SOCIAL JUSTICE
A new and very frequent term, born of the vague unease arising from something lacking in modern society and the feverish aspiration to find II.
Summary:
I. Definition
II. Duality of subjects in social justice
III. Obligatoriness of social justice
IV. Quantity in the duty of social justice
V. Systematic question.I. DEFINITION
In reality the very idea is not well defined and, in its many ambiguities, offers fertile ground for the agitating actions of many rabble-rousers, more or less interested or deluded servants of national and international hegemonic tendencies, whether political, social or, more often, economic in content.Thus social justice is the magical expression that resounds from the most opposed shores, and peoples, made credulous by exacerbated necessities, incessantly fluctuate between opposing shores. Serious doctrine, especially in the Catholic field, has made and is making great efforts to define the concept of social justice precisely, so as to proceed then surely and effectively to its concrete realization.
The results of these efforts are considerable, thanks especially to the light of papal documents, but they are not yet complete; probably the reality, both technical-economic and ethical-legal, which one wishes to interpret, is itself not definitive but still in a phase of evolution. While reserving for the end a brief note on the systematic question of framing the virtue of social justice among the other moral virtues, it is above all opportune to give of it the most precise and complete concept possible.
Social justice, before being specifically social, is first of all generically justice (v.) in its proper and not merely metaphorical sense. It therefore comprises the essential elements of every type of justice, which are three: the duality of subjects that justice puts in relation; the obligatoriness of this relation, which is therefore a characteristic right-duty relation; and the quantity that delimits the content of the relation itself, a quantity beyond which the right can no longer be conceived and within which the duty is extinguished. The duality of subjects supposes their physical or moral distinction. By virtue of this, every justice is essentially social, at least in the generic sense of establishing and regulating relations among men, thus influencing their social life.
In this sense other virtues too are social, in that they exercise themselves for the benefit of one's neighbor, as, for example, charity. These, however, either are not obligatory or, if they are, their obligatoriness is not founded on the right of the person for whose benefit they are exercised, but elsewhere; for justice, instead, the source of obligatoriness is not extrinsic but intrinsic to the relation itself, which is therefore a characteristic right-duty relation.
As for the content of this relation, more relevant than the qualitative aspect is the quantitative one; not only because it measures the gravity or otherwise of the obligation but above all because, by being exhausted within the limits of quantity, it guarantees the personal independence of the two subjects, who remain united to each other by the bond of justice.
Although every justice is social, as has been said, there exists, however, among the various kinds of justice a specifically social justice, and it is of this that we are concerned here. In it the threefold essential element of every type of justice assumes a characteristic configuration, which constitutes social justice in its own species, distinct from every other.
II. DUALITY OF SUBJECTS IN SOCIAL JUSTICE
Social justice, with its relations, sets before each other not individual and individual, but individual and society, so that society is the subject of the right, the associated individual is the subject of the duty.Since society is the subject of the right, social justice, even if it immediately benefits individuals or groups of them, always aims at the good of the entire society, and it is for this reason that this type of justice derives its proper specification as social.
But what precisely is society as the holder of a right, to which, by social justice, corresponds the duty of the associates? A preliminary observation is necessary.
A well-constituted society presents a multitude of men, suitably organized and operating toward the same end, of whose advantage all proportionally partake. That end, seen thus at the center of social reality, concretely constitutes what is called the common good.
It is common in two ways: in that it is the product of the cooperation, more or less immediate, of all and then in that all, more or less mediately, enjoy II. Around the common good gravitate the two essential moments of social life: the moment called productive, in that it shows social organization bent on the production of the common good; the moment called fruitive, in that it shows social organization bent on the enjoyment of the common good. It is evident that the two social moments, the productive and the fruitive, although in concrete reality they are inseparably intertwined, from the moral and legal point of view are entirely distinct.
This stated, when it is said that in the relation of social justice the subject of the right is society, it is meant society considered above all in its productive moment.
In the very fact of their belonging to society it is understood that the associated individuals have duties toward it, considered as the complex of social organizations operating for the common good.
It is commonly said that social justice obliges toward the common good. To be precise: the common good is the end of social justice; only the productive social moment is the subject of its rights. But since the common good is the goal to be reached in the productive social moment, in metonymic language the expression is correct. To avoid, however, dangerous ambiguities, the distinction between the common good as the end of social justice and the productive social moment as the subject of its rights must be opportunely recalled.
Just as the common good, so society, seen in the productive moment of the common good, are very complex realities; the more complex the more numerous the associates and the higher their social end. For the state society, for example, which is that which most interests all, the common good comprises very many and varied elements, from private and public economy to culture of every kind, from demographic conditions to sporting events and so on. It must be carefully noted, however, how the common good does not consist merely in the sum of these elements but more in the stable equilibrium of them, in that they realize the end of state society, which is temporal well-being informed by morality and law, subordinated to man's ultimate end, even supernatural.
To the complexity of the common good corresponds the complexity of society, seen in the productive moment of the common good.
Remaining with the same example, the productive moment of state society will present itself as the ensemble of all the organizations that, with their effective influence, contribute to producing, consolidating and improving the specific common good of state society, from economic institutions to cultural ones, from demographic provisions to sporting associations and so on. Here too it must be carefully noted that the productive moment of society does not consist so much in the totality of these organizations and institutions as in the stable and balanced dynamism of them operating for the common good.
In the midst of the society of peoples, social justice must establish and preserve the equilibrium of a social organism far more complex than the national one; instead, it is much simpler and more elementary within smaller associations, which are more or less directly subordinated or coordinated to the social life of the nation. However, whatever the nature and extent of the society, the subject of social justice operating within it is always the productive social moment.
It is self-evident that, in the face of this, not only the subjects of the society but also the authorities have obligations; indeed, since they have a greater influence on the efficiency of the common good, their obligations are greater than those of mere subjects.
A very serious error would be to fail to distinguish between society and authority and to designate the latter not as the subject of duties but as the subject of rights of social justice. Nowhere is this more harmful than in the case of legal positivism. It is true that among the tasks of the authorities is that of defining the duties of subjects toward society and overseeing their observance; it is also true that this task of the authority presents itself to the subjects as a right of the authority; but this does not mean that this same task, when referred to the entire society, is not a strict duty and in no way a right. Thus, in the face of society, both subjects and authorities stand on the same plane of collaboration for the common good, equally bound by duties of social justice, though in different ways.
St. Thomas expresses this truth in truly elegant terms. The duties of social justice, which he calls general or legal, are “in the prince mainly and as it were architecturally; in subjects, however, secondarily and as it were administratively” (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 58, a. 6). The authority is the subject of the architectural duty of social justice. It is indeed the duty of the authority, after an exact knowledge of the general state of social affairs, to architect a system of laws in which each subject finds defined the sector and limits of his concrete collaboration for the common good. Subjects could not know this by themselves, if only because they lack the general vision of things in which to frame their own action.
In this observation lies the most evident condemnation of economic liberalism. Who then does not see how the authority influences the efficiency of the common good primarily by well-architecting the law, while subjects influence it secondarily by faithfully observing it? The law formulated by the authority is observed by the subjects and is the ordinary instrument of social justice. For this reason, St. Thomas calls this type of justice legal.
Thus, authority and subjects are the primary subjects of the duties of social justice, but neither one nor the other could effectively and easily specify and practice their respective social duties without the help of intermediate associations. Their well-arranged network, bridging the enormous distance between the central authority and the individual, performs invaluable tasks. It provides the authority with more complete information on the needs and resources of individuals, so that laws may respond to the real exigencies of the common good and to the actual possibilities of achieving II. Conversely, through these associations, subjects of every condition can be better informed, supported, and supervised for the observance of laws, not only according to their literal tenor but in the spirit of their purposes. Above all, many issues can be resolved within the associations themselves, thereby completing many individual duties of social justice, something that neither subjects could do alone nor would it be convenient for the higher authority to undertake. The solutions provided by these bodies (think, for example, of collective labor agreements) are more agile, more suited to particular conditions of time and place, and lighten the already overly burdensome volume of affairs that weighs on the authority and that today often exceeds the reasonable limits of human possibility.
Moreover, this system of legally regulated associations, while fostering private initiative and respecting individual freedom, does not allow them to develop outside or, worse, against the common good. It further guarantees a minimum of stability to social life, even in cases of crisis of authority, a malady too frequent in modern politics. For these and many other reasons, papal documents strongly recommend as necessary and highly useful for the solution of social justice issues a broad network of smaller associations within modern society. It goes without saying that the extent of such a network will be proportionate to the size of the society in which it operates.
In conclusion, as with every justice properly so called, social justice, through its relationship, places before us two subjects truly distinct from each other. The subject of its right is society, considered in its productive moment of the common good; the subject of its duties is threefold: authority, individuals, and intermediate associations.
Between these two subjects, that is, of the right and the duty of social justice, there is a real distinction, though more or less obscured, inasmuch as authority, individuals, and intermediate associations are not opposed to the entire society but are integral parts of II.
But does not the part really differ from the whole?
III. OBLIGATORINESS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE — The nature of man and of the things he needs — at least in our present state — obliges him to live in society; on the other hand, every society, by reason of its end and nature, obliges its members to collaborate for the common good, which constitutes the duty of social justice; therefore, it is the very nature of man, of things, and of society that gives the character of obligatoriness to the duty of social justice. This means that social justice obliges by the force of natural law.
But toward which particular society does the duty of social justice oblige man? Evidently toward those societies to which he in fact belongs. That is: toward the Church, to which he must belong by the force of divine-positive law, in order to attain his supernatural perfection; toward a state society, to which he must belong by the force of natural law, in order to attain complete human perfection; toward those associations to which he belongs by the force of his free contract, in order to attain — in the various sectors of human activity — those particular ends that are proportionate to his own aptitudes and needs.
It is self-evident that the number and obligatory force of the duties relating to each of these societies cannot be the same. Moreover, the duties toward one society are subordinated to the duties toward the others, in the same order in which the societies themselves and their relative ends are subordinated: thus, from the lowest to the highest, which is the society of all peoples, whose common good is to be promoted by no single people but by all. The same subordination must be observed by all these societies of natural order with respect to the Church, which is the highest society of supernatural order.
But in which concrete actions or omissions will the duty of social justice be determined for each associate? Only in those that result in a necessary connection to the common good of the society to which he belongs.
It is true that this necessary connection to the common good will ordinarily be certain and precise thanks to duly promulgated positive law, but this is not always the case. For the omission of many acts harmful to the common good, as well as for many positive acts, their necessary connection to the common good may be clearly evident even from private knowledge: then they will be obligatory by natural law, antecedent to any positive law.
IV. QUANTITY IN THE DUTY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
First of all, both qualitative and quantitative limits are necessary to the right and, respectively, to the duty of social justice. Without them, associates would have to dedicate their entire activity directly to the common good; nor could they reserve any part of it for the defense and development of personal individuality, understood as an entity distinct and independent from the social totality. It would be the total sacrifice of all associates for the benefit of society. But—since society is nothing outside of the associates—ultimately, the sacrifice of all of them would dissolve into nothingness. This is the absurdity of those who babble that the individual exists for society and not society for the individual. Communism is founded upon this absurdity, aggravated by the further error of considering the common good either exclusively or subordinately in terms of dominant economic values.
Assuming this necessity, the qualitative and quantitative limits to the right and duty of social justice are in fact determined by the same criterion, stated above, of the necessary connection to the common good. Each associate must work for the common good only in the sector and to the extent indicated by their own abilities together with the exigencies of the common good.
Any other collaboration would either be impossible or would damage the rights of the human person without any social advantage. Here the observation made above applies: it is not always necessary for the law to establish these limits.
It is true, however, that under present social conditions, without the light of the law and without the pressure of its sanction, spontaneous collaboration for the common good is reduced to nothing. Peoples and rulers, preoccupied with their own personal interests, regard the common good as something merely to be exploited, not first to be produced before enjoying II. It follows clearly that, in such a spiritual disposition, no one sees their social duty: that each person enters into particular associations, considering them only as more powerful instruments for exploiting the common good, not as more effective means for realizing it; and that in the face of laws themselves, which bring before subjects, authorities, and associations the form and obligation of their social duty, a systematic attitude of hostility is adopted, so that every excuse and every maneuver is deemed acceptable to evade their observance.
This disintegrating malady is certainly not of recent date, but in modern society it seems to find the most propitious ground for its development and destructive effects.
The level of modern technology and civilization demands a more complex common good and, consequently, a broader, more intense, and more balanced organization in its production; especially in the economic sector. In this sector, even the largest national groupings are no longer sufficient by themselves; international collaboration is now necessary. But this unfortunately remains so fragile because it is not only unsupported by the balance of analogous international organizations in other sectors, e.g., politics; rather, it is subordinated to nationalist politics.
Hence the imbalances so sudden and profound that today so frequently disrupt the social life of nations and of the entire world. The most vast and intense seismic movements are not as harmful by comparison.
In conclusion, today, beyond the effort to possess a clear and precise concept of the common good—according to the reality of things and not according to ideological or political prejudices—beyond the effort to determine in function of the common good the social duties of individuals toward particular associations, of these toward the nation, of nations toward the entire human society, and of all toward the Catholic Church, there must be an intensified effort to awaken as soon as possible, by all means—individual and collective—and in all—peoples, rulers, private and public communities—a more sensitive social conscience.
Not only has he who does not collaborate in realizing the common good no right to participate in it, but it is in fact impossible to participate in a good that cannot subsist without the collaboration of all. In law and in fact, the moment of social enjoyment presupposes the moment of social production.
V. SYSTEMATIC QUESTION
What place should be assigned to social justice within the Thomistic system of moral virtues? The majority of Catholic scholars rightly emphasize that social justice coincides with the legal or general justice of St. Thomas (Sum. Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 6). Only a few observations need to be added.
Social justice, by subordinating to the exigencies of the common good the acts of all other particular virtues (of which it takes its name as general justice), certainly in some way modifies them. Always social justice adds to their original moral goodness that which is proper to its formal motive. By virtue of this motive, moreover, it can render obligatory an act that is good in itself but free within the scope of another particular virtue. Yes, a thousand times over is the behavior of charity, itself a general virtue in the supernatural realm, as social justice is in the natural realm.
But does the sphere of action of social justice coincide with the sphere of action of the other virtues, or does it transcend them all, thus constituting a proper and exclusive sector for its influence? One thing is certain: because of its complexity, the equilibrium of modern social life can no longer be sustained by observance of the particular virtues alone. In the past, within a simpler social life system, associates, by attending only to their own interests without violating those of others, more or less also realized the common good of all. Small gaps were sufficiently filled by the exercise of charity; so that the necessity of a broad application of social justice was not felt. Hence ancient authors speak little of II. Today this is no longer the case. The observance of particular virtues must be maintained, charity must intervene;—to preserve the stable equilibrium of social life, it is indispensable that social justice exercise a broad and effective influence, both within the realm of positive law and that of natural law. Indeed, it can reasonably be foreseen that the necessity and scope of its influence will continue to grow.
Therefore, sociologists in general, and jurists and moralists in particular, are called to a joint and up-to-date investigation that proportionally adjusts, to the successive developments of social life, the quantity of duties incumbent upon those who constitute II. The task is most delicate, especially for moralists, who are always cautious when it comes to imposing grave duties upon human consciences that decisively influence their eternal salvation. But the reality of things is this, and the problems must be courageously faced and resolved. Moreover, there is no cause for alarm. Social justice is neither a new virtue nor a new duty; it has existed since the world began. What is new are its applications to the renewed conditions of modern society. The same occurs for all virtues, though to a lesser degree, given the limitation of their formal object. And then, moralists have a sure guide in their inquiries and an infallible guarantee in their conclusions: the Chair of St. Peter.