Finality in Human Activity

FINALITY IN HUMAN ACTIVITY. - Finality is one of the most universal characteristics of reality and therefore is also one of the most universal notions of the human mind. To the intuition of common sense and to philosophical reflection, finality presents itself as the result of two essential elements: intellectual ideation and volitional impulse. Common sense discerns a trace of finalism everywhere and spontaneously places it in a necessary relationship with an intelligent and volitional being. This relationship can be either one of identity or one of causal dependence. Indeed, beings are possible and in fact exist which, although lacking intelligence and will, act in a finalistic manner; more than that, no activity is possible that is not oriented finalistically. But common sense perceives that finalism consists formally and fundamentally in intelligent and volitional activity, and therefore considers the finalism of beings lacking reason and will as caused by and participated in from an intelligent and willing being. Upon the perception of the genesis and the essentially intellective and volitional nature of finalism is founded the demonstration of the existence of God as pure intelligence and will, from which the unconscious finalism of irrational nature derives and depends.

These general principles concerning finalism immediately authorize the affirmation that human activities properly so called are finalistic by their intrinsic nature; indeed, a human act properly so called is one that proceeds from the intellect and the will, which are the specific faculties of man (v. ATTO UMANO). To think and to will is, by identity, to know and to tend toward an end. Therefore the end, in general, of human operation is everything that is the object of the human intellect and will, that is to say, every reality in its transcendental aspects of the true and the good. The same conclusion is reached by starting from the notion of end as perfection. The convertibility of the notion of end with that of perfection is a datum of immediate intuition: to the extent that any being tends to reach its end, it becomes and proves to be complete and perfect in its kind. The end of human operation thus coincides with the perfecting of the human intellect and will; the intellect is perfected by knowing reality as truth, the will is perfected by loving and possessing reality as good. This perfecting of the intellect and will is subjectively felt as the satisfaction of a need, as the fulfillment of a desire, from which springs a sense of joy and well-being. The term consecrated by usage to designate the end from this point of view is happiness. The end of human operation is therefore an objective reality, extrinsic to man and to his operations of intellect and will; but it is at the same time also a subjective reality, intrinsic to man, since it is identified with the very operations of the intellect and will. Of these two aspects, objective and subjective, of the end of human operation, the principal or determining one is the subjective; any reality whatsoever, however great its value in itself, so long as it is not known, loved, desired and possessed by man, has for him the value of an end in an actual and formal way; objectively, however, it is a potential or material end. The end, being the term of the operation, is posterior to it and represents, as it were, its crowning or result; it stands to the operation as the fruit stands to the plant; the very word end formally expresses its character of completion. But if one observes carefully, the end from another point of view precedes the operation, as its root and principle; indeed, it is necessary that man first know and love an end, in order then to be able to tend toward its attainment. This twofold aspect of principle and term inherent in the end is expressed by the well-known dictum: finis est primus in intentione, ultimus in executione (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1um). As the fruit comes indeed from the plant, but the plant in turn comes from the fruit; so the end is at once fruit and seed of the action. The word "motive," frequent in common language to designate the end, formally expresses the relationship of causal antecedence that it has toward the operation. The ideational-affective character of the end is instead formally expressed by the terms idea, ideal, aim, purpose, intention, intent, resolve.

An essential component of the finalistic structure of human operation is the means. End and means are opposed not as two contradictory or contrary terms, but as two correlative realities or notions. Indeed, what confers value and the name of end upon a reality is the fact of its being known and willed in its complete perfection. What instead confers upon a reality the value and name of means in relation to a given end is the aptitude or capacity, in whatever measure inherent in it, to contribute to bringing about that end. One can therefore establish as a general principle that potentiality is the characteristic of the means as such, while actuality is the characteristic of the end as such. End and means are in a certain way the same thing, in two really distinct phases: the phase of potency and the phase of act; and therefore it may be said that the means is the material object and the end the formal object of human operation; or, in other words, the end is an object in itself and for itself, while the means is an object in itself, but not for itself, of the will. It must further be noted that the same reality can have the value of an end, insofar as it is the actualization of means ordered to it, and can have the value of a means in relation to a further end. Hence means are also called intermediate ends. From this one can draw the conclusion that in the generality of goods, the name of end belongs in a full and absolute sense to the ultimate end (v.), and such can only be that good which, being infinitely good, contains in itself no potentiality in relation to a further good, and therefore cannot in any way be a means to another end; all other goods are ends in a relative sense, that is, to the extent of the actual perfection they represent, and all are means in the measure of their finitude. The more perfect a good is, the greater is its value as an end and the lesser its value as a means; conversely, the character of means grows as perfection diminishes.

Regarding the relationship of precedence between means and end, in the intentional order, that is, from the point of view of human operation, the will of the end precedes and generates the will of the means; instead, in the order of objective realization, the means precede and produce the end. However, this precedence of the means over the end in the ontological order is only relative, just as the precedence of potency over act is relative. Indeed, from the absolute point of view, embracing the whole of reality, the end, being the most perfect good, precedes, ontologically, the means, that is, finite goods. The ascending scale of means toward the end, of potency toward act, presupposes the descending scale of the end toward the means, of act toward potency. To the end there belongs, from the absolute point of view, therefore, the character of principle under every aspect.

Passing from the preceding general reflections to consider human operation as it presents itself in experimental reality, one is at first struck by the diversity and disparity of its concrete finalistic orientations. The indefinite multiplicity of men's aspirations, tastes, desires, vocations, professions, careers reflects the indefinite variety of the concrete ends or purposes that they set for themselves in their operation; the multicolored variety of goods or values understood and realized by multiform human activity is, by identity, the variety of the ends toward which it is directed. Nevertheless, beneath these most varied forms of activity lies a prinnalistic principle common to them all. Comparing, with St. Augustine, the attraction toward an end to the weight of a body (pondus meum amor meus [Confess., XIII, 9: PL 32, 849]), one may consider individual human subjects, in their finalistic activity, as so many bodies each having its own center of gravity; but just as a common force urges all bodies toward a common center of gravity, so a single finalistic impulse orients all men, in their varied human activity, toward a common and unique term. This common term is the ultimate end of human activity.

The problem of the ultimate end (v.) of human activity is fundamental in practical knowledge, inasmuch as only in the ultimate end is it possible to find the supreme point of reference for discriminating good from evil, the lawful from the unlawful; to indicate the touchstone for measuring the value of man and of his creations; to fix the criterion for judging the progressive and regressive sense of civilization. The very meaning of the terms good or evil, virtue and vice, progress and civilization, right and justice, etc., depends, more or less directly, on the determination of the ultimate end of man. As the supreme goal, it traces the fundamental directives to which man must adhere in all his activity and to which, consequently, the sciences that deal with it must ultimately be inspired, such as, for example, the political and economic sciences.

Leaving the theoretical and historical treatment of the ultimate end to its respective entry, two general premises are indicated here, chiefly in relation to human activity.

1) Human activity must have an ultimate end, whatever it may be. Just as in the order of efficiency a series of causes mutually subordinate to one another is repugnant, and it is necessary that there be a first efficient cause, not brought about by another, on which all depend, so in the order of finality an infinite series of ends mutually subordinate to one another is repugnant, and it is necessary to admit an ultimate end, subordinating all ends to itself without being subordinated to a further end. The end too is a moving cause and is therefore called a motive; to explain, then, the finalistic motion of human activity, it is necessary to admit the influence of a motive that is not itself motivated but has its motivation within itself; to push the motive of human activity to infinity amounts to depriving it of any motive, robbing it of meaning. A man who fails to concentrate and fix his aspirations on a goal that is at least provisionally ultimate, but who indefinitely seeks a further goal to give to his goals, will never be able to decide to act, just as one who does not fix where he is going will never decide to move. The very names "end" and "term" contain the idea of ultimacy, at least relative. But an end that is only relatively ultimate, while it closes the series of means subordinated to it, is in turn a means subordinated to a further end. Therefore an infinite series of ends mutually subordinate to one another is equivalent to an infinite series of means, and indeed can be considered globally as a single means. Now the means, as such, is possible and intelligible, both metaphysically and psychologically, only in relation to the end. The finalism of human activity therefore necessarily demands an absolutely ultimate end.

2) The general orientation of human activity toward its ultimate end is not freely chosen by man, but is naturally innate in him.

Given, in fact, the existence of an ultimate end, it follows that the total series of all human operations will have its point of departure and, as it were, its driving spring in the intentional direction toward the ultimate end. Such a direction can come only from nature itself, since if it came from a free act of man, it would no longer be the primordial act, because this free act in turn presupposes the intention of an end. What depends, more or less freely, on man is instead the application of this natural tendency toward the ultimate end to particular concrete ends; that is, there depends on man the execution of the intention toward the ultimate end, not the intention itself. If in making this executive application man remains coherent with that tendency, he acts well; if instead he opposes it, he acts badly. There depends on man, in other words, not the tendency toward the ultimate end, but the choice and use of the means to attain it.

The primordial tendency of human activity toward its ultimate end, being natural, is identical in all men. But precisely in the application of this tendency men differ among themselves through the varied forms of their activity.

Gaetano Corti