Doubt

DOUBT. -

I. PHILOSOPHY

The common classification distinguishes skeptical d., which is definitive in relation to a given object, and methodical d., which is admitted provisionally, until critical inquiry resolves it into positive or negative certainty. Methodical d. is in turn distinguished as real, if it entails a genuine suspension of assent, and fictitious, if it is merely simulated for the purposes of freer and more independent inquiry. In fictitious d. one proceeds as though one doubted, but the psychological state proper to d. is absent. As for skeptical d. (v. SCETTICISMO), it should be noted that, when it presumes to be universal, it entails an internal psychological-logical contradiction. For every d. entails at least certainty of itself and of the thinking subject; and to accept universal d. as the solution is to express a value judgment, and therefore one of certainty: by affirming that everything is d., one posits the certainty of d. This was already pointed out with forceful clarity by s. Agostino against the Academics (cf. De vera Relig., 39, 73; De Civit. Dei, XI, 26).

Methodical d., universally used in philosophy since Aristotele (cf. Met., I, 1; III, 1), and constantly practiced by the Scholastics, although for the most part as fictitious d., constitutes the essence of the Cartesian method which, beginning from a d. extended to all our knowledge and opinions, aims to rediscover certainty within d. itself, in the affirmation of the thinking subject, «cogito ergo sum» (Discours de la méthode, part 4, Medit. 1). Without going as far as the extension of Cartesian d. (understood by some as universal and therefore non-methodical d.: Mercier, p. 73), the reasons for the usefulness of methodical d. in every field of knowledge are evident, given the broad margin of uncertainty in human knowledge, as a function of the limits of our cognitive powers and of the complexity of truth. Alongside this legitimate and prudent d., which thought consciously admits and at the same time knows how to master, psychology recognizes certain mental states of a pathological order involving indecision and perplexity, both theoretical and practical, generally confined to a particular field of objects, in which d. gains the upper hand and overwhelms every power of discernment in the individual affected by II. This category includes what is called the madness of doubt and scrupulosity.

In modern philosophy, in opposition to decisively constructive systems (e.g. idealism), theoretical rational d. has been accentuated by positivist, pragmatist, and existentialist tendencies, and, in general, by all those approaches that substitute faith or feeling for evidence as the basis of certainty (v. CREDENZA; FIDEISMO).

The moral certainty of which theologians and jurists speak, and which is required for right living, is not moral certainty in the perfect and philosophical sense, but certainty in the broad and improper sense of the term; that is, it is synonymous with the highest probability. Thus, speaking abstractly, there is a precise difference among moral certainty, opinion, suspicion, and doubt, all stages on a scale of ascent toward the determination and adherence of our intellect to speculative truth as well as to practical truth. In certainty there is firmness of the intellect’s adherence; in opinion, imperfect adherence; in suspicion, barely incipient adherence; in doubt, suspension of assent.

In practice, however, one speaks of doubt in morals and law not only when the mind refrains from pronouncing judgment, but also when the mind merely suspects or adheres on the basis of barely probable reasons. This explains the use of certain expressions that have by now entered theological language: doubtful conscience, perplexed conscience—expressions which, considered in themselves, appear contradictory (conscience = practical judgment... — doubt = suspension of judgment...).

Strictly speaking, in the philosophical sense, a state of doubt would exist when, in the face of two contradictory theses, one has absolutely no grounds for deciding either in favor of one or in favor of the other (negative doubt). In the ethical sphere, however, one also speaks of doubt when grounds exist but are not decisive on either side (positive doubt). Finally, one again speaks of doubt when grounds exist on only one side, but are not convincing and attain no more than a certain degree of probability (probable doubt).

According to the strength of the reasons that prevent assent, doubt will be grave or light, prudent or imprudent, vincible or invincible. If, moreover, the doubt concerns the existence, obligation, or scope of the law, one speaks of doubt of law (dubium iuris); if, on the other hand, the doubt concerns the existence of the fact itself or its inclusion within the scope of the law, one speaks of doubt of fact (dubium facti). Doubt « iuris » is speculative if the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action is considered abstractly and in general; it is practical if the doubt concerns the action that must be performed at the present time.

It should be observed immediately that it is never lawful to act with practical doubt, since anyone who proceeds to action in such a condition shows indifference both to good and to evil, and this indifference is in itself evil, insofar as it constitutes hypothetical consent to evil. One must emerge from this state; or, if that is impossible and the person must act at all costs, one must adhere to what is safer, that is, to what most favors the obligation, according to the axiom: « In dubiis practicis tutior via est eligenda ». One speaks of positive doubt because in practice negative doubt is disregarded, as though it did not exist. It should also be observed, however, that one who is in speculative doubt, or even in speculative doubt with a general practical bearing (speculative-practical doubt), does not always lack a certain practical judgment concerning the subjective and formal lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action he must perform. Often, by turning back upon itself, the mind can find a reflex principle sufficient to determine it in one direction or the other. For example, someone may say to himself: « although the morality of this action appears doubtful to me, it is nevertheless certain that I must perform it if my superior commands it, because the presumption favors the superior ».

In particular, a certain practical judgment may be present while speculative doubt remains, and awareness of an obligation may arise whenever there is a certain and absolute obligation to attain a definite end that might otherwise perhaps not be achieved—for example, whenever a good effect (salvation, a Sacrament, health) is to be attained in the safest manner, or an evil effect (damnation, death, harm) is absolutely to be avoided—and one doubts not only the honesty but also the necessity or efficacy of the means required for this purpose, as well as the validity of the act or fact. In that case, a certain higher law intervenes and commands: « in dubiis de validitate actus ponendi tutius esse agendum ».

Through this reflex judgment, an objectively uncertain obligation becomes subjectively certain. The reason for recourse to the reflex principle of tutiorism is simple. In these cases, the issue is not merely the honesty of the action, which ultimately depends only upon our reason and conscience; rather, it concerns the value of the action itself or the removal of harm to ourselves or to others—things that do not depend upon us, since our evaluation cannot alter the nature of things.

This explains how someone who reasonably doubts that he is in possession of the truth, yet neglects to seek knowledge of the true faith, sins gravely or lightly according to the degree of his negligence. Whoever, after attaining the true faith, merely suspends his judgment concerning a truth proposed for belief, sins against the obligation to make an act of faith; and if the doubt is pertinacious, becomes a heretic (can. 1825 § 2). Whoever, contrary to the reflex principle « nemo censetur malus, nisi probetur », suspends without any reason his favorable judgment concerning the moral conduct of his neighbor, sins at least venially. This also explains why a confessor who doubts the penitent’s dispositions must refuse or defer absolution, since the validity of a Sacrament is at issue.

Finally, one who doubts not the value of the act or the absolute necessity of the required means, but only the honesty of the action or the binding force of the precept, must, as stated above, abstain from the action or act according to what is safer, that is, according to what most favors the obligation imposed by law; alternatively, he must endeavor to resolve the practical doubt through further examination or investigation of reasons, whether direct—intrinsic or extrinsic—or indirect (reflex principles).

It is precisely in connection with these reflex principles, which are capable of providing a certain practical certainty sufficient for action, that moral systems arose. It was in fact when Gaetani clarified the distinction between practical and speculative doubt that the way was opened for their elaboration.

Among these systems, some of the reflex principles that they developed or derived from juridical sources, applying them indiscriminately throughout the entire ethical field, emphasized the now well-known principle « Lex dubia non obligat », which apparently originated from three « regulae iuris » placed by Boniface VIII at the end of the Liber sextus (cc. 11 and 30, 57 R. J. in VI), the last of which, drawn from a Roman « regula iuris », l. 172, D. 50, was generalized as follows: « contra eum qui legem dicere potuit apertius, est interpretatio facienda ». But the elaboration of the principle is entirely the work of moralists, who, after reiterating the traditional arguments demonstrating the necessity of promulgation for a law to be binding, assert that when a law is doubtful, one cannot speak of sufficient promulgation, since, even if promulgation has taken place in the proper forms, what has been made known through it is only an equivocal and doubtful command, and therefore, in reality, nothing has been made known; in reality, promulgation is lacking. But since, in the absence of promulgation, the law does not bind, it is possible to affirm the principle: « lex dubia non obligat » (cf. s. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 3; Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 90, a. 4; s. Alfonso, Theologia moralis, I, n. 55 [ed. L. Gaudé, I, Rome 1905, p. 25]).

The principle is today commonly accepted with the reservations made above concerning the different status of doubt, both in the internal and in the external forum.

The CIC accepted and regulated it in can. 15, which again appeals to the distinction between doubt of law (iuris) and doubt of fact (facti). In the case of a doubt of law, positive canonical law does not oblige, even when the laws in question declare the nullity of an act or the incapacity of persons (invalidating and incapacitating laws). It must be observed, however, that here the reference is to an objective and not a subjective doubt, as above: nevertheless, given this declaration by the legislator, even subjectively the state of doubt is resolved in the sense of the fullest freedom to act.

It must also be observed that a law cannot be said to be objectively doubtful until the norms established by the legislator for its interpretation have been observed (v; cf. also cann. 6, 4; 17 § 2, 18, 23, 50, 68).

In a doubt of fact, one must in principle have recourse to the Ordinary, who is authorized to grant a dispensation when it concerns a dispensation that the Holy See customarily grants. Incidentally, if a doubt of fact is transformed into a doubt of law, the person who doubts may consider himself free from the obligation.

Moreover, the CIC itself provides particular legal solutions, especially in cases of doubt of fact.

The legislator thus shows himself benevolent when the doubt concerns the sufficiency of the cause required for a dispensation: the dispensation may lawfully be requested and lawfully and validly granted (can. 84 § 2). When a (positive and probable) doubt of law or of fact arises jurisdiction (v.) required, the Church herself supplies any possible defect in the internal and external forum (can. 209). Thus, in particular, the legislator declares the acts of the vicar general and of the bishop valid so long as doubt persists in them concerning the cessation of jurisdiction (can. 430 § 2).

On doubt of law or of fact the CIC bases various presumptions and legal favors: in favor of freedom to contract marriage (can. 1035), which may not be impeded even in the case of doubtful impotence (can. 1068 § 2), but only in the case of the doubtful existence of certain impediments that are certainly or at least probably of natural law (can. 1076 § 3); in favor of a contracted marriage, which is always held valid, and the bond held to exist, until the contrary is demonstrated with certainty (cann. 1014, 1069 § 2), even when the doubt concerns the validity of the Baptism of one of the parties and the possibility arises of an original impediment of disparity of worship (can. 1070 § 2, and V. DISPARITÀ DI CULTO); in favor of the faith, whereby in doubtful questions Pauline privilege (v.) or with the vicarious power enjoyed by the pontiff in matters of marriages between a baptized and an unbaptized spouse, the question is always to be resolved in favor of the freedom of the faithful party (can. 1127), unless this would entail the danger of dissolving a ratified and consummated marriage; in favor of the parish church in doubtful questions arising with other non-parish churches (can. 1217); in favor of the accused, who in doubt must be acquitted, subject to certain reservations, even in civil matters (can. 1069 § 4), but above all in penal matters (can. 2233 § 1). Furthermore, in the case of doubt concerning possessory actions or remedies, possession must be attributed to both parties (can. 1697 § 2); and in matters of censures, the reservation of the penalty is no longer binding (can. 2245 § 4).

Nevertheless, even in the external forum, when the necessity and efficacy of the means or the validity of the act are at stake, the legislator, in case of doubt, commands that the safer course be chosen. Thus, when there is a prudent doubt of law and of fact as to whether the Sacraments have really or validly been conferred, he commands their repetition under condition (cann. 732 § 2; 746 § 4; 747-48). This applies especially to Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders. As regards the Eucharist, Penance, and Extreme Unction, repetition is in itself permitted. As regards

Marriage, for social reasons, as has been seen, the legislator follows a contrary presumption, but he does not exclude—in fact, he encourages—the so-called ad cautelam convalidation. For the same reasons, when doubt subsequently arises concerning the competence of a confessor or preacher who has already been approved, the legislator allows them to be summoned for a new examination (cann. 877 § 2; 1340 § 2). Here we may merely mention the interrogative form in which, in the CIC and in canonical judicial practice, the object of the dispute is formulated: «an constet» (or similar expressions); the procedural act itself through which this determination takes place is called the joinder of the doubt (cf. cann. 2082, 2104, 2124, 2127, n. 2°, 2128, 2131, 2140).

The same practice is followed in the administrative procedure of the Roman Congregations for the questions submitted and the replies given to them. The replies of the Pontifical Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of the canons of canon law are likewise formulated in this manner.