GOVERNMENT. - The term does not have a univocal meaning, covering different, though connected, concepts, of which it will be appropriate to speak separately.
From the objective or functional point of view, by g. one may quite generally understand the entire activity of the State, in its constitutional organs carrying out the active or primary functions of sovereignty, which, having discerned in the dynamics of State life the interests to be assumed as general and proper to the community considered as a unity, creates the preconditions and implements the means suitable for realizing them. Therefore as such there must be considered not only the activity that may be described as the immediate implementation of those general interests themselves (for example, the conclusion of a treaty), but also, and perhaps to a greater extent, that which, by influencing the formation of the organs, by determining the guiding lines according to which the action of the powers must unfold, impresses upon the varied and manifold action of the State apparatus that unitary direction which, mediately, serves the realization of a program, of a policy; which the activity of g. precisely elaborates and realizes. This teleological or content-based criterion, which is almost generally adopted to identify the activity of g., explains on the one hand why the same cannot correctly be configured as a function in the juridical sense, as a quasi-fourth function of sovereignty, alongside and above the three traditional ones (legislative-executive [and judicial]), which are instead characterized by juridical-formal elements, that is, by the structure or by the form or by the efficacy of the acts of their exercise, and indeed appear to be the irreducible forms of manifestation of the will of the State. And it explains conversely why the same activity of g. must be found present in the manifestations of the supreme organs, whether of the executive power or of the legislative power, thus concretizing juridically in acts belonging to different juridical functions.
From the subjective or institutional point of view, by g., in a broad sense, one may understand the complex of the institutions or organs of the State which in a given legal order constitute the centers from which the activity just outlined as that of g. emanates; such a broad acceptation therefore embraces not only the organs, simple or collegial, participating actively in the exercise of that activity, but also those which, by way of control, conditioning the action of the former, exercise a substantial influence on the formation of the political directive.
It is precisely with regard to such a broad acceptation that the problem of classifying the various forms of g. must be posed; a problem in the face of which, after the vast literature on the subject and the most varied opinions advanced, more than one voice in doctrine has expressed an attitude of almost skepticism regarding the possibility of arriving at scientifically reliable results. And yet, given that the utility of the distinction is beyond doubt, it deserves to be sought. Now, if it is to respond to the purposes of classificatory logic, avoiding descriptive juxtapositions of non-essential connotative features, the distinction must on the one hand be founded on the substantial juridical criterion, drawn both from the varying attribution of the function of g. to one or another organ, and from the various relations that arise among the organs participating in it; on the other hand it must eliminate the complication that this problem very often suffers together with that of the classification of forms of State, a problem logically inassimilable to the first, since g., even understood in a broad sense, constitutes only a part of the juridical organization, which in turn is only one of the elements of which the State is composed; and therefore this distinction must be made, echoing an authoritative opinion (Crosa), within the homogeneous ambit of those States that can be traced back to the prototype of a single form of State; precisely, having regard to that form which, in the Western world, can still today be considered prevalent, that is to say, the distinction must be sought within those States that are susceptible of belonging to the form of the modern-liberal State, characterized synthetically as constitutional State, representative and as State of law, with all the specifications implicit in such characteristics (plurality of constitutional organs, division of powers, guarantees of the principle of liberty and equality for all citizens, etc.).
Proceeding to the distinction in such a manner, one overcomes, or at least considers as altogether secondary, traditional distinctions, such as (to say nothing of the Aristotelian tripartition into monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) that made by Machiavelli between monarchy and republic; which, applied to the reality of modern legal orders, reduces itself to describing the mode of organization of one organ, the head of State, configured as representative in monarchies, while for the rest it leaves entirely unexpressed the essential elements that serve to integrate the form of g.; further, by applying the discretive principle within the field of one and the same form of State, one avoids making one and the same of forms of g. which, although apparently similar, cover altogether heterogeneous phenomena, so that through them one would not arrive at a valid conceptual unification. And finally, by delimiting the field of the distinction in the sense indicated above, it is obvious that any reference is excluded to the forms of g. that appear in the modern and current forms of authoritarian State, whose legal order departs to a greater or lesser degree (violation of the principle of the division of powers, violation of the content of civil and political rights, etc.) from the structural canons of the modern liberal State.
On the basis of the discretive criterion and of the limit that has been assumed, the following forms of g. must therefore be distinguished:
1) Constitutional-pure g., which, with the disappearance in 1918 of the German Empire and of the monarchies that were part of it, in which an exemplification of it was commonly discerned, presents itself at present only in the republican species, being also called presidential g.; the most conspicuous example of it is offered by the United States of America. In this form the function of g. is centered in the head of State, who is therefore also head of the g.; he proceeds, autonomously and independently of the control of the Chambers, to the determination of the political directive; he appoints and revokes, on the basis of his own evaluations, the ministers, who do not constitute as a whole a collegial organ or cabinet, but are subordinate collaborators of the president, responsible to him alone, and not also to the Chambers. The president, who is elected by the people, encounters an indirect political responsibility only before the latter, and not instead before the Chambers.
2) Parliamentary government, which in its various historical manifestations, whether monarchical or republican, is characterized by the concentration of the function of government, prevalently or exclusively, in the Parliament or, at least, in the elective branch of the latter. This form, which arose principally through practice (thus, for example, in the English system and in the Italian system itself until the advent of Fascism) and was adopted in recent constitutional history also at the normative level, requires that the action of the collegial organ (cabinet), to which the activity of government in its executive phase is normally entrusted, adhere constantly to the will of the parliamentary majority. This relationship of dependence and political responsibility of the cabinet toward the Chambers is expressed by saying that it constantly requires the confidence of Parliament, and when this fails, the obligation to resign falls upon it. This relationship of confidence, which in the first phase of parliamentary government found its place in the fluid norms of constitutional custom, was in recent and very recent constitutions regulated in detail by law, which disciplined the forms and conditions for its granting and revocation.
The head of state is the other pivot upon which this form of government has usually been articulated; in the earliest historical forms, evolved into constitutional monarchy, it constituted an organ that could contribute substantially to the functioning of the system; in fact, since the cabinet was normally appointed and revoked by him, albeit on the basis of the indications of the parliamentary majority, there could exist, at least exceptionally, a further political responsibility of the ministers toward him. But, gradually, with the accentuation of political strength in Parliament, it progressively lost all substantial power of influence over political direction, so that it was either outright abolished or, at least, emptied as an institutionally autonomous organ, as happened in certain ultra-parliamentary constitutions of the first post-war period (Bavaria, Prussia, Estonia, Austria 1920), where even the formal competence to appoint and revoke the cabinet was assigned to the parliamentary assemblies; or, in any case, it was decisively transformed, becoming a constitutional cog essentially extraneous to the function of political direction. It appears instead invested with a different role, whether as guardian of constitutional normality in the action of government, or, more specifically, as restorer of that same constitutional normality when it is disturbed, in moments of governmental crisis. Here indeed its intervention can operate, either through the designation of the personality who appears capable of gathering around himself the support of the majority of the Chambers, forming a new government; or, when Parliament proves absolutely incapable of reconstructing a majority, proceeding, on the concurring proposal of the resigning government, to the dissolution of the Chambers.
3) A final form which, although usually absorbed into the preceding one, deserves instead to be distinguished from it on the basis of the distinguishing principle adopted, is that which, because of the very clear prominence that the electorate assumes in it, could be called popular government. This form, which seems by now consolidated in the English system and toward which the parliamentary systems of continental orders might in turn evolve, presents the active organ of government, that is the cabinet, more precisely its head, the Prime Minister, as deriving their investiture directly from the people in general elections. The role that in the form described as parliamentary is played by the Chamber, seems here to be assumed by the electorate, before which the government presents itself whenever questions relating to political direction are of such magnitude as to involve its platform and stability; here therefore the election acquires the value of approval of the government's political line or of rejection of the same, with the contextual indication, through the prevalence of the opposing political current, of the personality who, as its head, must be chosen by the king as the new prime minister. This form of government rests essentially on the so-called "two party system," that is, on a distribution of political forces and an electoral system which, far from shattering the will of the voters into a motley range of forces, each of which is impotent to give life to an efficient government (as more often happens with the adoption of the proportional system), ensures instead more easily the polarization of suffrages around two alternatives, of which the prevailing one obtains the power of government, the other constitutes the opposition.
In a final, narrower acceptation, the term government alludes to the organ, simple or collegial, which, constituting the central organ of the executive power, carries out the activity of government in its active and propulsive moment, even if by its permanence in office and by its functioning it is subject to the control of Parliament or of the people, when in them, as has been seen, the political gravitation of the system is concentrated. While government, in this technical sense, presents itself as a simple organ only in the presidential form, where it is identified in the person of the President of the Republic, in parliamentary forms of government it presents itself in the collegial form, given that, normally, in the organ that brings together the ministers (cabinet) lies the competence to form political direction. The requirements of a more efficient and unitary action of government have, however, in recent times led to a tempering of the collegial principle, in the organization of this organ, with the monocratic principle, whereby a prominence and a position altogether eminent over the other ministers has in certain systems come to be acquired by its head. Thus, for example, in the English system, where the Premier has conquered a very clear prominence over his cabinet colleagues, also by virtue of the fact that, as has been said, he derives his investiture almost directly from the popular will. Such pre-eminence, which is sanctioned, as mostly happens in the English system, in the elastic norms of "constitutional conventions," can however vary greatly depending on the prestige and personal qualities of the prime minister. A position of analogous prominence was established, even formally, for the Reichskanzler (Chancellor of the Reich) in the German constitution of Weimar (1919), it being for him to trace the directives of policy, to propose the appointment of ministers to the head of state, and to preside over their council with a preponderant vote in case of a tie. The structure given to the government by the new Italian constitution also seems partially inspired by these principles.
Government, as such, was not contemplated in the Statuto albertine Statute, which contained only a few norms (arts. 65, 67) concerning the appointment, revocation and responsibility of ministers. But in Italian constitutional life the collegial organ grouping the ministers, through which the royal prerogative necessarily had to be exercised, since they had to make themselves responsible by their countersignature for the acts of the sovereign, immediately took shape in an autonomous manner, as a cabinet, giving rise to the form of parliamentary government, which developed without breaks in continuity until the advent of fascism. The organization and internal structure of the Council of Ministers were, on the other hand, several times regulated by positive legislation, which, in the pre-fascist period, implemented (Decree of 14 Nov. 1901, no. 466) an organization of the ministry informed essentially by the principle of collegiality, the president of the Council remaining merely a "primus inter pares". The fascist law of 24 Dec. 1925, no. 2263, on the attributions and prerogatives of the head of government, by making him the sole organ competent to determine political direction, while at the same time freeing him from all control by Parliament, marked in Italy the end of the parliamentary form of government, and decisively set in motion the process of establishing the authoritarian form of State.
The regulation of the government in the new Italian Constitution has intended first of all to realize, establishing it also on the normative plane, the parliamentary form of government. It is carried out, however, with certain essential innovations, since the political responsibility of the government now exists exclusively toward the Chambers, and no longer also toward the head of State, who has been deprived of the power of revocation, which previously belonged to the king with regard to ministers; a power that allowed the sovereign, even if only exceptionally, to intervene profoundly in the function of government; from this the president of the Republic seems instead today to be made entirely extraneous, since he predominantly plays a role of guarantor of the Constitution, which has already been described as the most significant tendency revealed by this institution, in the evolution of the parliamentary form of government.
Secondly, the relationship of confidence no longer presents itself today as the fluid bond that was to be presumed existing in the statutory system in a normal way, until it was broken by a vote hostile to the government cast by the Chambers. Now the government, which enters into office upon the swearing-in of the ministers before the president of the Republic, cannot proceed to the execution of its program except on condition of expressly obtaining the confidence of both Chambers (art. 94); it is accordingly provided that the government, within ten days of its formation, shall present itself to the Chambers to obtain it; that it be granted or revoked by a reasoned motion by roll-call vote. And for the purposes of greater governmental stability, the vote of dissent has been suitably differentiated from the motion of no confidence, it being established that only the latter (presented by at least one tenth of the members of the Chambers and brought up for discussion not earlier than three days after its presentation) entails the obligation for the government to resign; an obligation that is tempered by the (alternative) faculty of the same government to promote the dissolution of the Chambers, to the president of the Republic.
In the new Constitution the government has been given a clearly distinct and autonomous configuration with respect to the head of State; it is articulated on the president of the Council, on the ministers, and on the meeting of these in the Council of Ministers. The president of the Council has in fact been assured a distinct position, no longer merely formally, with respect to the other ministers; to him, who is appointed directly by the president of the Republic, belong the attributions: of proposing the appointment of the other ministers to the head of State; of directing the general policy of the government, of which he is responsible; of promoting and coordinating the activity of the ministers, for the purposes of unity of political and administrative direction. On the other hand, the collegial principle always subsists, since the ministers encounter, alongside the individual responsibilities for the acts of their department, a collegial responsibility for the deliberations of the Council of Ministers. Which of the two organizational principles has the preponderance will be told in the future by the organizational laws, to which the Constitution entrusts the task of fixing the number and attributions of the ministers, as well as the organization of the presidency of the Council. The accusation against the president of the Council and the ministers, for offenses committed in the exercise of their attributions, may be brought by Parliament in joint session; on the accusations the Constitutional Court is competent to judge, with a specially integrated composition (art. 136, 6th para. of the Constitution).