ARISTOTELISMO

ARISTOTELIANISM. -

I. MEDIEVAL ARISTOTELIANISM

An event of primary importance in the development of medieval thought, destined to produce consequences of the first order in intellectual life, was the encounter in the 13th century between the masters of the University of Paris and the Arabic and Jewish Aristotelian philosophy. For the first time, Christendom—which until then had been Platonizing and Augustinian, with a typically theological mentality—found itself confronted with Aristotle’s formidable scientific and philosophical synthesis, inspired by naturalism, which for several reasons could be said to be in contrast with its vision of life. Aristotle constituted a genuine surprise for the masters of the Faith, and the appearance of his doctrine upon the tranquil waters of theological reflection gave rise to one of the most painful struggles that the history of culture records.

By around 1200, most of Aristotle’s works had already been translated into Latin. Of the Organon, we know that the Logica vetus had been translated by Boethius and was already in circulation in the 12th century. Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) and Henry Aristippus (d. 1162) translated, the former from Arabic and the latter from Greek, nearly all the Libri naturales. In the 12th century, translations of the Physics, On the Soul, and a partial version of the Metaphysics (Books I–IV, 4: Metaphysica vetustissima) and of the Nicomachean Ethics (Books II and III: Ethica vetus) also became known. Moreover, Porphyry’s Isagoge, Boethius’s commentaries on the Categories and On Interpretation, Themistius’s commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, Alfarabi’s Distinctio super librum Aristotelis de naturali auditu, Avicenna’s Paraphrases, and others all contributed significantly to making Aristotle known.

At the beginning of the 13th century, Aristotle’s penetration into the Latin world must already have been advanced, since the Council of Paris in 1210 (Chartularium Univ. Paris., I, p. 70, no. 11) and the ordinances of the papal legate Robert of Courçon in 1215 (ibid., I, pp. 78–79, no. 20) forbade the teaching of the Libri naturales and their commentaries. We then have a letter dated 7 July 1228 from Gregory IX addressed to the professors of theology at the University of Paris (ibid., I, pp. 114–116, no. 59), in which the Pope expresses his profound concern about the encroachment of philosophy into the field of sacred science: the Pope affirms that theology is the queen of all knowledge and that philosophy has, with respect to it, only an ancillary role. In 1229, in the wake of a serious crisis within the University of Paris, the University of Toulouse was founded, where, among the subjects

taught, Aristotle was studied in the manner of Avicenna, which had the effect of rapidly disseminating the vast knowledge of the Stagirite among the Latins. Albert the Great’s paraphrase, besides being a work of dissemination, also represents the first serious attempt to rethink Peripatetic thought in a Christian manner. For this reason, Albert must be considered the true founder of Christian Aristotelianism.

Yet the most complete and enduring synthesis, surpassing by far Albert’s reworking and bearing the imprint of the original genius of St. Thomas Aquinas, a disciple of Albert, is the one that arose. Aquinas rethought Aristotle by drawing on Neoplatonic and Christian authors, both ancient and contemporary, giving life to an entirely new philosophical system that can best be designated by the name of “Thomism” (v.), in which, however, the main framework is constituted by Aristotelian and Christian elements. Thomism may also be said to represent the most notable expression of orthodox and moderate Aristotelianism, while Averroism stands as the radical and heterodox current.

Heterodox Aristotelianism, or Averroism, suffered two condemnations by the Bishop of Paris, in 1270 and 1277. Among the theories condemned in 1277 were some Aristotelian propositions accepted by St. Thomas. But this was to be the last revenge that the still Platonizing masters of theology took against moderate Aristotelianism, for, thanks especially to the Aquinate, it was introduced into all schools and became an integral part of the official science of the Church, both philosophical and theological (scholasticism).

II. MODERN ARISTOTELIANISM

In this period of evolution of Aristotelianism, it is no longer a matter of a complete revival of it, but rather of a philosophical conception of the world, more or less systematically elaborated on the basis of certain fundamental Aristotelian elements, with the various philosophers proceeding according to different criteria and with different aims, in response to the various historical, cultural, environmental, and religious exigencies.

We may distinguish several stages in this evolution, which, however, in terms of their problematic and historical-developmental aspects, are not strictly connected to one another: 1) Italian Neo-Aristotelianism of the Renaissance, with analogous (weaker) movements in France, Spain, and England; 2) Scholastic Aristotelianism; 3) Protestant Aristotelianism; 4) The Aristotelian revival in the 19th century, which, in its various aspects (systematic, interpretive, and historical), continues to the present day.

I. *Italian Neo-Aristotelianism of the Renaissance*. - The motives that gave impetus to the first phase of Aristotelianism may be divided into two categories. The first comprises the various connections, whether material-formal or problematic-methodological, with scholasticism. Renaissance philosophy, in its intention to found anew the methodological vision of the world, may in a certain sense be considered a continuation of scholastic thought, inasmuch as it takes up from it certain groups of fundamental problems (logical, criteria-related, metaphysical, though not so much the ontological), which required deep reflection on methodological principles—an exigency that was felt even more strongly in the natural sciences. The second category of motives includes the various influences stemming from contact with Eastern Aristotelianism and the lively debates among Arab philosophers concerning its meaning and value, especially in comparison with Platonic philosophy. It was precisely these influences that largely determined the singular polemical and syncretistic character of Renaissance Aristotelianism. As a result of contact with Eastern literature, the problem arose of a dual Aristotelianism—one Averroist and the other Alexandrist—which made it very difficult for Renaissance Aristotelians to discover the genuine Aristotle, since the translations and commentaries reflected the thought of one or the other school rather than absolute objectivity. (The principal translators of the period are: B. Bressarone, T. Gaza, Argyropoulos, George of Trebizond, L. Bruni, and E. Barbaro).

The renewed Aristotelianism found support and scientific cultivation especially in Padua (with branches in Bologna, Pavia, Ferrara, Siena, and Naples), where the tradition of Averroistic Aristotelianism had been preserved. The first representative of Averroistic influence at the University of Padua is considered to be the physician and philosopher Peter of Abano (v.). Essentially a compiler, his translations are of little importance; however, he deserves credit for introducing the *Problemata pseudaristotelica* into the Western philosophical milieu. His principal work, *Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum et precipue medicorum*, was widely used until the humanist era. The relationship between Peter and the fundamental ideas of Arabic philosophy (e.g., the eternity of the world and matter) and particularly with the Averroistic theory of the unity of the intellect remains obscure.

Nevertheless, despite any enthusiasm for Averroes’ authority, Peter never upheld or promoted Averroistic ideas with the boldness characteristic of the leader of the Parisian Averroists, John of Jandun, and his friend Marsilius of Padua. John defended the eternity of the universe and motion as did Aristotle and the Arabs, and he vigorously affirmed the principle of double truth. He combined Averroistic ideas with a skepticism that unconditionally dominated the field of metaphysical psychology. Together with Marsilius, John also developed a heterodox ethical-political Aristotelianism. In the spirit of John, Averroism was also embraced by Paul of Venice (d. 1429), known for his rather encyclopedic commentaries on Aristotle’s *Physics*; his logical writings (with some Ockhamist influence) were officially imposed at Padua.

A disciple of Paul of Venice, Gaetano da Thiene (d. 1455), who later taught in Padua, attempted to reconcile Averroism with ecclesiastical doctrine. Following the same path of oscillation between reason and faith, between Aristotle and Averroes, were A. Achillini, N. Vernia, A. Nifo, and M. A. Zimara. Notable is Zimara’s attempt to interpret the unity of the human intellect in terms of the unity of the universal principles of knowledge.

During this period, the first printed edition of Averroes appeared in Padua in 1472.

Meanwhile, the Alexandrist Aristotelianism began to emerge, which connected with Aristotle through Greek commentators, particularly Alexander of Aphrodisias, with distinctly deistic-naturalistic tendencies opposed to the somewhat mystical-pantheistic leanings of Averroism, with which it nevertheless agreed in denying the possibility of miracles and the immortality of the individual soul in an absolute sense. The founder of this Pomponazzi (v.), to whom the greatest crisis of Averroistic Aristotelianism is attributed.

Pomponazzi’s influence was considerable. Among his disciples were S. Porta, G. Contarini (later an opponent), and the Spaniard Sepúlveda. From S. Porta, but also from Nifo and A. Cesalpino, there emerged an Aristotelian not precisely classifiable as either Averroist or Alexandrist. Even the most renowned Aristotelian of the Paduan school in the 16th century, G. ZABARELLA, GIACOMO (v.), famous for his logical writings, is sometimes counted among the Averroists and sometimes among the Alexandrists. His successor in the chair, C. Cremonini (the revived Aristotle, 1550–1631), more explicitly than Zabarella, proclaimed the autonomy of physics as a science according to the principles of genuine Aristotelianism and its requirement to be based exclusively on experience.

While these disputes over the logic, physics, and method of Aristotle unfolded, his *Poetics* enjoyed a triumph. In 1498, Giorgio Valla provided the first translation. Numerous editions and translations followed, produced by A. de’ Pazzi, F. Robortello, B. Segni, P. Vettori, L. Castelvetro, A. Piccolomini, and L. Salviati.

Toward the end of the 15th century, Aristotelianism experienced a revival in France with G. Lefèvre d’Étaples (Faber Stapulensis), who commented on Aristotle’s writings and purified them of “scholastic falsifications,” and with his disciple C. Bouillé, who attempted a singular fusion of Aristotle with the Neoplatonism of Nicholas of Cusa.

In England, a strong Aristotelian tradition persisted, at least in general metaphysical philosophy, until the mid-17th century; its principal center was Oxford, with I. Sanderson, I. Case, R. Crankarthorp, T. Wilson, and R. Lever. M. Carpenter was notable as a metaphysician; K. Digby attempted a reconciliation of Peripatetic metaphysical ideas with Cartesian thought and the new natural science. Even in F. Bacon, the study of nature remained closely tied to the Aristotelian-scholastic framework.

Throughout this period, the strengthening of Aristotelianism was hindered by serious conflicts, to which it ultimately succumbed. The representatives of Platonism, not without success, strove to demonstrate that Plato was more consonant with Christianity than Aristotle. One of the most characteristic works of this controversy is the violent pamphlet *De platonicae atque aristotelicae philosophiae differentia* (written in Greek) by G. Plethon (1355–1450), to which George of Trebizond responded with his *Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis* (1458). Cardinal Bessarion replied by acknowledging Aristotle’s scientific merits but placing Plato above him in the theological-philosophical realm. Later, strong reactions also arose from scientists against the abstractionism and qualitative tendencies (rather than quantitative) that governed the solutions to physical problems proposed by the Aristotelians in contrast to Galileo; among these was F. Patrizi (1529–97). The logic of Aristotle was vigorously opposed by L. Vives (1492–1550) in Spain and by P. de la Ramée (1515–1572) in France.

Yet it was not these external reactions that decided the fate of Renaissance Aristotelianism, but rather intrinsic deficiencies that led to its near-total disappearance with the rise of the new philosophy of Descartes. A dispassionate examination reveals that it was an attempt to establish and systematize a worldview using inadequate and insufficient means. The question of method, which was the most pressing of all, remained unresolved, despite some promising beginnings, as in Pomponazzi. Consequently, there were polemics lacking valid criteria for discernment, systematic attempts without adequate penetration of the issues, and, worse still, the philosophically unworthy principle of double truth. Excessive attachment to tradition impeded the understanding of Aristotle’s authentic thought, and this incomprehension, in turn, was one of the principal reasons why a systematic doctrine of being was never developed. The profound metaphysical insights of the Stagirite were neglected, while his outdated physical theories were increasingly emphasized. All of this, combined with formalism in logic and abstractionism and deductivism in method, precluded any genuine revitalization of Aristotelianism.

2. Scholastic Aristotelianism.

Rather than marking a beginning of progress, the great Aristotelian-Thomist synthesis became, historically and speculatively, a standstill—perhaps because of its overly systematic and, consequently, closed character. Indeed, among orthodox scholastics from the 14th century onward, one observes essentially a reaffirmation of Aristotelian-Thomist thought along with the conviction of possessing genuine Aristotelianism (thus little exegetical concern), but without significant speculative advances, especially in the 17th and 18th centuries.

The first continuators, more theologically than philosophically interested, commented on works by Aristotle and St Thomas: thus Capreolus (1380–1444), Cardinal Gaetano (1486–1534), who remained faithful to Thomistic Aristotelianism in the Paduan averroistic milieu, and Sylvester of Ferrara (1474–1526); cf. C. Giacon, *La seconda scolastica*, part I: *I grandi commentatori di S. Tommaso*, Milan 1944. In the sixteenth century a vigorous revival of Aristotelian-Thomism occurred only in Spanish scholasticism: F. de Vitoria, M. Cano, D. Soto, D. Báñez, Fr. Toledo, G. Vázquez, faithful Thomists; L. Molina and F. Suárez, rather eclectic, were Aristotelians in logic (with excessive influences) and in physics, though accepting, especially the latter, decisive ontological and metaphysical motifs from the thought of the Stagirite. Notable are the important *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu* (Coimbra, 1582–1606) on various works of Aristotle (principal designer P. Fonseca, 1528–97). In the seventeenth century some valuable Thomists remained faithful to traditional Aristotelianism: John of St Thomas, Sylvester Mauro. The historical importance of this strictly scholastic direction of Aristotelianism lay chiefly in having kept alive the thought of Aristotle and maintained a high speculative level, even though, as has been said, it lacked genuine problematic progress; this explains the vigorous revival in the nineteenth century after a period of stagnation and even decline amid modern currents for about a century and a half.

3. Protestant Aristotelianism

A picture altogether different from the orthodox scholasticism, which had become stagnant by the sixteenth century, is offered by the progressive development of Aristotelianism in Protestantism.

This development began with the return to Aristotle initiated by Melanchthon (1497–1560), who, also under the influence of Italian Aristotelianism, led to a complete renaissance of Aristotelian philosophy. Around 1600 Aristotle’s metaphysics was framed within the new doctrinal system that was to imprint its particular stamp on Protestant philosophy in the seventeenth century. One of the most important features was the growing tendency toward the autonomization of ontology. In close contact with scholasticism, the traditional questions of Aristotelian metaphysics of being were treated and critically discussed; in some respects this direction was more faithful to Aristotle than was orthodox scholasticism itself. This movement, whose speculative moment is still known today only in general outline and to which belonged about a hundred philosophers, some of them outstanding and productive, dominated almost the entire university curriculum in Germany throughout the seventeenth century and, though less exclusively, in Holland. Among the best-known Aristotelians of this school are D. Cramer, C. Martini, G. Gutke, V. Fromm, A. Calov, C. Timpler, O. Casmann, who also depended on Italian Aristotelianism.

Considering the above movement as a whole, one can speak of a certain deepening of Aristotle’s metaphysical thought that deserves consideration. In the eighteenth century, mainly under the influence of Pietism and the Enlightenment, the current that had seemed so promising in the second half of the seventeenth century came to an almost abrupt halt. Yet its influence is still noticeable up to the immediate predecessors of Kant. It was also the environment in which the young Leibniz was formed (Leipzig, Jena), and its influence is seen in some of the philosopher’s fundamental theories (entelechy, causality, finalism). Less studied is the undeniable connection that links Spinoza and Clauberg to this branch of scholasticism (cf. P. Petersen, *Geschichte der aristot. Phil. im protestant. Deutschland*, Leipzig 1921; M. Wundt, *Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des xvii. Jahrhunderts*, Tübingen 1939. The latter also contains a complete list of the principal centers and all the authors with their respective works, editions, etc.).

4. Nineteenth-Century Aristotelian Revival

A new reconnection with Aristotle took place in the nineteenth century, even though modern philosophy from Descartes onward had not altogether escaped the spirit of the Stagirite. Despite the recognition of Aristotle’s indisputable greatness, the almost abyssal methodological difference between the Aristotelian and modern currents seemed to preclude any renewal of Aristotelianism. Yet, under the impulse of the new evaluation of the history of philosophical thought by idealism, and also in reaction against idealism and the superficial positivistic trivialization, a new Aristotelianism arose alongside the dominant philosophical directions of the nineteenth century. Contributing to this formation was the magnificent critical edition by I. Bekker (Berlin 1831 ff.). Thus there developed fairly rapidly a particular enthusiasm for Aristotelian studies, not without the participation of the reforming scholasticism.

The forerunner of the new extra-scholastic Aristotelian movement was F. A. Trendelenburg (1802–72). For Trendelenburg Aristotle is and must be the essential historical basis of all philosophical speculation; he elaborated a logic based on Aristotelian principles, opposing it to the Hegelian (Elementa logicae arist., Berlin 1836), a tendency with which F. Ueberweg fully concurred (thinking is representing being); in metaphysics the finalistic idea prevailed. The studies and fundamental direction of Trendelenburg exercised a profound influence on Fr. Brentano, who, having a thorough knowledge of the scholastics, later became known for his studies on Aristotle, introduced many Aristotelian concepts into modern German philosophical culture, and, together with F. Bolzano, aroused a new interest in Aristotelian metaphysics in that milieu. Among others to be remembered are R. Eucken (*Die Methode der arist. Forschung*, Berlin 1872), Th. Waitz (edition of the *Organon*, Leipzig 1844–46), C. A. Brandis and H. Bonitz (studies on Greek philosophy), F. K. A. Schwegler (*Metaphysik des A.*, Tübingen 1847–48). This extensive Aristotelian research, which at first developed very markedly in Germany, then had a strong resonance in other countries where equally important results were achieved (in France: Hamelin, Ravisson, Robin, Carteron, Tricot; in England: Jackson, Joachim, Hicks, Ross).

Meanwhile the main work of the above movement unfolded rather in the field of exegetical studies aimed at distinguishing genuine Aristotelianism, leading to the rehabilitation of his philosophical thought and value (Eucken, Prantl), while systematic interest was awakened above all in the neo-scholasticism of the period and its sympathizers (Kleutgen, von Hertling, Baeumker, Rolfes, Mansion, Colle). In contemporary philosophical development, aporetic rather than systematic Aristotelianism has become an impelling force, for example in the ethics and ontology of N. Hartmann and others, who do not neglect, however, his great and enduring intuitions, or rediscover them independently (e.g., H. Driesch, [v.]). J. Geyser, in his discussions of modern and contemporary philosophy, has admirably vindicated the fundamental principles of Aristotelianism.

All these historical and systematic studies increasingly revealed the importance of the problem concerning the intrinsic evolution of the philosophical thought of the Stagirite. W. Jaeger was the first to set out all the problems concerning the genesis of Aristotelian metaphysics and to attempt to clarify the question of the doctrinal evolution of Aristotle from his initial Platonism to the mature personal thought (Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung, Berlin 1923, and other writings), not without criticism from other scholars (cf. A. Mansion, *La genèse de l’œuvre d’A. d’après les travaux récents*, in *Rev. Néoscolast. de phil.*, 29 [1927], pp. 307–41, 423–66); in Italy the direction of Jaeger was followed by E. Bignone and E. Oggioni.

Apart from the authors and works already cited, the most representative for the first phase include: F. Fiorentino, P. Pomponazzi, Florence 1868; id., Bernardino Telesio, ossia studi storici sull'idea della natura nel Risorgimento italiano, Florence 1874; id., Il risorgimento filosofico nel Quattrocento, Naples 1885 (posthumous); G. Voigt, Die Wiederbelebung des klass. Altertums, 2nd ed., Berlin 1880; B. Nardi, Intorno alle dottrine filosofiche di Pietro d'Abano, in Nuova Riv. Storica, 4 (1920), pp. 81-97, 464-81; 5 (1921), pp. 300-13; id., Sistemi di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano, Rome 1945; A. Dempf, Geisteswissenschaftliche Aufgaben der Erforschung der Renaissance-Philosophie, in Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 7 (1929), no. 4; E. Troilo, Averroismo e a. padovano, Padua 1939; E. Garin, A. e platonismo nel Rinascimento, in La Rinascita, 2 (1939), pp. 641-71. On the early beginnings of Paduan Averroism, V. F. Ueberweg, II, 11th ed., Berlin 1928, pp. 612-19. On the relations between scholasticism and natural philosophy in the Renaissance, V. the works of P. Duhem and A. Maier. For the second phase, in addition to the work cited of C. Giacon, K. Werner, Franz Suarez und die Scholastik der letzten Jahrhunderte, 2 vols., Regensburg 1861 and 1886, and the writings of M. Lechner and B. Jansen. For the third phase: E. Weber, Die philosophische Scholastik des deutschen Protestantismus im Zeitalter der Orthodoxie, Leipzig 1907. For the fourth phase: F. Ueberweg, IV, passim; H. Windischer, Franz Brentano und die Scholastik, Novato Picard.