IMPUTABILITÀ. – From the Latin noun imputabilitas and the verb imputare, that is, to reckon, ascribe, or attribute, it is the quality or property of an act or effect by virtue of which each is attributed to the agent as its author and master (Sym. Theol., 1°–2°c, q. 21, a. 2).
I.
I. OF ACTS
If the action proceeds from an agent lacking freedom, there is physical i., which is only improperly called such and is nothing other than the attribution of the effect to its material cause. If it emanates from a free agent, there is moral i., which is true i. in the strict sense, defined above. Often, through equivocation, one speaks of i. in relation to the agent, insofar as he is indicated as the author of the act: it would then be responsibility (v.).I. is in fact, as has been said, a property of the act, that is, the totality of the characteristics by which an act or an effect can be ascribed to a determinate individual as its cause; responsibility, on the other hand, is the indication of the condition of the subject or agent in relation to the act. Imputation, then, is the judgment by which the act or effect is ascribed to the agent as its author. In addition to moral i., one also speaks of political, juridical, and supernatural i.
Political i. exists when the legislator determines that the author of an act or the person responsible for an effect must answer for them before the public authority. From this proceeds juridical i., which exists when the magistrate determines, in the concrete case, under what aspect the author of an act is required to answer before society: if in civil proceedings, it is called civil i.; if in criminal proceedings, criminal i. In the juridical order, (juridical) i. does not always coincide with moral i.: at times it is more extensive, at others more limited. There is then an i. before the law, which does not follow the course and limits of real moral i., but is inspired by criteria of social necessity; this is also because it is impossible for the legislator to penetrate fully into the conscience of his subjects and diagnose psychological reality, and he must therefore rely on presumptions concerning external circumstances. Thus, in certain civil codes, compensation for damages is often required even from one who is not culpable, or at least not to the extent of the damage caused. The rule, although in itself false, is not irrational in the external forum, because it is often the only means of effectively blocking the way to abuses. This may also occur in canon law, although the legislator strives to shorten the distance between juridical and moral i. by proclaiming that juridical i. presupposes moral i. (can. 2218 § 1). Hence also the distinction between juridical guilt and moral guilt (v. COLPA; DELITTO), which is often alive and operative restitution (v.).
Supernatural i. begins from moral i., which it presupposes, but goes beyond it and elucidates the other conditions, so that moral actions may have supernatural value and be ascribed as merit (v.) for eternal life. Here the matter concerns particularly moral i. in relation to the goodness or wickedness of human acts, and the definition given initially applies to II.
The foundation of moral i. is free will, because it is through his superior internal faculties (intellect and will) that man can proclaim himself the author and master of his actions. It follows from this that: 1) where the subject’s voluntary (free) act or his voluntary (free) omission is lacking, one cannot speak of i.; 2) all causes that remove or diminish the voluntary human act remove or diminish moral i. In other words, the degree of moral i. depends on the degree of free will.
Moreover, for the goodness or wickedness of the act to be imputable, it is required: a) with regard to the goodness of the act, that it be not only known but also willed by the acting subject, at least in its objective conformity to the ethical norm, because human activity can be called good only when all its elements possess such conformity in themselves, and no one can become good without willing II. — b) With regard to wickedness, on the other hand, it is sufficient that this be present to the subject’s consciousness, that is, that it be known, because evil must not only not be admitted (intention), but must be positively rejected; the subject fails to do this when, while foreseeing it and being able to avoid it, he nevertheless wills the action as it objectively is.
For problems of a psychological nature concerning criminogenic efficacy (and therefore also sinful efficacy), V. ATTO UMANO; DELINQUENTE, and the principal entries indicating the causes influencing the voluntariness and freedom of acts, such as IGNORANZA; TIMORE, etc.
I. OF EFFECTS
In the sphere of moral imputability, the imputability of effects presents a particular difficulty, since they are not the immediate term of the agent’s action, but the result of a preceding action or omission. The action or omission from which they arise may, with respect to morality, be good, bad, or indifferent, and the effects may likewise be good, bad, or indifferent. If indifferent, they do not merit particular consideration with regard to imputability, but only if they are good or bad.Moreover, effects may be merely foreseen or foreseen and intended: their consideration differs according to the greater or lesser intervention of the internal faculties and the greater influence of causality. Keeping these frameworks in mind, it will be appropriate to analyze the various combinations in order to see the different degrees of imputability.
1. Foreseen and intended effect
The action or omission from which it proceeds may be good, bad, or indifferent, and the effect in itself may be good or bad. The various hypotheses are as follows:a) If the intended effect is good and proceeds from an action or omission that is good or indifferent in itself, the goodness of this effect is imputed, because it is intended and willed. b) If the intended effect is good but proceeds from a bad action or omission, one is in the condition of someone who performs a bad action for a good end. The bad act remains such, because one must not do evil in order to obtain good. Nevertheless, it loses part of its malice, given the good end pursued, because there is less affection of the will toward evil. Regarding the effect in itself, it must be added that it too is corrupted by the choice of the bad means when one formally tends toward the effect, subordinating it to the illicit action or omission: this is not so when the effect is pursued in an absolute manner and the action or omission, as a bad means, is admitted only out of necessity. If, in any event, the malice of the means remains, it is understandable why it is never licit to perform an action or omission in order to obtain a good effect; and the maxim retains its force: evil must not be done so that good may come of II. c) If the intended effect is bad and proceeds from an action or omission bad or indifferent in itself, the malice of the intended, and therefore foreseen, effect is imputed. Evil, in fact, must be avoided; all the more, it must not be sought and willed. This malice of the effect adds a new malice to an action or omission that is already bad, or constitutes the first malice if the action or omission is morally indifferent. d) If the intended effect is bad but proceeds from an action or omission good in itself, the malice of this willed and therefore foreseen effect is imputed first of all. But the good action or omission is also vitiated by this bad intention, either wholly, if the intended effect is the total or sole cause of the action or omission, or in part, if the bad effect is a partial or non-sole cause.
2. Foreseen but unintended effect
This is the second general hypothesis. Here too, a variety of cases arises in relation to the goodness and malice of the action or omission and of the effects proceeding from them.a) If the foreseen effect is good and proceeds from a good or indifferent action or omission, it is not imputed; for goodness to be ascribed to the agent must proceed from the will and be loved by II.
b) Again, if the effect is good and proceeds from a bad action or omission, the effect, for the reason stated above and even more clearly, is not imputed.
c) If the foreseen effect is bad and proceeds from a bad or indifferent action or omission, the effect is imputed simply because it was foreseen. For evil to be imputed, it is not necessary that it be willed; it is enough that it not be avoided.
The malice of the effect adds a new malice to the bad action or omission; to the indifferent action or omission it imparts its first malice.
d) If the foreseen effect is bad and proceeds from an action or omission good in itself, the effect is imputed if there was an obligation to prevent the bad effect and therefore to avoid its cause, that is, the action or omission.
This principle is very often stated negatively: a bad effect proceeding from a free action or from a good omission, although foreseen, provided it is not willed, is not imputed if there is no obligation to prevent the bad effect. Consequently—and this is the same principle stated in a new form—an action or omission is licit, even though it is foreseen that a bad effect will follow, if this effect is not willed and there is no obligation to omit such an effect and therefore its cause, or if there is a proportionately grave reason for permitting II. There may thus be a sufficient reason by which the agent is authorized to perform a good action or to omit it, while permitting a bad effect that will not be imputed to the agent. This reason will be sufficient if the bad effect is compensated by it, that is, if it is proportionately grave. In determining the proportion, all the elements required to form a judgment concerning the compensation in question must be considered: the advantages and disadvantages, not only individual but also social.
Moreover, the relations of connection and causality must also be considered. a) A proportionately grave reason is more readily admitted if the effect follows accidentally, mediately and remotely, probably and not with complete certainty. b) The graver the bad effect, the greater the reason for justification required. c) The greater the necessity or usefulness of the action or omission, the more readily the evil is compensated by the effect. d) The greater the title, right, or, even more so, duty to perform the act, the less justification is required, and vice versa. e) The greater the possibility that another cause, besides the agent’s own action or omission, may produce the bad effect, the lesser may be the reason by which the evil resulting from the effect of the agent’s own action or omission is compensated.
3. Principle of double causality
What should be said when two effects proceed from the same action, one good and the other bad (a cause with a double effect)?a) If, of the two effects, one is good but not willed, while the other is bad and willed, the good effect is not imputed, whereas the willed bad effect is imputed. b) If, on the contrary, the good effect is willed and the bad effect is not willed, a further distinction must be made: a) if these effects arise from a bad action or omission, the bad effect, provided it was foreseen, is imputable, because it proceeds from an action or omission bad in itself, which does not become good on account of the willed good effect and cannot serve to compensate for the bad effects. If the willed good effect is intended to be obtained formally through the bad action or omission, it no longer retains any goodness and consequently cannot diminish the malice of the bad action or omission; if, on the other hand, it is intended absolutely, it retains some goodness, but the malice of the action or omission itself is not removed, only diminished. β) If, instead, these effects arise from a good or indifferent action or omission, the willed good effect is imputed as good, so that the goodness of the action or omission is increased and thereby the bad effect may also be compensated. This bad effect, although not willed, is imputed if it was foreseen and if there was an obligation to prevent II. It is not imputed, however, if it was not foreseen and there was no obligation to prevent it, which is the case when there was a proportionately grave reason for permitting II. These are the premises of the principle called that of the cause with the double effect.
Il principio si può enunciare così: «È lecito porre una causa, buona o indifferente, dalla quale derivi un duplice effetto, uno buono e l'altro cattivo, purché l'agente voglia soltanto l'effetto buono, e vi sia una ragione proporzionalmente grave di porre la causa che provoca non soltanto l'effetto buono, ma anche l'effetto cattivo».
Gli elementi o le condizioni comprese in questo principio sono quattro; cioè si richiede: a) che la causa o motivo, cioè l'azione o l'omissione, sia per se stessa (prescindendo cioè dalle circostanze e dal fine dell'agente) buona o almeno indifferente. La ragione è chiara, perché se fosse per sé cattiva, sarebbe di per sé colpa, aggravata dall'effetto cattivo. b) Che l'effetto buono non segua mediante l'effetto cattivo, vale a dire che l'effetto buono segua immediatamente dalla causa come l'effetto cattivo. Infatti se l'effetto buono seguisse soltanto mediante l'effetto cattivo, il bene deriverebbe dal male, il che non è mai lecito, secondo l'adagio «Non sunt facienda mala, ut eveniant bona». c) Che solo l'effetto buono sia voluto; non si voglia mai l'effetto cattivo, altrimenti l'effetto cattivo sarebbe in sé volontario e perciò imputabile. d) Che vi sia un motivo proporzionalmente grave di porre la causa provocante l'effetto buono con quello cattivo, stante l'obbligo generale di schivare il male secondo le proprie possibilità.
Se quindi vi è un mezzo, con cui si può ottenere l'effetto buono e nello stesso tempo evitare l'effetto cattivo, si deve scegliere quest'ultimo mezzo, perché per l'altra soluzione non vi sarebbe più la causa proporzionalmente grave.
moralitate actus cum duplici effectu, in La vie diocésaine, 15 (1926), pp. 535-39; G. Kiselstein, La causalité accidentelle en théologie morale, in Ephemerides theologiae Lovanenses, 3 (1926), pp. 493-502; E. Ranwez, De voluntario in causa, in Collaciones Namurenses, 22 (1928), pp. 21-27; E. Leroux, La cause à double effet, in Revue ecoles, de Liège, 19 (1927-28), pp. 257-67; A. Vermeersch, De causaltiste per se et per accident, seu directa et indirecta, in Periodica de re morali, canon., lyturg., 21 (1932), pp. 101-16; H. G. Kramner, The indirect voluntary of voluntarium in causa, Washington 1935; O. Lottin, Principes de morale, I, Lovanio 1947, pp. 195-99, II, ivi 1947, pp. 155-62, 163-75; A. Lanza, Theologia moralis, I, Torino-Roma 1949, pp. 201-11.