POVERTÀ. — The condition of one who, deprived of what is superfluous and of what is appropriate, and often even of what is necessary for life, is exposed to privations and tribulations. It concerns not only the economist and sociologist but also the theologian and ascetic, because of the opposition it entails to the world’s tendencies toward wealth and power.
Poverty varies according to places, times, and persons. Today it is customary to distinguish poverty, which presupposes the absence of customary comforts, sometimes hardship and even uncertainty about the future, from that poverty called “indigence,” which presupposes deprivation even of what is necessary (to be assessed also in relation to the social class to which the individual belongs), and from what is called “misery,” which entails the lack of everything (Breton, V. BIBLICA., p. 33).
In the moral sphere, a distinction is made between poverty that is said to be imposed by necessity and voluntary poverty; between affective poverty and effective poverty, by which one lives detached from temporal goods, according to a different degree, variously determinable, just as the determination of what is necessary and what is superfluous varies; this ranges from renunciation of what is merely superfluous to deprivation even of what is necessary. The different aspects of poverty are founded on the motive that inspires it and on its degrees:
moral-preceptive, moral-ascetic, moral-juridical, and moral-mystical.
I. POVERTY FROM NECESSITY
This is poverty that, neither directly nor indirectly willed, is imposed by external factors. When it manifests itself broadly as a social phenomenon, pauperism (v.). Catholic doctrine imposes duties upon those poor through necessity, but it also recognizes their rights and the consequent duties of others.The rights of the poor are manifold. In a case of extreme necessity, there exists, prior to any duty, the right to take what is necessary from others; nor can this be called theft in such a case, since, among other things, the right of ownership was introduced precisely so that everyone might have what is necessary, and therefore ceases when this necessity is lacking. This principle, although belonging to natural law and known to the pagans (for ancient China, V. S. Lokuang, Ricchi e poveri nel confucianesimo e nel toosimo, Roma 1946, p. 29), receives a new light in Catholic doctrine, especially in the Greco-Roman world. Outside the case of extreme necessity, however, it is ordinarily held that the poor do not have the right to demand, through legal channels, the rich man’s superfluous goods, since the person whom the rich man must assist is not legally determined, and the rich man has the potestas dispensandi and may therefore distribute his surplus according to his prudent discretion. Another question is whether the poor taken collectively have the right to rise up against the government when it is an evident instrument of their oppression and of the economic advancement of the rich, thereby revealing the characteristics of a tyrannical government. Horvath (v. BIBLICA) maintains that in such a case this right exists in the poor class, although he denies the advisability of exercising II.
To raise the standard of living of the poor, they are morally recognized as having a right to a just wage (v.), not only an individual one but also a family wage (v. SOCIAL JUSTICE). Secondly, they are recognized as having a right to work (v. Pio XII, Messaggio Pentecoste 1941, encyclical Sertum laetitiae) and a right to property (id., Messaggio Natalizio 1942). In general, it may be said that doctrinal disagreements concerning the obligations of justice of the rich toward the poor arise principally from the fact that justice governed only by the internal forum is not distinguished from that which can also be enforced in the external forum; and also because it is not known how to reconcile this right with one of the Aristotelian categories of justice, commonly accepted even in manuals of moral theology.
Corresponding to the rights of the poor are the duties toward them of individuals, the Church, and the State. Before society, every person has the duty to help another person (v. ALMSGIVING). Whatever the nature of this duty, which Pio XI calls «gravissimo» (encyclical Quadragesimo anno), Catholic doctrine reaches its highest perfection by proposing that, through a true, supernatural reality, even if mystical, God himself is concealed in the poor; and since he is the true master of all things, he has rights over all that belongs to us and over ourselves. Therefore, in Christ, the poor are our masters, as the texts of Tradition affirm. For this reason, in Christianity this most stringent duty of individuals toward the poor cannot be limited to the superfluous alone, determined in too human and selfish a manner. This duty of individuals has enormous consequences in the sphere of the remission of sins and salvation. At the Last Judgment, Jesus speaks of the transgression of this duty by individuals (Mt. 35, 41 ff.). And John’s precept to give a tunic to one who has none is addressed to the individual who has two (Lc. 3, 11 and, at least according to a traditional interpretation, ibid., 11, 41). The Church has a right, before having a duty, to care for the poor. Indeed, it promulgated the well-known maxim «res Ecclesiae res pauperum», which also entered ecclesiastical legislation: councils and canonical collections from the Decree of Gratian through the most recent legislation. Rich peoples too have precise duties toward poor peoples. God created the earth and its riches for everyone; therefore a right arises for poor peoples when their land is incapable of sustaining them. «More than once it is inevitable that some families, here and there, by emigrating, seek elsewhere a new homeland. Then, according to the teaching of the Rerum navorum, the family’s right to living space must be respected (Pio XII, Messaggio Pentecoste 1941). Hence arises the right of poor peoples to emigrate, which, being closely joined to the right to the means of subsistence, cannot be prevented, but must be recognized internationally, even if it may be regulated.
II. VOLUNTARY POVERTY
This occurs when it is sought in order to attain an end, whether simply human or supernatural. If poverty were willed in order to avoid work and compel others to provide assistance, it would then be morally reprehensible even before being socially disastrous; among such poor persons, begging itself is illicit and may also be prohibited by law. Ordinarily, voluntary poverty means the condition of those who voluntarily make themselves poor for the love of God. This poverty is gradual and relative, with various theological-moral aspects.Voluntary poverty is a precept to a certain degree. The distinction between affective and effective poverty is often revisited in order to assert that the former, and not the latter, is properly a precept. Yet the Gospel seems to demand effective poverty from everyone, at least to a certain degree. The first of the evangelical beatitudes praises those who are poor spiritu (Mt. 5:3); many interpret spiritu as affective detachment (L. Pirot, Beatitudes évangéliques, in DIIs, I, col. 932). But, apart from the fact that spiritu is not found in St Luke, it does not seem correct that only affective poverty is a precept. Indeed, there is a minimum degree of poverty that is morally necessary for each person; one must detach oneself also effectively from what is superfluous, at least from what is superfluous to one’s state, and, in the case of the poor person’s extreme necessity, one must detach oneself even from what is necessary for the person. Indeed, beyond the case of extreme necessity, Catholic tradition contains no lack of texts asserting that one must give, at least out of charity, part of what is necessary.
Therefore, in these initial degrees of effective detachment from material things, many admit a true precept for everyone, more binding upon the rich. And that these initial degrees of effective detachment belong to the first degrees of voluntary poverty may be deduced from St Albert the Great (Maniale, q. 71, ed. Borgnet, XXXVII, p. 127 ff.) and from St Thomas, not only insofar as the rich person is obliged to divest himself of what is superfluous and, in the case of extreme necessity, of what is necessary for the person, but also because of the relation these precepts bear to poverty (cf., at least implicitly, Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 40, a. 3, especially in ad. 1); St Thomas further says that the word spiritu can be understood in different ways: «...Paupertas spiritu intelligi potest vel exinatio inflati et superbi spiritus, ut Augustinus exponit... vel etiam abiectio temporalium rerum, quae fit spiritu, idest propria voluntate (=p. effettiva volontaria) per instinctum Spiritus Sancti, ut Ambrosius, et Hieronymus exponunt» (Sum. theol., 2ᵃ-2ⁿᵈ, q. 19, a. 12).
On the other hand, from the comparison between the «beati pauperes» and the «vae divitibus» there emerges the exclusive character of the first of the beatitudes (v.), the condition for entering the Kingdom of God: all must practise poverty, therefore the rich as well, not only affectively but also effectively, at least insofar as this concerns the actual divestment of those temporal goods that are superfluous to them.
Some relate poverty to the virtue of temperance, following St Ambrose (Breton, V. BIBLICA., p. 20), whereas the Salmanticenses, together with others, hold that poverty, insofar as it is a virtue, should perhaps not differ from liberality (Giuseppe dello Spirito Santo, V. BIBLICA., p. 48). It seems that poverty in its first degrees, which are matters of precept, should be connected with temperance if the renunciation of what is superfluous by the rich is considered solely with regard to the end of individual morality; whereas, since the precept is connected with that of giving it to others, one may say that poverty is also connected with liberality and with those social virtues that govern the obligation to distribute what is superfluous.
Voluntary poverty has been recommended by the entire Catholic tradition as an evangelical counsel, highly useful for attaining Christian perfection. The example of Jesus and that of the first Christian community gave concrete and practical value to the achievement of total effective poverty. Primitive communism of love lived in the Church and still lives today, both in religious Congregations and in individual practice, as a means of perfection. Christian souls, even if they know theoretically that it is not necessary ad solutem to sell everything, nevertheless recognize that one cannot attain true Christian perfection without a growing detachment from earthly things. The life of the Church in this world requires the simultaneous realization of both property and poverty, because through the former the necessary sustenance of each person is secured more safely, in the present state of corrupted nature, while through poverty practised even beyond the precept, proprietors have the living, real examples of effective detachment from everything for the love of God, if they find it difficult to detach themselves at least from what is merely superfluous.
This poverty of counsel evidently presupposes effective poverty, which is already a precept for all, namely, detachment from earthly things, and includes effective detachment from those things that are necessary in some way. Poverty of counsel, so understood, has various degrees: a) renouncing things necessary to one’s state, when this is not also required by precept, at least modum extus. This renunciation may be total, if one is content to live frugally and not according to the demands of the social condition to which one belongs, or partial, if one renounces only something commonly regarded by good Christians as necessary for the person. It must nevertheless be kept in mind that sometimes this renunciation, as Alexander of Hales warns (De superfluo: ms., Paris, Bibl. naz., lat. 16406, f. 120 d), is not licit because of some circumstance, such as scandal, insofar as others might attribute such renunciation to avarice. St Thomas teaches (3ᵃ-2ⁿᵈ, q. 32, a. 6) that it would be disorderly to deprive oneself of what is absolutely necessary for living according to one’s social condition, except that, among other cases, «etsi sint necessaria ad convenientiam vitae, tamen de facili resarcisci possunt, ut non sequatur maximum inconveniens». b) Renouncing all possessions and changing one’s state for the love of Christ, as religious do. But here too it is presupposed that one has in some way what is necessary for one’s sustenance, which one may not renounce (cf. Summa fr. Alexandri de Hales, pars IV, q. 30, m. 1 ff., Venice 1575, f. 435 c-d). c) Even in the poverty of religious there are various degrees, ranging from renunciation even of private ownership of necessary things, while retaining only communal ownership and a moderate use of things, to renunciation of ownership even in common, while retaining only the use of those same necessary things, as among the Friars Minor.
This poverty of counsel is an ascetic path of great efficacy. In the present state of man’s corrupted nature, poverty of counsel belongs to perfection as a means to an end. This is attested by the Lord (Lk. 19:21): «If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have and give it to the poor...; then come and follow me». Poverty is a better means than wealth for attaining perfection. The scriptural texts leave no doubt: whereas riches are always proclaimed a danger to salvation, poverty is exalted as an excellent initial disposition for the Kingdom of God. Rich saints were very few (St Bonaventure, Expositio super Regulam Fratrum Min., ed. Quaracchi, VIII, p. 423, 18).
Poverty of counsel is not indispensable to perfection in the way that poverty of precept is, nor is it the sole means of attaining perfection. It is not the essence of perfection; hence it is called a means and not an end. It may nevertheless be debated whether such poverty is the principal, or rather the fundamental, means of attaining true perfection. This is not understood and affirmed by all in the same way. In Franciscan spirituality, for example, there is a tendency to regard it as the fundamental means: the more material poverty increases, the more, in Franciscan devotion, one’s closeness and love for Christ will increase.
Voluntary poverty is not infrequently understood in the metaphorical sense of detachment from everything, even from oneself, from one’s own judgments, thoughts, and even legitimate inclinations, for the love of God and in order not to offend one’s neighbor. There is also talk of that mystical poverty which is infused by the Lord through a special Grace and which can extend even to ecstasy and to abandonment, modum actus, of bodily heaviness in divine contemplation.
When voluntary poverty is also sealed by a vow, it vow (v.) and of the virtue of religion. If the vow of poverty is not only private but also public, it comes under the control of the external forum, like every vow recognized by the Church.
III. VOW OF POVERTY
Poverty, chosen voluntarily as a state of life and confirmed by a vow, constitutes the foundation of religious life in the canonical sense. It generally obliges all individual religious not to possess anything as their own (either illicitly or even validly), or to use anything as their own. The vow of poverty is a means of attaining the virtues of poverty, which is the end.Whoever makes the solemn vow of poverty thereby loses forever and independently of any renunciation: 1) every right of ownership and every other real right over external temporal things (worldly goods) that, before profession, were in his ownership and possession; 2) the capacity to acquire new temporal goods for himself, whether with regard to ownership or to usufruct or use, independently of the will of the legitimate Superior (cann. 579, 581, 582). Much discussion concerns the availability of goods whose acquisition by inheritance is anticipated.
Whoever makes the simple vow of poverty does not lose ownership or radical dominion over the goods he possessed at the time of profession (v.), nor does he lose the capacity to acquire new goods; rather, he loses only the free disposition of things and freedom of use, independently of the express or at least presumed permission of the Superiors.
The solemn vow of poverty excludes ownership by individual solemnly professed religious, but it does not prevent the community from owning and possessing goods proportionate to the purpose of the society itself. It may happen, however, that the vow of poverty excludes the right of ownership from the community itself to various degrees. The Council of Trent (sess. XXV, chap. 3 de regul.) granted the capacity to possess in common to all monasteries and religious houses of men and women, including mendicants, with the exception of the Capuchins and the Friars Minor of the Franciscan Order. The Discalced Carmelites and the Society of Jesus renounced this faculty, though with certain restrictions. In order, therefore, to judge the twofold degree of poverty as regards communities, it is necessary to consider the constitutions and adaptations introduced by the Holy See. In practice, it is also necessary to consider civil legislation, which often does not recognize canon law; consequently, certain acts are necessary that would in themselves conflict with the vow of poverty.
The vow of poverty extends to all external goods estimable in monetary value (worldly goods). Things not estimable in monetary value, such as good repute, etc., are therefore not the object of the vow. Manuscripts suitable for printing are the object of the vow (although opinions on this matter are numerous and conflicting), at least when the religious has been commissioned to carry out the work or when the religious order has incurred expenses for that purpose. The vow of poverty in itself extends only to external acts; but it may also be violated by internal acts concerning matter prohibited by the vow. The vow of poverty is violated by arbitrarily disposing of, retaining, consuming, or accepting things without the knowledge of the Superiors; by giving them away, alienating them, lending them, or using them beyond the time permitted by the superiors; by assigning them to purposes other than those intended by the Superiors; by neglecting things entrusted to the religious for safekeeping and use; and by avarice or wastefulness in the distribution of things entrusted to religious. The violation constitutes a grave sin when the matter would be grave in the case of theft, or, in the case of a violation in the use of things, when the value of the use is of considerable importance and gravity. If a religious professed under simple vows still disposes of things belonging to him, a value four or five times greater is required for the violation of the vow to constitute grave matter.
There is an obligation of restitution in the event of violation of the vow. The obligation of restitution does not, however, require the religious to deprive himself of things necessary for his suitable sustenance, but only to avoid expenses that he could lawfully incur beyond his suitable sustenance, using the goods of the religious house. The legitimate Superior’s renunciation of restitution can often be presumed. The grant to a religious of worldly goods, or of their use, for his peculium (v.) and may be independent of or dependent on the Superior. As regards the period of the novitiate,