COOPERAZIONE

COOPERATION. — I. COOPERATION IN EVIL OR SIN

I. Notion and Divisions

Cooperation can occur in good as well as in evil; in both cases it always presupposes an external act, or at least the communication of one’s intentions to others.

By “cooperation,” however, moral theologians mean only complicity in another’s guilt or assistance—even if merely negative—given to another in the commission of a sinful act.

Under the name of cooperation, properly speaking, one does not include scandal, for whereas scandal provokes another’s guilt, cooperation in another’s sin is added to it and generally presupposes II.
Cooperation can take the form of command, advice, approval, or praise of evil. One can be a cooperator in evil through silence, non-resistance, concealment, positive participation in the action, patronage, or aiding and abetting, which can assume numerous aspects. One speaks properly of cooperation when the cooperator’s action or omission is secondary in relation to a principal agent; yet it is customary to speak of cooperation even with regard to the principal agent himself. In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish between scandal and cooperation in sin, especially when cooperation is effected in the form of advice.

Cooperation can be positive or negative, depending on whether it consists in an action or an omission. Positive cooperators, accomplices in guilt either physically or morally, can in greater or lesser measure lend their assistance either as principal authors, instigators, or mere helpers. One can contribute to an evil action either directly (as a partner) or indirectly (as a participant). Direct cooperation, according to the degree of directness with which it contributes to the action, is called proximate or remote.

This relationship of greater or lesser proximity must be understood, in matters of morals, not in the sense of material distance to be calculated by the number of intermediate members, but according to the importance that the accidental action bears in relation to the principal action, which is the sin of another.

Of great significance is the distinction between formal and material cooperation. Cooperation is formal when it embraces the sin itself, consenting to it; it remains merely material when it rejects the sin in itself and consists in an accidental action having a more or less proximate relation to another’s sin. For example, one who freely holds the ladder for a thief cooperates formally in the theft; one who does so under grave duress performs a merely material act.

Cooperation can be formal either explicitly, by the very intention of the agent, or implicitly, when—even without the cooperator’s intention—their action, by its very nature, is ordered to the service of another’s sin and admits no good end.

2. Malice of Cooperation

Material cooperation that stands in such close relation to the sinful act that the action would not be possible without it is to be equated with implicit formal cooperation. If, however, material cooperation stands in a looser relation to the principal action, it can be licit, provided certain conditions are met: the cooperator’s action, if not proximate, must in itself be licit or at least morally indifferent; it must occur for serious reasons such that refusal would be morally impossible; and one must in no way approve of the other’s sin.

The existence of these conditions must be verified in individual cases through a very careful judgment that takes all circumstances into account. Above all, the motives excusing cooperation must be all the more serious the graver the sin to which one gives occasion—even if only materially—the greater the probability that, had the material cooperator abstained, the other would not have sinned; the closer the relation to the sinful act; and the lesser the necessity or right to perform the act or omission that constitutes the material cooperation.

Since this concerns the spiritual necessity of one’s neighbor, one must also bear in mind the principles governing this matter and consider what one is obliged to do according to the degree of spiritual necessity of the neighbor.

Cooperation remotely connected with the principal action, which can easily be performed by another if one abstains, is to be considered licit if no scandal ensues. Remote cooperation that is not necessary is licit even for a moderate inconvenience. Closer cooperation, or remote cooperation that is necessary, is licit for a grave inconvenience. Avoiding a greater evil is considered a sufficient excusing cause in the case of material cooperation. To cooperate materially in a grave sin under conditions such that the assistance given has a notable connection with the principal action or, worse still, is indispensable to it, is not licit unless one suffers a grave inconvenience, which must be most grave if both conditions are met or if a very great harm accrues to third parties. If, moreover, this third party is the Church or the State, material cooperation can be entirely illicit for the sake of higher exigencies of the common good.

Indirect cooperation is licit when it is a matter of preventing an equally great inconvenience to oneself, for charity does not require one to avoid another’s harm at so high a price.

Parents, superiors, and others with special obligations, however, are subject to graver burdens in this regard.

Cases of cooperation in sin can arise in all walks of life. Those most exposed are servants under a contract of employment; merchants and publicans, particularly because of their constant contact with the public; publishers, printers, newspapers, and writers; theater and cinema impresarios and, even more so, actors and actresses; innkeepers and hoteliers; professionals, and in particular physicians, magistrates and judges; government officials and deputies vested with legislative power and their electors. All these and more exceptional cases are treated under their respective headwords.

It should be noted here that the question of cooperation in evil—especially material cooperation—is a grave issue presenting many varied and difficult aspects, yet it is of daily application. Not only later moral theologians have concerned themselves with it and written about it, but from the earliest times such questions occupied the Fathers and Christian writers. It suffices to recall Tertullian, who took rather rigid positions on the matter (cf. *De corona*), Clement of Alexandria, and St. Augustine (*In Ps.* 18, 2.13; *Serm.* 88, 19).

Problems that troubled the early Christians recur today in the missionary world and beyond, concerning, for example, the liceity for a Christian of manufacturing statues and images of gods, their temples, and so forth; the same issue arises for Catholics in relation to heretics. The ecclesiastical magisterium continues to pronounce uniformly, evaluating individual cases according to the principles set forth (Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, 8 Jan. 1851; Holy Office, decrees of 14 Jan. 1818, 15 Mar. 1848, 31 Jan. 1872, 26 Mar. 1885, 26 July 1888, 15 June 1889, 12 Dec. 1898) and combating the indifferentism of today, which would regard truth and error with equal eye.

BIBL.:
Tertullian, *De corona militis*.
Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*.
St. Augustine, *In Psalmos*, 18, 2.13; *Sermones*, 88, 19.
Dictionaries: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, III, 1737 ss.; *Enciclopedia cattolica*, III, 1594 ss.

Many new cases of cooperation have prompted modern secular legislations for magistrates, officials, etc., in the application, for example, of laws on divorce (v.), on secular schools (v. SCUOLA), on the confusion of ecclesiastical goods (v. SCUOLA). Often the issues are made even more difficult by the emergence of special conditions of dependence or by the economic position of the persons involved. In the light of the principles set forth, the Christian conscience must be guided when there is no more direct intervention by ecclesiastical authority.

3. Cooperation to harm

Beyond material damage, there is often spiritual damage as a consequence of cooperation. This too must be repaired as far as possible, and this for the sake of justice, when it involves persons who, by office, were to promote the spiritual growth of the soul they instead harmed; or persons who used unjust means or formally cooperated in the injury. Moreover, charity demands, and in case of scandal absolutely requires, that the damage be repaired as far as possible.

II. COOPERATION IN CRIME

The cooperators are said to be: a) principal or secondary (the latter also accomplices in the strict sense), depending on the influence their action had on the execution of the crime (the criterion of distinction is not constant in doctrine and legislation); b) material or moral, according as they performed a physical or merely moral activity for the commission of the crime (moral cooperation may consist in mandate, command, coercion, instigation, or advice).

There is no cooperation in the case where several persons agree to commit a crime and then it is not committed (not even attempted); and likewise in the case where someone incites another to commit a crime, without the instigated party then committing or even attempting to commit the crime. In some cases, however, the agreement or instigation, though not followed by effect, may constitute crimes in themselves.

Likewise, there is no cooperation in the crime when someone, without any prior agreement to the crime, helps the author of the crime to escape the authorities’ investigations, or to secure the profit of the crime (aiding and abetting), or makes an apology for the committed crime (apology of crime), or shares in the profit of the crime (receiving stolen goods).

While the current Italian Penal Code (arts. 110-119) establishes that all cooperators in the crime are subject to the penalties established for the author, with certain exceptions, the CIC instead grades responsibility and punishment according to the extent of the action performed.

It establishes, in fact, that, unless there is for someone some aggravating or mitigating circumstance, equal penal responsibility falls, and therefore they are subject to the penalty established by law for the author of the crime: 1) all co-authors of the crime (and this even in so-called bilateral crimes, such as adultery and incest, or in collective crimes, such as conspiracy) and the mandators; 2) the instigators and other accomplices, if without their cooperation the crime would not have been committed (cann. 2209 §§ 1-3, 2231). Those accomplices whose action was not determinative, that is, those without whose cooperation the crime would have been committed anyway, have mitigated responsibility and are therefore punished with a lesser penalty (cann. 2209 § 4 and 2231). These rules, obviously, do not apply in cases where the law provides as a distinct crime some form of complicity (cann. 2331).

Those accomplices who, before the crime is committed, have withdrawn their cooperation, either partially or totally, are punished with a lesser penalty, or even go unpunished (cann. 2209 § 5).

Those who give negative cooperation, limiting themselves to not preventing the crime when they have the duty to do so, are subject to responsibility and therefore to a penalty proportionate to the gravity of the duty (cann. 2209 § 6).

The CIC, in accordance with the principles of modern penal law, excludes that aiding and abetting, apology of crime, and receiving stolen goods are considered cases of cooperation in the crime (cann. 2209 § 7). Instigation, if it has no effect, is equated to attempted crime (cann. 2212 § 3).