PECULIO. – A highly important legal institution in Roman Law, intimately connected with the unified conception, in civil and economic matters, of the family under the authority of the pater familias. It passed into Canon Law (cf. c. 1–5, X, tit. 25, bk. III, de peculio clericorum), in which today its name and doctrine remain in the law concerning religious persons, together with traces relating to clerics (cf. can. 1473).
I. HISTORICAL OUTLINE. – The Church, following the example of Roman Law, adopted the institution with regard to clerics, equating them with the filii familias; only the episcopate was exempt from the rule. As civil persons, clerics could possess their p. civile, observing Roman legislation; more important was the application of the doctrine to the p. ecclesiastico, denoting those movable goods or money that the cleric receives from the Church or from the fruits of ecclesiastical goods, of which, like a son of the family, he is not the absolute owner, but only a conditional one, in the sense that whatever exceeds his honest sustenance must be distributed to the poor or returned to the Church. Whereas the p. civile comes to the cleric from his paternal or family goods, the p. ecclesiastico is supplied by quasi-patrimonial goods (derived from activities or ecclesiastical goods unrelated to the benefice), parsimonial goods (derived from personal economies made on the goods of the benefice), and surplus goods: it is with regard to the latter that the provision requiring the cleric to distribute them to the poor applies. Before the CIC, there was debate as to whether clerics possessed true and free ownership of the p., or rather merely its administration and simple use. The nature of the obligation to distribute surplus goods depended on the answer: whether it arose from justice or from religion and obedience; consequently, whether an obligation of restitution existed, which, being a real obligation, passed to the heirs. The CIC (can. 1473) is silent on this matter, establishing only the obligation of distribution; commentators therefore say that, since the legislator did not wish to specify a serious and well-known question, the matter must be regarded solely as an obligation ex religione. In keeping with Roman doctrine, ancient Canon Law determined that clerics could not make wills. Custom and various pontifical privileges, in order to avoid difficulties in the separ-
(Int. U. op. int. nec.)
PECORA — Silver dish with a cross between two sheep. Above, the dove and the hand of God (5th century) — Treasury of Canoscio.
II. P. OF RELIGIOUS. — The doctrine of p. in the law of religious is a matter of current interest. In patrimonial matters (by virtue of can. 580, if they have simple vows, and can. 582, if they have solemn vows), they are equated with the filii familias of Roman Law: they are incapable of possessing, retaining, disposing of, receiving, giving, or using anything without the permission of their superiors, even if the thing is given specifically for the individual and on a personal basis by the same relatives or derives from their patrimonial goods; moreover, whatever they realize through their own activity or personally acquire enters into the patrimony of the community (the cited canons and 594), from which they have the right to receive what is necessary.
In the case of religious, p. denotes any temporal good, assessable in monetary value, separated from the common mass, which the subject keeps and uses on his own authority for his personal desires or needs that are not currently present. Whatever the Superior gives for a specific purpose, even if future, is not p., because by designating the end, an indispensable element of p. is in fact removed (use on one’s own authority); thus, money which the Superior gives on a single occasion to a religious who must go out frequently and use the tram, etc., is not p. Similarly, clothing, books, furnishings, tools, etc. granted to an individual religious do not constitute p., whether they come directly from the Superior or are donated by outsiders, provided that they are understood to have been received for the community and that the Superior may grant or deny their use. The patrimony which a religious with simple vows must preserve with radical ownership, without the right to enjoy its fruits personally; money given to a religious by outsiders for honest and charitable purposes that are not personal, even if it is kept by the religious himself; spending money or goods obtained from one’s own work for a specific personal purpose or for the purpose of benefiting third parties, with the superior’s permission; etc., do not constitute p. P. exists in life annuities, pensions, and similar benefits established and given by relatives or third parties, if these goods do not enter the common mass and the religious may have the right to dispose of them (not if the Superior, out of a certain sense of equity, first takes account of the religious’s needs); in money deposited with the Superior for the direct purpose of providing food, clothing, etc., for a particular religious; and in the fact that the religious may obtain clothing, books, etc., from the proceeds of his work.
Religious p. may be perfect or proper, and imperfect or improper, according as the individual may keep and use things independently of the superior, or with his consent and under his authority, so that the Superior may limit or revoke their use. Proper p. is contrary to the poverty (v.), not merely to common life; therefore it cannot be introduced even by religious with simple vows (cf. can. 27); and in a matter of notable importance can. 2389 applies. Improper p. does not in itself destroy the vow of poverty; but it is contrary to perfect common life and to the will of the Church. Cann. 580 § 2, 582, and 594 use terms implying totality (quid-quad, omnia bona, quovis modo), and impose careful observance of common life in matters concerning food, clothing, etc., also on the part of Superiors; these must place in the common fund whatever they receive. It is clear that this is not a matter of mere material placement, but of juridical placement. Authors regard excessive rigor and severity on the part of the Superior in procuring things suitable for the dignified sustenance of religious as a principal cause of p.; a middle course thus becomes necessary. Suitability takes account of the strictness of the individual religious institutes, the needs of individuals, climatic and regional conditions, economic and social circumstances, and the resources of the common fund. Before the Council of Trent, improper p. was neither expressly prohibited nor expressly permitted. An implicit direct prohibition was issued at Trent (sess. XXV, de regularibus, c. 1 s.); a more forceful one came from Clement VIII (25 July 1599), from other popes, and from various decrees of the S. Congregation of Bishops and Regulars.
In the face of clear declarations and facts that were no less clear and not sporadic, authors asked whether improper p. could be introduced by custom. Some denied this, proceeding from the principle that no custom could derogate from the Council of Trent and that the obligatory public reading of Clement VIII’s decree removed the necessary legal consent of the legislator. Nevertheless, s. Alfonso considers the affirmative opinion well founded. In some institutes p. was officially permitted, on the condition that it be placed in the common fund, that the Superior’s consent be obtained for procuring particular things, and that the individual be prepared to renounce it as soon as the Superior deemed it appropriate to arrange otherwise.
Can. 594, and consequently all Constitutions, inculcate perfect common life and observance of poverty. Therefore, if in 1918 the custom ab immemorabili of p. was in force in some institutes, the Ordinary could, in accordance with can. 5, tolerate it if he judged that it could not prudently be abolished. In other religious institutes (provinces, monasteries, etc.), it could in future be introduced in accordance with can. 27, if the Superiors do not object.
It is clear that, in its concept, p. entails: a) a small quantity, b) use for purposes consonant with the religious state, c) effective dependence on the Superior. Experience teaches that p. causes serious harm to religious discipline and charity. Superiors have a grave obligation to abolish it, unless serious reasons advise against doing so; still more must they prevent its introduction, and therefore they must provide suitably for the needs of their subjects. Serious reasons for permitting its continuation are, for example, preventing the introduction of proper p., the indigence of the religious house, and the grave and prolonged negligence of Superiors in providing for the religious.
Genova 1877, nn. 717-27; A. Vermeersch, De religiosis, I, 2ª ed., Bruges 1907, nn. 273-81; F. X. Wernz, Jus decretalium, III, 2ª ed., Roma 1908, nn. 175-86; S. A. Loiano, Instit. theol. mor., III, Torino 1937, nn. 39, 705; T. Schaefer, De religiosis, 4ª ed., Roma 1947, nn. 1138-41; H. Jone, Comment. in CIC, I, Paderborn 1950, p. 524 sg. Sinisio da Romello