DECRETO. — This is the particular form assumed on certain occasions by the written orders and measures of the constituted authority. Decrees are ordinarily emanations of the administrative function, although they are also found among the acts of the judicial and legislative powers. In Roman law, the decree was at times an administrative act and at times a judicial act, although it is not always easy to distinguish when it had one character or the other.
In the law of the Church, this name was given not only to acts of government, but also to measures issued by a judge apart from a sentence, and to various enactments of the legislative power. In ancient times, the acts of the supreme pontiff were called decreta, in opposition to the acts of Councils, called statuta (Dict. Grat. ad c. 2 D. 3); for this reason, pontifical constitutions containing general and particular decisions and norms were formerly called decretals. This name was also given to the disciplinary decisions of certain councils, including the Council of Trent. The name of decree was likewise given, by antonomasia, to various collections of sources, chiefly those of Burcardo, Ivo, and Graziano (v. COLLEZIONI CANONICHE).
Also in the current canon law, decrees are acts proper, predominantly, to the executive power. Such are, for example, the decisions and resolutions of the SS. Congregations (can. 1389), as well as the orders and measures of bishops and other prelates, issued through administrative channels (cann. 345, 513 § 2, 1601, 2152 § 2, 2187).
In the procedural field, this term denotes the various measures of the judge that do not bear the name and have not the force of sentences (cann. 1868, 1840); in the legislative field, disciplinary laws and doctrinal decisions of Councils retain this name (cann. 227, 291).
The decrees of the Roman Congregations are of particular importance; they are distinguished into general and particular, according as the decisions issued or the norms established concern particular persons and cases, or are directed to the generality.
Particular disciplinary decrees are equivalent to precepts and bind only their recipients, while remaining for others an authoritative directive norm for the interpretation of the law in similar cases. General decrees, on the other hand, provided that they are approved by the pontiff and legitimately promulgated, constitute a general juridical norm.
The same may be said of doctrinal decrees, both general and particular, to which, although they are not articles of faith, it is not lawful to deny assent, since they are acts of the ordinary Magisterium.