IMPUTABILITY. – From the Latin substantive *imputabilitas* and the verb *imputare*, meaning to put to account, to ascribe, to attribute, it is the quality or property of an act or effect by virtue of which the one and the other are attributed to the agent as its author and master (*Sum. Theol.*, 1-2a, q. 21, a. 2).
I. IMPUTABILITY OF ACTS. – If the action proceeds from an agent lacking freedom, there is physical imputability, which is only improperly so called, and is nothing other than the attribution of the effect to its material cause. If it emanates from a free agent, there is moral imputability, which is the true one in the strict sense, as defined above. Often, through equivocation, one speaks of imputability in relation to the agent insofar as he is indicated as the author of the act: it would then be more proper to speak of responsibility (v.).
Imputability, in fact, is—as has been said—the property of the act, that is, the sum of the characteristics by virtue of which an act or effect can be ascribed to a particular individual as its cause; responsibility, on the other hand, is the indication of the condition of the subject or agent in relation to the act. Imputation is then the judgment by which the act or effect is ascribed to the agent as its author. Besides moral imputability, one also speaks of political, legal, and supernatural imputability.
Political imputability exists when the legislator determines that the author of an act or the responsible party for an effect must answer for it before public authority. From this comes legal imputability, which exists when the magistrate determines, in a concrete case, under which aspect the author of an act is held to answer before society: if in civil proceedings, it is called civil imputability; if in criminal proceedings, it is called penal imputability. In the legal system, legal imputability does not always coincide with moral imputability: sometimes it is more extensive, other times more limited. There is then an imputability before the law, which does not follow the footsteps and limits of real moral imputability, but is inspired by criteria of social necessity; this also because the legislator cannot fully penetrate the consciences of subjects and diagnose their psychological reality, and must therefore rely on presumptions based on external circumstances. Thus, in certain civil codes, compensation for damages is often required even from one who is not guilty, or at least not to the extent of the damage caused. The norm, although false in itself, is not irrational in the external forum, because it is often the only means to effectively close the door to abuses. This can also occur in canon law, although the legislator strives to shorten the distance between legal and moral imputability, proclaiming that legal imputability presupposes moral imputability (can. 2218 § 1). Hence also the distinction between legal guilt and moral guilt (v. COLPA; DELITTO), which is often keen and operative in matters of justice and restitution (v.).
Supernatural imputability proceeds from moral imputability, which it presupposes, but goes beyond it and illustrates the other conditions because moral actions have supernatural value and are ascribed as merit (v.) for eternal life. Here, in particular, it is a question of moral imputability in relation to the goodness or malice of human acts, and to it the initial definition applies.
The foundation of moral imputability is free will, because it is through its superior, internal faculties (intellect and will) that man can proclaim himself the author and master of his actions. From this it follows that: 1) where the voluntary (free) act of the subject or his voluntary (free) omission is lacking, one cannot speak of imputability; 2) that all causes which remove or diminish the free human act remove or diminish moral imputability. In other words, the degree of moral imputability depends on the degree of free will.
Moreover, for the goodness or malice of the act to be imputed, it is required: a) with regard to the goodness of the act: that it be not only known but also desired by the agent, at least in its objective conformity to the ethical norm, because human activity can be said to be good only when all its elements conform to it, and no one can become good without willing II. b) With regard to malice, it is sufficient that it be present to the agent’s consciousness, that is, known, because evil must not only not be admitted (intention), but must be positively rejected, which the subject does not do when, although foreseeing or able to avoid it, he nevertheless wills the action as it is objectively.
For problems of a psychological nature regarding the criminogenic (and therefore also sinful) efficacy, V. ATTTO UMANO; DELINQUENTE, and the principal entries indicating the causes influencing voluntariness and freedom of acts, such as IGNORANZA; TIMORI ECC.
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II. IMPUTABILITY OF EFFECTS. – In the field of moral imputability, a particular difficulty is presented by the imputability of effects, which are not the immediate term of the agent but the result of a previous action or omission. The action or omission from which they derive can be, in relation to morality, good, bad, or indifferent, and the effects themselves can in turn be good, bad, or indifferent. If indifferent, they do not merit particular consideration in relation to imputability, but only if they are good or bad.
Moreover, the effects can be merely foreseen or foreseen and intended: the consideration varies according to the greater or lesser intervention of the internal faculties and the greater influence of causality. Keeping these frameworks in mind, it will be appropriate to analyze the various combinations to see the different degrees of imputability.
1. **Foreseen and intended effect.** – The action or omission from which it proceeds can be good, bad, or indifferent, and the effect itself can be good or bad. Here are the various hypotheses:
a) If the intended effect is good and proceeds from an action or omission that is itself good or indifferent, the goodness of this effect is imputed, because it is intended and willed. b) If the intended effect is good but proceeds from a bad action or omission, one is in the condition of one who does a bad action for a good end. The bad act remains such, because one must not do evil to obtain good. However, it loses part of its malice, given the good end pursued, because there is less affection for the evil itself.
The will toward evil. Regarding the effect in itself, it must be added that this too is vitiated by the choice of a bad means when the effect is formally intended, subordinating the illicit action or omission to it; not so when the effect is pursued absolutely and the bad action or omission, as a means, is admitted only out of necessity. If, however, the malice of the means remains, it is clear that it is never lawful to perform an action or omission in order to obtain a good effect; and the adage retains its force: “One must not do evil that good may come.”
c) If the intended effect is evil and proceeds from an action or omission that is in itself evil or indifferent, the malice of the intended and therefore foreseen effect is imputed. For evil must be avoided; all the more reason not to seek and desire II. This malice of the effect will add a new malice to the already evil action or omission, or will constitute the first malice if the action or omission is morally indifferent.
d) If the intended effect is evil but proceeds from an action or omission that is in itself good, first of all the malice of this willed and therefore foreseen effect is imputed. But even the good action or omission is vitiated by this evil intent, either entirely, if the intended effect is the total or sole cause of the action or omission, or in part, if the evil effect is a partial or non-unique cause.
2. Foreseen but not intended effect
This is the second general hypothesis. Here too a variety of cases arises in relation to the goodness or malice of the action or omission and of the effects that proceed from them.a) If the foreseen effect is good and proceeds from a good or indifferent action or omission, it is not imputed; for in order that goodness may be ascribed to the agent, it must proceed from and be loved by the will.
b) Again, if the effect is good and proceeds from a bad action or omission, the effect, for the reason just stated and for stronger reasons, is not imputed.
c) If the foreseen effect is evil and proceeds from a bad or indifferent action or omission, the effect is imputed simply because it was foreseen. For evil, in order to be imputed, need not be willed; it suffices that it not be avoided.
The malice of the effect adds a new malice to the bad action or omission; to the indifferent action or omission it imparts the first malice.
d) If the foreseen effect is evil and proceeds from a good action or omission, the effect is imputed if there was an obligation to prevent the evil effect and thus to avoid the cause, namely, the action or omission.
This principle is often stated negatively: the evil effect that proceeds from a free action or good omission, although foreseen, provided it is not willed, is not imputed if there is no obligation to prevent the evil effect. Consequently—and thus we have a new formulation of the same principle—it is lawful to perform the action or omit it, even though an evil effect is foreseen, if this effect is not willed and there is no obligation to omit the effect and thus its cause, or if there is a proportionally grave cause for admitting II. There may therefore be a sufficient reason why the agent is authorized to perform a good action or to omit it, permitting an evil effect that will not be imputed to the agent. This reason will be sufficient if the evil effect is compensated thereby, that is, if it is proportionally grave. In determining the proportion, all the elements required to form a judgment of the required compensation must be considered: the advantages and disadvantages not only individual but also social.
Moreover, the relations of connection and causality must also be considered. a) The proportionally grave reason is more easily admitted if the effect follows accidentally, mediately and remotely, probably and not with absolute certainty. b) The more grave the evil effect, the greater the reason required for justification. c) The greater the necessity or utility of the action or omission, the more easily it is compensated by the effect. d) The greater the title, right, or, all the more, the duty to perform the act, the less reason for justification is required, and vice versa. e) The greater the possibility that another cause, apart from one’s own action or omission, will produce the evil effect, the less the reason required to compensate for the evil that follows from the effect of one’s own action or omission.
3. Principle of double effect
What is to be said when from one and the same action two effects proceed, one good and the other evil (double-effect cause)?a) If of the two effects one is good but not willed, the other is evil and willed, the good effect is not imputed, while the willed evil effect is imputed.
b) If, on the contrary, the good effect is willed and the evil effect is not willed, further distinctions must be made: α) if such effects arise from a bad action or omission, the evil effect, provided it is foreseen, is imputable, because it proceeds from an action or omission that is bad in itself, which, for the sake of the willed good effect, does not become good, nor can it serve as compensation for the evil effects. The willed good effect, if it is formally intended through the bad action or omission, no longer retains any goodness and consequently cannot diminish the malice of the bad action or omission; if, however, it is intended absolutely, it retains some goodness, but the malice of the action or omission itself is not removed, only diminished.
c) If, instead, such effects proceed from a good or indifferent action or omission, the willed good effect is imputed as good, so that the goodness of the action or omission is increased and with it the evil effect can also be compensated. This evil effect, although not willed, is imputed if it was foreseen and there was an obligation to prevent II. It will not, however, be imputed if it was not foreseen and there was no obligation to prevent it, which occurs when there is a proportionally grave reason for permitting II.
These are the premises of the principle called that of the cause with double effect.
The principle may be stated thus: “It is lawful to set a cause, good or indifferent, from which there proceed a double effect, one good and the other evil, provided that the agent wills only the good effect, and there is a proportionally grave reason for setting the cause that brings about not only the good effect but also the evil effect.”
The elements or conditions included in this principle are four; namely, it is required: a) that the cause or motive, that is, the action or omission, be in itself (abstracting from circumstances and the agent’s end) good or at least indifferent. The reason is clear, for if it were in itself evil, it would be sinful in itself, aggravated by the evil effect. b) That the good effect not follow through the evil effect, that is, that the good effect follow immediately from the cause as the evil effect does. For if the good effect followed only through the evil effect, good would derive from evil, which is never lawful, according to the adage “Non sunt facienda mala, ut eveniant bona.” c) That only the good effect be willed; the evil effect must never be willed, otherwise the evil effect would be in itself voluntary and thus imputable. d) That there be a proportionally grave reason for setting the cause that brings about the good effect with the evil effect, in view of the general obligation to avoid evil according to one’s ability.
If therefore there is a means by which the good effect can be obtained and at the same time the evil effect avoided, this latter means must be chosen, because otherwise there would no longer be a proportionally grave reason.