò costituisce un incoraggiamento per i duellanti ed un'approvazione per il d.
Una forma di cooperazione è anche lo scrivere libri che propugnino la liceità del d., ribadendo pregiudizi
sull'onore. Questi libri, in quanto diretti contro i buoni costumi, sono ipso iure prohibiti (can. 1399).
Riguardo alla riparazione, non si è obbligati di solito a prestare qualche compenso per i danni causati dall'uccisione o ferimento in d.; con la provocazione e con l'accettazione della provocazione l'uccisione cessa di essere un'ingiustizia contro l'ucciso. Se invece chi uccide o ferisce accettò l'intimazione solo perché costretto, la coazione parte ordinariamente dal tribunale di onore, che può assimilarsi ad un mandante, a tutti gli effetti, anche dal risarcimento dei danni.