POVERTY. - The state of one who, lacking the superfluous and the fitting, and often even the necessities of life, is exposed to privations and hardships. It concerns not only the economist and the sociologist but also the theologian and the ascetic, because of the opposition it implies to the world's tendencies toward wealth and power.
Poverty varies according to places, times and persons. Today a distinction is customarily drawn between poverty, which presupposes the absence of the usual comforts, sometimes of conveniences and even of certainty about tomorrow, and that poverty called "indigence," which presupposes the deprivation even of necessities (to be assessed also in relation to the social class to which the individual belongs), and that which is called "destitution" and which implies the lack of everything (Breton, v. bibl., p. 33).
In the moral field, consideration is given to poverty, which is usually called poverty of necessity, and to voluntary poverty; to affective poverty and to effective poverty, by which one lives detached from temporal goods, according to a different gradation, variously determinable, just as the determination of the necessary and the superfluous varies, and which extends from the renunciation of the superfluous alone to the deprivation even of the necessary. On the motive that inspires it and on its degrees are founded the different aspects of poverty: moral-preceptive, moral-ascetic, moral-juridical and moral-mystical.
I. POVERTY BY NECESSITY
This is the poverty that, neither directly nor indirectly willed, is imposed by external factors. When it has a broad manifestation as a social phenomenon, we have pauperism (v.). Catholic doctrine imposes duties on these poor by necessity, but also recognizes their rights and the consequent duties of others.
The rights of the poor are manifold. In the case of extreme necessity, prior to the duty, there is the right to take what is necessary from others, nor in this case can one speak of theft, because, beyond everything else, the right of property was introduced precisely so that everyone might have what is necessary, and therefore it ceases when this necessary is lacking. This principle, even though it belongs to natural law and was known to the pagans (for ancient China, v. S. Lokuang, Ricchi e poveri nel confucianesimo e nel taoismo, Rome 1946, p. 29), especially in the Greco-Roman world, receives a new light in Catholic doctrine. Outside the case of extreme necessity, however, it is ordinarily held that the poor do not have the right to demand by juridical means the superfluous of the rich, inasmuch as the person whom the rich man must assist is not juridically determined, and the rich man has the potestas dispensandi and therefore can distribute his superfluous according to his own prudential judgment. Another question is whether the poor taken collectively have the right to rise up against the government when this is an evident instrument of their oppression and of favoritism, even economic, toward the rich, revealing the characteristics of a tyrannical government. Horvath (v. bibl.) maintains in that case the existence of that right in the class of the poor, even though he denies the opportuneness of its implementation.
In order to raise the standard of living of the poor, morally there is admitted in them the right to a just wage (v.) not only individual, but also family (v. SOCIAL JUSTICE). Secondly, there is recognized in them a right to work (v. Pius XII, Messaggio Pentecoste 1941, encyclical Sertum laetitiae) and a right to property (id., Messaggio Natalizio 1942). In general it may be said that the doctrinal disagreements concerning the obligations of justice of the rich toward the poor arise principally from the fact that no distinction is made between justice controlled only by the internal forum and that controllable also in the external forum; and also because it is not known how to reconcile this right with one of the Aristotelian categories of justice, commonly accepted also in manuals of moral theology.
To the rights of the poor correspond the duties toward them on the part of individuals, of the Church, of the State. Before society, every man has the duty to help the other man (v. ALMSGIVING). Whatever the nature of this duty, which Pius XI calls "most grave" (encyclical Quadragesimo anno), Catholic doctrine reaches its highest perfection by proposing that, through a true, supernatural reality, even if mystical, in the poor is hidden God himself, who, being the true master of all things, has a right over all our things and over ourselves. Therefore the poor are in Christ our masters, as the texts of Tradition affirm. For this reason in Christianity such a most strict duty of individuals toward the poor cannot be limited to the superfluous alone, too humanly and egoistically determined. Such a duty of individuals has enormous consequences in the field of the remission of sins and of salvation. Jesus in the last Judgment speaks of the transgression of that duty in individuals (Mt. 35, 41 ff.). And the precept of John to give a tunic to one who has none is addressed to the individual who had two (Lk. 3, 11 and, thus at least according to a traditional interpretation, ibid., 11, 41). The Church has a right, before a duty, to the care of the poor. It indeed proclaimed the well-known maxim "res Ecclesiae res pauperum" which also entered into ecclesiastical legislation: councils, canonical collections from the Decree of Gratian up to the latest legislations. Rich peoples too have precise duties toward poor peoples. God created the earth and its riches for all, therefore a right arises in poor peoples when the soil of these is not capable of maintaining them. "More than once it is inevitable that some families, here and there, emigrating, seek elsewhere a new homeland. Then, according to the teaching of Rerum novarum, the right of the family to a living space must be respected (Pius XII, Messaggio Pentecoste 1941). Hence arises the right of poor peoples to emigrate, which, closely joined with the right to the means of subsistence, cannot be impeded, but must be internationally recognized, even if it may be regulated.
II. VOLUNTARY POVERTY
This occurs when it is sought in order to attain an end, whether merely human or supernatural. If poverty were willed in order to avoid work and force others to give assistance, then it is morally deplorable before being socially disastrous; in such poor people, begging itself is unlawful and can even be prohibited by law. Ordinarily, by voluntary poverty is meant the state of those who voluntarily make themselves poor for the love of God. This poverty is gradual and relative, with various theological-moral aspects.
Voluntary poverty is of precept in a certain degree. Not infrequently the distinction between affective poverty and effective poverty is revisited in order to affirm that the former and not the latter is properly of precept. Yet the Gospel seems to require of everyone effective poverty, at least in a given degree. The first of the evangelical beatitudes applauds the poor in spirit (Mt. 5:3); many interpret in spirit in the sense of affective detachment (L. Pirot, Béatitudes évangéliques, in DBS, I, col. 932). But, apart from the fact that spiritu is not found in St. Luke, it does not seem accurate that only affective poverty is of precept. Indeed, there is a minimum degree of poverty morally necessary for everyone; one must detach oneself effectively also from superfluous things, at least from what is superfluous relative to one's state, and, in the case of extreme necessity of the poor, one must detach oneself even from what is necessary for one's own person. Indeed, beyond the case of extreme necessity, there is no lack in Catholic tradition of texts affirming that one must give, at least out of charity, part of what is necessary.
Therefore, in these first degrees of effective detachment from things, many admit a true precept for all, more grave for the rich. And that these first degrees of effective detachment belong to the first degrees of voluntary poverty can be deduced from St. Albert the Great (Manuale, q. 71, ed. Borgnet, XXXVII, p. 127 ff.) and from St. Thomas, not only insofar as the rich man is bound to strip himself of superfluous things and of what is necessary for his person in the case of extreme necessity, but also because of the relation these precepts have with poverty (cf. at least implicitly in Sum. Theol., 3a, q. 40, a. 3, especially in ad. 1); St. Thomas further says that the word spiritu can be understood in different ways: «...Paupertas spiritu intelligi potest vel exinanitio inflati et superbi spiritus, ut Augustinus exponit... vel etiam abiectio temporalium rerum, quae fit spiritu, idest propria voluntate (=effective voluntary poverty) per instinctum Spiritus Sancti, ut Ambrosius, et Hieronymus exponunt» (Sum. theol., 2a-2ae, q. 19, a. 12).
On the other hand, from the comparison of the «beati pauperes» with the «vae divitibus» there appears the character of exclusivity of the first of the beatitudes (v.), a condition for entering the Kingdom of God: all must practice poverty, therefore also the rich, not only affectively but also effectively, at least as regards the effective stripping away of temporal things superfluous to them.
Some refer poverty to the virtue of temperance, following St. Ambrose (Breton, v. bibl., p. 20), while the Salmanticenses with others hold that poverty, insofar as it is a virtue, should perhaps not differ from liberality (Giuseppe dello Spirito Santo, v. bibl., p. 48). It seems that poverty in its first degrees, which are of precept, should be connected with temperance, if the renunciation of superfluous things in the rich is regarded under the sole end of individual morality, whereas, since the precept is connected with that of giving to others, one can say that poverty is also connected with liberality and with those social virtues that preside over the obligation to distribute superfluous goods.
Voluntary poverty has been recommended by the whole Catholic tradition as an evangelical counsel, very useful for the conquest of Christian perfection. The example of Jesus and also of the first Christian community gave a concrete and practical value to the realization of a total effective poverty. The primitive communism of love lived in the Church and still lives both in religious Congregations and in individual practice, as a means of perfection. Christian souls, even if they know theoretically that it is not necessary for salvation to sell everything, nonetheless recognize that one cannot arrive at true Christian perfection without a growing detachment from earthly things. The life of the Church in this world needs the double simultaneous realization: of property and of poverty, because by the former the necessary sustenance of each is assured in a more secure way, in the present state of corrupted nature, and by poverty exercised even beyond the precept, owners have living real examples of an effective detachment from everything, for the love of God, if they find it difficult to detach themselves at least from superfluous things alone.
This poverty of counsel evidently presupposes effective poverty, which is already of precept for all, that is, detachment from earthly things, and includes effective detachment from those things that are in some way necessary. This poverty of counsel thus understood has several gradations: a) to renounce the things necessary to one's state, when this is not also required by precept, at least per modum actus. This renunciation can be total, if one is content to live frugally and not according to the requirements of the social condition to which one belongs, or partial, if one renounces only something that is commonly held by good faithful to be necessary for the person. One must however bear in mind that sometimes this renunciation, as Alexander of Hales warns (De superfluo: ms., Paris, Bibl. nat., lat. 16406, f. 120 d), is not lawful because of some circumstance, such as that of scandal; insofar as others might attribute such renunciation to avarice. St. Thomas teaches (3a-2ae, q. 32, a. 6) that it would be inordinate to withdraw what is absolutely necessary to live according to one's social condition, except that, among other cases, «etsi sint necessaria ad convenientiam vitae, tamen de facili resarcisci possunt, ut non sequatur maximum inconveniens». b) To renounce all things possessed, changing one's state for the love of Christ, as in the case of religious. But even here it is presupposed that one has in some way what is necessary for one's sustenance, which it is not lawful to renounce (cf. Summa fr. Alexandri de Hales, pars IV, q. 30, m. 1 ff., Venice 1575, f. 435 c-d). c) Even in the poverty of religious there are several gradations, which range from the renunciation even of the private ownership of necessary things, retaining only community ownership and a moderate use of things, to the renunciation even in common of properties, retaining only the use of the same necessary things, as among the Friars Minor.
This poverty of counsel is an ascetic path of great efficacy. In the present state of man's corrupted nature, poverty of counsel belongs to perfection, as a means to the end. This is attested by the Lord (Lk. 19:21): «If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have and give it to the poor...; then come and follow me». Poverty is a better means than wealth for attaining perfection. The scriptural texts leave no doubt: while riches are always proclaimed a danger for salvation, poverty is exalted as a first excellent disposition for the Kingdom of God. The rich saints were very few (St. Bonaventure, Expositio super Regulam Fratrum Min., ed. Quaracchi, VIII, p. 423, 18).
The poverty of counsel is not indispensable to perfection as that of precept is, nor is it the only means of attaining perfection. It is not the essence of perfection; therefore it is called a means and not an end. One may, however, discuss whether such poverty is the principal, or rather the fundamental, means of attaining true perfection. This is not understood and affirmed equally by all. In Franciscan spirituality, for example, there is a tendency to regard it as the fundamental means: the more material poverty grows, the more, in Franciscan piety, will closeness to and love of Christ grow.
Voluntary poverty is not infrequently understood in the metaphorical sense of detachment from everything, even from oneself, from one's own judgments, from one's own thoughts, from one's own inclinations even when legitimate, for the love of God and in order not to offend one's neighbor. And there is also talk of that mystical poverty which is infused, by a special Grace, by the Lord and which can reach as far as ecstasy and the abandonment, even by modum actus, of bodily heaviness, in divine contemplation.
When voluntary poverty is also sealed with a votive promise, it enters the field of the vow (v.) and of the virtue of religion. If the vow of poverty is not only private but also public, it comes under the control of the external forum, like every vow recognized by the Church.
III. VOW OF POVERTY
Poverty, voluntarily chosen as a state of life and confirmed by vow, stands at the foundation of the religious life in the canonical sense. Generally it obliges all individual religious not to have (licitly or even validly) anything of their own, or not to use anything as their own. The vow of poverty is, as it were, a means of obtaining the virtues of poverty, which is the end.
Whoever takes the solemn vow of poverty thereby loses, in perpetuity and independently of any renunciation: 1) every right of ownership and every other real right over external temporal things (goods of fortune) that were in his ownership and possession before profession; 2) the capacity to acquire for himself new temporal goods, whether as to ownership or as to usufruct or use, independently of the will of the legitimate Superior (cann. 579, 581, 582). Much discussion arises concerning the disposal of goods whose acquisition by inheritance is foreseen.
Whoever takes the simple vow of poverty does not lose the ownership or radical dominion of the goods he had at the time of profession (v.), nor does he lose the capacity to acquire new goods, but only the free disposal of things and the freedom of use, independently of the permission of Superiors, whether expressed or at least presumed.
The solemn vow of poverty excludes ownership from individual religious who are solemnly professed, but it does not prevent ownership and possession, on the part of the community, of goods that are proportionate to the end of that same society. But it may happen that the vow of poverty excludes from the community itself the right of ownership in various degrees. The Council of Trent (sess. XXV, cap. 3 de regul.) granted the capacity to possess in common to all monasteries and religious houses of men and women, even mendicant ones, except the Capuchins and the Friars Minor of the Franciscan Order. The Discalced Carmelites and the Society of Jesus renounced this faculty, albeit with certain restrictions. To give therefore a judgment on the twofold degree of poverty, as regards communities, one must attend to the constitutions and to the temperaments introduced by the Holy See. In practice, moreover, one must also attend to civil legislation, which often does not recognize canon law, and therefore certain acts are necessary that in themselves would be in conflict with the vow of poverty.
The vow of poverty extends to all external goods estimable in monetary value (goods of fortune). Things therefore not estimable in monetary value, such as good reputation, etc., are not the object of the vow. Manuscripts ready for printing are the object of the vow (the opinions on the matter, however, are many and conflicting), at least when the religious has been charged with doing the work, or the religion has borne expenses for that purpose. The vow of poverty in itself extends only to external acts; but violation can also occur through internal acts, pertaining to matter prohibited by vow. The vow of poverty is violated by disposing arbitrarily, retaining, consuming, accepting things without the knowledge of Superiors; by giving them away, alienating them, lending them, using them beyond the time granted by Superiors; by devoting them to other purposes than those intended by Superiors; by neglecting the things that have been entrusted to the religious for preservation and use; by avarice or waste in the distribution of things entrusted to religious. The violation constitutes grave sin when the matter would be grave in the case of theft, or, in the case of violation in the use of things, when the value of the use is of notable importance and gravity. If a professor of simple vows still disposes of things of his own property, in order to have grave matter in the violation of the vow a value four or five times higher is required.
There exists the obligation of reparation in case of violation of the vow: the obligation of reparation does not, however, require that the religious deprive himself of the things necessary for his suitable sustenance, but only that he avoid expenses that he could licitly make, beyond his suitable sustenance, with the goods of the religious house. Often the renunciation of reparation on the part of the legitimate Superior may be presumed. The concession made to a religious of goods of fortune or of their use for his own personal needs is called peculium (v.) and may be independent of or dependent on the Superior. As regards the period of novitiate, v. the relevant entry. - See plate CXXVI.
Bibliography22 works
Ermengildo Lio