Attention

ATTENZIONE. -

I. PHILOSOPHY

From the Latin ad and tendere, it is the convergence or direction of consciousness (v.) toward some object of the world, whether external or internal. According to the nature of the psychic forces that cause it, it is distinguished as conscious and unconscious, voluntary and involuntary, sensory and spiritual attention. In positive psychology, attention stood at the center of psychic life, and its functioning was reduced to the response, of a reflex or associative character, that the subject gave to the sensory stimulus to which it corresponded exactly; in more recent psychology, attention is explained less in terms of the physical nature of the stimulus than in terms both of the real value of the object (biological or spiritual) and of the conditions operating at a given moment in the total field of consciousness. But since involuntary attention also exists, and even unconscious attention is not excluded (although the term may seem contradictory), inasmuch as, while present consciousness is directed toward a defined object, other objects may likewise become present without being perceived until later, as memories or phenomena of “déjà vu,” attention thus assumes a broader meaning, coexisting and almost inseparably connected with the whole of cognitive and affective life. In conscious attention, awareness of the object’s presence is conditioned by definite minimum and maximum quantities in the energy of the stimulus (threshold of attention), below or above which attention becomes impossible, as Aristotle himself had recognized (De Sensu et Sensato, 6, 445 b 2 ff.). The physiological theory of attention has recourse to the distribution and intensity of nervous energy (Titchener); psychological theory appeals rather to constellations of images, ideas, and feelings, which may be conceived either as more or less complex associations (associationism) or, according to more recent psychology, as immediate and original totalities and forms (Ganzheiten, Gestalten) (Wertheimer’s School of Gestalten, F. Krueger’s School of Ganzheit). In reality, the nature of attention must be understood in terms of the very nature of consciousness, the multiplicity of its fields, and the diversity of its activities, and not as a single, uniform activity.

BIBL.: Fr. Iodl, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 3rd ed., Stoccarda and Berlino 1924, especially vol. II, p. 86 ff.; J. Fröbes, Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie, II, 3rd ed., Friburgo in Br. 1929, chap. 1, sec. 7; H. Gruender, Experimental Psychology, Milwaukee 1932, p. 213 ff.; K. Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology,

Londra 1936, especially p. 318 f.; W. B. Pilsbury, The Fundamentals of Psychology, 3rd ed., Nuova York 1937, especially p. 357 f.; W. Metzger, Psychologie, Dresda and Lipsia 1941, pp. 78 f., 98 f., 186 f. Cornelio Fabro

II. PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY

From a descriptive and experimental point of view, the following principal forms of attention may be distinguished: concentrated, when it is polarized upon a single content of consciousness (as in the case of the scientist absorbed in one object and distracted by everything else); distributed, when it is applied «simultaneously» to several contents (as in the case of Giulio Cesare dictating several letters at the same time); oscillating or fluctuating, when it moves with a certain rapidity from one content to another (as in the case of a driver of a fast vehicle); expectant, when it is directed toward an object not yet in its possession, but anticipated and awaited—the typical case being that of one who awaits a given perception by representing it in advance (preperception)—or, in the field of mental pathology, of certain deluded persons and certain hallucinated persons who await something anticipated or feared—some so-called «spiritistic» phenomena, or phenomena of suggestion in hypnosis or in the waking state, are explained as effects of this form of attention—conscious or subconscious—excited by the experimenter in the subject upon whom he operates; vigilant, when it is intent upon awaiting a stimulus that is still absent and toward which it prepares to react (as in the case of an individual lying in ambush).

Like every form of psychic activity, attentional activity too is accompanied by organic phenomena, in the circulation (congestion of the cerebral centers in action, parallel to decongestion at the periphery), in respiration (shortening of inspirations, lengthening of expirations), and in the muscular system (the minimum characteristic being the immediate adaptation of certain organs and the mediated adaptation of the body, together with the spontaneous inhibition of movements contrary to attention). Yet attention cannot thereby be reduced to a physiological mechanism, by regarding it as the result of somatic modifications: far from being their consequence, it is their provocateur. Thus attention reveals to us one of the most evident and significant influences of the psyche upon the soma. The «why» of attention is founded upon the «law of interest», which, considered biologically, is the very law of life. Objects attract attention not because of their objective value (because of what they are in themselves), but because of their subjective value (because of what they are for us). Therefore, ultimately, the determinism of attention is to be sought in us, not outside us; and attention is essentially a phenomenon of self-determination.

Considering attention in its positive aspect, its entire instrumental importance for knowledge becomes apparent: it is, in fact, the convergence of the psychic person toward the object, with the conscious or subconscious aim of knowing II. In the pedagogical field, therefore, the greatest importance must be given to attention, utilizing its mechanisms and adapting methods to them. In intellectual education, the felicitous conjunction of voluntary and spontaneous attention will always be of great assistance, especially in combating intellectual distractions and digressions. But, first and foremost, education of the feelings must be placed through affective attention, which is so rarely proper and healthy. As regards moral education, as also religious education, its foundation consists in the rational formation of the habit of attending to healthy objects and disregarding unhealthy ones; this is achieved by polarizing psychic energies toward a moral ideal (hence the importance of attention in prayer, which is the easiest and most habitual expression of religious feeling). In the moral life, one of the essential aspects of the struggle of duty against passion is the struggle of voluntary attention for an ideal against spontaneous attention to inferior attractions.

BIBL.: In addition to the significant treatment devoted to attention in all psychology textbooks (especially James, Wundt, Ebbinghaus, Höfling, Titchener, Baldwin, De Sanctis, Dumas, Baudin, Lindworsky), v.: Th. Ribot, Psychologie de l'a., Paris 1889; G. Calò, La psicologia dell'a., Florence 1907; Vachide-Meunier, La psychologie de l'a., Paris 1910; J. P. Vayrac, Physiologie et psychologie de l'a., ibid. 1914; E. Rignano, Psicologia del razionamento, Bologna 1920; A. Binet, Etude expérimentale de l'intelligence, Paris 1922. - For the pathological aspect, v.: S. De Sanctis, La pathologie de l'a., Paris 1910. - Concerning attention in prayer, v.: S. Tommaso, Sum. Theol., 2°-2°, q. 83, a. 13; id., In IV Sent., dist. 15, q. 4, n. 2. Gislero Flesch

III. THEOLOGY

In the theological sphere, attention is considered especially with regard to prayer and the Sacraments, and is divided into internal and external. The former is the mind’s awareness of the action being performed, and excludes the mind’s distraction or wandering to extraneous matters. The latter excludes external distraction and consists in avoiding any external act that cannot coexist with internal attention.

The theologians are unanimous in admitting that some attention, either internal or external, is absolutely necessary to the essence of prayer, and that internal attention is required for mental prayer, since this is an act of the intellect. The controversy concerns vocal prayer. Some say that internal attention is necessary, and therefore affirm that anyone lacking any internal attention does not satisfy the obligation of reciting the Divine Office. Others teach that internal attention is not necessary. The practical difference is slight, and the disagreement is reduced rather to a mere question of words, since, according to the theologians, internal attention may refer not only to the proper end of prayer, which is to honor God, but also to the literal sense of the words, and even to the words taken materially, insofar as they are pronounced completely and accurately. All theologians require for vocal prayer, particularly for the recitation of the Divine Office, at least this material attention concerning the correct pronunciation of the words, which by its nature entails a certain internal attention. Voluntary distractions during prayer are always more or less sinful.

For the valid administration of the Sacraments, external attention suffices; therefore even a distracted minister can validly administer them. For licit administration, however, internal attention is required, which excludes voluntary distraction, both because of the reverence due to the Sacraments and in order to avoid the danger of making a mistake. Involuntary distraction is not a sin; voluntary distraction ordinarily constitutes a venial fault. In the person receiving the Sacrament, attention is not required ad validitatem. Anyone who has the use of reason and voluntarily becomes distracted while receiving it sins, by failing to show the requisite reverence.

BIBL.: S. Tommaso, In IV Sent., dist. 15, q. 4, art. 2, quaestium, 4; Sum. Theol., 2°-2°, q. 83, art. 13; F. Suárez, De relig., I. IV, cap. 26, n. 3; s. Alfonso, I. IV, n. 177; F. de Lugo, De Buch., disp. 22, n. 25 seg.; F. M. Cappello, Tractatus canonico-moralis de Sacramentis, I, 4° ed., Torino 1945, nn. 51, 71, 769; D. M. Prümmer, Manuale Theol. moralis, II, 9° ed., Friburgo in Br. 1940, n. 363 seg.; A. Vermeersch, Theol. mor., III, 3° ed., Roma 1935, n. 39. Felice M. Cappello
Cite this article

“ATTENZIONE.” Enciclopedia Cattolica, vol. II (1949), p. 208. Azione Romana digital edition, https://azioneromana.com/article/attenzione.