POVERTY. – The condition of one who, lacking what is superfluous and what is fitting, and often even what is necessary for life, is exposed to privations and tribulations. It concerns, along with the economist and the sociologist, also the theologian and the ascetic on account of the opposition it implies to the world’s tendencies toward wealth and power.
Poverty varies according to place, time, and persons. Today it is customary to distinguish poverty, which supposes the absence of usual comforts, sometimes even hardships and uncertainty about the future, from that poverty called “indigence,” which supposes the deprivation even of what is necessary (also from a Lutheran perspective, in relation to the social class to which the individual belongs), and from that which is termed “destitution” and implies the lack of everything (Breton, V. BIBLICA., p. 33).
In the moral sphere, poverty is considered in its necessitated rights, and in its voluntary form; in its affective and effective aspects, by which one lives detached from temporal goods, according to a varying gradation that can be determined in different ways, just as the determination of what is necessary and superfluous varies. This gradation ranges from renouncing only what is superfluous to the deprivation even of what is necessary. The motive inspiring poverty and its degrees form the basis for the different aspects of poverty in relation to access to judgment (v. p. 13). For access to a judgment (v. p. 13). For access to a judgment (v. p. 13).
of poverty: moral-preceptive, moral-ascetic, moral-legal, and moral-mystical.
I. POVERTY BY NECESSITY
This is poverty that is neither directly nor indirectly willed, but is imposed by external factors. When it manifests widely as a social phenomenon, it is called pauperism (v.). Catholic doctrine imposes duties upon those poor by necessity, but also recognizes their rights and the consequent duties of others.The rights of the poor are manifold. In cases of extreme necessity, there exists, prior to any duty, the right to take what is necessary from others; in such a case, one cannot speak of theft, because, among other things, the right to property was introduced precisely so that each person might have what is necessary, and thus property loses its force when this necessity is lacking. This principle, even if it is of natural law and known to pagans (for ancient China, V. S. Lokuang, Ricchi e poveri nel confucianesimo e nel taoismo, Rome 1946, p. 29), especially in the Greco-Roman world, receives new light in Catholic doctrine. Outside the case of extreme necessity, however, it is ordinarily held that the poor do not have the right to demand by legal means the superfluous goods of the rich, insofar as the person whom the rich person is bound to assist is not juridically determined, and the rich person has the power of dispensation and thus may distribute his superfluous goods according to his prudent discretion. Another question is whether the poor taken collectively have the right to rise up against a government when it is an evident instrument of their oppression and even of economic favoritism toward the rich, revealing the characteristics of a tyrannical government. Horvath (v. BIBLICA) maintains in such a case the existence of that right in the class of the poor, even if he denies the opportunity for its implementation.
To elevate the standard of living of the poor morally, their right to a just wage (v.) is recognized, not only for the individual but also for the family (v. SOCIAL JUSTICE). Secondly, their right to work (v. PIUS XII, Pentecost Message 1941, encyclical *Serium laetitiae*) and their right to property (id., Epiphany Message 1942) are recognized. In general, it may be said that doctrinal disagreements about the obligations of justice of the rich toward the poor stem principally from the fact that the distinction is not made between justice controlled only by the internal forum and that which can be controlled also in the external forum; and also because it is not known how to reconcile this right with one of the Aristotelian categories of justice, commonly accepted even in manuals of moral theology.
To the rights of the poor correspond the duties toward them on the part of individuals, the Church, and the State. Before society, every person has the duty to help another (v. ALMSGIVING). Whatever the nature of this duty, which Pius XI calls “most grave” (encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*), Catholic doctrine reaches its highest perfection by proposing that, for a true, supernatural reality, even if mystical, in the poor is hidden the same God, who, being the true owner of all things, has the right to all our possessions and to ourselves. Therefore, the poor are our masters in Christ, as affirmed by texts of Tradition. For this reason, in Christianity, such a strict duty of individuals toward the poor cannot be limited to what is superfluous, too humanly and selfishly determined. This duty of individuals has enormous consequences in the realm of the remission of sins and of salvation. Jesus speaks in the Last Judgment of the transgression of this duty by individuals (Mt. 25:41ff.). And the precept of John to give a tunic to one who has none is directed to the individual who has two (Lk. 3:11 and, at least according to a traditional interpretation, ibid., 11:41). The Church has a right, prior to any duty, to care for the poor. It indeed promulgated the well-known maxim “res Ecclesiae res pauperum,” which entered even into ecclesiastical legislation: councils, canonical collections from the Decree of Gratian to the latest legislation. Even wealthy peoples have precise duties toward poor peoples. God created the earth and its riches for all; therefore, a right arises in poor peoples when the land of these peoples is not capable of sustaining them. “More than once it is inevitable that some families, here and there, emigrating, seek elsewhere a new homeland. Then, according to the teaching of *Rerum novarum*, the right of the family to living space must be respected” (Pius XII, Pentecost Message 1941). Hence arises the right of poor peoples to emigrate, which, closely joined to the right to means of subsistence, cannot be impeded but must be internationally recognized, even if it can be regulated.
II. VOLUNTARY POVERTY
This occurs when it is sought to achieve an end, whether merely human or supernatural. If poverty were willed to avoid work and to compel others to give alms, then it is morally deplorable before being socially disastrous; in such poor persons, even mendicancy itself is illicit and may be prohibited by law. Ordinarily, voluntary poverty refers to the condition of those who voluntarily become poor out of love for God. This poverty is gradual and relative, with various theological-moral aspects.Voluntary poverty is a precept to a certain degree. It is not rare to return to the distinction between affective poverty and effective poverty to affirm that the former, and not the latter, is properly a precept. And yet the Gospel seems to demand from all effective poverty, at least to a certain degree. The first of the Beatitudes praises the poor in spirit (Mt. 5:3); many interpret “in spirit” as affective detachment (L. Pirot, *Beatitudes evangeliques*, in DBS, I, col. 932). But, apart from the fact that *spiritui* is not found in St. Luke, it does not seem exact that only affective poverty is a precept. Indeed, there is a minimal degree of poverty morally necessary for each person; one must detach oneself even effectively from what is superfluous, at least from what is superfluous to one’s state, and, in the case of extreme necessity of the poor, one must detach oneself even from what is necessary for the person. Indeed, beyond the case of extreme necessity, there are not lacking in the Catholic tradition texts that affirm that one must give, at least out of charity, part of what is necessary.
Therefore, at these initial stages of actual detachment from worldly goods, many acknowledge a true precept binding upon all, and more grave for the rich. That these initial stages of actual detachment belong to the first degrees of voluntary poverty can be deduced from St. Albert the Great (Mariale, q. 71, ed. Borgnet, XXXVII, p. 127 sq.) and from St. Thomas Aquinas, not only insofar as the rich man is bound to divest himself of what is superfluous and even of what is necessary for his person in cases of extreme necessity, but also because of the relation these precepts have to poverty (cf. at least implicitly in Summa Theologiae, 3°, q. 40, a. 3, especially in ad. 1). St. Thomas further states that the word *spiritui* can be understood in different ways: “...Poverty can be understood as *spiritui* either as the quenching of an inflated and proud spirit, as Augustine explains... or as the rejection of temporal goods, which becomes *spiritus*, that is, a voluntary act (= voluntary actual poverty), by the instigation of the Holy Spirit, as Ambrose and Jerome explain” (Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, q. 19, a. 12).
On the other hand, from the comparison of the “blessed poor” with the “rich man” there emerges the exclusive character of the first Beatitude (v.), a condition for entering the Kingdom of God: all must practice poverty, therefore even the rich, not only affectively but also effectively, at least to the extent of divesting themselves of temporal goods that are superfluous to them.
Some relate poverty to the virtue of temperance, following St. Ambrose (Breton, V. BIBLICA., p. 20), while the Salmanticenses, along with others, hold that poverty, insofar as it is a virtue, ought perhaps not to differ from liberality (Giuseppe dello Spirito Santo, V. BIBLICA., p. 48). It seems that poverty, in its initial degrees—which are matters of precept—ought to be connected with temperance, if the renunciation of the superfluous by the rich is regarded solely under the end of individual morality. However, since the precept is linked with that of giving to others, it may be said that poverty is also connected with liberality and with those social virtues that govern the obligation to distribute superfluous goods.
Voluntary poverty has been commended by the entire Catholic tradition as an evangelical counsel, highly useful for the attainment of Christian perfection. The example of Jesus and of the first Christian community gave concrete and practical value to the realization of total actual poverty. The primitive communism of love lived on in the Church and continues to live, both in religious congregations and in individual practice, as a means of perfection. Christian souls, even if they know in theory that it is not necessary for salvation to sell everything, nevertheless recognize that true Christian perfection cannot be attained without a growing detachment from earthly things. The life of the Church in this world requires the simultaneous realization of both property and poverty: the former ensures the necessary sustenance of each person in a more secure manner, given the present state of corrupted nature, while the latter—practiced even beyond precept—provides living examples of actual detachment from all things for the love of God, for those who find it difficult to detach themselves even from what is superfluous.
This poverty of counsel clearly presupposes affective poverty, which is already a precept for all, namely, detachment from earthly things, and it includes actual detachment from those things that are in some way necessary. Thus understood, this poverty of counsel admits of various degrees: a) renunciation of what is necessary to one’s state, when this is not required even by precept, at least *per modum actus*. This renunciation can be total, if one is content to live in a manner barely sufficient and not according to the demands of one’s social condition, or partial, if one renounces only what is commonly regarded by good faithful as necessary to the person. It must be kept in mind, however, that such renunciation is not always licit, as Alexander of Hales warns (De superfluo: ms., Paris, Bibl. nat., lat. 1646, f. 120), in cases such as that of scandal, insofar as others might attribute such renunciation to avarice. St. Thomas teaches (2a-2ae, q. 32, a. 6) that it would be inordinate to withhold what is absolutely necessary for living according to one’s social condition, except in certain cases, “even if these things are necessary for a decent life, yet they can easily be restored, so that no great inconvenience follows.” b) Renunciation of all possessions, changing one’s state for the love of Christ, as in the case of religious. Yet even here it is presupposed that one has in some way the necessities for one’s sustenance, which it is not licit to renounce (cf. Summa fratris Alexandri de Hales, pars IV, q. 30, m. 3 sq., Venice 1575, f. 435 c-d). c) Even within the poverty of religious there are various degrees, ranging from renunciation of private ownership of necessary things while retaining only communal ownership and moderate use of goods, to renunciation even of communal property while retaining only the use of necessary things, as in the case of the Friars Minor.
This poverty of counsel is an ascetical path of great efficacy. In the present state of man’s corrupted nature, the poverty of counsel belongs to perfection as a means to an end. This is attested by the Lord (Lk 19:21): “If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have and give to the poor...; then come and follow me.” Poverty is a better means than wealth for attaining perfection. The scriptural texts leave no doubt: while riches are always proclaimed a danger to salvation, poverty is extolled as an excellent first disposition for the Kingdom of God. There have been very few saintly rich men (cf. St. Bonaventure, *Expositio super Regulam Fratrum Min.*, ed. Quaracchi, VIII, p. 423, 18).
The poverty of counsel is not indispensable to perfection as that of precept is, nor is it the only means of attaining perfection. It is not the essence of perfection; hence it is called a means and not an end. Yet it may be debated whether such poverty is the principal or even the fundamental means of attaining true perfection. This is not equally understood or affirmed by all. In Franciscan spirituality, for example, there is a tendency to regard it as the fundamental means: the greater the material poverty, the greater, in Franciscan piety, will be the closeness and love for Christ.
Voluntary poverty is not infrequently understood in a metaphorical sense as detachment from all things, even from oneself, from one’s judgments, thoughts, and even legitimate inclinations, for the love of God and in order not to offend one’s neighbor. There is also mention of that mystical poverty which is infused, by a special grace, by the Lord and which can rise to ecstasy and even to the abandonment, *per modum actus*, of bodily heaviness in divine contemplation.
When voluntary poverty is also sealed by a votive promise, it enters the domain of vows (v.) and of the virtue of religion. If the vow of poverty is not only private but also public, it falls under external control, like every vow recognized by the Church.
III. Vow of Poverty
Poverty, voluntarily chosen as a state of life and confirmed by vow, underlies religious life in the canonical sense. Generally, it obliges each religious to have (licitly or even validly) nothing as his own or to use anything as his own. The vow of poverty is like a means of obtaining the virtues of poverty, which is the end.Anyone who makes a solemn vow of poverty thereby loses, in perpetuity and independently of any subsequent meeting, the following: 1) every right of ownership and every other real right over temporal external goods (worldly possessions) that were previously in their possession; and 2) the capacity to acquire new temporal goods for themselves, whether in terms of ownership or in terms of usufruct or use, independently of the will of the legitimate Superior (cf. cann. 579, 581, 582). Much discussion surrounds the disposition of goods that may be acquired through inheritance.
One who makes a simple vow of poverty does not lose the radical ownership or dominion of the goods they possessed at the time of profession, nor does such a person lose the capacity to acquire new goods; they only lose the free disposition of these things and the liberty of their use, independently of the permission of the Superiors, whether this permission is expressed or at least presumed.
A solemn vow of poverty excludes individual solemnly professed religious from ownership, but it does not prevent the community from owning and possessing goods that are proportionate to the purpose of the society itself. However, the vow of poverty may exclude the community itself from the right of ownership to varying degrees. The Council of Trent (Session XXV, chapter 3 *de regul.*) granted the capacity to possess in common to all monasteries and religious treasuries of men and women, including mendicants, with the exception of the Capuchins and the Friars Minor of the Franciscan Order. The Discalced Carmelites and the Society of Jesus renounced this faculty, albeit with certain restrictions. Therefore, to form a judgment on the two degrees of poverty with regard to communities, one must refer to the constitutions and the permanent norms introduced by the Holy See. In practice, one must also consider civil legislation, which often does not recognize canon law; hence, certain acts that would otherwise be contrary to the vow of poverty become necessary.
The vow of poverty extends to all external goods that are estimable in monetary value (worldly possessions). Thus, things that are not estimable in monetary value, such as good repute, are not subject to the vow. Manuscripts intended for publication are also subject to the vow (though opinions on this matter are varied and conflicting), at least when the religious has been tasked with the work or when the religious institute has borne the expenses for this purpose. The vow of poverty, in itself, extends only to external acts; however, violation can also occur through internal acts concerning matters prohibited by the vow.
The vow of poverty is violated by arbitrarily disposing of, retaining, consuming, or accepting goods without the knowledge of the Superiors; by donating, alienating, lending, or using goods beyond the time permitted by the Superiors; by devoting goods to purposes other than those intended by the Superiors; by neglecting goods entrusted to the religious for preservation and use; or by causing damage or waste in the distribution of goods entrusted to the religious. Violation constitutes a grave sin when the matter would be grave in the case of theft, or, in the case of violation in the use of goods, when the value of the use is of notable importance and gravity. If a professed religious under simple vows still disposes of goods that are their own property, a matter of grave violation of the vow requires a value four or five times greater.
There exists an obligation of reparation in the case of violation of the vow; however, this obligation does not require the religious to deprive themselves of the necessities for their proper sustenance, but only to avoid expenses that they could lawfully incur, beyond their proper sustenance, with the goods of the religious house. Often, the legitimate Superior may be presumed to waive the obligation of reparation. The concession made to a religious of worldly goods or their use for personal needs is called *peculium* (q.v.) and may be independent of or dependent upon the Superior. Regarding the period of novitiate, see the relevant entry. — See plate CXXVI.