I. Philosophy
Attention (from the Latin *ad tendere*) is the convergence or direction of consciousness (v.) toward some object, whether in the external or internal world. Depending on the nature of the psychic forces that cause it, a distinction is made between conscious and unconscious, voluntary and involuntary, sensory and spiritual attention. In positive psychology, attention was once considered central to psychic life, and its functioning was reduced to the reflex or associative response that the subject gave to the sensory stimulus to which it corresponded exactly. In more recent psychology, attention is not explained solely by the physical nature of the stimulus, but rather by both the real value of the object (biological or spiritual) and the operative conditions present at a given moment in the total field of consciousness.
However, since involuntary attention also exists, and even (though the term seems contradictory) unconscious attention is not excluded—inasmuch as, while current consciousness is directed toward a defined object, other objects may likewise become present but only be perceived later as memories or phenomena of *déjà vu*—attention assumes a broader meaning, coexisting and almost solidary with the entire cognitive and affective life. In conscious attention, awareness of the object’s presence is conditioned by definite minimum and maximum quantities of stimulus energy (the threshold of attention), beyond which attention becomes impossible, as Aristotle himself recognized (*De Sensu et Sensato*, 6, 445 b 2 ff.).
The physiological theory of attention appeals to the distribution and intensity of nervous energy (Titchener), while the psychological theory appeals rather to constellations of images, ideas, and feelings that may be conceived either as more or less complex associations (associationism) or as immediate and original wholes and forms (Gestalten) according to more recent psychology (the Gestalt School of Wertheimer, the *Ganzheit* School of F. Krueger). In reality, the nature of attention must be understood in relation to the very nature of consciousness, the multiplicity of its fields, and the diversity of its activities, rather than as a single and uniform activity.
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II. Psychology and Pedagogy
From a descriptive and experimental standpoint, the following main forms of attention can be distinguished:
- **Concentrated attention**, when it is polarized on a single content of consciousness (as in the case of a scientist absorbed in one object and distracted from everything else);
- **Distributed attention**, when it is applied “simultaneously” to multiple contents (as in the case of Julius Caesar dictating several letters at the same time);
- **Fluctuating or oscillating attention**, when it shifts rapidly from one content to another (as in the case of a driver of a fast vehicle);
- **Expectant attention**, when directed toward an object not yet possessed but anticipated and awaited—typical in the case of someone awaiting a given perception by representing it in advance (preperception)—or, in the field of mental pathology, in certain delusions and hallucinations where something foreseen or feared is awaited. Some so-called “spiritualistic” phenomena or phenomena of suggestion in hypnosis or wakefulness can be explained as effects of this form of attention—conscious or subconscious—excited by the experimenter in the subject under observation;
- **Vigilant attention**, when it is strained in awaiting a still absent stimulus to which one prepares to react (as in the case of an individual lying in ambush).
Like every form of psychic activity, attention is accompanied by organic phenomena: in circulation (congestion of active cerebral centers, paralleled by decongestion at the periphery), in respiration (shortening of inhalations, lengthening of exhalations), and in the muscular system (characteristic facial expressions, immediate adaptation of certain organs and mediated adaptation of the body, spontaneous inhibition of movements contrary to attention). Yet attention cannot be reduced to a physiological mechanism or considered a mere result of somatic changes; far from being their consequence, it is their cause. Thus, attention reveals one of the most evident and significant influences of the psyche on the soma. The “why” of attention is grounded in the “law of interest,” which, considered biologically, is the very law of life. Objects attract attention not by their objective value (what they are in themselves) but by their subjective value (what they are for us). Therefore, ultimately, the determinism of attention is to be sought within us, not outside us; and attention is essentially a phenomenon of self-determination.
From a positive standpoint, the instrumental importance of attention for knowledge becomes clear: it is the convergence of the psychic person toward the object, with the aim—conscious or subconscious—of knowing II. In the pedagogical field, therefore, maximum importance must be given to attention, utilizing its mechanisms and adapting methods accordingly. In intellectual education, the happy conjunction of voluntary and spontaneous attention will always be of great help, especially against distractions and intellectual digressions. But above all, the education of feelings through affective attention—so rarely just and healthy—must be prioritized. Regarding moral education, as with religious education, its foundation lies in the rational formation of the habit of attending to healthy objects and withdrawing attention from unhealthy ones; this is achieved by polarizing psychic energies toward a moral ideal (and hence the importance of attention in prayer, which is the easiest and most habitual expression of religious feeling). In moral life, one of the essential aspects of the struggle between duty and passion is the struggle of voluntary attention toward an ideal against spontaneous attention toward inferior attractions.
**DINTL.:** Besides the substantial treatment of attention in all psychology textbooks (esp. James, Wundt, Ebbinghaus, Höffding, Titchener, Baldwin, De Sanctis, Dumas, Baudin, Lindworsky). V. Th. Ribot, *Psychologie de l’attention*, Paris 1886; G. Calò, *La psicologia dell’attenzione*, Florence 1907; Vaschide-Muenier, *La psychologie de l’attention*, Paris 1910; J. P. Nayrac, *Physiologie et psychologie de l’attention*, 1911; E. Rignano, *Psicologia del ragionamento*, Bologna 1920; A. Binet, *Etude expérimentale de l’intelligence*, Paris 1922. — For the pathological aspect, V. S. De Sanctis, *La pathologie de l’attention*, Paris 1910. — On attention in prayer, V. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 83, art. 13; id., *In IV Sent.*, dist. 15, q. 4. Gislero Flesch
III. Theology
In the theological field, attention is considered especially with regard to prayer and the Sacraments, and is divided into internal and external. The former is the mind’s awareness of the action being performed, and excludes distraction or the mind’s wandering to external things. The latter excludes external distraction and consists in avoiding any external act that cannot coexist with internal attention.
Theologians are agreed in admitting that for the essence of prayer some attention, whether internal or external, is absolutely necessary, and that for mental prayer internal attention is required, since it is an act of the intellect. The controversy concerns vocal prayer. Some say that internal attention is necessary, and therefore they affirm that one who lacks any internal attention does not satisfy the recitation of the Divine Office. Others teach that internal attention is not necessary. The practical difference is minimal, and the disagreement reduces rather to a mere question of words, since internal attention, according to theologians, can refer not only to the proper end of prayer, which is to honor God, but also to the literal sense of the words, indeed even to the words taken materially, inasmuch as they are pronounced fully and accurately. All theologians require for vocal prayer, and in particular for the recitation of the Divine Office, at least this material attention concerning the correct pronunciation of the words, which of itself implies a certain internal attention. Voluntary distractions during prayer are always more or less sinful.
For the valid administration of the Sacraments external attention suffices; hence even a distracted minister can validly administer them. However, for licit administration internal attention is required, which excludes voluntary distraction, both out of reverence due to the Sacraments and to avoid the danger of error. Involuntary distraction is not a sin; voluntary distraction ordinarily constitutes a venial fault. In the subject who receives the Sacrament, attention is not required for validity; but one who has the use of reason and voluntarily distracts himself in the act of receiving it, sins by lacking the due reverence.