GIUSTIZIA SOCIALE. – A new and very frequent expression, born of the vague unease arising from something lacking in modern society and from the feverish aspiration to seek it out.
SUMMARY:
I. Definition
II. Duality of the subjects in social justice
III. The obligatory nature of social justice
IV. Quantity in the duty of social justice
V. Systematic question.I. DEFINITION
In reality, the idea itself is not well defined and, in its many equivocations, provides fertile ground for the agitational activities of so many rabble-rousers, more or less interested or deluded servants of national and international hegemonic tendencies, with political, social or, more often, economic content.Thus, s. j. is the magical expression that resounds from the most opposing shores, and peoples, made credulous by their exacerbated needs, ceaselessly fluctuate between those opposing shores. Serious doctrine, especially in the Catholic sphere, has made and is making great efforts to define precisely the concept of s. j., in order then to proceed confidently and effectively to its concrete realization.
The results of these efforts are considerable, thanks especially to the light shed by pontifical documents, but they are not yet complete; probably the reality—both technical-economic and ethical-legal—that is to be interpreted is itself not definitive, but still in a phase of evolution. Reserving for the end a brief consideration of the systematic question of classifying the virtue of s. j. among the other moral virtues, it is above all appropriate to present its concept as precisely and completely as possible.
S. j., before being specifically social, is first and foremost justice in general (v.) in its proper and not merely metaphorical meaning. It therefore comprises the essential elements of every kind of justice, which are three: the duality of the subjects, whom justice brings into relationship; the obligatory nature of that relationship, which is therefore a relationship characteristically consisting of right and duty; and the quantity that delimits the content of the relationship itself, beyond which right can no longer be conceived and within which duty is extinguished. The duality of the subjects presupposes their physical or moral distinction. By virtue of this, every justice is essentially social, at least in the general sense of establishing and regulating relations among human beings, thereby influencing their social life.
In this sense, the other virtues too are social, insofar as they are exercised for the benefit of one’s neighbour, as, for example, charity. These, however, are either not obligatory or, if they are, their obligatory nature is not founded upon the right of the person for whose benefit they are exercised, but elsewhere; in justice, by contrast, the source of obligation is not extrinsic but intrinsic to the relationship itself, which is therefore a relationship characteristically consisting of right and duty.
As regards the content of this relationship, its quantitative aspect is more significant than its qualitative aspect; not only because it measures the greater or lesser gravity of the obligation, but above all because, since the entire obligatory nature of the relationship is exhausted within the limits of quantity, it guarantees the personal independence of the two subjects, who nevertheless remain united to one another by the bond of justice.
Although every justice is social, as has been said, among the various kinds of justice there is nevertheless a specifically social justice, and it is this with which we are concerned here. In it, the threefold element essential to every kind of justice assumes a characteristic configuration, which constitutes s. j. as a distinct species in its own right, separate from every other.
II. DUALITY OF THE SUBJECTS IN SOCIAL JUSTICE
Social justice, through its relationships, places before one another not individual and individual, but individual and society, so that society is the subject of the right, while the associated individual is the subject of the duty.Since society is the subject of the right, social justice, even if it immediately benefits individuals or groups of them, always aims at the good of society as a whole, and therefore this type of justice receives the specific designation of social.
But what precisely is society insofar as it is the holder of the right to which, through social justice, the duty of the associates corresponds? A preliminary observation is necessary.
A properly constituted society consists of a multitude of men, suitably organized and operating toward the same end, whose benefit all enjoy proportionately. That end, viewed at the center of social reality, concretely constitutes the so-called common good.
It is common in two respects: insofar as it is the product of the cooperation, more or less immediate, of all, and then insofar as all, more or less indirectly, enjoy II. Around the common good revolve the two essential moments of social life: the moment called productive, insofar as it displays the social organization directed toward producing the common good; and the moment called fruitional, insofar as it displays the social organization directed toward enjoying the common good. It is evident that the two social moments, the productive and the fruitional, although in concrete reality they are inseparably intertwined, are completely distinct from the moral and juridical points of view.
This being established, when it is said that in the relationship of social justice the subject of the right is society, society is understood above all in its productive moment.
From the very fact of their belonging to society, it may be understood that associated individuals have duties toward it, considered as the complex of organizations socially engaged in the common good.
It is customary to say that social justice obliges one toward the common good. To be precise: the common good is the end of social justice; only the productive social moment is the subject of its rights. But since the common good is the goal to be attained in the productive social moment, the expression is correct in metonymical language. To avoid dangerous misunderstandings, however, the distinction should appropriately be recalled between the common good, as the end of social justice, and the productive social moment, as the subject of its rights.
Like the common good, society too, viewed in the productive moment of the common good, is a very complex reality; all the more complex the more numerous the associates and the higher their social purpose. In the case of the state society, for example, which is the one of greatest concern to everyone, the common good includes a multitude of the most disparate elements, from private and public economy to culture of every kind, from demographic conditions to sporting activities, and so forth. It must, however, be carefully
noted that the common good does not consist merely in the sum of these elements, but rather in their stable equilibrium, insofar as they realize the purpose of the state society, which is temporal well-being, informed by morality and law, subordinately to the ultimate, including supernatural, end of man.
The complexity of the common good corresponds to the complexity of society, viewed in the productive moment of the common good.
Remaining with the same example, the productive moment of the state society will present itself as the totality of all the organizations which, through their effective influence, contribute to producing, consolidating, and improving the specific common good of the state society, from economic institutions to cultural ones, from demographic welfare provisions to sporting associations, and so forth. Here too it must be diligently noted that the productive moment of society consists not so much in the totality of these organizations and institutions as in their stable and balanced dynamism as they operate for the common good.
Amid the society of peoples, social justice must establish and preserve the equilibrium of a social organism much more complex than the national one; whereas within the smaller associations, more or less directly subordinate or coordinated with the social life of the nation, it concerns an organism much simpler and more elementary. But whatever the nature and extent of the society, the subject of social justice operating within it is always the productive social moment.
It is self-evident that, in relation to this, not only the subjects of the society but also the authorities have obligations; indeed, since they exercise greater influence on the efficiency of the common good, they have greater obligations than ordinary subjects.
It would be a very grave error not to distinguish between society and authority, and to designate the latter not as the subject of duties but as the subject of the rights of social justice. Nowhere does juridical positivism prove more harmful than here. It is true that among the tasks of the authorities is that of defining the duties of subjects toward society and supervising their observance; it is also true that this task of authority appears to subjects as a right of authority. But this does not mean that the same task, when referred to society as a whole, is not a strict duty and in no way a right. Thus, in relation to society, subjects and authorities stand on the same level of cooperation for the common good, equally bound by duties of social justice, although in different ways.
S. Tommaso expresses this truth in truly elegant terms. The duties of social justice, which he calls general or legal, are «in principe principaliter et quasi architectonice; in subditis autem secundario et quasi administrative» (Sum. Theol. 2a-2ac, q. 58, a. 6). Authority is the subject of the duty of social justice architectonice. It falls, in fact, to authority, after an exact knowledge of the general state of social affairs, to architect a system of laws in which each subject finds defined the sphere and limits of his concrete cooperation in the common good. They could not, in fact, know this by themselves, if only because they lack a general vision of affairs within which to frame their own action.
This observation contains the clearest condemnation of economic liberalism. Who, then, does not see that authority influences the effectiveness of the common good principaliter, by properly architecting the law, while subjects influence it secundario, by faithfully observing it? The law formulated by authority and observed by subjects is the ordinary instrument of social justice. Therefore S. Tommaso calls this type of justice legal.
Thus authority and subjects are the primary subjects of the duties of social justice, but neither the one nor the others could effectively and easily specify and practice their respective social duties without the assistance of intermediate associations. Their well-ordered network, bridging the enormous distance between central authority and the individual, performs invaluable tasks. It provides the authorities with more complete information about the needs and resources of individuals, so that the laws may respond to the real requirements of the common co-
common good and the genuinely existing possibilities of realizing II. Conversely, through these associations, subjects of every condition can be better informed, supported, and supervised in observing the laws, not merely according to their literal wording, but according to the spirit of their purposes. Above all, many questions can be resolved within the associations themselves, where many individual duties of s. j. can be fulfilled—something that neither the subjects could accomplish on their own, nor would it be appropriate for the higher authority to undertake. The solutions provided by these bodies (consider, for example, collective labor agreements) prove more agile, more closely adapted to the particular conditions of time and place, and lighten the already excessively heavy volume of business that concerns the authorities and that today often exceeds the reasonable limits of human capabilities.
Moreover, this system of legally regulated associations, while fostering private initiative and respecting individual freedom, does not allow them to develop outside, much less against, the common good. More importantly, it guarantees a minimum of stability to social life, even in cases of crisis of authority, a disease far too frequent in modern politics. For these and many other reasons, pontifical documents warmly recommend, as necessary and highly useful for resolving questions of s. j., an extensive network of minor associations within modern society. It goes without saying that the breadth of such a network will be proportionate to the breadth of the society in which it operates.
In conclusion, like every justice properly so called, s. j. too, through its relation, places two subjects who are truly distinct from one another opposite each other. The subject of its right is society, considered in its function of producing the common good; the subject of the duties is threefold: authority, individuals, and intermediate associations.
Between these two subjects—that is, of the right and of the duty of s. j.—there is a real distinction, although more or less inadequate, insofar as authority, individuals, and intermediate associations do not stand opposed to society as a whole, but are integral parts of II.
But is not the part really distinct from the whole?
III. OBLIGATORY CHARACTER OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
The nature of man and of the things he needs—at least in our present state—obliges him to live in society; moreover, every society, by reason of its purpose and nature, obliges its members to collaborate in the common good, which constitutes the duty of social justice. Thus it is the very nature of man, of things, and of society that gives the duty of social justice its obligatory character. This means that social justice is binding by virtue of natural law.But toward which society in particular does the duty of social justice oblige man? Evidently, toward those societies to which he in fact belongs. That is: toward the Church, to which he must belong by virtue of divine-positive law, in order to attain his supernatural perfection; toward a political society, to which he must belong by virtue of natural law, in order to attain complete human perfection; and toward those associations to which he in fact belongs by virtue of his free contract, in order to attain—in the various sectors of human activity—those particular ends proportionate to his own aptitudes and needs.
It is self-evident that the number and binding force of the duties relating to each of these societies cannot be the same. Moreover, duties toward one society are subordinate to duties toward the others, in the same order in which the societies themselves and their respective ends are subordinated: thus, from the lowest to the highest, which is the society of all peoples, whose common good is harmed by no people, but enhanced by all. The same subordination must be observed by all these societies of the natural order with respect to the Church, which is the highest society of the supernatural order.
But in what concrete actions or omissions will the duty of social justice be determined for each member? Only in those that prove to be necessarily connected with the common good of the society to which he belongs.
It is true that this necessary connection with the common good will ordinarily be established with certainty and precision through duly promulgated positive law, but this is not always the case. In the omission of very many acts harmful to the common good, as in the case of many positive acts, their necessary connection with the common good may be clear even through private knowledge; then they will be obligatory by natural law, prior to any positive law.
IV. QUANTITY IN THE DUTY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
First of all, both qualitative and quantitative limits are necessary to the right to and, respectively, the duty of social justice. Without them, the associated members would have to devote all their activity directly to the common good; nor could they directly reserve any part of it for the defence and development of their personal individuality, insofar as it is an entity distinct from and independent of the social totality. It would mean the complete sacrifice of all the associated members for the benefit of society. But—since society is nothing apart from its members—in the end, the sacrifice of all of them would amount to nothing. This is the absurdity of those who prate that the individual exists for society and not society for the individual. Communism is founded on this absurdity, compounded by the further absurdity of considering the common good either exclusively or subordinately in terms of the dominant economic values.Given this necessity, the qualitative and quantitative limits to the right to and duty of social justice are in fact marked out according to the same criterion, stated above, of necessary connection with the common good. That is, each associated member must work for the common good only within the sphere and to the extent indicated jointly by his own abilities and by the requirements of the common good.
Any further collaboration would either prove impossible or damage the rights of the human person, without social benefit. Here the observation made above applies: namely, that the law is not always necessary to establish these limits.
It is true, however, that under the present conditions of society, without the light of the law and without the pressure of its sanction, spontaneous collaboration for the common good is effectively reduced to nothing. Peoples and rulers, concerned with their own personal interests, regard the common good as something merely to be exploited, not something to be produced before it is enjoyed. It plainly follows that, in such a spiritual disposition, no one sees his own social duty; that each person joins particular associations, considering them only as a more powerful instrument for exploiting the common good, not as a more effective means of realizing it; and that, even in the face of the laws themselves, which make subjects, authorities, and associations aware of the form and obligation of their own social duty, a systematic attitude of hostility is adopted, so that every excuse and every manoeuvre is deemed suitable for evading compliance with them.
This disintegrating disease is certainly not of recent origin, but in modern society it seems to find the most favourable ground for its development and destruction.
The level of modern technology and civilization demands a more complex common good and consequently a broader, more intensive, and more balanced organization for producing it, especially in the economic sphere. In this sphere, even the largest national communities are no longer sufficient on their own; international collaboration has by now become necessary. Unfortunately, however, this collaboration is so fragile because it is not only unsupported by the balance of analogous international organizations in other spheres, for example, in politics; it is, in fact, subordinated to nationalistic politics.
Hence the sudden and profound imbalances that today too frequently convulse the social life of nations and of the entire world. The broadest and most intense telluric movements are not so harmful by comparison.
In conclusion, today, in addition to the effort to possess a clear and precise concept of the common good, in accordance with the reality of things and not with ideological or political prejudices; in addition to the effort to determine, in relation to the common good, the social duties of individuals toward particular associations, of these toward the nation, of nations toward the whole of human society, and of all toward the Catholic Church, the effort must be strengthened to awaken as soon as possible, by every individual and collective means, and in everyone—peoples, rulers, private and public communities—a more sensitive social conscience.
Not only has anyone who does not collaborate in realizing the common good no right to participate in it, but it is in fact impossible to participate in a good that cannot exist without the collaboration of all. In law and in fact, the fruitful social moment presupposes the productive social moment.
V. QUESTIONE SISTEMATICA
Quale posto si deve assegnare alla g. s. nel sistema tomistico delle virtù morali? La maggioranza degli studiosi cattolici sostiene - e con ragione - che la g. s. coincide con la giustizia legale o generale di s. Tommaso (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 58, a. 6). Va aggiunta solo qualche osservazione.La g. s., subordinando alle esigenze del bene comune gli atti di tutte la altre virtù particolari (di qui la sua denominazione di giustizia generale), certamente in qualche modo li modifica. Sempre la g. s. aggiunge alla loro originaria bontà morale quella propria del suo motivo formale. In forza di esso inoltre può rendere obbligatorio un atto, che è buono sì ma libero nell'ambito d'altra virtù particolare. Si mille è il comportamento della carità, anch'essa virtù generale in campo soprannaturale, come la g. s. lo è nel campo naturale.
Ma la sfera d'azione della g. s. coincide con la sfera d'azione delle altre virtù ovvero le trascende tutte, costituendo così un settore proprio ed esclusivo alla sua influenza? Una cosa è certa: a causa della sua complessità, l'equilibrio della vita sociale moderna non riesce più a sostenersi sulla osservanza delle sole virtù particolari. In passato, in un sistema di vita sociale più semplice, gli associati badando solo ai propri interessi, senza ledere quelli altrui, realizzavano più o meno anche il bene comune di tutti. Piccole lacune erano sufficientemente colmate dall'esercizio della carità; così che non era avvertita la necessità d'una larga applicazione della g. s. Perciò gli autori antichi ne parlano poco. Oggi non è più così. Si richiede l'osservanza delle virtù particolari, deve intervenire la carità; ma - a salvare l'equilibrio stabile della vita sociale - è indispensabile che la g. s. eserciti un influsso vasto ed efficace, sia nell'ambito del diritto positivo che in quello del diritto naturale. Anzi si può ragionevolmente prevedere che la necessità e l'ampiezza della sua influenza andranno crescendo.
S'impone quindi ai sociologi in genere, ai giuristi e moralisti in modo particolare, una investigazione solidale e aggiornata, che proporzioni ai successivi sviluppi della vita sociale la quantità dei doveri di coloro che la costituiscono. Il compito è delicatissimo specialmente per i moralisti, sempre cauti quando si tratta di impegnare la coscienza degli uomini con doveri gravi che decisamente influiscono sulla loro eterna salvezza. Ma la realtà delle cose è questa e bisogna coraggiosamente affrontarne e risolverne i problemi. Del resto non c'è di che im-
pressionarsi. La g. s. non è una virtù nuova, né nuovo il suo dovere; da che è mondo è esistita. Sono nuove le sue applicazioni alle rinnovate condizioni della società moderna. Avviene così per tutte le virtù, benché in proporzione minore, per la limitazione del loro oggetto formale. E poi, i moralisti hanno una guida sicura nelle loro ricerche, una garanzia infallibile nelle loro conclusioni: la Cattedra di S. Pietro.