PURPOSIVENESS IN HUMAN ACTIVITY. — Purposiveness is one of the most universal characteristics of reality and is therefore also one of the most universal notions of the human mind. To common-sense intuition and philosophical reflection, purposiveness presents itself as the resultant of two essential elements: intellectual conception and volitional impulse. Common sense perceives a trace of teleology everywhere and spontaneously places it in a necessary relation with an intelligent and volitional being. This relation may be one of identity or of causal dependence. In fact, beings that, although devoid of intelligence and will, act purposively are possible and actually exist; indeed, no activity is possible that is not purposively oriented. But common sense recognizes that teleology consists formally and fundamentally in intelligent and volitional activity and therefore regards the teleology of beings devoid of reason and will as caused and participated in by an intelligent and willing being. The demonstration of the existence of God as pure intelligence and will, from whom the unconscious teleology of irrational nature derives and on whom it depends, is founded on the perception of the essentially intellectual and volitional genesis and nature of teleology.
These general principles concerning teleology immediately authorize the assertion that properly human activities are purposive by their intrinsic nature; for a properly human act is one that proceeds from intelligence and will, which are the specific faculties of man (v. ATTO UMANO). To think and to will is, by identity, to know and to tend toward an end. In general, therefore, the end of human activity is everything that is the object of human intelligence and will, that is, every reality in its transcendental aspects of truth and goodness. The same conclusion is reached by starting from the notion of the end as perfection. The convertibility of the notion of end with that of perfection is an immediately intuited datum: insofar as any being tends to attain its end, it becomes and proves complete and perfect in its own kind. The end of human activity thus coincides with the perfection of human intelligence and will; intelligence is perfected by knowing reality as truth, and will is perfected by loving and possessing reality as good. This perfection of intelligence and will is subjectively experienced as the satisfaction of a need, as the fulfillment of a desire, from which there arises a sense of joy and well-being. The term consecrated by usage to designate the end from this point of view is happiness. The end of human activity is therefore an objective reality, extrinsic to man and to his operations of intelligence and will; but it is at the same time also a subjective reality, intrinsic to man, since it is identified with the very operations of intelligence and will. Of these two aspects, objective and subjective, of the end of human activity, the principal or determining one is the subjective; any reality, however great its value in itself, so long as it is not known, loved, desired, and possessed by man, does not have for him the value of an end in an actual and formal sense; it is, however, objectively a potential or material end. The end, being the terminus of the operation, is posterior to it and represents, as it were, its crowning or result; it stands to the operation as the fruit stands to the plant; the very word end formally expresses its character of completion. But if one observes carefully, the end, from another point of view, precedes the operation, as its root and principle; for it is necessary that man first know and love an end in order then to be able to strive toward its attainment. This twofold aspect of principle and terminus inherent in the end is expressed by the well-known dictum: finis est primus in intentione, ultimus in executione (Sum. Theol., 1°-2°², q. 1, a. 1, ad 1°²). Just as the fruit comes from the plant, but the plant in turn comes from the fruit, so the end is at once the fruit and the seed of the action. The word “motive,” frequently used in ordinary language to designate the end, formally expresses the relation of causal precedence that it has to the operation. The ideological-affective character of the end, on the other hand, is formally expressed by the terms idea, ideal, aim, purpose, intention, intent, and plan.
An essential component of the purposive structure of human activity is the means. End and means are opposed not as two contradictory or contrary terms, but as two correlative realities. Indeed, what confers on a reality the value and name of an end is the fact that it is known and willed in its complete perfection. What, on the other hand, confers on a reality the value and name of a means in relation to a given end is the aptitude or capacity, to whatever degree inherent in it, to contribute to the realization of that end. One may therefore establish as a general principle that potentiality is the characteristic of the means as such, whereas actuality is the characteristic of the end as such. End and means are in a certain sense the same thing, in two really distinct phases: the phase of potency and the phase of act; and it may consequently be said that the means is the material object and the end the formal object of human activity; or, in other words, the end is the object in itself and for itself, whereas the means is the object in itself, but not for itself, of the will. It must further be noted that the same reality may have the value of an end insofar as it is the actualization of means ordered to it, and may have the value of a means in relation to a further end. For this reason means are also called intermediate ends. It may be concluded that, among goods in general, the name of end belongs in the full and ultimate end (v.) and that this can be only that good which, being infinitely good, contains in itself no potentiality in relation to any further good and therefore cannot in any way be a means to another end; all other goods are ends in a relative sense, that is, insofar as they represent a certain degree of actual perfection, and all are means to the extent of their finiteness. The more perfect a good is, the greater is its value as an end and the lesser its value as a means; conversely, the character of means increases as perfection diminishes.
With regard to the relation of precedence between means and end, in the intentional order, that is, from the standpoint of human activity, the will of the end precedes and generates the will of the means; in the order of objective realization, however, the means precede and produce the end. Yet this precedence of means over the end in the ontological order is only relative, just as the precedence of potency over act is relative. Indeed, from the absolute standpoint, embracing all reality, the end, being the most perfect good, ontologically precedes the means, that is, finite goods. The ascending scale of means toward the end, of potency toward act, presupposes the descending scale of the end toward the means, of act toward potency. From the absolute standpoint, therefore, the end possesses the character of principle in every respect.
Turning from the preceding general reflections to consider human activity as it presents itself in experimental reality, one is at first struck by the diversity and disparity of its concrete purposive orientations. The indefinite multiplicity of men’s aspirations, tastes, desires, vocations, professions, and careers reflects the indefinite variety of the concrete ends or purposes that they set themselves in their activity; the many-colored variety of the goods or values intended and realized by multifaceted human activity is, by identity, the variety of the ends toward which it is directed. Yet beneath these most varied forms of activity lies a prin-
A common teleological principle underlies these extraordinarily diverse forms of activity. Comparing, with s. Agostino, the attraction toward an end to the weight of a body (pondus meum amor meus [Confess., XIII, 9: PL 32, 849]), one may consider individual human subjects, in their purposive activity, as so many bodies possessing their own center of gravity; but just as a common force impels all bodies toward a common center of gravity, so the same teleological impulse directs all human beings, in their varied human activity, toward one common and unique terminus. This common terminus is the ultimate end of human activity.
ultimate end (v.) of human activity is fundamental in practical knowledge, since only in the ultimate end is it possible to find the supreme point of reference for distinguishing good from evil, what is licit from what is illicit; to indicate the touchstone by which to measure the value of man and of his creations; and to establish the criterion for judging the progressive or regressive character of civilization. The very meaning of the terms good and evil, virtue and vice, progress and civilization, law and justice, etc., depends, more or less directly, on the determination of man’s ultimate end. As the supreme goal, it lays down the fundamental directives to which man must conform in all his activity and which, consequently, must ultimately inspire the sciences that deal with it, such as, for example, the political and economic sciences.
Leaving the theoretical and historical treatment of the ultimate end to the respective entry, two general premises are indicated here, chiefly in relation to human activity.
1) Human activity must have an ultimate end, whatever that end may be. Just as, in the order of efficiency, a series of mutually subordinated causes is untenable, and it is necessary that there be a first efficient cause, itself uncaused, upon which all depend, so, in the order of finality, an infinite series of mutually subordinated ends is untenable, and it is necessary to admit an ultimate end, subordinating all ends to itself without being subordinated to any further end. The end is also a moving cause and is therefore called a motive; to explain, then, the teleological movement of human activity, it is necessary to admit the influence of an unmotivated motive, possessing in itself its own motivation; to defer the motive of human activity indefinitely is equivalent to depriving it of any motive whatsoever, and thus of meaning. A man who cannot concentrate and fix his aspirations upon a goal that is at least provisionally ultimate, but who indefinitely seeks a further goal to assign to his goals, will never be able to decide to act, just as one who never determines where to go will never decide to move. The very names “end” and “terminus” contain the idea of ultimacy, at least in a relative sense. But an end that is only relatively ultimate, although it closes the series of means subordinated to it, is itself a means subordinated to a further end. Therefore, an infinite series of mutually subordinated ends is equivalent to an infinite series of means; indeed, it may be considered globally as a single means. Now a means, as such, is possible and intelligible, both metaphysically and psychologically, only in relation to the end. The teleological character of human activity therefore necessarily requires an absolutely ultimate end.
2) The general orientation of human activity toward its ultimate end is not freely chosen by man, but is naturally innate in him.
Given, in fact, the existence of an ultimate end, it follows that the entire series of all human operations will have its starting point, and almost its activating spring, in the intentional direction toward the ultimate end. This direction can derive only from nature itself, since, if it derived from a free act of man, it would no longer be the primordial act, for this free act would itself presuppose the intention of an end. What depends, more or less freely, on man is instead the application of this natural tendency toward the ultimate end to particular concrete ends; that is, the execution of the intention toward the ultimate end depends on man, but not the intention itself. If, in carrying out this application, man remains consistent with that tendency, he acts well; if, on the contrary, he opposes it, he acts badly. In other words, what depends on man is not the tendency toward the ultimate end, but the choice and use of the means for attaining II.
The primordial tendency of human activity toward its ultimate end, being natural, is identical in all men. But it is precisely in the application of this tendency that men differ from one another through the various forms of their activity.