DOUBT. - I. PHILOSOPHY. - From dubius, uncertain, hesitant (perhaps from the root duo, by analogy with German Zwei-fel), it is the indecision of thought between yes and no, whether for lack of positive proofs for and against an affirmation (negative doubt), or because the reasons balance each other out and cancel one another (positive doubt). It is the mental state directly opposed to certainty (v.); distinct from opinion, or the provisional assent given to a probable proposition; also different from ignorance properly so called, because, unlike the latter, in doubt the objective expression of the judgment is present to consciousness, even if only with the value of problematicity. For this reason doubt, psychologically, can never be a purely passive state, but entails an active taking of a position, albeit in a negative sense, before an object of thought.
The common classification distinguishes skeptical doubt, which is definitive in relation to a given object, and methodological doubt, which is admitted provisionally, until critical inquiry resolves it into positive or negative certainty. Methodological doubt in turn is distinguished into real, if it entails a true suspension of assent, and fictitious, if it is merely simulated for the purposes of a freer and more independent inquiry. In fictitious doubt one acts as if one doubted, but the psychological state proper to doubt is lacking. As for skeptical doubt (v. SCETTICISMO), it should be noted that, when it presumes to be universal, it implies an internal psychological-logical contradiction. In fact every doubt entails at least the certainty of itself and of the thinking subject; and to accept universal doubt as a solution is to express oneself in a judgment of value, hence of certainty: by affirming that everything is doubt one posits the certainty of doubt. This is what St. Augustine already pointed out with vigorous clarity against the Academics (cf. De vera Relig., 39, 73; De Civit. Dei, XI, 26).
Methodological doubt, of universal use in philosophy since Aristotle (cf. Met., I, 1; III, 1), and constantly practiced by the Scholastics, though for the most part as fictitious doubt, constitutes the essence of the Cartesian method which, starting from a doubt extended to all our knowledge and opinion, aims to rediscover certainty within doubt itself, in the affirmation of the thinking subject, «cogito ergo sum» (Discours de la méthode, part 4, Medit. 1). Without reaching the extension of Cartesian doubt (understood by some as universal and therefore not methodological: Mercier, p. 73), the reasons for the usefulness of methodological doubt in every field of knowledge are evident, given the vast margin of uncertainty of human knowledge, in function of the limits of our cognitive powers and of the complexity of truth. Alongside this legitimate and prudent doubt, which thought consciously admits and at the same time knows how to master, psychology knows certain mental states of a pathological order of indecision and perplexity, both theoretical and practical, generally circumscribed to a determined field of objects, in which doubt gains the upper hand and overrides every power of discernment of the individual affected by it. Belonging to this category are what is called the madness of doubt and scruple.
In modern philosophy, in the face of decidedly constructive systems (e.g. idealism), theoretical rational doubt has been accentuated by positivist, pragmatist, existentialist tendencies, and, in general, by all the currents that substitute faith or feeling for evidence as the basis of certainty (v. CREDENZA; FIDEISMO).
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Ugo Viglino
II. MORALITY AND CANON LAW
In doubt one must distinguish the philosophical, merely speculative aspect from the practical aspect, under which it is chiefly considered in moral theology and in law. First of all, with respect to its object, the doubt that concerns the ethical and juridical world is that which bears on the norm of honesty in the concrete, that is, on the practical laws of life, and it is opposed only to moral certainty (v. CERTAINTY), not to any certainty.
The moral certainty of which theologians and jurists speak, and which is required for living well, is not moral certainty in the perfect and philosophical sense, but certainty in the broad and improper sense, that is, it is a synonym for the greatest probability. Therefore, abstractly speaking, there is a precise difference between moral certainty, opinion, suspicion and doubt, all of them steps on a ladder of ascent toward the determination and adherence of our intellect to speculative truth as to practical truth. In certainty there is firmness of adherence of the intellect; in opinion there is an imperfect adherence; in suspicion an adherence barely beginning; in doubt a suspension of assent.
But in practice one speaks of doubt in morals and in law not only when the mind abstains from pronouncing, but also when the mind barely suspects or adheres on the basis of barely probable motives. And this explains the use of certain expressions that have by now entered theological language: doubtful conscience, perplexed conscience, which, considered in themselves, seem contradictory (conscience = practical judgment... - doubt = suspension of judgment...).
The state of doubt would exist, in itself, in the philosophical sense, when in the face of two contradictory theses one has absolutely no motives for deciding, neither in favor of one nor in favor of the other (negative doubt). In the ethical field, on the other hand, one still speaks of doubt when the motives exist, but are not decisive for either side (positive doubt). And finally one still speaks of doubt when the motives exist on one side only, but are not convincing and reach only a certain degree of probability (probable doubt).
According to the force of the motives that impede assent, the doubt will be grave or light, prudent or imprudent, vincible or invincible. If the doubt further touches the existence, the obligation or the extension of the law, one speaks of doubt of law (dubium iuris); if instead the doubt turns on the existence of the fact itself or on its inclusion within the scope of the law, doubt of fact (dubium facti). Doubt "iuris" is speculative, if the licitness or illicitness of the action is considered in the abstract and in general; it is practical, if the doubt bears on the action that must actually be performed.
Let it be observed at once that with practical doubt it is never licit to act, since one who in such conditions passes to action shows himself indifferent to both good and evil, and this indifference is in itself evil, inasmuch as it is a hypothetical consent to evil. It is necessary to emerge from it, or if one cannot and the subject must absolutely act, it is necessary to adhere to what is safer, that is, to what most favors the obligation, according to the axiom: "In dubiis practicis tutior via est eligenda". One speaks of positive doubt, because in practice negative doubt is disregarded, as if it did not exist. But it is also to be observed that not always does one who is in speculative doubt, or even in speculative doubt with a general reflection to practice (speculative-practical), lack a certain practical judgment of the subjective and formal licitness or illicitness of the action he must perform. Often the mind, turning back upon itself, can find a reflex principle sufficient to make it determine in one sense or the other. For example, someone can say to himself: "although the morality of this action appears doubtful to me, it is nevertheless certain that I must do it, if the superior commands it, because the presumption stands for the superior".
In particular, one can have a certain practical judgment while the speculative doubt remains, and the awareness of an obligation can arise whenever there presents itself the certain and absolute obligation to obtain a determined end, which otherwise perhaps would not be attained, for example, whenever the good effect (salvation, a Sacrament, health) is to be reached in the safest way, or the evil one (damnation, death, harm) is absolutely to be avoided, and one doubts not only of the honesty, but also of the necessity or efficacy of the means required for this and of the validity of the act or of the fact. Then a higher certain law intervenes, which commands: "in dubiis de validitate actus ponendi tutius esse agendum".
Through this reflex judgment the objectively uncertain obligation becomes subjectively certain. The reason for recourse to the reflex principle of tutiorism is simple. In these cases it is not a question of the simple honesty of the action, which in the end depends only on our reason and conscience; but it is a question of the value of the action itself or of the removal of a harm to ourselves or to others, things which do not depend on us, since our appraisal cannot change the nature of things.
Thus it is explained how one who reasonably doubts that he is in the truth and nevertheless neglects to know the true faith, sins gravely or lightly, according to the degree of negligence. One who, having attained the true faith, merely suspends his judgment on a truth proposed for belief, sins against the obligation to make an act of faith; and if the doubt is pertinacious, he becomes a heretic (can. 1825 § 2). One who, against the reflex principle "nemo censetur malus, nisi probetur", suspends his own good judgment on the moral conduct of his neighbor, without any reason, sins at least venially. Thus it is explained how the confessor who doubts the dispositions of the penitent must refuse or defer absolution, since it is a question of the validity of a Sacrament.
Finally, one who doubts not the value of the act or the absolute necessity of the means required, but only the honesty of the action or the binding force of the precept, must, as has been said, abstain from the action, or act according to what is safer, that is, according to what most favors the obligation of the law, or else must strive to resolve the practical doubt through a further examination or search for motives, whether direct, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, or indirect (reflex principles).
It is in connection with these reflex principles, which serve to give some practical certainty sufficient for acting, that the moral systems are grafted. It was precisely when Gaetani clarified the distinction between practical and speculative doubt that the way was opened to their elaboration.
Some of these systems, among the reflex principles which they elaborated or drew from juridical sources, applying them indiscriminately in the whole ethical field, insisted on that now most well-known one, "Lex dubia non obligat", originating, as it seems, from three "regulae iuris" placed by Boniface VIII at the end of the Liber sextus (cc. 11 and 30, 57 R. J. in VI), of which the last, taken from a Roman "regula iuris", l. 172, D. 50, was generalized thus: "contra eum qui legem dicere potuit apertius, est interpretatio facienda". But the elaboration of the principle is entirely the work of the moralists, who, after having repeated the traditional arguments that demonstrate the necessity of promulgation for the law to be obligatory, affirm that in the case where the law is doubtful one cannot speak of a sufficient promulgation, since, even if the promulgation has occurred with the due forms, through it nothing has been made known except an equivocal, doubtful command, and therefore, in reality, nothing has been made known; the promulgation is in reality lacking. But since, the promulgation being lacking, the law does not oblige, it is possible to affirm the principle: "lex dubia non obligat" (cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 3; Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 90, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, I, n. 55 [ed. L. Gaudé, I, Rome 1905, p. 25]).
The principle is today commonly accepted with the reservations we made above concerning the different state of doubt, both in the internal forum and in the external forum.
The CIC has accepted and regulated it in can. 15, which again appeals to the distinction between doubt of law (iuris) and of fact (facti). In the case of doubt of law, the positive canon law does not oblige, even if these are laws that declare the nullity of an act or the incapacity of persons (irritating and incapacitating laws). It must be observed, however, that here we are dealing with objective and not subjective doubt, as above: nevertheless, given this declaration of the legislator, even subjectively the state of doubt is resolved in the sense of the most complete freedom to act.
It must further be observed, however, that the law cannot be said to be objectively doubtful except after the norms given by the legislator for interpretation have been observed (v.; cf. also cann. 6, 4; 17 § 2, 18, 23, 50, 68).
In doubt of fact, in itself recourse must be had to the Ordinary, who is authorized to dispense when it is a question of a dispensation that the Holy See is accustomed to grant. Incidentally, if the doubt of fact is transformed into doubt of law, the subject who doubts may in itself consider himself free from the obligation.
Furthermore, in the CIC itself particular legal solutions are given, especially in the case of doubt of fact.
The legislator shows himself thus benign when it is a question of doubt about the sufficiency of the cause required for dispensation: the dispensation may licitly be requested and licitly and validly granted (can. 84 § 2). When a (positive and probable) doubt of law or of fact should arise concerning the existence of jurisdiction (v.) that is required, the Church herself supplies the possible defect in the internal and external forum (can. 209). Thus in particular the legislator declares valid the acts of the vicar general and of the bishop, as long as the doubt of the cessation of jurisdiction persists in them (can. 430 § 2).
On doubt of law or of fact the CIC founds various presumptions and favors of law: in favor of the freedom to contract marriage (can. 1035), which cannot be impeded, even in the case of doubtful impotence (can. 1068 § 2), but only in the case of the doubtful existence of certain impediments that are certainly or at least probably of natural law (can. 1076 § 3); in favor of the marriage contracted, which is always held to be valid, and the bond to exist, until the contrary is demonstrated with certainty (can. 1014, 1069 § 2), even if the doubt falls on the validity of the Baptism of one of the parties and the probability of an original impediment of disparity of cult presents itself (can. 1070 § 2, and v. DISPARITÀ DI CULTO); in favor of the faith, whereby in doubtful questions connected either with the Pauline privilege (v.) or with the vicarious power that the pontiff enjoys in matters of marriages between a baptized spouse and an unbaptized one, the question is always to be resolved in favor of the freedom of the faithful party (can. 1127), unless with this there is the danger of dissolving a ratified and consummated marriage; in favor of the parish church in doubtful questions that have arisen with other non-parish churches (can. 1217); in favor of the accused, who in doubt must be absolved, with certain reservations, even in civil matters (can. 1069 § 4); but above all in penal matters (can. 2233 § 1). Further: in case of doubt in matters of possessory actions or remedies, possession must be attributed to both parties (can. 1697 § 2); and in matters of censures, the reservation of the penalty is no longer binding (can. 2245 § 4).
Nevertheless, even in the external forum, when the necessity and efficacy of the means or the validity of the act is at stake, the legislator, in case of doubt, commands that the safer way be chosen. Thus when there exists a prudent doubt of law and of fact as to whether the Sacraments have really or validly been conferred, he commands their reiteration under condition (cann. 732 § 2; 746 § 4; 747-48). This holds above all for Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders. As for the Eucharist, Penance and Extreme Unction, reiteration is in itself permitted. As for Matrimony, for social reasons, as has been seen, the legislator adheres to a contrary presumption, but does not exclude, indeed favors, so-called convalidation ad cautelam. For the same reasons, when there is doubt about the capacity of a confessor or a preacher already approved, the legislator grants that they may be called back for a new examination (cann. 877 § 2; 1340 § 2). This is the place to mention briefly the dubitative form in which, in the CIC and in canonical judicial practice, the object of the suit is concretized: «an constet» (or similar); the procedural act itself through which the determination takes place is called the concordance of the doubt (cf. cann. 2082, 2104, 2124, 2127, n. 2°, 2128, 2131, 2140).
The same is used in the administrative practice of the Roman Congregations for the questions posed and the answers given to them. The answers of the Pontifical Commission for the authentic interpretation of the canons of canon law are likewise formulated.