HOLY SEE. — The Catholic Church is a societas iuridica perfecta, that is, a primary legal order, and as such it has naturally understood within itself the character of sovereignty. The person who, by divine right, exercises this sovereignty in the Church is the Roman Pontiff, who, in the exercise of this same sovereignty, is assisted by certain governing organs; together with him they are known by the name of the Holy See.
Its definition is given by can. 7 of the CIC: *Nonmine Sedis Apostolicae vel Sanctae Sedis... veniunt non solum Romanus Pontifex, sed etiam, nisi ex nea natura vel sermonis contextu aliud appareat, Congregationes, Tribunalia, Officia, per quae idem Romanus Pontifex negotia Ecclesiae universae expedire solet.*
Therefore the expression Holy See can have two distinct meanings. In the first, broader sense, which is in fact its usual meaning, it includes, besides the Pontiff, the organs that assist him in the government of the Church, that is, the so-called Roman Curia. In the second, narrower sense, which is its exceptional meaning, to be adopted only when required by the nature of the matter or the context of the discourse, it includes only the Pontiff, excluding all auxiliary organs, but also considered in the abstractness of his supreme office, that is, as the Primatus Petri and his successors constituted by Jesus Christ, no longer as individual persons of the Roman Pontiffs.
I. The Holy See in canon law
1. Legal personality
By positive divine law the Holy See is not a mere office, but a true legal person (cf. can. 100 § 1). The legal personality of the Holy See is therefore founded, like that of the Church, on divine law itself.There is no doubt that the legal personality of the Holy See is not to be confused with that of the Church and that it constitutes a subject of law, existing indeed within and operating in the societas Ecclesiae, but with a personality of its own and distinct from that of the order itself; equally beyond doubt is that this personality is a true and proper subject of public law. The Holy See must be considered a public legal person par excellence; and there is no doubt, moreover, despite some isolated contrary opinions, that, like that of all other offices and dignities, this personality has an essentially institutional and not corporate nature.
More debatable and indeed controversial is the question whether this personality belongs to the Holy See in its broader sense or rather in its narrower sense. That the Holy See understood in the narrower sense, that is, *l'officium Roman Pontificis*, possesses the character of a moral person is beyond dispute, both because by divine right it is the Roman Pontificate that exists, without which the ecclesiastical Dicasteries that assist it would have no meaning, and moreover the ecclesiastical office in general is almost always considered in the CIC as a true subject of law; and because it has, if nothing else, the nature and characteristics of a true episcopal office (*Sedes episcopalis Romana*), for the *Sedes episcopales* the legal personality is explicitly recognized, independently and distinctly from the corresponding episcopal mensa (cf. can. 350 § 2). Equally beyond dispute is the fact that the Roman Curia, as a complex organism consisting of the Sacred Congregations, Tribunals and Offices (can. 242), possesses its own legal personality, just as the diocesan Curia does, and that, in any case, the individual Congregations, Tribunals and Offices that compose it have such personality. The entire problem, therefore, reduces itself to determining whether these various moral entities, in addition to constituting a collection of distinct subjects, sometimes present themselves also as a single subject of law in its own right, constituted by the individual entities but with a legal personality and capacity of its own, distinct from that of the various members that compose it (the so-called Holy See in the broader sense). The affirmative answer, however, seems to impose itself as the most correct, since the prescription of can. 7 not only presupposes the possibility of the existence of this complex entity, but formally sanctions indeed that, as a general rule, by *Apostolic See* one must understand precisely the unitary organism embracing the individual entities. And therefore can. 100 § 1 would refer to the Holy See both in the broader sense and in the narrower sense, that is, as a general rule in the first sense and as an exception in the second.
2. Legal capacity
With regard to the legal capacity of this entity, it may first be observed that, as a *subiectus iuris*, it is naturally the holder, within canon law, of that same legal capacity in public and private law that is proper to all other ecclesiastical moral entities and that, like them, enjoys by that title all those rights and privileges that the canon legislator attributes to them. A large part of such rights finds explicit consecration in specific provisions of positive law. Thus, with particular regard to its capacity in private law, the CIC itself recognizes in the Holy See the right to appear in court and the *ius acquirendi, retinendi et administrandi bona temporalia ad fines sibi proprios prosequendos* (can. 1495 § 1).Independently, however, of any express provision, such capacity, representing in substance nothing other than the concrete manifestation of its legal personality, constitutes in itself a true and proper *ius nativum* linked to its very nature, indeed a right belonging to it precisely as its personality does, *ex ipsa ordinatione divina*, and therefore absolutely inalienable, unchangeable and imprescriptible, both in its title and in its exercise.
3. Sovereignty (primacy) in the Church
The Holy See deserves particular consideration above all for the very special position it occupies in the juridical order of the Church according to the so-called *ius publicum ecclesiasticum*. From this public-law perspective the Holy See presents itself: a) as the supreme spiritual ruler of the universal Church, that is, as the *universalis Ecclesiae primatus*; b) as the temporal sovereign of the State of the Vatican City (v.); c) as Patriarch of the West, Primate of Italy, metropolitan of the Roman ecclesiastical province, bishop of Rome.Limiting the examination to only the first of these aspects, that is, to its position, prerogatives and rights as the supreme universal power of the Church, and referring for the examination of its position and attributes under the other aspects to the specific related entries (v. Papa; Patriarchi; PRIMASIO; Vaticano), the general juridical principles relating to it are expressly formulated in can. 218 § 1: *Romanus Pontifex, beati Petri in primata Sucessor, habet non solum primatum honoris, sed supremam et plenam potestatem iurisdictionis in universam Ecclesiam tum in rebus quae ad fidem et mores, tum in iis quae ad disciplinam et regimen Ecclesiae per totum orbem diffusae pertinent*. § 2: *Haec potestas est vere episcopalis, ordinaria et immediata tum in omnes et singulas ecclesias, tum in omnes et singulos pastores et fideles, a quavis humana auctoritate independens*.
This canon, however, constitutes nothing more than a simple summary and a mere translation into juridical terms of the general theological principles already formulated as true articles of faith in the Fourth Session of the Vatican Council and formally and solemnly expressed in the famous *First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ*; whereby the canon law order presents in this regard the singular and exclusive characteristic that this supreme primatial power proper to the Holy See finds its first roots, its preeminent protection and its ultimate justification in theology rather than in law, that is, in dogma even before juridical norms (v. PRIMASIO).
4. *Its Nature and Characteristics* — On the basis of these theological and juridical norms, the nature, content, and limits of the primatial authority belonging to the Holy See in the Church are clearly determined.
As regards its nature, it presents itself as: a) a *potestas iurisdictionis plena et suprema*, that is, a true and effective sovereign power, and not merely a primacy of honour or a simple power of representation, inspection, execution, or appeal; and, as such, a power superior and distinct from all others, embracing the *plenitudo iurium* necessary and sufficient to govern the Church both in its universal unity and in its particular circumscriptions, down to the individual relations of the faithful, whether in matters of faith and morals or in matters pertaining to ecclesiastical discipline and administration;
b) a *potestas ordinaria et immediata*: ordinary, in that it is inherent and proper to the office of the Holy See itself; and immediate (i.e., original), in that it is directly and immediately conferred upon its office by Christ Himself and not by delegation from the Church. From this follow two necessary consequences: 1) that the Holy See is the holder of this primatial power not by the will of the Church and through its conferral, but by the will of the deity, through its direct and immediate attribution, and thus not as the representative of a right of the canonical order, but rather as the bearer of a right proper and personal to itself, of which it is itself the subject, thereby rising from a mere organ of the sovereignty of the Church to the true holder of the sovereignty of the Church itself; 2) that, for the same reason, the enjoyment and exercise of these primatial powers remain naturally and necessarily independent and autonomous from the will and consent of the Church, since these rights do not belong to the Church even originally, even potentially or abstractly, and thus remain absolutely incapable of any modification, change, or revocation by the Church, and are endowed with the fullest and most complete inalienability, imprescriptibility, and immutability;
c) a *potestas vere episcopalis*, that is, a power which in itself possesses the full juridical possibility and capacity to substitute itself for the jurisdiction exercised by the various bishops within the scope of their diocesan circumscription, thus constituting a kind of *Episcopus universalis*, *Episcopus totius Ecclesiae*, with a jurisdiction potentially concurrent with that of the individual bishops of the various dioceses, whose governance it could reserve entirely to itself or, for particular matters, issue provisions in their place and stead.
5. *Its Content* — a) The Pope as Supreme Legislator — As regards the content of this universal primatial power, it embraces the sum of all supreme powers of governance, conferring upon the Pope the juridical figure of supreme legislator, supreme judge, supreme administrator, and supreme teacher and doctor of the Church.
The Holy See and the Ecumenical Council constitute the sole sources of production of universal canonical legislation, but it is the Pope who convokes and presides over the Council, whose canons do not acquire legislative force unless and until he has given his confirmation and ratification (can. 227). By virtue of this supreme legislative power, the Holy See declares and interprets divine natural and positive law and enacts universal and particular canonical laws: to the former it is itself naturally bound and subject, while to the latter it is absolutely superior, so much so that it may be said to stand *praeter, contra et supra legem* and thus to be able to abrogate, derogate from, or modify at its discretion both general and particular norms, whether issued by previous Popes or by lower ecclesiastical hierarchies, and to grant privileges and dispensations in particular cases (can. 36 § 1, 81). For their enactment and publication, a determined form is prescribed, but the Holy See as such (and apart from the individual Dicasteries) is not strictly bound to observe it and may even completely disregard it (can. 9), so that the famous principle *quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem* may be applied to it in all its extent.
b) As Supreme Administrator — In this capacity, the Holy See has the representation of the universal Church, which it personifies both in its internal activity and in its external relations with civil authorities (can. 3, 163, 255, 265, 267); it oversees the maintenance of exclusive discipline, the observance of dogmas and canonical laws, divine worship, and the Sacraments (can. 1145, 1256, 1257, 1259, etc.), as well as the functioning of secular and regular ecclesiastical offices and entities, exercising constant control over the entire Church, both directly through its legates (can. 267) and through the mediation of lower ecclesiastical authorities, from which it receives written and oral reports on the state of the territories entrusted to them (can. 340–42); it establishes, modifies, and suppresses ecclesiastical offices and benefices (can. 1414, 1422, 1425, etc.), religious orders and associations (can. 488, 492–94, 497, 498), and Catholic universities and faculties (can. 1276); it is the supreme collator of all ecclesiastical offices and benefices (can. 1431), and to it alone is reserved the appointment, transfer, and deposition of the major officials of the Church’s hierarchy, such as cardinals (can. 232 § 1), bishops and auxiliary bishops (can. 329 § 2), the major officials of the Roman Curia, papal legates, and chapter dignitaries (can. 396 § 1, 1435 § 1), as well as the conferral of the respective benefices (can. 1435); it is the supreme superior of all religious (can. 499), and it is for the Holy See to grant permission for passage from one religious order to another (can. 632) and the indult of exclaustration and secularization (can. 638); it convokes, presides over, suspends, and dissolves the Ecumenical Council and confirms its deliberations (can. 222); it grants permission for the convocation of plenary councils (can. 281); it presides over the organization of missions (can. 1350 § 2); and, finally, it is the supreme administrator and dispenser of all the temporal goods of the universal Church (can. 1518), and as such may dispose of the temporal goods of extinct regular and secular entities (can. 493, 674), alienate them directly or authorize their owners to alienate ecclesiastical goods, whether for consideration or gratuitously, without any limit whatsoever (can. 534 § 1, 1532 § 1, 1541 § 1); regulate, commute, and reduce burdens and dispositions in last wills for pious causes (*ad pias causas*) (can. 1517 § 1, 1551 § 1); impose and remit taxes on ecclesiastical entities and the faithful (can. 1056, 1507), and condone debts in whole or in part.
c) As supreme judge (can. 1597). — As such, it is directly reserved the jurisdiction from the first instance of the so-called causae maiores (can. 220), that is, those controversies which either by their very nature cannot pertain except to the Pope (e.g., causes relating to faith), or which the Pope has, by positive law, reserved to his direct examination and judgment, excluding any jurisdiction of inferior judges both because of the particular difficulties in their treatment and because of the dignity of the persons constituting the parties in the cause. Thus, he reserves to his personal examination all causes relating to heads of state and their children, and penal causes against bishops, even titular ones (can. 1557 § 1, 2227 § 1); and he retains for the exclusive competence of his tribunals both the judgment of bishops in non-patrimonial civil causes and ecclesiastical moral persons immediately dependent on the Holy See, such as exempt religious orders and monastic congregations (can. 1557 § 2); and the conduct of investigations into ratified but unconsummated marriages for their dissolution (can. 1962), and the processes of beatification and canonization (can. 1999); and finally the infliction of certain censures (can. 2245). In the appellate stage, or in the last instance, it always pertains to the Holy See to examine and decide all civil and penal causes without exception (can. 1597, 1599 § 1). Finally, it possesses in every case a full and unappealable right of avocation, by virtue of which it may always withdraw to itself personally or to its own tribunals any controversy, whether from the beginning or at any stage or degree of the trial, regardless of the authority before which it is pending (can. 1557 § 3, 1569, 1599 § 2). Naturally, moreover, on the basis of the well-known dogmatic principle, now confirmed in can. 1556, that the first see is judged by no one, no appeal of any kind is admitted against its decisions before any other authority, and in particular the appeal both to the ecumenical council (can. 228 § 2, 2332) and to secular authority (appellatio ab abusu) is formally forbidden and severely punished.
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d) As supreme teacher and doctor. — As such, it establishes the dogmatic principles relating to the Catholic faith throughout the entire world (can. 218), and in this capacity the Pope is infallible, that is, the definitions issued by him by virtue of this supreme apostolic power on a given dogmatic point cannot be the object of doubt or discussion of any kind, bind the faithful perpetually, and are irreformable in themselves, not by the consent of the Church (can. 1323; cf. INFAILLIBILITÀ).
6. Autocratic essence of sovereignty in the Church
These brief observations are more than sufficient to conclude that the constitutional order of the Church in its form of regiminis, that is, in the type of government by which it is ruled, must be considered as the classic example of an absolute monarchical regime in its most explicit and symptomatic form, namely, as an order in which supreme authority, in all its various functions and manifestations, resides in its fullness in a single subject, the Holy See, which constitutes the principle and center of all social unity, caput et fundamentum totius Ecclesiae, and to which all other subjects of the same order are completely subordinate and dependent. Indeed, in this system, the supreme authority of the Holy See, deriving its source directly from divinity and grounding its title and exercise in positive divine law itself, is so inherent and connatural to the very existence of the order that it possesses the most complete and absolute inalienability, imprescriptibility, and immutability. To this is added the fact that, independently even of this theological basis, the very dogmatic principle of infallibility covers this universal primacy in all its functioning and in all its principal manifestations, inasmuch as, apart from the elasticity of its limits, it certainly safeguards and preserves those dogmatic definitions and declarations that reflect the Catholic faith and morals, and thus, given the nature of the Church’s order, precisely all that legislative activity of the Holy See which pertains to the foundation and bases of its legal system.Under these conditions, it is easily understood why ecclesiastical jurists rightly observe that in the constitutional order of the Church there is absolutely no trace, according to its current positive law, of any division of powers in the exercise of sovereignty (at least in the technical sense proper to that concept), nor is there any possibility, de iure condendo, of a future realization of such a form of government, as being contrary to the very nature of the public order of the Church as instituted by Christ. If in fact, from the earliest times, a certain more or less pronounced distinction of powers is found in its constitution (cf. can. 106, 242-64, 1553, etc.), this in reality has no basis or justification other than the will of the Pope himself, who remains fully free to revoke, restrict, or modify it at his absolute discretion and notwithstanding any rights acquired by third parties; while the various organs, subjects, and dicasteries that in fact participate in sovereignty exercise their functions and attributions only by delegation from the Holy See itself and as its mere representatives.
It is therefore only as a matter of fact that the research and determination hitherto made of the powers and functions of government proper to the Holy See can have any value. In terms of law, it is sufficient to observe with canonists that it is superfluous to enumerate the specific prerogatives of the primatial power one by one, for, since the Roman Pontiff possesses ecclesiastical authority extensively and intensively, and since he stands above canon law itself, we may briefly say that he can do anything he wishes. For the limits placed upon him are not fixed by natural law, by positive divine law, by the end of the religious and spiritual society over which he presides, as regards validity; nor by prudence and the obligation to act for edification and not for destruction, as regards the lawful exercise of his power. Apart from these limits, marked either by the basic norm from which the Church’s order derives its juridical constitution and value, or by its own intrinsic and proper nature, it pertains to the Holy See to possess the true plenitudo iurium necessary for ruling the Church, that is, the fullest, absolute, and unlimited sovereignty over all its members and hierarchies, so as to concentrate in its office all the authority and sovereign powers of government of the society itself over which it presides.
I. The Holy See in the Italian legal system
II. The regime of the Lateran Agreements
The political-legal problem of the position of freedom and independence of the Holy See in Italy, which for a long time was the subject of a serious and irreconcilable conflict between State and Church (v. ROMAGNA) and which had already been regulated by the so-called Law of Guarantees (v.), unilaterally enacted by the Italian State and never accepted by the Holy See, has finally found its solution in the Lateran Pacts (v.). In these Agreements, and in particular in the Treaty, a series of guarantees of a political and legal nature—among which the creation of a true temporal State—have been established to ensure, in a stable manner, a factual and legal condition for the Holy See within the Italian legal system, guaranteeing its absolute independence for the fulfillment of its lofty mission in the world (preamble, para. 1), that is, whatever is necessary for it to govern the diocese of Rome and the Catholic Church in Italy and throughout the world with due freedom and independence (art. 26, para. 1).These agreements present two essential characteristics: a) the formal one, of determining the legal position of the Holy See in the Italian legal system not through a unilateral regulation, sovereignly imposed and modifiable by the Italian State through the enactment of an internal law, but through a bilateral discipline, conventionally agreed upon between the State and the Holy See and modifiable only by mutual consent through the stipulation of an international agreement; b) the substantive one, of basing this position not merely on personal sovereignty, but also on temporal sovereignty, and not merely on a set of simple legal guarantees, but also and primarily on a territorial guarantee, integrating the personal prerogatives already conferred upon it by the Law of Guarantees with the attribution and recognition of its full and exclusive sovereign jurisdiction over a specific autonomous territory, thus placing it once again at the head of a true State, as it was before 1870.
At present, therefore, the position of freedom and independence of the Holy See in the Italian legal system is conventionally ensured by a fundamental guarantee of a political-territorial nature (the State of the City of Vatican) and by a set of complementary guarantees of a legal-personal nature (v. PATTI LATERANENSIS; vaticano). Among these complementary guarantees, special mention should be made of the legal qualification of Italy as a Catholic State.
Analogous to the Law of Guarantees, which in Title II provided an additional guarantee of the independence and freedom of the Holy See precisely through the voluntary assumption by the Italian State of a specific political and legal attitude and behavior toward religion and the Church—but contrary to its guiding principle, which saw such a guarantee in the proclamation of the separation of Church and State and in the profession of agnosticism, indifferentism, and aconfessionalism on the part of the latter in religious matters—in art. 1 of the Treaty, Italy recognizes and reaffirms the principle enshrined in art. 1 of the Statuto del Regno of 4 March 1848, according to which the Catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion is the only religion of the State. For the content, effects, and limits of this solemn profession of faith by the Italian State, reference should be made to the entry Italia, IV. Condizione giuridica della Chiesa.
7. The position of the Holy See in the Italian legal system
Even with this new and changed regulatory regime, the legal position of the Holy See in the Italian legal system has remained, more or less, the same as it substantially possessed under the Law of Guarantees, both in public and private law.As regards its public law position, as in the previous regime, the Holy See today appears in the Italian legal system as a completely autonomous and independent organism, absolutely exempt from the sovereignty of the Italian State and from the empire of its laws, not only with regard to its temporal and political activity as head of the State of the City of Vatican and thus as sovereign of a foreign State, but also with regard to all its spiritual and religious activity as supreme ruler of the Church, both in relation to the entire Catholic world and, in particular, within the Italian territory. In this respect, the difference from the previous regime lies solely in the fact that whereas in the past there was no formal recognition by the Italian State of this autonomy and independence of the Holy See, and it derived solely from the substantive content of its actual position in the Italian legal system as a logical consequence, today, in art. 2 of the Treaty, by formally recognizing the sovereignty of the Holy See in the international sphere as an attribute inherent to its nature, in conformity with its tradition and the exigencies of its mission in the world, the Italian State officially and solemnly acknowledges such qualification and position in relation to itself, as a presupposition of the very convention stipulated with it, and specifically recognizes it as the supreme religious ruler of the Church, thus distinguishing it clearly and autonomously from the position it holds as temporal sovereign of the State of the City of Vatican. Moreover, whereas in the previous regime the existence or non-existence of this legal position was in any case dependent on the persistence of the factual condition accorded to it in the Italian legal system and was based on an internal law of the Italian State, which could be unilaterally revoked at its discretion; today, instead, it is independent of its actual substantive condition and is based on an international agreement and thus on a bilateral discipline conventionally agreed upon between the Holy See and the Italian State and modifiable or revocable only by mutual consent.
As for its private law position, by virtue of art. 29(a) of the Concordat, the Holy See still retains unchanged that legal personality which had already been recognized to it by the pre-concordat Italian laws, and in this regard is governed by the civil norms relating to the condition, activity, and acquisitions of ecclesiastical moral bodies (cf. Treaty, art. 11; Concordat, art. 27 para. 1; 30 para. 2; law no. 848 of 27 May 1929, arts. 9–11); hence today the former dispute regarding the capacity of the Holy See to acquire property and the necessity of prior authorization by the Italian State can be considered definitively resolved in the affirmative. Likewise, the well-known question regarding the charitable nature of its legal personality can be considered resolved in the affirmative. For not only has sovereignty been recognized to the Holy See, but also full ownership of the territory of the State of the City of Vatican (Treaty, art. 3), thus reconstituting for it a patrimonial endowment; since it is beyond dispute that the Holy See has such a nature in canon law, indeed constituting the highest beneficiary entity of the Church; and since, on the other hand, it is a basic principle of Italian legislation in ecclesiastical matters that the State generally recognizes in Church entities the same nature and characteristics conferred upon them by canon law, it does not seem that there is any reason to deny, with any foundation, to the Holy See the legal figure of a true beneficiary entity, albeit of a peculiar kind.
### III. The Holy See in the International Order
The Holy See holds an international legal status. As is well known, the Holy See asserts itself as a subject of international law not only by virtue of its temporal power as sovereign of the State of the Vatican City, like all other temporal princes (v. VATICAN), but also, and primarily and independently, by virtue of its universal spiritual primacy as the supreme institution of the Church. Restricting ourselves to current canon law, the *Codex Iuris Canonici* (CIC), after recognizing in canon 100 § 1 its divine right moral personality, provides in subsequent canons for the Holy See’s relations with subjects of the international community. It regulates the organs (the Congregation of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs; the Secretariat of State) that act in its name in matters connected with civil laws and international agreements with various nations (cf. canons 3, 163, 255, 265, 267). Moreover, in article 2 of the Lateran Treaty, the Holy See secured formal recognition from Italy of its sovereignty in the international sphere as an inherent attribute of its nature, in conformity with tradition and the exigencies of its mission in the world, thereby unequivocally demonstrating its claim to and assertion of such qualification within the international community.
At present, moreover, the issue may be considered fully resolved, and international legal doctrine is almost unanimous in accepting what was already evident from the reality of facts and the will of States: namely, that it recognizes—despite the most opposed and varied theories and with greater or lesser limitations—the existence of effective legal personality of the Holy See in the realm of international relations.
### 2. Duality of Such Personality
By contrast, still debated and disputed is the question of the title under which it currently enjoys this subjectivity: whether solely as head of the Church and religious sovereign, or merely as head of the State of the Vatican City and temporal sovereign, or indeed in both capacities simultaneously. Consequently, whether this title is single or dual, and whether its legal personality in this sphere is single or dual.
One point, however, is certain: namely, that the two orders—the Church and the State of the Vatican City—from which the Holy See derives its juridical existence and capacity, and thus its possible qualification and rights as a subject of the international community according to its own subjective determination, are both decisively informed and governed, in their fundamental principles as in their individual positive provisions, by the precise dualistic presupposition: that is, the clear distinction between the two orders, the Church and the State of the Vatican City, and between the two corresponding sovereignties personified in the Holy See. This dualism is evident both within their respective internal spheres and in the external sphere of their reciprocal relations, and above all in their relations and activities with foreign legal systems. Indeed, it is precisely in the international legal sphere that both orders, in their positive law, strive to emphasize and even accentuate the dualism of the two personalities within the Holy See, and to maintain a clear distinction between the title, scope, and limits of their respective capacity to act and their concrete actions. Precisely in this field, in fact, they exclude any idea of representation of one entity by the other and any possibility of fusion or interpenetration of the two organisms into a single subject of both spiritual and temporal nature, intended to safeguard the interests of the Church and those of the State of the Vatican City vis-à-vis other members of the international community.
This dualistic presupposition is most clearly revealed in the individual legislative provisions of both canon law and Vatican law. Even without delving into an analysis of these specific norms of positive law in the two systems, it finds necessary confirmation in the very theoretical principle of canon law, according to which the possibility of the existence of a primary order is inconceivable unless it is, by definition, a true *subiectus iuris* in both the internal and international orders. It is evident, in fact, on this basis, that the acceptance of any monistic hypothesis of fusion or interpenetration of one organism into the other—even solely in the sphere of their international capacity and activity—would necessarily imply that one or the other of them would be deprived of such nature. This would mean either that the Church would no longer be a *societas iuridica perfecta*, contrary to the express prescriptions of divine and canon law; or that the State of the Vatican City would no longer be a true State, in antithesis to the quasi-dogmatic legal principle of the necessity of an effective State for the spiritual independence of the Holy See.
It is equally certain that this same dualistic presupposition of the two distinct sovereignties and international personalities was formally asserted by the Holy See and accepted by the Italian State in the stipulation of the Lateran Agreements, and that it has come to constitute the informing spirit, foundation, object, and true keystone of the Treaty (it suffices to recall articles 2, 3, 23, 24, and 26 of the same, which reveal in an unequivocal manner the distinction and opposition between the two organisms recognized as possessing their own distinct international personality).
Now, undoubtedly, the fact that canon law and Vatican law establish this specific relationship between the two entities, and that in the sphere of international relations it has been accepted by one of its members, the Italian State, does not in itself imply that the other States, and thus the international community as a whole, must necessarily adopt it in their regard. They might well determine otherwise, even in a manner contrasting with this view. Yet the fact that, in entering into relations with the Holy See, they have neither expressly nor tacitly specified any different determination seems to be a necessary and sufficient element to deduce their willingness to take note of its subjective self-determination and to conform their behavior accordingly. Thus, it may be rightly concluded that in the international sphere and community, the Holy See must be recognized, in accordance with the qualification and nature it claims for itself, as a dual and distinct subject: one representing and safeguarding the interests of the Church, the other those of the State of the Vatican City.
### 3. Relationship Between the Two Personalities
Having established this fundamental dualistic presupposition, it remains to determine the relationship between these two distinct subjectivities that are combined in the Holy See. The problem has been one of the most debated and controversial in the doctrine of international law, and as such deserves a brief mention.
Certainly to be excluded first of all is the notion that this relationship can be reduced to a type of simple personal union, that is, a union characterized by a merely occasional and contingent conjunction of the person of the sovereign of the two orders, arising from purely accidental reasons and liable to cease. Indeed, both in its creation and in its subsistence, the State of the City of Vatican is justified only as a State that is the necessary object of the sovereignty of the Holy See and pursues the specific end of ensuring its freedom and independence as the supreme institution of the Church. Thus, the bond that ties it to the latter and makes of the latter its sovereign is, by its very nature, indissoluble, immutable, and perpetual, and therefore altogether different from that which characterizes any personal union whatsoever.
Equally to be excluded, on the other hand, is the hypothesis of a real union, such as would indeed reflect and safeguard perfectly the necessary and indissoluble conjunction between the two sovereignties and international subjectivities of the Holy See, but which, in turn, would not accord with the natural and necessary subordination that exists and must exist between the state organism and the extra-state organism and between the international personality of the Holy See as the supreme representative of the former and as the supreme institution of the latter. As is well known, in fact, the primary reason for the existence and the ultimate condition for the life of the pontifical temporal sovereignty is precisely and solely that of being and having to be a mere means of protection and safeguard for its spiritual sovereignty.
What remains is the figure of an improper and non-parallel union, such as that subsisting between a suzerain State and a vassal State, or between a protecting State and a protected State. But, apart from any other divergence, when one considers that this bond of union and subordination is found to exist between two organisms of essentially different nature, that is, between a religious organization and a State, and therefore between two organisms and two subjects each exercising their activity, by definition, in an absolutely distinct sphere of relations, it is easily understood how even this figure is in itself as unusable as the other two examined above.
It is precisely this last observation that precludes any possibility of identifying or assimilating the juridical relationship existing between these two organisms and subjects with any of the classical doctrinal figures of unions between States, and leads to the conclusion that it is a union truly unique and singular, resting on three essentially concurrent and, in a certain respect, contradictory factors: a) a complete and perfect sovereignty and international personality of the two subjects, distinct and autonomous both in its juridical title and in its concrete exercise; b) a very strict bond of stable, necessary, and inviolable union between the one and the other, such as to keep them indissolubly bound together even in the future; c) a subordination, finally, intimate and immutable, of the state entity to the extra-state entity, such as to make of the former, first and foremost, a mere means and safeguard for the attainment of the ends of the latter.