### DOUBT
**I. PHILOSOPHY.** — From *dubius*, uncertain, hesitant (perhaps from the root *duo*, analogous to Germ. *Zwei-fel*), doubt is the indecision of the mind between yes and no, either due to a lack of positive evidence for or against a proposition (negative doubt) or because the reasons balance each other out and cancel one another (positive doubt). It is the mental state directly opposed to certainty (q.v.); distinct from opinion, which is a provisional assent given to a probable proposition; and different also from ignorance *per se*, because, unlike ignorance, in doubt the objective expression of the judgment is present to consciousness, even if only in the form of a problem.
For this reason, psychologically, doubt can never be a purely passive state but involves an active stance—albeit a negative one—toward an object of thought.
Common classifications distinguish *skeptical* doubt, which is definitive with respect to a given object, and *methodical* doubt, which is admitted provisionally until critical inquiry resolves it into positive or negative certainty. Methodical doubt, in turn, is divided into *real* doubt, which involves a genuine suspension of assent, and *feigned* doubt, which is merely simulated for the sake of a freer and more independent inquiry. In feigned doubt, one proceeds as if in doubt, but the psychological state proper to doubt is absent. As for skeptical doubt (q.v.), it should be noted that when it presumes to be universal, it implies an internal psychological-logical contradiction. For every doubt presupposes at least the certainty of the self and of the thinking subject; and to accept universal doubt as a solution is to express a judgment of value, hence one of certainty: by affirming that everything is doubtful, one posits the certainty of doubt. This is what St. Augustine already emphasized with clarity against the Academics (cf. *De vera religione*, 39, 73; *De civitate Dei*, XI, 26).
Methodical doubt, universally employed in philosophy since Aristotle (cf. *Metaphysics*, I, 1; III, 1), and constantly practiced by the Scholastics—though mostly as feigned doubt—constitutes the essence of the Cartesian method, which, starting from a doubt extended to all our knowledge and opinions, aims to rediscover certainty within doubt itself, in the affirmation of the thinking subject: “cogito ergo sum” (*Discourse on Method*, part 4; *Meditations*, 1). Without extending doubt to the Cartesian extreme (some interpret it as universal doubt and therefore not methodical: Mercier, p. 73), the utility of methodical doubt is evident in every field of knowledge, given the vast margin of uncertainty in human knowledge, due to the limits of our cognitive powers and the complexity of truth.
Alongside this legitimate and prudent doubt, which the mind consciously admits and at the same time knows how to master, psychology recognizes certain pathological mental states of indecision and perplexity, whether theoretical or practical, generally confined to a specific range of objects, in which doubt takes over and overwhelms the individual’s power of discernment. To this category belong what is termed the “madness of doubt” and scrupulosity.
In modern philosophy, in the face of decidedly constructive systems (e.g., idealism), theoretical rational doubt has been accentuated by positivistic, pragmatistic, and existentialist tendencies, and, in general, by all those approaches that substitute faith or sentiment for evidence as the basis of certainty (q.V. *CREDENCE*; *FIDEISM*).
**
Ugo Viglino
**II. MORALS AND CANON LAW.** — In considering doubt, a distinction must be made between its purely speculative, philosophical aspect and its practical aspect, under which it is chiefly examined in moral theology and law. First, with respect to its object, the doubt that concerns the ethical and juridical sphere is that which pertains to the norm of honesty in concreto, i.e., to the practical laws of life, and it is opposed not to any certainty whatsoever but to moral certainty alone (q.V. CERTAINTY).
The moral certainty spoken of by theologians and jurists, which is required for right living, is not the perfect and philosophical moral certainty but the broadly and improperly so-called kind, i.e., it is synonymous with maximum probability. Therefore, abstractly speaking, there is a precise difference between moral certainty, opinion, suspicion, and doubt—all stages in a scale ascending toward the determination and assent of our intellect to speculative truth as well as practical truth. In certainty, there is firm adherence of the intellect; in opinion, imperfect adherence; in suspicion, a barely incipient adherence; in doubt, suspension of assent.
In practice, however, in moral theology and law, the term “doubt” is used not only when the mind refrains from pronouncing judgment but also when it merely suspects or assents on the basis of barely probable motives. This explains the use of certain expressions now entrenched in theological language: “doubtful conscience,” “perplexed conscience,” which, considered in themselves, seem contradictory (conscience = practical judgment... doubt = suspension of judgment...).
Strictly speaking, in the philosophical sense, doubt would obtain when, faced with two contradictory theses, there are absolutely no motives for deciding in favor of one or the other (negative doubt). In the ethical sphere, however, the term “doubt” is still used when motives exist but are not determinative on either side (positive doubt). Finally, the term is still applied when motives exist on only one side but are not convincing and reach only a certain degree of probability (probable doubt).
According to the strength of the motives that prevent assent, doubt will be grave or light, prudent or imprudent, vincible or invincible. If doubt further concerns the existence, obligation, or extent of the law, it is termed doubt of law (*dubium iuris*); if, instead, it pertains to the existence of the fact itself or its subsumption under the law, it is termed doubt of fact (*dubium facti*). Doubt of law is speculative if the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action is considered abstractly and in general; it is practical if the doubt concerns an action that must be performed at present.
It should be noted immediately that with practical doubt, it is never lawful to act, for whoever acts under such conditions demonstrates indifference to both good and evil, and this indifference is in itself evil, insofar as it constitutes a hypothetical consent to evil. One must emerge from such doubt, or, if one cannot and the subject must absolutely act, one must adhere to what is most secure, i.e., to what most favors obligation, according to the principle: “In dubiis practicis tutior via est eligenda.” Positive doubt is so called because in practice negative doubt is disregarded as if it did not exist. It must also be observed, however, that one who is in speculative doubt, or even in speculative doubt with a general reflection on practice (speculative-practical), does not always lack a certain practical judgment regarding the subjective and formal lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action to be performed. Often, the mind, turning back on itself, can find a sufficient reflective principle to determine it one way or the other. For example, someone might say to himself: “Although the morality of this action is doubtful to me, it is nevertheless certain that I must do it if my superior commands it, because the presumption is in favor of the superior.”
In a specific case, one may have a certain practical judgment, while the speculative doubt remains, and an awareness of an obligation may arise whenever there is a certain and absolute obligation to attain a determined end, which otherwise might not be achieved—e.g., whenever a good effect (salvation, a sacrament, health) must be secured in the most certain way, or a bad effect (damnation, death, harm) must be absolutely avoided, and there is no doubt merely about honesty but also about the necessity and efficacy of the means required and the validity of the act or deed. Then a higher, certain law intervenes, commanding: “In dubiis de validitate actus ponendi, tutius esse agendum.”
In this reflected judgment, an objectively uncertain obligation becomes subjectively certain. The reason for resorting to the reflected principle of the more secure course is simple. In these cases, it is not merely a question of the honesty of the action, which ultimately depends only on our reason and conscience; rather, it concerns the value of the action itself and the removal of harm to ourselves or others, which do not depend on us, since our assessment cannot alter the nature of things.
Thus, it is explained how one who reasonably doubts being in the truth and yet neglects to know the true faith sins gravely or venially according to the degree of negligence. Whoever, having attained the true faith, merely suspends judgment on a truth proposed for belief, sins against the obligation to make an act of faith; and if the doubt pertains to this, he becomes a heretic (can. 1825 § 2). Whoever, contrary to the reflected principle “Nemo censetur malus, nisi probetur,” suspends a good judgment about the moral conduct of another without any reason sins at least venially. Thus it is explained why a confessor who doubts the dispositions of the penitent must refuse or defer absolution, since this concerns the validity of a sacrament.
Finally, whoever does not doubt the value of the act or the absolute necessity of the required means but only the honesty of the action or the binding force of the precept must, as has been said, refrain from the action or act according to what is more secure—that is, according to what best fulfills the obligation of the law—or must strive to resolve the practical doubt through further examination or research for direct motives, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, or indirect ones (reflected principles).
It is in connection with these reflected principles, which provide a certain practical certainty sufficient to act, that moral systems are developed. It was precisely when Gaetano clarified the distinction between practical and speculative doubt that the way was opened to the elaboration of these principles.
Some of these systems, among the reflected principles derived or drawn from juridical sources and applied indiscriminately throughout the ethical field, insisted on the now well-known principle “Lex dubia non obligat,” which seems to have originated from three “regulae iuris” placed by Boniface VIII at the end of the Liber sextus (cc. 11 and 30, 37 R. J. in VI), the last of which, drawn from a Roman “regula iuris,” 1. 172, D. 50, was generalized thus: “Contra eum qui legem dicere potuit apertius, est interpretatio facienda.” But the elaboration of the principle is entirely the work of the moralists, who, after repeating the traditional arguments demonstrating the necessity of promulgation for a law to be binding, affirm that in the case of a doubtful law one cannot speak of sufficient promulgation, since even if promulgation has taken place in the required form, what has been made known is not a clear command but a doubtful one, and thus, in reality, nothing has been made known; in fact, promulgation is lacking. But since, in the absence of promulgation, the law does not bind, it is possible to affirm the principle: “Lex dubia non obligat” (cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 3; Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 90, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, I, n. 55 [ed. L. Gaudé, I, Rome 1905, p. 25]).
The principle is today commonly accepted with the reservations noted above regarding the different state of doubt in the internal and external forum.
The Code of Canon Law has adopted and regulated it in can. 15, which again appeals to the distinction between doubt of law (iuris) and doubt of fact (facti). In the case of doubt of law, positive canon law does not bind, even if it concerns laws that declare the nullity of an act or the incapacity of persons (irritating and incapacitating laws). It must be observed, however, that here the doubt is objective and not subjective, as above; yet, given this declaration by the legislator, even subjectively the state of doubt is resolved in favor of the most complete freedom to act.
It must still be noted that a law cannot be said to be objectively doubtful unless the norms given by the legislator for interpretation have been observed (v. cf. also can. 6, 4; 17 § 2, 18, 23, 50, 68).
In the case of doubt of fact, one must in principle have recourse to the Ordinary, who is authorized to grant a dispensation when it concerns a dispensation that the Holy See is accustomed to grant. Similarly, if the doubt of fact is transformed into doubt of law, the subject who doubts may consider himself free from the obligation.
Moreover, the Code itself provides particular legal solutions especially in cases of doubt of fact.
The legislator thus shows himself lenient when it comes to doubt about the sufficiency of the cause required for a dispensation—the dispensation may be licitly requested and licitly and validly granted (can. 84 § 2). When a positive and probable doubt of law or fact arises regarding the existence of the jurisdiction required, the Church supplies in the internal and external forum (can. 209). Thus, in a specific case, the legislator declares valid the acts of a vicar general and a bishop as long as the doubt about the cessation of their jurisdiction persists (can. 430 § 2).
On doubt of law or fact, the Code establishes various presumptions and legal favors: in favor of the freedom to contract marriage (can. 1035), which cannot be impeded even in the case of doubtful impotence (can. 1068 § 2), but only in the case of doubt about the existence of certain impediments that are certainly or at least probably of natural law (can. 1076 § 3); in favor of a marriage already contracted, which is always presumed valid and the bond existing until the contrary is proven with certainty (can. 1014, 1069 § 2), even if the doubt concerns the validity of the baptism of one of the parties and there arises a probability of an original impediment of disparity of cult (can. 1070 § 2, and V. DISPARITÀ DI CULTO); in favor of the faith, so that in doubtful questions connected with either the Pauline privilege (v.) or the vicarious power enjoyed by the pope in matters of marriages between a baptized and an unbaptized spouse, the question is always to be resolved in favor of the freedom of the faithful party (can. 1127), unless there is danger of dissolving a ratified and consummated marriage; in favor of the parish church in doubtful questions arising with other non-parochial churches (can. 1217); in favor of the accused, who in doubt must be absolved, with certain reservations, even in civil matters (can. 1069 § 4); but above all in penal matters (can. 2233 § 1). Again: in cases of doubt regarding possessory actions or remedies, possession must be attributed to both parties (can. 1697 § 2); and in matters of censures, the reservation of the penalty is no longer binding (can. 2245 § 4).
However, even in the external forum, when the necessity and efficacy of the means or the validity of the act are at stake, the legislator, in the case of doubt, commands that the safer course be chosen. Thus, when a prudent doubt of law and fact exists, if the Sacraments have been truly or validly conferred, the repetition of the same under condition is commanded (can. 732 § 2; 746 § 4; 747-48). This applies especially to Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders. As for the Eucharist, Penance, and Extreme Unction, repetition is in itself permitted. As for
Matrimony, for social reasons, as has been seen, the legislator adheres to a contrary presumption, but does not exclude—in fact, favors—the so-called precautionary convalidation. For the same reasons, when doubt arises regarding the capacity of a confessor or preacher already approved, the legislator grants that they may be recalled for a new examination (can. 877 § 2; 1340 § 2). It is here appropriate to mention briefly the dubitative form, in which the object of the dispute is concretized in the CIC and in canonical judicial practice: “an constet” (or similar); the procedural act itself through which the determination is made is called the concordantia dubii (cf. can. 2082, 2104, 2124, 2127, n. 2, 2128, 2131, 2140).
The same is used in the administrative practice of the Roman Congregations for the questions posed and the answers given to them. Likewise, the responses of the Pontifical Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of Canon Law are formulated in this manner.
DUBLANCHY, Edmond. “Theologian, b. at Bruvile (diocese of Metz) on 21 Jan. 1858, d. on 26 Jan. 1938 at Differt (Belgian Luxembourg). After completing ecclesiastical studies at Nancy, he entered as a deacon the Society of Mary (Marist Fathers), where he made his religious profession and was ordained priest. For four years (1881-82 and 1884-87), he taught Sacred Scripture and dogmatic theology at Dublin; then philosophy and dogmatics in the scholasticate of his society, both in his homeland and abroad (Spain and the United States).
At Washington he obtained a doctorate at the Catholic University (1895) and published his thesis Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus (Bar-le-Duc 1895, pp. 442). Returning to Europe, he taught theology at the seminary of Moulins (1897-1900), at Montbel (1900-1903), and at Differt (1903-1905); in 1913 he was at the International Scholasticate in Rome, and in 1925 returned to Differt to teach Sacred Scripture, history, and later dogmatic and moral theology until 1935. He collaborated with theological journals (e.g., Revue thomiste, 1918-19) and with the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. He wrote La voix de Pierre pour l'indépendance du Pape (Paris 1920). Death prevented him from completing a book on the Blessed Virgin.