DECRETO

DECREE. – It is the particular form assumed by written orders and provisions of constituted authority on given occasions. Decrees are normally emanations of the administrative function, although they are also found among the acts of the judicial and legislative powers. In Roman law, the decree was at times an administrative act and at times a judicial act, though it is not always easy to distinguish when it has one character or the other.

In canon law, this name was applied not only to acts of governance but also to judicial decisions outside of judgments, as well as to various enactments of the legislative power. In antiquity, the acts of the Supreme Pontiff were called *decreta* in opposition to the acts of Councils, which were termed *statuta* (Dict. Grat. ad c. 2 D. 3); for this reason, papal constitutions containing general and particular decisions and norms were formerly called *decretals*. The name was also given, by antonomasia, to various collections of sources, especially those of Burchard, Ivo, and Gratian (v. CANONICAL COLLECTIONS).

Even in current canon law, decrees are acts proper, for the most part, to the executive power. Such are, for example, the decisions and resolutions of the Sacred Congregations (can. 1389), as well as the orders and provisions of bishops and other prelates given in an administrative manner (can. 345, 513, 2, 1601, 2152, 2, 2187).

In the procedural field, this term is used to denote the various decisions of the judge that do not have the name and value of judgments (can. 1868, 1840); in the legislative field, disciplinary laws and doctrinal decisions of Councils retain this name (can. 227, 291).

Particular importance attaches to the decrees of the Roman Congregations, which are distinguished as general or particular, depending on whether the decisions given or the norms established pertain to particular persons and cases or are directed to the generality.

Particular disciplinary decrees are equivalent to precepts and bind only their intended recipients, though they remain authoritative directives for others in the interpretation of the law in similar cases. General decrees, on the other hand, provided they are approved by the Pope and lawfully promulgated, constitute general juridical norms.

The same may be said of doctrinal decrees, whether general or particular, to which, although they are not articles of faith, it is not permissible to withhold assent, since they are acts of the ordinary magisterium.

Bibl.: E. Maroto, *Institutiones iuris canonici*, Madrid 1919, pp. 303 ff., n. 272 ff.; Wernz-Vidal, I, pp. 282 ff., n. 208 ff.; Zaccaria da San Mauro.