PECULIUM. – A very important juridical institution in Roman Law, closely connected with the unitary conception of civil and economic matters within the family under the authority of the pater familias. It passed into Canon Law (cf. cc. 1-5, X, tit. 2-5, I. III, de peculio clericorum), in which its name and doctrine remain today in the law of religious, with traces regarding clerics (cf. can. 1473).
I. Historical Notes
The Church, following the example of Roman Law, adopted the institution with regard to clerics, equating them to filii familias; only the episcopate was exempt from the law. As civil persons, clerics could possess their civil peculium, observing Roman legislation; more significant was the application of the doctrine to ecclesiastical peculium, indicating those movable goods or money which the cleric receives from the Church or from the fruits of ecclesiastical goods, of which he, like a son of the family, is not the absolute owner, but rather a conditional one, in such a way that whatever is received for his honest sustenance must be expended for the poor or returned to the Church. Whereas civil peculium comes to the cleric from paternal or family goods, ecclesiastical peculium is derived from quasi-patrimonial goods (derived from activities or ecclesiastical goods extraneous to the benefice), parsimonial goods (derived from personal economy on the goods of the benefice), and surplus goods: it is for these latter that the disposition holds which obliges the cleric to expend them for the poor. Before the CIC, it was debated whether clerics had true and free dominion over peculium, or rather only administration and simple use. The answer depended on the nature of the obligation to expend surplus goods, whether by justice or by religion and obedience; consequently, whether there exists an obligation of restitution, which, being real, passes to the heirs. The CIC (can. 1473) is silent on this point, sanctioning only the obligation of expenditure; commentators therefore state that, since the legislator did not wish to specify a grave and well-known question, in this case one must see only an obligation ex religione. Consistent with Roman doctrine, ancient Canon Law determined that clerics could not make wills. Custom and various papal privileges, to avoid difficulties in the separation of civil from ecclesiastical goods and thus prevent lawsuits and discord, legitimize the making of wills, with the restriction regarding surplus goods.II. PECULIUM OF RELIGIOUS
The doctrine of peculium in the law of religious is of current importance. In matters of property (by virtue of can. 580, if of simple vows, and can. 582, if of solemn vows), they are equated to the filii familias of Roman Law: they are incapable of possessing, retaining, disposing of, receiving, donating, or using anything without the permission of their superiors, even if the thing is given specifically for the person and as a personal title by their own relatives or derived from their patrimonial goods; moreover, whatever they acquire through their own activity or personally acquired enters into the patrimony of the community (cf. cited can. and 594), from which they have the right to receive what is necessary.In the case of religious, peculium indicates any temporal good, estimable in value, separated from the common mass, which the subject holds and uses of his own authority for his personal desires or needs. Whatever the Superior gives for a specific purpose, even if future, is not peculium because by designating the purpose, in effect an indispensable element for peculium (the use of one’s own authority) is removed; thus that money which a Superior might give once to a religious who must frequently go out and use trams, etc., is not peculium. Similarly, the clothing, books, furnishings, tools, etc., granted to an individual religious do not constitute peculium, whether they come directly from the Superior or are donated by outsiders, provided they are understood to be received for the community and the Superior can grant or deny their use. The patrimony which a religious of simple vows must preserve with radical dominion without the right to personally have its fruits, the money given to the religious by outsiders for honest and charitable ends not personal even if kept by the religious himself, the spending of money or goods earned from one’s own work for a specific personal or third-party end with the permission of the Superior, etc., do not constitute peculium. Peculium exists in the case of annuities, pensions, and the like constituted and given by relatives or third parties, if these goods do not enter into the common mass and the religious has the right to dispose of them (not if the Superior, for a certain equity, first takes into account the needs of the religious); in the money deposited with the Superior for the direct purpose of providing food, clothing, etc., for a particular religious; in the fact that the religious can procure with the proceeds of his work clothing, books, etc.
Religious peculium can be perfect or proper, and imperfect or improper, according to whether the individual can hold and use things independently of the Superior, or only with his consent and under his dependence, in such a way that the Superior can limit or revoke its use. Proper peculium is contrary to the substance of the vow of poverty (v.), not only to common life; therefore it cannot be introduced even by religious of simple vows (cf. can. 27); and in notable matters can. 2389 applies. Improper peculium does not in itself destroy the vow of poverty; but it is contrary to perfect common life and to the will of the Church. The canons cited (538 § 2, 582, 594) use terms that imply totality (quidquid, omnia bona, quovis modo), imposing the careful observance of common life in matters regarding food, clothing, etc., even on the part of Superiors; these must place in the common chest whatever they receive. It is clear that this is not a matter of mere material placement, but juridical. Authors see in excessive rigor and severity on the part of the Superior in procuring suitable things for the decent sustenance of the religious a principal cause of peculium; a middle line becomes necessary. Suitability takes into account the strictness of individual religious orders, the needs of individuals, the conditions of climate, region, socio-economic conditions, and the possibilities of the common chest. Before the Council of Trent, improper peculium was neither prohibited nor expressly conceded. A direct implicit prohibition was issued at Trent (sess. XXV, de regularibus, c. 1 s.); greater force was given by Clement VIII (25 July 1599), by other popes, and by various decrees of the S. Congregation of Bishops and Regulars.
In the face of clear declarations and no less clear and not sporadic facts, authors asked whether improper peculium could be introduced by custom. Some denied it, starting from the principle that no custom could derogate from Trent and that from the public and obligatory reading of the decree of Clement VIII the necessary legal consent of the legislator was lacking. Nevertheless, St. Alphonsus considers the affirmative opinion well founded. In some institutes it was officially licit to have peculium, on condition that it be placed in the common chest, that there be the consent of the Superior to procure certain things, and that the individual be disposed to renounce it as soon as the Superior deemed it opportune to dispose otherwise.
Can. 594, and consequently all the Constitutions, inculcate perfect common life and the observance of poverty. Therefore, if in 1918 there existed a custom ab immemorabili of peculium in some institutes, by virtue of can. 5, the Order could tolerate it, if it judged that it could not prudently be removed. In other religious orders (provinces, monasteries, etc.), for the future it could be introduced by virtue of can. 27, if the Superiors do not oppose II.
It is clear that in his conception private property implies: a) a small quantity, b) use for purposes consonant with the religious state, c) actual dependence on the Superior. Experience teaches that private property gravely harms religious discipline and charity. Superiors have the grave obligation to remove it, unless serious causes advise against doing so; much more must they prevent its introduction, and therefore must suitably provide for the needs of their subjects.
Serious causes for permitting its continuation are, for example, preventing the introduction of private property proper, the indigence of the religious house, or the grave and persistent negligence of Superiors in providing for the religious.