INAVVERTENZA

INADVERTENCE

In general, everything that lies outside the field of present consciousness is called *i.* (inadvertence). Inadvertence takes the form and name of forgetfulness when it refers to the past; of unforeseen circumstances when it concerns the future. Terms such as distraction, inattention, and thoughtlessness are often used as synonyms for *i.*, and their metaphorical expressiveness reveals a common intuition of the psychological mechanism of inadvertence.

Inadvertence is not in itself an error, though it may be a cause of error. Since human action, properly speaking, is essentially conditioned and measured by the agent’s present or virtual awareness, inadvertence acts as a limit to voluntariness and responsibility and thus acquires, in many cases, legal and moral relevance. What is unnoticed is neither willed nor voluntary in itself.

Nevertheless, inadvertence can be voluntary. Man indeed possesses a certain control over his awareness; he can freely fix, shift, expand or narrow its scope, strengthen or suppress it, concentrate or disperse II. In other words, it is within man’s power to pay attention, reflect, observe, examine, and monitor himself and reality. Now, since every human action is bound by the moral norm, this norm first of all requires that he become aware of the moral value of his actions. Hence the first and fundamental duty of man is expressed in the words: “Be consistent with your conscience: form your conscience.” And conscience means not merely abstract and generic awareness of good and evil, but also—and properly—the awareness of good and evil in relation to the content, circumstances, intentions, and possible repercussions of concrete action (v. CONSCIENCE; SOURCES OF MORALITY).

The general obligation to become aware of the moral value of one’s actions assumes different forms and proportions according to individuals, their capacities, objective possibilities, the nature, and importance of particular actions. In any case, whoever voluntarily fails in this obligation becomes directly aware of inadvertence and indirectly aware of its consequences. These are the cases in which common sense, morality, and even civil laws rightly qualify and punish as fault the inconsistency and irresponsibility involved. Since inadvertence is a form of ignorance, all the distinctions and principles regarding ignorance as a limit to voluntariness apply to it (v. IGNORANCE; RESPONSIBILITY).

BIBL.: V. ATTENTION; AWARENESS. Also: E. Carton de Wiart, *De influxu ignorantiae in voluntarium*, in *Collectanea Micheliniensia*, 4 (1930), pp. 537–40; J. Brys, *De ignorantia eiusque influxu in actum humanum*, in *Collationes Brugenses*, 30 (1930), pp. 116–21; D. M. Prümmer, *Manuale theol. mor.*, I, Freiburg im Br. 1931, nn. 364–65; M. G. Kraler, *The indirect voluntary voluntarium in causa*, Washington 1935. Gaetano Corti