IMPUTABILITY. - From the Latin noun imputabilitas and the verb imputare, that is, to charge to an account, to ascribe, to attribute, it is the quality or property of an act or effect by virtue of which the one and the other are attributed to the agent as to their author and lord (Sym. Theol., 1st-2nd c., q. 21, a. 2).
I. IMPUTABILITY OF ACTS
If the action proceeds from an agent devoid of freedom, there is physical imputability, which is only improperly so called, and is nothing other than the attribution of the effect to its material cause. If it emanates from a free agent, there is moral imputability, which is true imputability in the strict sense, as defined above. Often, through a confusion of terms, one speaks of imputability in relation to the agent, insofar as he is indicated as the author of the act: in that case it would be more proper to speak of responsibility (v.).
Imputability is in fact, as has been said, a property of the act, that is, the set of notes by which an act or an effect can be ascribed to a determinate individual as to its cause; responsibility, on the other hand, is the indication of the condition of the subject or agent in relation to the act. Imputation, then, is the judgment by which the act or effect is ascribed to the agent as to its author. Besides moral imputability, one also speaks of political, juridical, and supernatural imputability.
Political imputability exists when the legislator determines that the author of an act or the person responsible for an effect must answer for them before the public authority. From this proceeds juridical imputability, which exists when the magistrate determines in the concrete case under what aspect the author of an act is bound to answer before society: if in the civil forum, it is called civil imputability; if in the criminal forum, criminal imputability. In the juridical order, (juridical) imputability does not always coincide with moral imputability: sometimes it is more extensive, at other times more limited. There then arises an imputability before the law, which does not follow the footsteps and limits of real moral imputability, but is inspired by criteria of social necessity; this also because it is impossible for the legislator to penetrate fully into the conscience of his subjects and to diagnose the psychological reality, and he must therefore rely on presumptions concerning external circumstances. Thus in certain civil codes compensation for damages is often required even from one who is not guilty, or at least not to the extent of the damage caused. The norm, however false in itself, is not irrational in the external forum, because it is often the only means of effectively closing the way to abuses. This can also occur in canon law, although the legislator strives to shorten the distance between juridical and moral imputability, proclaiming that juridical imputability presupposes moral imputability (can. 2218 § 1). Hence too the distinction between juridical fault and moral fault (v. COLPA; DELITTO), which is often alive and operative in matters of justice and restitution (v.).
Supernatural imputability starts from moral imputability, which it presupposes, but goes beyond it and sets forth the other conditions required for moral actions to have supernatural value and to be ascribed as merit (v.) for eternal life. Here we are concerned particularly with moral imputability in relation to the goodness or malice of human acts, and to it the definition given at the outset applies.
The foundation of moral imputability is the free will, because it is through its higher, internal faculties (intellect and will) that man can proclaim himself the author and lord of his actions. From this it follows that: 1) where the voluntary (free) act of the subject or his voluntary (free) omission is lacking, one cannot speak of imputability; 2) that all causes which remove or diminish the voluntary human act remove or diminish moral imputability. In other words, the degree of moral imputability depends on the degree of free will.
Furthermore, in order that the goodness or malice of the act may be imputed, there is required: a) in relation to the goodness of the act: that it be not only known but also willed by the acting subject, at least in its objective conformity to the ethical norm, because human activity can be called good only when all its elements possess such conformity in themselves, and no one can become good unless he wills it. - b) In relation to malice, on the other hand, it is sufficient that it be present to the conscience of the subject, that is, that it be known, because evil must not only not be admitted (intention), but must be positively avoided, which the subject does not do when, although foreseeing it and being able to avoid it, he nonetheless wills the action as it objectively is.
For problems of a psychological nature in relation to criminal (and therefore also sinful) efficacy, v. ATTO UMANO; DELINQUENTE, and the principal entries indicating the causes influencing the voluntariness and freedom of acts, such as IGNORANZA; TIMORE, etc.
Bibliography7 works
II. IMPUTABILITY OF EFFECTS
In the field of moral imputability, a particular difficulty is presented by the imputability of effects, which are not the immediate term of the agent, but the result of a preceding action or omission. The action or omission from which they derive can be, in relation to morality, good, bad or indifferent, and the effects can in turn be good, bad or indifferent. If indifferent they do not merit particular consideration in relation to imputability, but only if good or bad.
Furthermore, effects can be merely foreseen or foreseen and intended: the consideration differs according to the greater or lesser involvement of the internal faculties and the greater influence of causality. Keeping these frameworks in mind, it will be appropriate to analyze the various combinations in order to see the different degrees of imputability.
1. Effect foreseen and intended
The action or omission from which it proceeds can be good or bad or indifferent, and the effect in itself good or bad. Here are the various hypotheses: a) If the intended effect is good and proceeds from an action or omission good or indifferent in itself, the goodness of this effect is imputed, because it is intended and willed. b) If the intended effect is good, but proceeds from a bad action or omission, one is in the condition of him who does a bad action for a good end. The bad act remains such, because one must not do evil in order to obtain a good. Nevertheless it loses part of its malice, given the good end pursued, because there is less affection of the will toward the evil. Regarding the effect in itself, it must be added that it too is spoiled by the choice of the bad means, when one formally tends toward the effect, subordinating it to the illicit action or omission: not so when the effect is pursued in an absolute manner and the action or omission, a bad means, is not admitted except out of necessity. If nevertheless the malice of the means remains, one understands how it is never lawful to perform an action or omission in order to obtain a good effect; and the adage retains its value: one must not do evil so that good may come of it. c) If the intended effect is bad and proceeds from an action or from an omission bad or indifferent in itself, the malice of the intended and therefore foreseen effect is imputed. Evil indeed must be avoided, and all the more must it not be sought and willed. This malice of the effect will lend a new malice to the action or omission already bad, or it will be the first malice if the action or omission is morally indifferent. d) If the intended effect is bad, but proceeds from an action or omission good in itself, the malice of this effect, willed and therefore foreseen, is imputed first of all. But the good action or omission too is vitiated by this bad intent, either entirely, if the intended effect is the total or sole cause of the action or omission, or in part, if the bad effect is a partial or not sole cause.
2. Effect foreseen, but not intended
This is the second general hypothesis. Here too a variety of cases presents itself in relation to the goodness and malice of the action or omission and of the effects that proceed from it.
a) If the foreseen effect is good and proceeds from an action or from an omission good or indifferent, it is not imputed; for in order that goodness may be ascribed to the agent, it must proceed from the will and be loved by it.
b) Again, if the effect is good and proceeds from a bad action or omission, the effect, for the aforementioned reason and all the more, is not imputed.
c) If the foreseen effect is bad and proceeds from an action or omission bad or indifferent, the effect is imputed for the sole fact that it was foreseen. For evil, in order to be imputed, need not be willed; it is enough that it not be avoided.
The malice of the effect brings to the bad omission or action a new malice; to the indifferent action or omission it confers the first malice.
d) If the foreseen effect is bad and proceeds from a good action or omission, the effect is imputed, if there was an obligation to prevent the bad effect, and therefore to avoid the cause, that is, the action or omission.
This principle is very often stated negatively: the bad effect, which proceeds from a free action or from a good omission, although foreseen, provided it is not willed, is not imputed, if there is no obligation to prevent the bad effect. Consequently — and thus one has the new formulation of the same principle — the action or omission is lawful, even though one foresees that a bad effect will follow, if this effect is not willed, and there is no obligation to omit such an effect and therefore its cause, or else a proportionately grave cause is given for permitting it. There can therefore be a sufficient motive by which the agent is authorized to perform a good action or to omit it, permitting a bad effect, which will not be imputed to the agent. This motive will be sufficient, if the bad effect is compensated by it, that is, if it is proportionately grave. In determining the proportion, all the elements that are required to form a judgment of the required compensation must be considered; the advantages and disadvantages not only individual, but also social.
Furthermore, the relations of connection and causality must also be considered. a) The proportionately grave motive is more easily admitted if the effect follows in an accidental manner, mediately and remotely, probably and not with full certainty. b) The graver the bad effect, the greater the motive of justification that is required. c) The greater the necessity or utility of the action or omission, the more easily the evil is compensated by the effect. d) The greater the title, the right or, all the more, the duty to perform the act, the less the justification required, and vice versa. e) The greater the possibility that another cause, besides one's own action or omission, may produce the bad effect, the smaller the motive can be with which the evil that follows from the effect of one's own action or omission is compensated.
3. Principle of double causality
What must be said when from one and the same action two effects proceed, one of which is good and the other bad (cause with double effect)?
a) If of the two effects one is good, but not willed, the other is bad and willed, the good effect is not imputed, while the bad effect that is willed is imputed. b) If on the contrary the good effect is willed, and the bad effect is not willed, a further distinction is still needed: a) if such effects arise from a bad action or omission, the bad effect, provided it is foreseen, is imputable, because it derives from an action or omission bad in itself, which does not become good through the good effect willed, and which cannot serve as compensation for the bad effects. The good effect willed, if one wills to obtain it formally through the bad action or omission, no longer preserves any goodness and consequently cannot diminish the malice of the bad action or omission; if instead one intends it absolutely, it preserves some goodness, but the malice of the same action or omission is not removed, but only diminished. β) If instead such effects derive from a good or indifferent action or omission, the good effect willed is imputed as good, so that the goodness of the action or omission is increased and with this the bad effect can also be compensated. Which bad effect, although not willed, is imputed, if it was foreseen and at the same time if there was an obligation to prevent it. It will not instead be imputed, if it is not foreseen, and if there was no obligation to prevent it, which happens when there was a proportionately grave motive for permitting it. These are the premises of the principle called that of the cause with the double effect.
The principle can be stated thus: "It is lawful to posit a cause, good or indifferent, from which a twofold effect derives, one good and the other bad, provided that the agent wills only the good effect, and that there be a proportionately grave reason for positing the cause that brings about not only the good effect but also the bad effect."
The elements or conditions included in this principle are four; that is, it is required: a) that the cause or motive, that is, the action or omission, be in itself (that is, prescinding from the circumstances and from the end of the agent) good or at least indifferent. The reason is clear, because if it were in itself evil, it would be of itself a fault, aggravated by the evil effect. b) That the good effect not follow by means of the evil effect, that is to say that the good effect follow immediately from the cause as does the evil effect. In fact, if the good effect followed only by means of the evil effect, the good would derive from evil, which is never lawful, according to the adage "Non sunt facienda mala, ut eveniant bona." c) That only the good effect be willed; the evil effect must never be willed, otherwise the evil effect would be in itself voluntary and therefore imputable. d) That there be a proportionately grave motive for positing the cause that brings about the good effect together with the evil one, given the general obligation to avoid evil according to one's possibilities.
If, therefore, there is a means by which the good effect can be obtained and at the same time the bad effect avoided, that latter means must be chosen, because for the other solution there would no longer be a proportionately grave cause.