GOVERNMENT. — The term does not have a single, univocal meaning, encompassing different though connected concepts, which it will be useful to discuss separately.
From an objective or functional point of view, government may be understood, in a very general sense, as the whole activity of the State, carried out through its constitutional organs exercising the active or primary functions of sovereignty. Having identified, in the dynamics of state life, the interests to be assumed as general and proper to the community considered as a unity, this activity creates the conditions and implements the means suited to achieving them. Consequently, government must be understood to include not only activity that may immediately be described as the implementation of those general interests (e.g., the conclusion of a treaty), but also, and perhaps to an even greater extent, activity which, by influencing the formation of the organs and determining the guiding principles according to which the action of the powers is to proceed, gives the varied and manifold action of the state apparatus that unified direction which, indirectly, serves to implement a programme or a policy: namely, the activity which government itself develops and carries out. This teleological or substantive criterion, which is almost universally adopted to identify governmental activity, explains, on the one hand, why it cannot properly be conceived as a function in the juridical sense, as though it were a fourth function of sovereignty alongside and above the three traditional ones (legislative, executive, and judicial), which are instead characterized by juridical-formal elements, that is, by the structure, form, or efficacy of the acts through which they are exercised, and which indeed appear to be the irreducible forms in which the will of the State is manifested. Conversely, it explains why the same governmental activity must be found in the manifestations of the supreme organs, both of the executive power and of the legislative power, and thus takes juridical form in acts belonging to different juridical functions.
From a subjective or institutional point of view, government, in the broad sense, may be understood as the complex of institutions or organs of the State which, in a given constitutional order, constitute the centres from which the activity just outlined as governmental proceeds. This broad meaning therefore encompasses not only the individual or collegial organs that participate actively in the exercise of such activity, but also those which, by exercising control and conditioning the action of the former, exert a substantial influence on the formation of political direction.
It is precisely with regard to this broad meaning that the problem of classifying the various forms of government must be posed. Faced with the vast literature on the subject and the extremely diverse opinions advanced, more than one voice in legal scholarship has expressed an attitude of near scepticism regarding the possibility of arriving at scientifically reliable results. Nevertheless, given that the usefulness of the distinction is beyond doubt, it deserves to be pursued. Now, if it is to serve purposes of logical classification, avoiding descriptive juxtapositions of non-essential characteristics, the distinction must, on the one hand, be founded on a substantive juridical criterion, derived both from the varying relevance of the governmental function to one organ or another and from the various relations established among the organs that participate in it; on the other hand, it must eliminate the complication that this problem very often suffers through being conflated with that of classifying forms of the State, a problem that is logically inassimilable to the former, since government, even when understood in the broad sense, constitutes only one part of the juridical organization, which in turn is merely one of the elements composing the State. Accordingly, this distinction must be made, echoing an authoritative opinion (Crosa), within the homogeneous sphere of those States that can be traced back to the prototype of a single form of State; more precisely, bearing in mind the form that in the Western world may still be regarded as predominant, the distinction must be sought among those States capable of belonging to the form of the modern free State, synthetically characterized as a constitutional State, a representative State, and a State governed by the rule of law, with all the specifications implicit in these characteristics (plurality of constitutional organs, separation of powers, safeguards for the principle of liberty and equality for all citizens, etc.).
Proceeding with the distinction in this manner, traditional distinctions are either transcended or, at least, regarded as entirely secondary, such as—apart from Aristotle’s tripartition into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—that made by Machiavelli between monarchy and republic. When applied to the reality of modern constitutional orders, this distinction is reduced to describing the mode of organization of one organ, the head of State, conceived as representative in monarchies, while otherwise leaving wholly unexpressed the essential elements that serve to constitute the form of government. Moreover, by applying the distinguishing principle within the field of one and the same form of State, one avoids treating as identical forms of government which, although apparently similar, encompass entirely heterogeneous phenomena, so that they could not yield a valid conceptual unification. Finally, by delimiting the field of the distinction in the sense indicated above, it is obvious that any reference to the forms of government found in the modern and present-day forms of the authoritarian State is excluded, since their constitutional order departs to a greater or lesser extent (violation of the principle of the separation of powers, violation of the substance of civil and political rights, etc.) from the structural canons of the modern free State.
On the basis of the distinguishing criterion and the limitation adopted, the following forms of government must therefore be distinguished:
1) Pure constitutional government, which, with the disappearance in 1918 of the German Empire and of the monarchies belonging to it, in which it was commonly regarded as exemplified, now appears only in its republican form and is also called presidential government; its most striking example is provided by the United States of America. In this form, the governmental function is centred in the head of State, who is therefore also head of government; he proceeds, autonomously and independently of the control of the Chambers, to determine the political direction; he appoints and dismisses the ministers on the basis of his own assessments. These ministers do not together constitute a collegial organ or cabinet, but are subordinate collaborators of the president, responsible only to him and not to the Chambers. The president, who is elected by the people, incurs indirect political responsibility only before the latter, and not before the Chambers.
2) Parliamentary government, which in its various historical manifestations, both monarchical and republican, is characterized by the concentration of the function of government, predominantly or exclusively, in Parliament or, at least, in its elected chamber. This form, which arose principally through practice (as, for example, in the English constitutional order and in the Italian constitutional order itself until the advent of fascism) and which in recent constitutional history has also been established on the normative level, requires that the action of the collegial organ (the cabinet), to which the activity of government in its executive phase is normally entrusted, should constantly conform to the wishes of the parliamentary majority. This relationship of dependence and political responsibility of the cabinet toward the Chambers is expressed by saying that it constantly needs the confidence of Parliament, and that, when this is withdrawn, it is obliged to resign. This relationship of confidence, which in the first phase of parliamentary government was based on the fluid rules of constitutional custom, was regulated in recent and most recent constitutions in detail by law, which established the forms and conditions for its granting and withdrawal.
The head of state is the other pivot around which this form of government has usually been structured; in its earliest historical forms, which developed into constitutional monarchy, he constituted an organ that could contribute substantially to the functioning of the system. Since the cabinet was normally appointed and dismissed by him, even if on the basis of indications from the parliamentary majority, there could in fact exist, at least exceptionally, a further political responsibility of the ministers toward him. But gradually, as Parliament’s political strength increased, he progressively lost every substantial power of influence over political direction, with the result that he was either completely abolished or at least emptied of substance as an institutionally autonomous organ, as occurred in certain ultra-parliamentary constitutions of the period immediately following the First World War (Bavaria, Prussia, Estonia, Austria 1920), in which even the formal competence to appoint and dismiss the cabinet was assigned to the parliamentary assemblies; or, in any event, he underwent a decisive transformation, becoming a constitutional mechanism essentially unrelated to the function of political direction. Instead, he appears to be entrusted with a different role: either that of safeguarding constitutional normality in the action of government, or, more specifically, that of restoring that same constitutional normality when it has been disturbed, at times of governmental crisis. Here, in fact, he may intervene either by designating the person who appears capable of gathering around himself the support of a majority in the Chambers and forming a new government, or, when Parliament proves wholly incapable of reconstructing a majority, by dissolving the Chambers upon the corresponding proposal of the resigning government.
3) A final form which, although usually subsumed under the preceding one, nevertheless deserves to be distinguished from it on the basis of the differentiating principle adopted, is that which, because of the exceptionally prominent role assumed in it by the electorate, might be called popular government. This form, which now seems consolidated in the English constitutional order and toward which the parliamentary systems of continental constitutional orders might in turn evolve, presents the active organ of government—that is, more precisely, its head, the Prime Minister—as deriving his investiture directly from the people in general elections. The role played by the Chamber in the form described as parliamentary seems here to be assumed by the electorate, before which the government appears whenever questions relating to political direction are of such importance as to involve its platform and stability. Here, therefore, the election acquires the significance of approval of the government’s political line or rejection of it, together with the indication, through the predominance of the opposing political current, of the person who, as its leader, is to be chosen by the king as the new prime minister. This form of government rests essentially on the so-called « two party system » (two-party system), that is, on a distribution of political forces and an electoral system which, far from fragmenting the voters’ will into a colorful range of forces, each of them incapable of creating an efficient government (as more often occurs with the adoption of proportional representation), instead more readily ensures the polarization of votes around two alternatives: the prevailing one obtains the power of government, while the other constitutes the opposition.
In one final, narrower sense, the term government refers to the single or collegial organ which, constituting the central organ of executive power, carries out the activity of government in its active and propulsive phase, even if, for its continuation in office and its operation, it is subject to the control of Parliament or the people, when political power is concentrated in them, as has been seen, within the system. Whereas government, in this technical sense, appears as a single-member organ only in the presidential form, in which it is identified with the person of the President of the Republic, in parliamentary forms of government it appears as a collegial body, since the competence to establish political direction normally lies in the organ that brings the ministers together (the cabinet). The requirements of more efficient and unified governmental action have nevertheless led in recent times to a balancing of the collegial principle, in the organization of this organ, with the single-member principle, as a result of which its head has acquired, in certain constitutional orders, a position of entirely outstanding importance over the other ministers. Thus, for example, in the English constitutional order, where the Premier has acquired an exceptionally prominent position over his cabinet colleagues, also because, as has been said, he derives his investiture almost directly from the popular will. This pre-eminence, which is established, as most often occurs in the English constitutional order, in the flexible rules of the « constitutional conventions », may nevertheless vary considerably according to the prestige and personal qualities of the prime minister. A position of similar importance was also formally established for the Reichskanzler (Reich Chancellor) in the German Constitution of Weimar (1919), since he was responsible for determining the directives of policy, proposing the appointment of ministers to the head of state, and presiding over their council with a casting vote in the event of a tie. The structure given to government by the new Italian Constitution also appears to be partially inspired by these principles.
Government, as such, was not contemplated in the Statuto...
Albertine, which contained only a few provisions (Arts. 65, 67) concerning the appointment, dismissal, and responsibility of ministers. But in Italian constitutional life, the collegial body grouping the ministers, through whom the royal prerogative necessarily had to be exercised, since they had to assume responsibility for their sovereign’s acts by countersigning them, immediately took shape autonomously as a cabinet, giving rise to the form of parliamentary g., which developed without interruption until the advent of Fascism. The organization and internal structure of the Council of Ministers, by contrast, were repeatedly regulated by positive law, which, in the pre-Fascist period, established (Decree of 14 November 1901, no. 466) an organization of the ministry essentially informed by the principle of collegiality, with the president of the Council remaining merely a « primus inter pares ». The Fascist law of 24 December 1925, no. 2263, concerning the powers and prerogatives of the head of g., by making him the sole body competent to determine political direction, while simultaneously freeing him from any control by Parliament, marked the end in Italy of the form of parliamentary g. and decisively initiated the process of establishing the authoritarian form of the State.
The regulation of g. in the new Italian Constitution first of all sought to implement, by establishing it also on the normative level, the form of parliamentary g. It is nevertheless implemented with certain essential innovations, given that the political responsibility of g. is now directed exclusively toward the Chambers, and no longer also toward the head of State, who has been deprived of the power of dismissal formerly belonging to the king with respect to ministers; a power that enabled the sovereign, albeit exceptionally, to intervene profoundly in the function of g. The president of the Republic, by contrast, now appears to be entirely extraneous to this function, primarily occupying the role of guarantor of the Constitution, which has already been described as the most significant tendency manifested by this institution in the evolution of the parliamentary form of g.
Secondly, the relationship of confidence no longer presents itself today as the fluid bond that, under the statutory system, was normally presumed to exist until it was broken by a vote of hostility toward g. cast by the Chambers. Now g., which enters office when the ministers take their oath before the president of the Republic, cannot proceed with the implementation of its program unless it expressly obtains the confidence of both Chambers (Art. 94); it is therefore provided that g. must appear before the Chambers within ten days of its formation in order to obtain it, and that confidence be granted or withdrawn by a reasoned motion and roll-call vote. For the purpose of achieving greater governmental stability, the vote of dissent has appropriately been differentiated from the motion of no confidence, it being established that only the latter—introduced by at least one-tenth of the members of the Chambers and placed on the agenda no sooner than three days after its introduction—entails the obligation for g. to resign; this obligation is tempered by the alternative power of g. itself to request the dissolution of the Chambers from the president of the Republic.
In the new Constitution, g. has been given a configuration clearly distinct and autonomous from that of the head of State; it is composed of the president of the Council, the ministers, and their meeting in the Council of Ministers. The president of the Council has in fact been assured a distinct position, no longer merely formal, vis-à-vis the other ministers. He is appointed directly by the president of the Republic and is entrusted with the following powers: to propose the appointment of the other ministers to the head of State; to direct the general policy of g., for which he is responsible; and to promote and coordinate the activity of the ministers, with a view to unity of political and administrative direction. The collegial principle, moreover, continues to apply, since, alongside their individual responsibility for the acts of their departments, ministers bear collective responsibility for the decisions of the Council of Ministers. Which of the two organizational principles will prevail will be determined in the future by the organizational laws, to which the Constitution entrusts the task of establishing the number and powers of the ministers, as well as the organization of the presidency of the Council. Charges against the president of the Council and the ministers, for offenses committed in the exercise of their powers, may be brought by Parliament in joint session; jurisdiction over the charges belongs to the Constitutional Court, with a specially supplemented composition (Art. 136, sixth paragraph, Const.).