SANCTION. — From the Latin *sancire*, it denotes the solemnity of a sovereign act by which a law, pact, or contract acquires the character of absolute inviolability (*sanctum, sanctum*). In an immediately derived sense, *s.* indicates the penal prosecution of violations of what has been sanctioned, as a necessary guarantee for its practical enforcement, thus becoming synonymous with penal law. *Sanctae quoque res, veluti muri et portae civitatis, quodammodo divini iuris sunt... Ideo autem muros sanctos vocamus, quia poena capitis constituta est in eos qui aliquid in muros deliquerint. Ideo et legum eas partes quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fecerint, sanctiones vocamus* (Inst., II, *De rerum divisione*, § 10). In a general sense, the term *s.* expresses all the good or bad consequences that accrue to a person or group from their activity (natural, social, moral *sanctions*), which, foreseen by them, influence decisions as motives (psychological *sanctions*).
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### I. SANCTION IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
The concept of *sanction* is intimately connected with the solution to the problem of the obligatoriness of moral law (v. OBLIGATION). Naturalism (v.), whether empirical or rationalistic, interpreting moral obligation according to the principles of determinism, considers *sanction* the necessary result of psychophysical or rational laws. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, sees in *sanction* the very cause of moral obligatoriness, which is thus reduced to psychological pressure or a hypothetical imperative (J. Bentham, *Principles of Moral and Legislation*, Oxford 1907, III, § 2; J. Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, London 1863, ch. 3). Sociological positivism reduces moral *sanction* to social pressure, as the very cause of moral norms and their obligatory force (E. Durkheim, *Division du travail social*, 2nd ed., Paris 1902, p. 47; P. Fauconnet, *La responsabilité*, étude de sociologie, 1912, p. 297). In all these conceptions, moral *sanction* is reduced to natural, psychological, and social *sanctions*, which are extrinsic to the true moral life of the person, even if they represent a conditioning factor.
For Christian thought, moral life is realized in the interiority of the person through the free choice of good or evil: the will for good is the free adherence of love to God and His law, expressed in the essential demands of rational nature in relation to its ultimate end; the will for evil is the free "aversion" from God, as a violation of moral law. It is understandable that living according to or against nature necessarily entails an immediate natural *sanction*, ranging from the comfort of a upright conscience and the remorse of a wicked conscience to the broader and more remote consequences of virtue and vice on the individual and social planes. However, moral *sanction* can only be situated in the attainment of the ultimate end to which all moral life is directed (cf. C. Gent., III, 140); such attainment is not merely the fruit of natural development but is God’s response to the merit (v.) that the person has acquired toward Him by fulfilling his vocation through the constant will for the good He desires: *"meritum est quoddam iter in finem beatitudinis"* (St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 35, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4). The pains of earthly life are considered by Christianity as *sanctions* of sin, both original and actual (*malum poenae*), to be absolutely distinguished from moral *sanction*, which follows directly from the *malum culpae* of the individual person (ibid., *De malo*, q. 1, a. 4; *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 48, a. 5). The pain and suffering that even the just endure can be transformed into an act of love and expiatory, propitiatory union with the merits of Christ and the saints, thereby achieving the greatest interior freedom from all natural and social conditioning (*Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 49, a. 3). Moral and perfect *sanction* is realized only in the afterlife through eternal possession or eternal privation of God; yet it is already initially expressed in earthly life through merit or demerit, which inherently imply a state of friendship or enmity with God. St. Augustine, in *De Civitate Dei*, also admits an earthly *sanction* of societies as such: it consists in the attainment of earthly prosperity or the ruin of peoples. Vico posits as a historical law that cities fallen into irreverence and immorality share in divine wrath, losing all their human civilization and even the possibility of political freedom (cf. *Scienza Nuova seconda*, Bari 1942, pp. 161–63).
Kant separates the concept of *sanction* from that of morality, arguing that the intention of reward transforms the categorical imperative of pure duty into the utilitarian calculation of a hypothetical imperative. Yet he acknowledges the necessity of positing a *sanction* adequate to the categorical and universal nature of the pure law of duty; hence the postulate of God’s existence, which grants perfect moral holiness the fullness of happiness (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, I. II, ch. 2, § 5). However, it must be observed that the transcendental form of the categorical law of pure duty, devoid of content, does not explain the essence of moral life, which is love of the Absolute Good and thus a perpetual striving to attain it through the fulfillment of moral duty: God must be loved above oneself, and thus no utilitarian calculation can intervene, even if the love of God is for us the source of supreme happiness. Attaining such perfection of love is a difficult path of moral formation; hence the necessity of psychological *sanctions* that pedagogically assist man in overcoming his egoism and conditioning to achieve full moral freedom: *"Whoever acts solely with a view to rewards or punishments may still do good, but does not do it well"* (cf. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, 121: PL 40, 288).
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### II. SANCTION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
The problem of *sanction* in the philosophy of law (v.) is connected to the conception of the value of the legal order. The legal order finds its raison d’être in natural law—and thus fundamentally in eternal law—which demands social life as a necessary means for human perfection. Positive law, necessary for the attainment of the common good, finds in the absolute value of divine eternal law the foundation of its imperative character. As imperative, positive law acquires the character of inviolability and thus of coercibility. Coercibility is fundamentally of a moral nature: the law binds subjects to its observance, placing them in personal responsibility before society and its necessary ends. It is in this sense that the positive character of *sanction*, necessary for the perfection of law, is expressed: by imposing a moral and civil personal duty, the law places itself in intrinsic correlation with the supreme values of human conscience. Yet given the inadequacy and moral imperfection of human nature, it is necessary that the coercibility of positive law also acquire a meaning of moral faculty to exercise physical coercion against its violators; *sanction* thus assumes a negative character, that is, the defense of the established order, exerting psychological pressure through the promise of rewards or the threat of punishment.
The problem of *sanction* in the philosophy of law thus transforms into that of the value and scope of penal law.
Three are the inherent characteristics of sanctions, according to the purpose of punishment: the vindictive purpose, inasmuch as it is intended to repair the dignity of the violated law, according to the principle: "punitur quia peccatum est"; the social purpose, namely to guarantee the attainment of the public good; and the medicinal purpose, inasmuch as punishment serves as a warning to all and an attempt at the reformation of the offender, according to the principle: "punitur, ne peccetur." Certainly, the vindictive aspect has its importance and corresponds to the human will for justice; however, it has only a partial significance, since only God can fully enact perfect justice and punish sin in its personal dimension as guilt (Deut. 32:35; cf. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 108, ad 1): the law can only punish the crime as an external act and as just expiation for the offense against public conscience. Fundamental, instead, is the social purpose, because the public good, as the proper end of the legal order, demands the punishment of offenders in proportion and within the limits imposed by its safeguarding. The medicinal purpose derives from the very nature of the public good, which is essentially directed toward the ultimate good of individuals and to making every citizen a useful member in the life of the community. Christian thought, in the name of human dignity and the limit of public authority marked by the purpose of the common good, emphasizes above all the pedagogical character of sanctions (cf. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 96, ad 5).
The separation of morality from law, as effected by contractualism and jurisdictionalism, makes physical coercibility the essential element of positive law. The Italian school of criminology (Lombroso, Ferri) considers criminal law not as a sanction, but as social defense against those who are constitutionally incapable of acting according to civil order.
Tullio Piacentini
I. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE AGGRESSOR
Under this name came all those diplomatic, economic, financial, and even military measures which, without yet reaching the point of open hostilities (v.), were envisaged in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (v.) as a preventive measure against one or more member States that had resorted to war under circumstances prohibited by the Covenant (aggressors).In the history of the League of Nations, few were the cases of application, and the most notorious was that against Italy at the time of the Ethiopian War. A first threat of sanctions by the Council of the League occurred against Greece for its invasion of Bulgaria (20 Oct. 1925); Greece submitted. In the war between Bolivia and Paraguay, no proper sanctions were applied, but only the lifting of the arms embargo on Bolivia; as a protest, Paraguay resigned from membership in the League of Nations (23 Feb. 1935).
The invasion of Ethiopia by Italy (3 Oct. 1935) provoked a vote by the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, which declared Italy’s recourse to war contrary to the provisions of the Covenant; this vote was approved by the Assembly with the consent of 50 members out of 54 (9 Oct. 1935). The sanctions measures were then put into effect by a Coordination Committee and applied beginning 18 Nov. The measure was unsuccessful, also because there was a lack of uniformity in its application among the States; thus, after the annexation of Ethiopia to Italy, they were revoked (4 July 1936).
On the occasion of Japan’s aggression against China, then no longer a member of the League of Nations, the Council contented itself with a declaration that member States now had reason to take individual measures envisaged by Article 16. On the occasion of Russia’s aggression against Finland, the latter was expelled from the League of Nations (14 Dec. 1939), and member States were invited to aid Finland.
Sanctions measures are also envisaged in the Statute of the U.N., where they have not yet found application, whereas armed intervention in support of the aggrieved party against the aggressor has been applied. The establishment of a supranational authority or of any arbitration tribunal necessarily entails recourse to certain measures against transgressors and recalcitrants. Even Benedict XV envisaged economic boycott as a repressive measure against the aggressor (letter of 1 Oct. 1917). Given the industrial nature of modern warfare, certain economic measures could have real preventive efficacy against war and repressive efficacy against aggression, but above all, an efficient international organization is required that knows how to apply them firmly and ensure their observance.
II. SANCTIONS AGAINST FASCISM
Under this title came the Royal Decree-Law of 27 July 1944, which coordinated * the previous provisions on the purging or removal from political offices and public employment (sometimes also from private ones) of persons who had seriously compromised themselves with Fascism (v.) before or after 25 July 1943 or had rendered themselves guilty of collaboration with the Germans. The first provisions on defascistization date to 28 Dec. 1943; modifications were introduced by Royal Decree-Law of 12 Apr. 1944; on 13 Apr., a High Commission for National Purge of Fascism was finally established. New norms in the matter were issued by the Royal Decree-Law of 26 May 1944 and by the aforementioned Decree-Law of 27 July 1944, which entrusted the application of the norms to the High Commission for Sanctions against Fascism, called to replace the previous Commission. Another Decree-Law of 3 Oct. 1944 subdivided the aforementioned body into four High Sub-Commissions (1st for the punishment of crimes, 2nd for purging from administrations, 3rd for the appropriation of regime profits, 4th for the liquidation of Fascist assets), and other Decree-Laws of 11 Oct., 23 Oct. 1944, and 4 Jan. 1945 issued new norms in the matter. The direction of the inquisitorial body passed successively, with the resignation of Carlo Sforza, from the High Commissioner to the President and then to the Vice-President of the Council and finally to a special office of the Presidency of the Council (8 Feb. 1946). Other decrees followed: Decree-Law of 9 Nov. 1945, which revised the entire matter of purging and limited, within the deadline of 1 Mar. 1946, the purging of officials from the 7th grade to cases of serious partisanship, etc.; Decree-Laws of 26 Mar. and 2 Aug. 1946; Decree of the Provisional Government of 7 Feb. 1948.Amnesties tempered the rigor of these laws.