ATTACK. — In its broadest sense, it is any violent act directed against another's right. When it has as its object a right protected by criminal law, its notion, inasmuch as it disregards the achievement of the immediate end proposed by the agent, merges with that of an attempt (v.); but this does not prevent it in certain cases of special political importance from constituting a crime in itself. To this category belong the legal figures of the a. against the constitution of the State (cf. art. 283 of the Italian Penal Code), of the a. against the political rights of the citizen (ibid., art. 294), against the head of State (ibid., art. 276), against the heads of foreign States (ibid., art. 295), etc. (cf. the modifications made to some of the articles cited, by law no. 1317 of 11 Nov. 1947).
The repression of the a. against the Supreme Pontiff is provided for by art. 8 of the Lateran Treaty (11 Feb. 1929), where it is stated: “Italy, considering the person of the Supreme Pontiff sacred and inviolable, shall declare punishable the a. against him and the incitement to commit it with the same penalties established for the a. and the incitement to commit it against the person of the King.”
In canon law procedure, the term a. assumes a particular technical meaning, serving to designate any act performed by one party to the prejudice of the other or by the judge to the prejudice of one or both of them, against the rule “pendente lite nihil innovetur” (cf. can. 1854 in relation to can. 1725, n. 5 of the CIC). The a. are null by operation of law, and their nullity, upon the request of the party with an interest, must be declared by decree of the same judge of the principal cause; without prejudice to any possible action for damages in cases of violence or fraud (can. 1855-57).