Sanction

SANCTION. - From the Latin sancire, it indicates the solemnity of a sovereign act, whereby a law, a pact or a contract acquires the character of absolute inviolability (sanctium, sanctum). In a sense immediately derived from this, s. indicates the criminal enforceability against the violation of what has been sanctioned, as the necessary guarantee of its practical implementation, thus coming to be synonymous with criminal law. "Sanctae quoque res, veluti muri et portae civitatis, quodammodo divini iuris sunt... Ideo autem muros sanctos vocamus, quia poena capitis constituta est in eos qui aliquid in muros deliquerint. Ideo et legum eas partes quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fecerint, sanctiones vocamus" (Inst., II, De rerum divis. § 10). In a general sense the term s. expresses all the good or bad consequences deriving to a person, or to a group, from its activity (natural, social, moral s.), and which, being foreseen by it, influence its decisions as a motive (psychological s.).

I. SANCTION IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

The concept of s. is intimately connected with the solution of the problem of the obligatoriness of the moral law (v. OBBLIGAZIONE). Naturalism (v.), whether empirical or rationalistic, interpreting moral obligation according to the principles of determinism, holds s. to be the necessary result of psychophysical or rational laws. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, sees in s. the very cause of moral obligatoriness, which is therefore reduced to a psychological pressure or to a hypothetical imperative (J. Bentham, Princ. of moral and legislation, Oxford 1907, III, § 2; J. Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, London 1863, ch. 3). Sociological positivism reduces moral s. to social pressure, as the very cause of moral ideas and of their obligatory force (E. Durkheim, Division du travail social, 2nd ed., Paris 1902, p. 47; P. Fauconnet, La responsabilité, étude de sociologie, ibid. 1920, p. 297). In all these conceptions moral s. is reduced to natural, psychological and social s., which are extrinsic to the true moral life of the person, even if they represent a conditioning of it. For Christian thought the moral life is enacted in the interiority of the person, through the free choice of good or evil: the will of good is a free adherence of love to God and to his law, expressed in the essential demands of rational nature in relation to its ultimate end; the will of evil is a free "aversion" from God, insofar as it is a violation of the moral law. It is understandable that living according to nature and against nature necessarily entails an immediate natural s., which ranges from the comfort of a right conscience and the remorse of an evil conscience to the broader and more remote consequences of virtue and vice on the individual and social plane. But moral s. can be posited only on the plane of the attainment of the ultimate end to which the whole moral life is directed (cf. C. Gent., III, 140); such attainment is not simply the fruit of natural development, but is God's response to the merit (v.) that the person has acquired toward him by fulfilling his vocation through the constant will of the good willed by him: "meritum est quoddam iter in finem beatitudinis" (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 35, q. 1a, a. 3 ad 4). The sorrows of earthly life are considered by Christianity as s. of sin, both original and actual (malum poenae), to be absolutely distinguished from the moral s. that directly follows the malum culpae of the individual person (id., De malo, q. 1, a. 4; Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 48, a. 5). The punishment and pain that strike even the just man can be transformed into an act of love and of expiatory and propitiatory union with the merits of Christ and of the saints: thus the greatest interior freedom is brought about with respect to all natural and social conditioning (Sum. Theol., 3a, q. 49, a. 5). Perfect moral s. is found only in the future life with the eternal possession or the eternal privation of God; but it already expresses itself initially in earthly life in merit or demerit, which have implicit in themselves the state of friendship or enmity with God. St. Augustine in the De Civitate Dei also admits an earthly s. of societies as such: it consists in the attainment of earthly prosperity or in the ruin of peoples. Vico posits as a historical law that cities fallen into irreligion and immorality become dens of wild beasts, losing all their human civilization and the very possibility of political liberty (cf. Scienza Nuova seconda, Bari 1942, pp. 161-63).

Kant severs the concept of s. from that of morality, holding that the intention of reward transforms the categorical imperative of pure duty into the utilitarian calculation of a hypothetical imperative: he nevertheless recognizes the necessity of positing the existence of an s. adequate to the categoricalness and universality of the pure law of duty; hence the postulate of the existence of God, who confers upon perfect moral holiness the fullness of happiness (Kritik d. pr. Vernunft, I, II, ch. 2, § 5). But it must be observed that the transcendental form of the categorical law of pure duty without content does not explain the essence of the moral life, which is love of the absolute Good and therefore a perennial effort to reach its possession through the fulfillment of moral duty: God must be loved above ourselves, and therefore no utilitarian calculation can be interposed, even if the love of God is for us the source of the greatest happiness. To attain such perfection of love is an arduous path of moral formation: hence the necessity of psychological s. that pedagogically help man to overcome his egoisms and his conditioning in order to realize full moral freedom: "He who acts solely in view of rewards or punishments can still do good; but he does not do it well" (cf. St. Augustine, Enchir., 121: PL 40, 288).

II. THE SANCTION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

The problem of sanction in the philosophy of law (v.) is connected to the conception of the value of the juridical order. The juridical order finds its reason for being in the natural law itself - and therefore radically in the eternal law - which demands social life as a necessary means for human perfection: the positive law necessary for the attainment of the common good finds in the absolute value of the divine eternal law the foundation of its character of imperativeness. Insofar as it is imperative, positive law acquires the character of inviolability and therefore of coercibility. Coercibility is fundamentally of a moral character: the law in fact binds its subjects to observe it, placing them in their personal responsibility before society and its necessary ends. It is in this sense that the positive character of the sanction necessary for the perfection of the law is expressed: the law in fact, by imposing a personal moral and civil duty, places itself in intrinsic correlation with the supreme values of the human conscience. But given the inadequacy and moral imperfection of human nature, it is necessary that the coercibility of positive law also acquire a meaning of moral faculty to exercise physical coercion against its violators: the sanction thus assumes a negative character, that is, of defense of the sanctioned order, exercising a psychological pressure with the promise of rewards or the threat of penalties. The problem of sanction is therefore transformed, in the philosophy of law, into that of the value and extension of criminal law.

Three are the characters inherent in sanction, according to the purpose of punishment: vindictive purposes, insofar as it is destined to repair the dignity of the violated law, according to the principle: "punitur quia peccatum est"; social purpose, that is, of guaranteeing the attainment of the public good; medicinal purpose, insofar as punishment is a warning for all and an attempt at the redemption of the guilty, according to the principle: "punitur, ne peccetur". Certainly the vindictive aspect has its importance and responds to man's own will for justice; nevertheless it has only a partial meaning, since it belongs to God alone to bring about perfect justice and to punish sin in its personal value of guilt (Deut. 32, 35; cf. Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵇ, q. 108, ad 1): the law can punish crime only insofar as it is an external act and as just expiation for the offense to the public conscience. Fundamental, on the other hand, is the social purpose, because the public good, as the proper end of the juridical order, demands the punishment of the guilty in the proportion and within the limits that its safeguarding imposes. The medicinal purpose derives from the very character of the public good, essentially directed to the ultimate good of individual persons and to making every citizen a useful member in the life of the community. Christian thought, in the name of the dignity of the human person and of the limit of public authority marked by the purpose of the common good, emphasizes above all the pedagogical character of sanction (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-1ᵃᵇ, q. 96, ad 5).

The separation of morality from law brought about by contractualism and jurisdictionalism makes physical coercibility the essential element of positive law. The Italian criminological school (Lombroso, Ferri) considers the criminal law not as a sanction, but as a social defense against those who are constitutionally incapable of acting according to the civil order.

Tullio Piacentini

I. SANCTION AGAINST THE AGGRESSOR

Under this name there passed that body of diplomatic, economic, financial, and also military measures which, without yet amounting to the opening of hostilities (v.), were provided for in art. 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (v.) as a preventive measure against one or more member States that had resorted to war in circumstances forbidden by the Covenant (aggressors).

In the history of the League of Nations there were very few cases of application, and the most clamorous was that against Italy at the time of the Ethiopian war. A first threat of s. on the part of the League Council occurred against Greece, which had invaded Bulgaria (Oct. 20, 1925); Greece submitted. In the war between Bolivia and Paraguay there were no s. properly so called, but only the revocation of the embargo on arms destined for Bolivia; in protest Paraguay resigned as a member of the League of Nations (Feb. 23, 1935).

The invasion of Ethiopia by Italy (Oct. 3, 1935) provoked a vote on the part of the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, which declared Italy's resort to war contrary to the provisions of the Covenant, a vote approved by the Assembly with the consent of 50 members out of 54 (Oct. 9, 1935). The sanctionist measures were therefore put into effect by a Coordination Committee and applied as of Nov. 18. The measure was not successful, also because there was a lack of uniformity in its application among the States; thus, after the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy, they were revoked (July 4, 1936).

On the occasion of the aggression of China by Japan, then no longer a member of the League of Nations, the Council contented itself with a declaration according to which the member States now had reason to take individually the measures provided for by art. 16. On the occasion of the aggression of Finland by Russia, the latter was expelled from the League of Nations (Dec. 14, 1939) and the member States were invited to aid Finland.

Sanctionist measures are also provided for by the Charter of the U.N., where, however, they have so far found no application, whereas armed intervention in support of the aggregate against the aggressor has found application. The institution of a supranational power or of any court of arbitration has as its necessary corollary recourse to certain measures against transgressors and the recalcitrant. Benedict XV himself foresaw as a repressive measure the economic boycott of the aggressor (letter of Oct. 1, 1917). Given the industrial character of today's war, certain measures of an economic character could have a real effectiveness in preventing war and repressing aggression, but what is required first of all is an efficient international organism that knows how to apply them rightly and is able to enforce their observance.

II. SANCTION AGAINST FASCISM

Under this title passed the D.L.L. of 27 July 1944, which coordinated "the previous provisions on the purge or removal from political offices and public employments (sometimes also from private ones) of persons who had gravely compromised themselves with fascism (v.) before or after 25 July 1943 or had made themselves guilty of collaborationism with the Germans. The first provisions on defascistization date from 28 Dec. 1943; amendments were introduced by the R.D.L. of 12 Apr. 1944; on 13 Apr. a High Commissariat for the national purge of fascism was finally instituted. New rules on the matter came with the R.D.L. of 26 May 1944 and with the already cited D.L.L. of 27 July 1944, which assigned the application of the rules to the High Commissariat for the s. against fascism, called upon to succeed the previous Commissariat. Yet another D.L.L. of 3 Oct. 1944 divided the aforesaid body into four added High Commissariats (1st for the punishment of crimes, 2nd for the purge of the administrations; 3rd for the recovery of regime profits; 4th for the liquidation of fascist assets), and other D.L.L.s of 11 Oct., 23 Oct. 1944 and 4 Jan. 1945 issued new rules on the matter. The direction of the inquisitorial body passed subsequently, with the resignation of Carlo Sforza, from the high commissioner to the president and then to the vice-president of the Council and finally to a special office of the Presidency of the Council (8 Febr. 1946). There were other decrees on the matter: D.L.L. of 9 Nov. 1945, which revised the whole matter of the purge and limited, within the term of 1 March 1946, the purge of officials from the VII grade to cases of grave factionalism, etc.; D.L.L. 26 March and 2 Aug. 1946; D.L.P. 7 Febr. 1948.

Amnesties tempered the rigor of these exceptional laws, particularly the great amnesty granted by presidential decree of 22 June 1946, which decisively set the nation on the road to national reconciliation.

The period, however, in which the s. exercised their rigor was not free of injustices, partisanship, factionalism. But what is most to be reproached in these laws is having neglected the principle of the non-retroactivity (v.) of laws and having kept infinite categories of persons in a permanent condition of illegality. For the forfeiture of senators, v. SENATO.

Pietro Palazzini