LABOR. - In the historical order, labor is the second factor of production: it is the first in dignity and importance. It can be defined as conscious and ordered activity directed toward achieving a result. Christianity makes labor not only a necessary means to provide for physical life, but a powerful element for the perfection of man. The substantial influence exerted by Christianity on labor can be effectively illustrated through the most salient periods of history.
SUMMARY: I. Dignity of labor - II. Division of labor - III. The right to labor - IV. The rights of labor.
I. DIGNITY OF LABOUR
1. Labour in antiquity
The classical Greco-Roman world had not lacked some voices exalting labour (cf., e.g., Hesiod, Works and Days, vv. 298-321; Virgil, Georgics and Bucolics, passim). Yet in the general conception, manual labour was regarded with disdain, and material occupations were objectively seen as something base and degrading; subjectively, for those who practised them, they were a sign of inferiority, understandable only in those born into such a state (slaves) or in those who had lost their civic independence. Just as, in man, the body must by nature serve the spirit, so in society those who attend to material occupations must submit entirely to the dominion of those who engage in spiritual activities. These alone are the domini, the cives, the liberi, the proprietors; the others are slaves, res et instrumenta. This thought was formulated by Plato (Republic, VI, 54; Laws, V, VII, VIII), Aristotle (Politics, III, 3; IV, 13; V, 2; VII, 8), and Xenophon (Oeconomicus, IV). Cicero, reviewing the various trades, concluded with this severe judgement: «Opifices omnes in sordida arte versantur; nec enim quidquid ingenuum habere potest officina» (cf. De Officiis, I, 42).2. At the origins of Christianity
In Christianity, labour received its finest rehabilitation. The entire Gospel moves within the world of labour; and the evangelical message is a message of redemption for the worker. The dignity of man is not to be determined by what he possesses, but by the intrinsic dignity that comes from the very fact of being human. Universal equality, therefore, since all are children of the same Father, oriented toward the same end, which is possession of Him. Hence, a natural and instinctive aspiration in all men for social justice; in the light of these principles, economic questions of lawfulness, justice, and charity arise. Labour is a law that obliges all to procure the necessities of existence, and for it a just wage must therefore be paid (Lk. 10:7: «the labourer is worthy of his hire»; Mt. 10:10); idleness is condemned (cf. the parable of the talents, ibid., 25:30). Labour, however, is not only an economic factor but also a means of redemption and forgiveness, a source of elevation (Jn. 6:27).In the teaching of the Apostles, some testimonies of St. Paul are particularly significant: «And when we were with you, we gave you this command: If any one will not work, let him not eat. For we hear that some of you are living in idleness, mere busybodies, not doing any work. Now such persons we command and exhort in the Lord Jesus Christ to do their work in quietness and to earn their own living» (II Thess. 3:7-13; cf. also Acts 20:33-35; Eph. 4:28). The right to a just wage is also the subject of the Apostles’ preaching. St. James, in his epistle, exclaims that the wages defrauded from labourers cry out to God for vengeance (Jas. 5:4; cf. also I Cor. 9:7-14). The law of rest, affirmed alongside that of labour, finds its expression in Sunday, which, succeeding the Jewish Sabbath, becomes a day of freedom and religious fraternity.
Even in post-Apostolic catechesis, among the Fathers, Christianity continued its work of social redemption through labour. Labour is not in itself a penalty due to original sin, for even in the Earthly Paradise, in the state of original justice, man would have worked (cf. Gen. 2:15; original sin added to labour the toil (ibid. 3:19: «In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread»), which, when associated with the Passion of Christ, becomes an element of redemption (cf. St. John Chrysostom, In Io. hom., 36, 2: PG 59, 206).
The economist evaluates labour from the standpoint of immediate material yield; the Christian, instead, from the standpoint of final yield: labour is thus brought back to theology. Only labour that implies immorality is forbidden to the Christian, and the early Fathers of the Church drew up a list of such occupations; but most occupations fall within the moral law. «Attend to agriculture, if you are a farmer, but know God while you work the fields. Sail, if you are a sailor, but invoke the heavenly Pilot» (Clement of Alexandria, Protr., X: PG 8, 216). And thus labour becomes a norm of asceticism in monastic practice, both in the East and in the West (St. Augustine, In Ps. 91, 2 and 3: PL 27, 1173). Prayer and labour become, among the Fathers, a motto expressing the ideal of Christian life. The condition of worker, therefore, is not a cause for shame but for pride. And in this sense, Origen responds to the pagan philosopher Celsus, who had mocked Christians because Jesus was a worker, the son of a «peasant woman, poor and a labourer» (cf. Origen, Contra Celsum, I, 28-29: PG 11, 714-15). Oppression, abuse, and every form of labour exploitation are condemned by the Fathers of the Church, who remind masters of the limits of their power and at the same time give servants the awareness of their own freedom (cf. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis, 15, 23: PG 33, 902). Thus, in Christian families, the emancipation of servants was inculcated and widely practised for the love of Christ. Without overturning the existing legal framework, the person was reconstructed in the individual to then rebuild structures; external liberation only came after forging souls capable of living with responsibility and dignity.
3. In the Middle Ages
The same teaching was put into practice by Christianity when, in the medieval agrarian economy, slaves were succeeded by «serfs of the glebe». Three fundamental rights were recognised for them: to their own life, to a legitimate marriage, and to possess the fruit of their labour. They were, however, indissolubly bound to the land. The dignity of the human person demanded further recognition, and Christianity did not fail to provide it, beginning with Pope Gregory the Great (590-604), who, through a vast action more than through his writings, outlined the Christian concept of land ownership and urged landowners to consider themselves procuratores pauperum and dispensatores Dei (cf. H. Grisar, S. Gregorio Magno, Roma 1928, pp. 326-36). This was, in germ, the Christian system of property later elaborated by the great masters of scholasticism, especially St. Thomas Aquinas (cf. Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae: q. 66, a. 2).In the sphere of industrial-commercial economy, the guilds took shape, a typical expression of the Christian spirit in their triple character as economic, political, and religious bodies. Contemporary economic historiography has highlighted the remarkable results achieved by medieval guilds in the creations of manual work and in institutions of fraternal solidarity among workers (v. CORPORAZIONE).
4. In the modern era
The modern era is marked, in the economic field, by the separation of capital from labour, with the consequent emergence of a socio-economic structure in which capital has come to prevail over labour (v. CAPITALISMO). Hence, in reaction, the classist-materialist theory. Between these two opposing conceptions, Christianity raised its voice in defence of the human rights of the worker through the movement of Catholic thinkers, which arose in the first half of the 19th century and gave rise to the Christian-social school, and above all through the papal magisterium in the social field, particularly that of Leo XIII (Rerum novarum), Pius XI (Quadragesimo anno), and Pius XII (radio messages and discourses: cf. Le encicliche sociali dei Papi da Pio IX a Pio XII, ed. I. Giordani, 4th ed., Roma 1948).BIBL.:
H. Grisar, S. Gregorio Magno e le sue opere, Roma 1928; I. Giordani, Le encicliche sociali dei Papi da Pio IX a Pio XII, Roma 1948; G. Toniolo, Trattato di economia sociale, Firenze 1907-1921; F. Walter, Geschichte des römischen Rechts bis auf Justinian, Bonn 1840-1845; A. Fanfani, Cattolicesimo e protestantesimo nella formazione storica del capitalismo, Milano 1934; J. B. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire, London 1923; H. Pirenne, Histoire économique et sociale du Moyen Âge, Paris 1933; E. Troeltsch, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, Tübingen 1912; G. Goyau, L'Église et le problème social, Paris 1910; A. Müller, Die christliche Lehre von der Wirtschaft, Paderborn 1921; O. Schilling, Die Staats- und Soziallehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin, München 1923; J. Mausbach, Katholische Moraltheologie, Münster 1918-1921.
A. FANFANI.
Secondo l'etica cristiana: a) Il l. ha due fondamentali proprietà: è personale e necessario. Da esse si svolge, come in conseguenti corollari, tutta la dottrina sul l. (cf. radiomessaggio di Pio XII per il 50o della Rerum novarum: AAS, 33 [1941], p. 195 sgg.); b) esso ha la preminenza sul capitale. Vanno respinte quindi l'equazione l.-merce, propria del liberismo economico, e la teoria del collettivismo materialista, che asserviscono il l. rispettivamente al capitalismo privato ed al capitalismo di Stato (cf. radiomessaggi del Natale 1942 e del 1o sett. 1944: ibid., 35 [1943], p. 9 sgg.; 36 [1944], p. 249 sgg.). c) Deve svolgersi nel pieno rispetto dei diritti della persona umana, favorendone, tramite un'adeguata legislazione, lo sviluppo fisico (con ambiente igienico, orari ragionevoli, riposo proporzionato, tutela delle donne e dei fanciulli, ecc.), intellettuale (non riducendo l'uomo a macchina, spersonalizzandolo con una tecnica disumana) e morale (non rendendo maggiormente difficile la virtù; cf. encicll. Rerum novarum e Quadragesimo anno: I. Giordani, op. cit.). d) Costituisce un obbligo (legge morale universale) ed un diritto, perché è mezzo indispensabile per procurare il necessario per la vita. È questo non per derivazione dallo Stato, ma in base al diritto naturale di ogni persona (cf. radiomessaggi per il 50o della Rerum novarum e del Natale 1942: AAS, 33 [1941], p. 195 sgg.; 35 [1943], p. 9 sgg.). e) Il l. esige un salario adeguato alla giustizia sociale, cioè tale che permetta di soddisfare le necessità economiche di vitto, vestito, alloggio ed onesto avago e ciò non solo per l'individuo, ma per la famiglia (salario familiare); che assicuri le fondamentali esigenze della previdenza e che dia possibilità di un graduale accesso alla proprietà privata (cf. Rerum novarum,
Quadragesimo anno, radiomessaggi per il 50° della Rerum novarum, 1° giugno 1941, e del Natale 1942, in cui il l. è indicato come uno dei cinque punti fondamentali richiesti per l'ordine interno degli Stati: I. Giordani, op. cit.; AAS, 33 [1941], p. 195 sgg.; 35 [1943], p. 9 sgg.). f) Il contratto salariale, qualora rispetti i principi suesposti, non è ingiusto; però nelle odierne condizioni sociali esso va temperato con il contratto di società, superando il dualismo tra capitale e l., ed instaurando una collaborazione. g) Ai lavoratori va riconosciuto il diritto di unirsi in libere associazioni per tutelare i propri interessi di fronte alle varie resistenze (cf. encicll. Rerum novarum, Quadragesimo anno, e discorso alle A. C. L. I. del 1° marzo 1945: I. Giordani, op. cit.; AAS, 37 [1945], p. 68). h) Lo Stato ha il diritto ed il dovere di svolgere un'azione positiva in campo economico, non per assorbire o sostituire l'iniziativa privata o delle libere associazioni, ma per supplire, indirizzare, coordinare, stimolare in vista del bene comune quel complesso di condizioni in forza delle quali i singoli individui possano realizzare lo sviluppo integrale della propria personalità. Anzi a questo scopo va instaurata una cooperazione economica internazionale (cf. encicll. Rerum novarum, Quadragesimo anno, e radiomessaggi per il 50° della Rerum novarum, del Natale 1939, 1941 e 1942: I. Giordani, op. cit.; AAS, 32 [1940], p. 5 sgg.; 33 [1941], p. 195; 34 [1942], p. 5 sgg.; 35 [1943], p. 5 sgg.). i) La via da seguire per attuare questi principi dell'etica del l. non è la rivoluzione, ma la pacifica e concorde evoluzione (cf. radiomessaggio del 13 giugno 1943).
BIBLI: Per l'aspetto storico dei rapporti tra l. e cristianesimo, cf.: S. Talamo, Il cristianesimo ed il l. manuale, Roma 1885; V. Brants, Esquisse des théories économiques professées par les écrivains des XIIIe et XIVe siècles, Lovanio 1895; A. Winterstein, Die sittliche Lehre vom Erdengut nach den Evangelien und apostolischen Schriften, Magonza 1898; M. Sabatier, L'Eglise et le travail manuel, Parigi 1898; J. Weber, Evangelium und Arbeit, Friburgo in Br. 1898; G. Toniolo, Trattato di economia sociale, Introduzione, Firenze 1906, pp. 98-163; I. Seipel, Die wirtschaftsethischen Lehren der Kirchenväter, Vienna 1907; P. Louis, Le travail dans le monde romain, Parigi 1912; V. Boissonade, Le travail dans l'Europe chrétienne au moyen âge, ivi 1921; J. C. Husslein, Biblia and labor, Nuova York 1924; F. Marconcini, L'economia del l., Milano 1926, pp. 57-85; A. Tilgher, Homo faber, Roma 1929; M. Rocha, Travail et salaire à travers la scolastique, Parigi 1933; A. Fanfani, Storia delle dottrine economiche. Il volontarismo, 3ª ed., Milano 1942, pp. 79-146; id., Storia del l. in Italia. Dalla fine del sec. XV agli inizi del XVIII, ivi 1943; id., Cattolicesimo e protestantesimo nella formazione del capitalismo, ivi 1944; F. Marconcini, Rientrare nella società, Varese 1944; L. Dal Pane, Storia del l. in Italia. Dagli inizi del sec. XVIII al 1915, Milano 1944; I. Giordani, Il messaggio sociale di Gesù. I. Gli Evangelii, 5ª ed., ivi 1946, pp. 221-38; II. Gli Apostoli, 2ª ed., ivi 1946, pp. 109-17; III. I primi Padri della Chiesa, 2ª ed., ivi 1947, pp. 199-207; IV. I grandi Padri della Chiesa, ivi 1947, pp. 184-204; A. Lanza, La vita rurale nel Vangelo, in I problemi della vita rurale (Atti della XXI Settimana sociale dei cattolici d'Italia, Napoli 21-29 sett. 1947), Roma 1948, pp. XIX-XXXIX. Per l'aspetto dottrinale dei rapporti tra l. e cristianesimo: P. Pavan, L'ordine sociale, 2ª ed., Roma 1944, pp. 101-10; id., La vita sociale nei documenti pontifici, 2ª ed., Milano 1946, pp. 10-23; Unione intern. di studi sociali, Codice sociale, Roma 1944, pp. 82-112; G. Gonella, Principi di un ordine sociale, ivi 1944, pp. 253-59; Per la comunità cristiana (a cura di un gruppo di studiosi amici di Camaldoli), ivi 1945, pp. 59-85; F. Cimetier, Brève synthèse de théologie morale sociale, Parigi 1945, pp. 78-126; A. Fanfani, Summula sociale, Roma 1945, pp. 115-54; II. I. (Atti della XX Settimana sociale dei cattolici d'Italia, Venezia 14-24 ott. 1946), Roma 1947; J. Haessele, L'etica cristiana del l., trad. II. di A. Miggiano, ivi 1949; G. Thils, Théologie des réalités terrestres, I. Parigi 1949, pp. 185-94; G. B. Guzzetti, Problemi religiosi del l., in La scuola cattolica, 77 (1949), pp. 3-16; L. Leypaert, Nature et noblesse du travail, in Res. diocés. de Tournai, 4 (1949), pp. 193-213. Pio Menoni
II. DIVISION OF LABOR
I. Various Distinctions. — The prevailing idea of labor is that which flourished in the climate of mechanistic positivism: an expenditure of energy conditioned by efficiency. This is an imperfect and incomplete notion, yet it applies more evidently to manual labor than to intellectual labor. Upon this idea are founded the Marxist theories regarding labor and workers.
The common distinction between manual and intellectual labor is simplistic and deceptive. Such qualifications apply only to the extreme ends of a continuous series of complex forms, which are already—and will increasingly become—ingenious combinations of physical and intellectual labor in the most varied proportions. Manual labor that requires no contribution of the mind is no less exceptional than intellectual labor that can be prepared, accomplished, and resolved in pure and comfortable meditation.
A legitimate distinction, however, is that between servile labor and free labor: the former lacks the qualities of freedom, initiative, originality, and noble passion that, to varying degrees, manifest in the latter, rendering it a typical expression of the worker’s personality. From this perspective, even intellectual labor can be servile.
Another lawful and substantial distinction is that between useful, or productive, labor and useless or unproductive labor: for only utility, understood in the broadest and most complete sense, confers value upon labor and legitimizes its worth and compensation. The discriminating criterion can only be this: labor is useful, that is, productive, when, after and as a consequence of it, life is enriched with well-being, necessary goods that satisfy real needs, or with services, ideas, knowledge, new possibilities for useful labor, new capacities, or at least reduced suffering.
Any labor can be scarcely productive if performed with little spirit and diligence; more easily, for obvious intrinsic reasons, bureaucratic labor in general, intermediary and parasitic labor, as well as that dedicated to advertising, entertainment, journalism, the press, syndicalism, and politics, may become so. Even much labor that assumes typically industrial aspects can, in reality, be unproductive or even harmful, fueling luxury consumption, bureaucratic necessities, and war.
Yet the phenomenon that today appears to constitute the foundation and necessary condition of all civil progress concerns a division and specialization of labor’s purposes and actions. Nature itself provides a first great specialization of tasks through pre-established factual situations and the variety of intelligences, temperaments, and aptitudes; thus arise entrepreneurs, merchants, technicians, soldiers, politicians, officials, skilled workers, etc. But each activity, already so oriented, is then exercised and concretized within a limited sector of production.
The phenomenon of exchange, in which equivalent or supposedly equivalent utilities are permuted, naturally drives each party to offer types of products or services that, while valuable to the other party, cost the offeror less effort. Such reduced effort may derive from the availability of inexpensive raw materials, knowledge of more efficient production processes, or particular capacity, skill, and dexterity in production. Each individual thus dedicates himself particularly, if not exclusively, to a given type of good or service, or to a specific part of a product or phase of service. The division of labor is the cause of increasing labor productivity, as the effectiveness of effort and the perfection of organization are achieved more swiftly and profoundly when sought within a limited sector of productive labor, refining the skills necessary to accomplish II.
Progress, which accelerates the pace of exchanges, broadens their scope, and increases their difficulties, drives toward an ever-growing division and specialization of productive labor, becoming an essential law of technical, economic, and social progress, linked to both the quantitative increase in production and the improvement of quality, as well as the reduction of prices. However, this coin has its reverse, for labor specialization leads to narrow visions of reality, hence to misunderstandings, rivalries, and egoisms, exacerbated by mass production, which raises the problems of selling and competition. From this arise, to a large extent, the profound anxieties of modern life, as from centrifugal forces destined to disintegrate every fruitful capacity for synthesis and human solidarity. Such forces must be neutralized by centripetal counterforces that restore unity to partial visions and individual efforts: intelligent charity in the foreground, then a homogeneous moral formation of individuals and a profound organizational rationality of exchanges based on the concentration of services (v. SCAMBIO).
5. Labor as a Commodity
The concept, attributed to liberal economics, that labor is equated to a commodity, in disregard of its human and spiritual value, is today met with harsh criticism. The resentment is justified, as has been said; however, the forum in which it is claimed is not entirely appropriate. As long as labor is offered and demanded by negotiating its price, and economics is the science of contract, labor will be valued, in economic terms, solely for its economic utility, to the extent recognized by the market. Supplementary forms of fixed wages are already widely adopted (v. SALARIO), but always within the framework and measure of productivity.A total appreciation of labor, which also and principally accounts for its human and spiritual value, and adequately compensates for its creative force and contribution to universal happiness, civil example, and soul’s torment, exceeds earthly possibilities: if a supplementary and complementary compensation can and must be achieved, it will be through other authorities and in a forum distinct from the strictly economic one. Thus, it is through different means and by different methods than the economic that labor prices may be corrected with respect to the judgment expressed by the market: unless one accepts the burdens and risks of enterprise. More than a problem of distributive justice, it is perhaps a question of morality and virtue.
III. THE RIGHT TO LABOR
6. Existence of the Right
Since labor is a natural law, a moral duty, and an economic necessity, reason and justice demand that every able individual be recognized the fundamental right to work usefully, receiving the just and maximum price for his labor, without the social organization opposing any impossibilities, or difficulties and resistances that practically amount to the same. This constitutes the right to labor: an elementary right, before which society demonstrates its greatest unpreparedness and most serious uncertainty.There is no lack of useful, demanded, and even urgent labor: indeed, it abounds in the world, so numerous are the ancient and new necessities of humanity, and so many arise continuously with the progress of civilization. There is no shortage of available workers in impressive numbers; nor are the necessary capitals lacking to employ them, if one considers the immense masses of savings seeking investment or squandered in useless works or war. Nevertheless, no effective means is yet known to coordinate these productive elements in order to guarantee dignified and fruitful employment for all individuals, and sufficient production to ensure that minimum of tranquility which is the basis of social peace (v. SICUREZZA SOCIALE).
7. Historical affirmation of the right
The right to labor is first affirmed in Locke, for whom the need to work necessarily implies in man the right to be able to work. In Adam Smith, it is found among those constituting "natural liberty." It is reaffirmed by Montesquieu and Rousseau, declared in an edict of 1776 by Turgot, minister of Louis XVI and one of the greatest among the physiocrats; and then, repeatedly, during the French Revolution, in decrees of the Constituent Assembly, the Legislative Chamber, and the Convention. Yet for all, it remained a doctrinal affirmation.The German philosopher Fichte, first in his Naturrecht and later in Geschlossene Handelsstaat, derived from it an obligation for the State (1800); and after him Winkelblech, Lassalle, and Menger. In France, the Saint-Simonians championed it; in England, the Chartists, opposed to the introduction of machinery, advocated II. Finally, Karl Marx and Louis Blanc: the latter's ateliers sociaux, realized in Paris during the revolution of 1848, met with no success.
After this, the right to labor fell into oblivion due to the difficulty of applying it in concrete forms; it reappeared in the encyclicals and papal messages of recent decades and was included in the political programs of parties and in democratic and socialist constitutions. The Code social de Malines alludes to it vaguely.
8. Concretization of the right
Evidently, we have not yet moved beyond the doctrinal sphere, lacking even a practical vision of the principle of concrete realization: perhaps because it has always been sought where it could not be found, namely in collective action and the economic policies of States.Social and political difficulties certainly exist, but only because economic difficulties exist: perhaps a single one, which is at the root of all others, already known to all schools, which denounced it both in the clear propositions of the classics like J. B. Say and in the more convoluted ones of the romantics like Müller and List, as well as in the invectives of Proudhon and the rebukes of the forerunner of socialism, Sismondo de' Sismondi. Some have blamed the nature of things, others intrusive politics, still others the disorganized regime of civil society, or the continuous theft by a privileged class at the expense of others. Yet these are always digressions in the face of the common and persistent inability to resolve, in the practical field of exchanges, the anomaly by which humanity cannot buy all that it manages—and could manage even more—to produce.
Clearly, it is a matter of perfecting the organization of exchange to the same degree that scientific and technical progress succeeds in perfecting productive organization. It is a matter of resolving the congestion by which products stagnate in markets because they do not easily find buyers at remunerative prices. In other words, it is a matter of raising the "demand" for products and services to the same level as "supply."
From another perspective, it is a matter of elevating the purchasing power of the masses of workers, which has remained too far below their own productive capacity. Demagogy, simplistic and crude, points to wage increases as an obvious remedy: but the remedy is of no use if, simultaneously, the two causes of the devaluation of labor are not reduced: the colossal mass of useless labor, lavishly remunerated at the expense of useful labor, and the defective mobility and transformability of capital, which is not ready to rush with the necessary promptness, in the necessary measure, and at a convenient cost, where productive effort would require II.
The two causes ultimately constitute a single one: because bureaucratic and parasitic elephantiasis (commercial, state, syndical, and military) arises, thrives, and prospers on economic difficulties, particularly on the scarcity of capital and the thousand obstacles to production and exchange. Experience teaches that the scarcer products are, the more people must mobilize to distribute them; the poorer a population is, the more complicated the bureaucracy that governs it; the more disorder there is in the market, the more strange and brazen trades flourish that live off disorder. Ephemeral issues—dynastic, national pride, race, social regimes, and political opinions—take on life and virulence solely from the preexistence of problems of hindered exchanges, invincible or feared competitions, and financial hegemonies.
Given that the essential elements for a full realization of the right to labor exist, the question appears solely organizational: not in the sense of centralizing directive functions, but in that of promoting and developing the natural automatism that derives from spontaneous compliance with economic laws, when these are well known and their utilitarian aspect is made evident through the perfection of contractual instruments, easy accessibility to markets, and the constancy of the purchasing power of money. This is the truly scientific criterion that, vainly attempted by liberal schools, is now being pursued by the Christian social school and democratic schools, though hesitantly in the face of the alluring prospects of planned and directed economies: while socialist and communist schools place the State as the supreme regulator and despot of economic activities, in contempt of human freedom, reason, and true science.
Unfortunately, in the face of this greatest—if not sole—problem of associated life, minds prefer to draw inspiration from political art, hoping rather in the capacities of bureaucracies and in the—otherwise reasonable—transformations of social structures than in the perfection of technical means to determine and fertilize the encounter of initiatives, labor, and capital: such means are, above all, freedom and education, then professional instruction, new productive processes, insurance and the circulation of savings, a more perfect organization of exchanges and markets (v. RISPARMIO; SCAMBIO).
Small, hesitant steps in this direction, more episodic than systematic, can be seen in the Marshall Plan, in Truman's Fourth Point on depressed areas, and in the theories generally known as Keynesianism (v. KEYNES): but we are still in full empiricism, lacking an organic and scientific vision of what a rational economic order might be, in which alone the right to labor will find its full and practical recognition. Mario Baronci
IV. RIGHT TO LABOUR - Understood in an economic sense (the presupposition of its juridical dimension), labour may be considered as the exercise of human faculties directed towards the production of wealth, that is, the performance of an activity that is materially exchangeable.
Labour thus involves the simultaneous contribution of physical-organic and psychic faculties (intellectual: reason; moral: will), which are essentially common to all men, though in practice they vary greatly in degree and manner. Indeed, physical effort is always necessary to subdue the external world and material forces; yet this effort does not achieve its intended purpose unless guided by a directing mind, nor does anyone endure the sacrifice of burdensome labour unless an act of will intervenes to overcome natural repugnance. Labour is therefore a physical-organic effort, ordered and directed by the intellect towards a concrete end and translated into action by the command of the will. Consequently, human activity and its results bear a spiritual imprint, as expressions not of deterministic forces but of rational and free energies.
It must be premised that some activities are juridically irrelevant, while others, though relevant, fall outside the proper subject matter of this discipline within the current general system of law. Irrelevant, for example, is activity that does not transcend the interests and needs of the acting subject; relevant, however, is activity that establishes a relationship between multiple subjects, that is, when labour is performed in favour of a subject distinct from the agent. Yet even in this case, the position of labour may assume highly varied aspects. As has been correctly observed, if the right to labour were understood literally as that right which regulates all relationships in which the element of human labour somehow enters, it would dissolve into indeterminacy. To achieve technical precision, the object must be delimited so as to attain juridical concreteness. Some marginal criteria may vary.
The proper object or subject matter is the labour relationship as an economic exchange relationship, in which one subject (the worker) obligates himself, by virtue (at least normally) of a contract, to place his labour energies at the disposal of another subject, the entrepreneur or employer (of labour), who in turn remunerates the former in a measure considered economically equivalent. Modern labour law, however, does not limit itself to regulating the labour contract but also governs institutions and relationships aimed at preparing the stipulation of the contract itself or at integrating it in the period following its resolution. All this material falls within the sphere of the aforementioned right, insofar as it always concerns a (subordinate) labour relationship, whether already in effect, in potential (as regards, for example, employment placement organisation), or resolved as the unfolding of the principal reciprocal performances (performance of labour and remunerative counter-performance) between entrepreneur and worker, yet still productive of further effects dependent on the same relationship (for example, benefits of social insurance, already established during and by virtue of the aforementioned relationship).
Labour law, like and even more than other branches of contemporary law (in which the accentuation of social ends is more pronounced), is composed of a combination of elements of private and public law. The labour relationship is fundamentally, for the private subjects who establish it, a private law relationship aimed at satisfying their interests on the basis of juridical equality and contractual freedom. Yet it also has an obligatory and inderogable public interest discipline (regarding the minimum treatment of the worker), which limits individual freedom for the sake of general interest through so-called "social legislation." Labour law, considered as the regulation of performances of an economic character, is of a patrimonial nature, but it is undoubtedly permeated with personal elements due to the inseparability of the labour performance from the acting person himself. Indeed, it is the subject himself, in the exercise of his energies, who in some way becomes the object of the labour relationship and of the juridical disposition by the entrepreneur. And it is precisely the subject as such, more than labour in its objectivity, that a part of the legislation in this field directly targets in its norms, as in the physical and moral protection of workers, particularly minors and women. The personal nature of the performance then gives the relationship a marked character of trust. Due to the indicated aspect of such an intense combination of patrimonial and personal elements, labour law has its own particular profile compared to other branches of law in which, if not always exclusively, either the former (as in real and obligatory rights) or the latter (as in family rights) clearly prevail.
The various Italian and foreign denominations can be reduced to three types, corresponding roughly to three different stages of discipline. Initially, it was called "industrial law," as there was special legislation for industry, including its labour relationships. When the social protection of workers extended to other branches of production (though limited almost exclusively to manual labourers), it was termed "workers' law." Finally, when the labour relationship was comprehensively regulated in all its elements and with reference to all categories, including clerical workers, the terminology "labour law" was adopted, which has come to prevail. It is understood as that branch of (domestic) law which regulates the relationships arising from the contractual performance of (human) labour in (private) enterprises.
Like other contemporary constitutions, the Italian Constitution has proclaimed principles regarding labour, some of which are more political than juridical in value, both for collective relationships (of trade union law) and for individual ones. Some of these, concerning the latter (which alone are of interest here), confirm already existing principles (though elevating them to the constitutional level, and thus to the highest level of the hierarchy of sources in a system with a rigid constitution); others are newly enunciated, entrusting subsequent laws with their specification and development.
In particular, the worker has the right: 1) to remuneration proportional to the quantity and quality of his labour, in any case sufficient to ensure for himself and his family a free and dignified existence; 2) to the establishment of a maximum daily working hours; 3) to a weekly rest; 4) to paid holidays (Art. 36; V. CONTRATTO DI LAVORO; SALARIO).
Alongside the specific material regulation of labor relations, a particular procedural discipline has appropriately developed, aimed at making judgments faster, simpler, and more economical compared to ordinary proceedings, as well as at establishing a judicial body suited to understanding and appropriately resolving labor disputes. In the past, a notable contribution to the development of this new branch of law was made by the probiviri for industries (established in 1893) and the commissions for private employment (established in 1916). Without mentioning other institutions, during the Fascist period, the "magistratura del l." (a section of the court of appeal with a mixed composition of magistrates and expert citizens) played a significant role in resolving collective disputes, both legal (concerning the interpretation of collective agreements with erga omnes effect) and economic (regarding the issuance of new norms or the revision of existing contractual ones), in correlation with the prohibition of self-protection by producers, and thus with the criminal prosecution of strikes and lockouts. The new constitutional charter, however, configures the strike as a "right" (exercisable within the framework of the laws regulating it, Art. 40); nor does the lockout (though not equally proclaimed) seem, according to the preferable but contested opinion, to be further considered a crime, but rather to fall within the legal void. The resolution of collective disputes is no longer provided for, nor could special magistracies be established for this purpose, nor could compulsory arbitration be imposed, at least for those categories to which the aforementioned right to strike is recognized. However, specialized conciliation and mediation offices, existing in many countries, could be highly appropriate, avoiding the continuous recourse to the intervention of the Ministry of Labor. This is a matter that may be regulated in the future; for now, the provisions of the 1942 Code of Civil Procedure on individual disputes remain in force, with some modifications of no great significance. The special procedure does not constitute a system distinct from the ordinary one, because most of the rules that previously formed its content have been extended to the common process; nevertheless, some particular provisions remain (among others, regarding the broader scope of the judge's investigative powers, legal representation, appeals, etc.), which apply before the special sections (always composed solely of magistrates) of the preture and tribunals (in the first instance, depending on the value of the dispute) and the courts of appeal (in the second instance) for disputes concerning: 1) labor or employment relationships that are or may be regulated by collective agreements; 2) sharecropping, partial farming, and lease relationships with direct cultivators; 3) labor and employment relationships of employees of public entities, framed by trade union associations (according to the teaching of the Cassazione, in disagreement with the Consiglio di Stato); 4) labor relationships of employees of public entities, which by law are not devolved to another judge. In matters of social insurance, the tribunal is competent in the first instance (and the port captaincies for disputes concerning maritime labor).
Another aspect of labor law is the international one, of great relevance for countries with large emigration like Italy. Norms in this regard are sometimes found in trade and navigation treaties, on legal and judicial protection, in general emigration conventions, and particularly in specific labor treaties (or for special institutions, e.g., accident insurance, etc.) between certain states or in multilateral conventions usually open to successive adhesions. The latter have seen great development thanks to the "Organizzazione internazionale del l." (v. LEGISLAZIONE SOCIALE; PROTEZIONE DEI LAVORATORI).