Sanction

SANZIONE. — From the Latin sancire, it denotes the solemnity of a sovereign act, by which a law, pact, or contract acquires the character of absolute inviolability (sanctium, sanctum). In its immediately derived sense, s. denotes criminal prosecution for violating what has been sanctioned, as the necessary guarantee of its practical implementation, thus becoming synonymous with penal law. “Sanctae quoque res, veluti muri et portae civitatis, quodammodo divini iuris sunt... Ideo autem muros sanctos vocamus, quia poena capitis constituta est in eos qui aliquid in muros deliquerint. Ideo et legum eas partes quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fecerint, sanctiones vocamus” (Inst., II, De rerum divis. § 10). In the general sense, the term s. expresses all the good or bad consequences arising for a person or a group from their activity (natural, social, moral s.), and which, insofar as they are anticipated by that person or group, influence their decisions as motives (psychological s.).

I. SANCTION IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

moral sanction to social pressure, as the very cause of moral ideas and of their obligatory force (E. Durkheim, Division du travail social, 2e ed., Paris 1902, p. 47; P. Fauconnet, La responsabilité, étude de sociologie, ibid. 1920, p. 297). In all these conceptions moral sanction is reduced to natural, psychological, and social sanctions, which are extrinsic to the person’s true moral life, even though they condition II. For Christian thought, moral life is realized in the interiority of the person, through the free choice of good or evil: the will of the good is a free adherence of love to God and to his law, expressed in the essential demands of rational nature in relation to its ultimate end; the will of evil is free «aversion» from God, insofar as it constitutes a violation of the moral law. It is understandable that living according to nature and against nature necessarily entails an immediate natural sanction, ranging from the comfort of a good conscience and the remorse of an evil conscience to the broader and more remote consequences of virtue and vice on the individual and social planes. But moral sanction can be situated only on the plane of attaining the ultimate end toward which the whole of moral life is directed (cf. C. Gent., III, 140); this attainment is not simply the fruit of natural development, but is God’s response to the merit (v.) that the person has acquired before him by fulfilling his vocation through the constant willing of the good willed by him: « meritum est quoddam iter in finem beatitudinis » (s. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 35, q. 1a, a. 3 ad 4). The sufferings of earthly life are regarded by Christianity as the sanction of sin, both original and actual (malum poenae), and must be absolutely distinguished from the moral sanction that directly follows the malum culpae of the individual person (id., De malo, q. 1, a. 4; Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 48, a. 5). The punishment and suffering that also strike the just can be transformed into an act of love and of expiatory and propitiatory union with the merits of Christ and the saints: thus the greatest interior freedom with respect to all natural and social conditioning is achieved (Sum. Theol., 3a, q. 49, a. 5). Moral sanction is perfect only in the future life, with the eternal possession or eternal deprivation of God; but it is already initially expressed in earthly life in merit or demerit, which implicitly contain the state of friendship or enmity with God. S. Augustine, in De Civitio Dei, also admits an earthly sanction of societies as such: it consists in the attainment of earthly prosperity or in the ruin of peoples. Vico posits as a historical law that cities fallen into irreligion and immorality become lairs of wild beasts, losing all their human civilization and the very possibility of political freedom (cf. Scienza Nuova seconda, Bari 1942, pp. 161–63).

Kant severs the concept of sanction from that of morality, holding that the intention of reward transforms the categorical imperative of pure duty into the utilitarian calculation of a hypothetical imperative: he nevertheless recognizes the necessity of positing the existence of a sanction adequate to the categorical and universal character of the pure law of duty; hence the postulate of the existence of God, who confers upon perfect moral holiness the fullness of happiness (Kritik d. pr. Vernunft, I, II, chap. 2, § 5). It must be observed, however, that the transcendental form of the categorical law of pure duty without content does not explain the essence of moral life, which is love of the absolute Good and therefore a perpetual effort to attain its possession through the fulfillment of moral duty: God must be loved above ourselves, and therefore no utilitarian calculation can intervene, even though the love of God is for us the source of the greatest happiness. To attain such perfection of love is an arduous path of moral formation: hence the necessity of psychological sanctions which, pedagogically, help man to overcome his egoisms and his conditioning in order to realize full moral freedom: « He who acts solely with a view to rewards or punishments may still do good; but he does not do it well » (cf. s. Augustine, Enchir., 121: PL 40, 288).
II. THE S. IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. — The problem of the s. philosophy of law (v.) is connected with the conception of the value of the juridical order. The juridical order finds its reason for being in the natural law itself—and therefore, radically, in the eternal law—which requires social life as a necessary means for human perfection: the positive law necessary for the attainment of the common good finds in the absolute value of the divine eternal law the foundation of its imperative character. Insofar as it is imperative, positive law acquires the character of inviolability and therefore of coercibility. Coercibility is fundamentally of a moral character: the law in fact binds subjects to its observance, placing them in their personal responsibility before society and its necessary ends. It is in this sense that the positive character of the s. necessary to the perfection of the law is expressed: the law, by imposing a personal moral and civil duty, places itself in intrinsic correlation with the supreme values of human conscience. But given the inadequacy and moral imperfection of human nature, it is necessary that the coercibility of positive law should also acquire the meaning of a moral faculty to exercise physical coercion against its violators: the s. thus assumes a negative character, that is, the defense of the sanctioned order, exerting psychological pressure through the promise of rewards or the threat of punishments. The problem of the s. therefore becomes, in the philosophy of law, that of the value and scope of criminal law.

According to the purpose of punishment, three characteristics are inherent in the s.: vindictive purpose, insofar as it is intended to repair the dignity of the violated law, according to the principle: «punitur quia peccatum est»; social purpose, that is, to guarantee the attainment of the public good; medicinal purpose, insofar as punishment is a warning to all and an attempt to redeem the offender, according to the principle: «punitur, ne peccetur». Certainly, the vindictive aspect has its importance and responds to the human will for justice; nevertheless, it has only a partial significance, since only God has the power to enact perfect justice and to punish sin in its personal value as guilt (Deut. 32, 35; cf. Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵇ, q. 108, ad 1): the law can punish the crime only insofar as it is an external act and as a just expiation for the offense against public conscience. Fundamental, however, is the social purpose, because the public good, as the proper end of the juridical order, requires the punishment of offenders in the proportion and within the limits imposed by its safeguarding. The medicinal purpose derives from the very character of the public good, which is essentially directed toward the ultimate good of individual persons and toward making every citizen a useful member of the life of the community. Christian thought, in the name of the dignity of the human person and of the limit placed upon public authority by the purpose of the common good, emphasizes above all the pedagogical character of the s. (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-1ᵃᵇ, q. 96, ad 5).

The separation of morality from law carried out by contractualism and jurisdictionalism makes physical coercibility the essential element of positive law. The Italian criminological school (Lombroso, Ferri) regards criminal law not as a s., but as a social defense against those who are constitutionally incapable of acting according to the civil order.

M. Wittmann, Die Ethik des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Munich 1931; M. S. Gillet, La valeur éducative de la morale catholique, 5th ed., Paris 1932; R. Marett, The nature of the sanction in primitive law, in Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 2 (1935), p. 63; R. Pound, Social control through law, New Haven 1942; P. Sertillanges, La philosophie morale de saint Thomas d'Aquin, Paris 1946, p. 402 ff.; R. Le Senne, Traité de philosophie morale, 2nd ed., ibid. 1947, p. 588 ff.; O. Lottin, Principes de morale, Louvain 1947, p. 303 ff.; J. Leclercq, Les grandes lignes de la philosophie morale, ibid. 1947, p. 313 ff. Tullio Piacentini

I. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE AGGRESSOR

In the history of the League of Nations, there were very few

cases of application, and the most notorious was that against Italy during the Ethiopian war. An initial threat of sanctions by the League Council was directed at Greece, which had invaded Bulgaria (20 October 1925); Greece complied. In the war between Bolivia and Paraguay, there were no actual sanctions, but only the revocation of the arms embargo against Bolivia; in protest, Paraguay resigned from the League of Nations (23 February 1935).

Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia (3 October 1935) prompted a vote by the League Council Committee, which declared Italy’s recourse to war contrary to the provisions of the Covenant, a vote approved by the Assembly with the consent of 50 out of 54 members (9 October 1935). The sanction measures were then implemented by a Coordination Committee and applied starting from 18 November. The measure was unsuccessful, also due to the lack of uniformity in application among states; thus, after the annexation of Ethiopia to Italy, they were revoked (4 July 1936).

On the occasion of Japan’s aggression against China, no longer a member of the League of Nations at the time, the Council merely issued a declaration stating that member states now had reason to individually adopt the measures provided for in Article 16. When Russia invaded Finland, the latter was expelled from the League of Nations (14 December 1939), and member states were invited to assist Finland.

Sanction measures are also provided for in the Charter of the U.N., though they have not yet been applied, whereas armed intervention in support of the attacked party against the aggressor has been implemented. The establishment of a supranational authority or any arbitration tribunal necessarily entails recourse to certain measures against transgressors and recalcitrants. Benedict XV himself foresaw the economic boycott of the aggressor as a repressive measure (letter of 1 October 1917). Given the industrial nature of modern warfare, certain economic measures could have real preventive efficacy against war and repressive efficacy against aggression, but this first requires an efficient international body capable of applying them correctly and ensuring their observance.

Amnesties tempered the severity of these exceptional laws, particularly the great amnesty granted by presidential decree on 22 June 1946, which decisively set the nation on the path of national reconciliation.

However, the period in which these sanctions exerted their severity was not free from injustices, partisanship, and bias. But what must be reproached above all to these laws is their neglect of the principle of non-retroactivity (v.) of laws and their maintenance of infinite categories of persons in a permanent condition of illegality. For the forfeiture of senators, V. SENATO.

SANZIONE CANONICA

Definizione

La s. canonica è la pena inflitta dalla Chiesa per la violazione di una legge ecclesiastica. Essa si distingue dalla s. morale, che è la conseguenza intrinseca del peccato, e dalla s. civile, che è comminata dallo Stato per la violazione delle sue leggi. La s. canonica ha per fine la riparazione dell'ordine giuridico violato, la correzione del colpevole e la tutela del bene comune della Chiesa.

Fondamento

Il fondamento della s. canonica si trova nell'autorità che Cristo ha conferito alla Chiesa di legare e sciogliere (Mt 16, 19; 18, 18), cioè di stabilire leggi e di infliggere pene per la loro violazione. Questa autorità è stata esercitata fin dai primi secoli della Chiesa, come attestano i canoni dei concili e le lettere dei Pontefici.

Classificazione

Le s. canoniche si possono classificare secondo vari criteri:

1. Secondo la loro natura:
- Medicinali o censurae: hanno per fine la correzione del colpevole (es. scomunica, interdetto, sospensione).
- Vindictive: hanno per fine la riparazione dell'ordine giuridico violato (es. privazione di benefici, deposizione, degradazione).

2. Secondo la loro gravità:
- Gravissime: riservate alla Sede Apostolica (es. scomunica latae sententiae per eresia).
- Gravi: comminate dai vescovi o dai superiori religiosi (es. interdetto locale).
- Lievi: comminate dai parroci o dai superiori minori (es. censura per mancanze disciplinari).

3. Secondo il modo di inflizione:
- Latae sententiae: si incorrono automaticamente con la commissione del delitto (es. scomunica per apostasia).
- Ferendae sententiae: richiedono una sentenza giudiziale o amministrativa (es. deposizione di un chierico).

Applicazione

L'applicazione delle s. canoniche è regolata dal diritto canonico, che stabilisce le condizioni per la loro inflizione, le modalità di procedura e le cause di esenzione o di remissione. La Chiesa, nel suo diritto penale, segue i principi di legalità, proporzionalità e personalità della pena, nonché il principio della favor rei, che tende a interpretare le norme in modo favorevole all'accusato.