**CAPREOLO, Giovanni.** - Dominican theologian, known as the “Princeps Thomistarum.” Born in the diocese of Rodez (southern France) in 1380, he died there on 7 April 1444; he entered the Dominican Order in that city while still young. After completing his initial studies, in 1409 he was sent to Paris, where he taught until 1411, expounding the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. He earned his doctorate in theology in 1412, was appointed regent of studies at the Toulouse convent—whence probably the epithet *Tholosanus* often applied to him—and remained there until 1426, when he returned to the Rodez convent.
The work by which Capreolo left an indelible mark on the history of theology and Thomism is his *Dictiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis*, composed between 1409 and 1432 and first printed in Venice from 1480 to 1484, then again in 1514, 1519, and 1589, always in Venice. No further editions appeared until 1900. This hiatus was due to the influence of Protestantism, whose anti-scholastic spirit stifled good studies, especially in scholastic theology; but the decline of scholasticism itself also contributed by rendering unpopular works and authors that had once been highly esteemed. An indirect impetus toward reprinting Capreolo’s work came from Leo XIII’s encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879), which restored scholastic philosophy in general and Thomism in particular. Yet it was Monsignor Bourret, bishop of Rodez and later cardinal, who championed the need for a new edition, which was eventually produced by two Dominicans, Frs. C. Paban and T. Pèques (5th ed., 7 vols., Tours 1900–1908).
Capreolo’s personality—modest to a fault—remains little known, since few wrote about him and his doctrine has not, to this day, been the subject of sustained study, save for a few isolated questions. Yet one should not suppose that, living as he did in troubled and turbulent times, he remained indifferent or estranged from the life of the Church. Serious scholars such as Fontana, Percin, and Sponde affirm that he took part in the Councils of Constance (1414–17) and Basel (1431–43), though regarding Basel a serious difficulty arises: the conciliar acts make no mention whatsoever of Capreolo. Nevertheless, his love for the Church and his piety shine through many scattered indications in his entire œuvre. Yet the characteristic, indeed defining, note of Capreolo’s personality is his love for St Thomas Aquinas, for whose defense he wrote his *Defensiones*—a love that was neither irrational nor fanatical but, on the contrary, remarkably serene and measured. Thus, though his intellect might have enabled him to compose an outstanding work of his own, he chose almost to efface himself before the Angelic Doctor so that Aquinas might shine forth in his full splendor. He candidly declares this at the outset of the *Defensiones*, after setting forth the first question: *“Antequam ad conclusiones veniam praemitto unum quod per totam lecturam haberi volo pro supposito, et est quod nihil de proprio intendo influere, sed solum opiniones quae mihi videntur de mente s. Thomae fuisse recitare, nec aliquas probationes ad conclusiones adducere praeter verba sua, nisi raro. Obicctiones vero... propono locis suis adducere et solvere per dicta s. Thomae.”*
In truth, the innovative mind and work of Aquinas provoked lively reactions and tenacious opposition even within his own Order; yet these reactions became far more serious elsewhere, where many were reluctant to abandon their tradition and their teachers and threatened to overwhelm the young Thomism—if not by force of argument, then by sheer numbers. Capreolo courageously undertook the arduous task of defending Aquinas, and victory was his. His adversaries were formidable and skilled. Among those within the Dominican Order, Durand of Saint-Pourçain stood out—the *Doctor resolutissimus*, sometimes also called the *Doctor temerarius*, who after serving as Master of the Sacred Palace died as bishop of Meaux in 1334. A mind of robust intellect and a spirit of the utmost independence, he must have been a formidable opponent, for later he even succeeded in exasperating Cajetan, who wrote: *“Factus sum insipiens, sed Durandus me coegit”* (*In Sum. Theol.*, III, q. 75, a. 4, n. 16). Outside the Order, mention must be made of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus, the *Doctor subtilis* (d. 1308), and above all Peter Auriol (d. 1322), another Franciscan and bishop of Aix-en-Provence, against whom Capreolo’s polemic is almost continuous, since in his judgment Auriol was the principal adversary of St Thomas, synthesizing and surpassing all the others, Scotus not excepted. Yet the most vehement opponents of Thomism were the Nominalists, led by the combative Franciscan William of Ockham (d. 1347). Innovative and bold, they had spread widely, drawing down upon themselves several condemnations, yet to no avail. Their doctrines took deep root
The theological field is both philosophical and theological. The principal nominalist cited by Capreolus is Gregory of Rimini of the Augustinian Hermits, who was also general of his Order and died in 1368. Setting aside others of lesser importance, the authors whom Capreolus cites and largely refutes number twenty-seven: alone against all, calm, courteous, he gives no peace to his adversaries; he follows them step by step, dismantling one after another all their positions. In this Defence of his, Capreolus is obliged to follow not the order of St Thomas but that of Peter Lombard, because the target of his adversaries was precisely the commentary of the Aquinate on the *Sentences*, which at that time—and for centuries to come—remained the textbook of the schools of theology; yet Capreolus displays such vast and profound knowledge of all the works of the Saint, citing them with such intelligence and pertinence, that no other writer in the entire history of the Thomist school can be compared with him.
This does not mean that Capreolus’s work is a mere controversy; it is, rather, an organic, harmonious, and unified work, even though its apologetic character necessarily gives it the form of a mosaic and the appearance of compliance.
By the very task he had set himself, Capreolus’s doctrine coincides with that of St Thomas, from whose teachings he has no intention of departing. In the points of controversy, however, Capreolus assumes a historical and theoretical value of the first order: historical, because he is closest to the sources of all the great commentators of the Aquinate; theoretical, because it is hardly conceivable that a man of such talent should not have grasped exactly the thought of his author, for whom he entertained the highest esteem and profound love.
Capreolus’s name, however, remains particularly linked to two questions of the greatest importance—indeed, central to the whole of philosophy and theology: the ontological constitution of the person and the principle of individuation of bodies.
As regards the first, Capreolus holds that, according to the Aquinate, the formal constituent of the person is the “natural act,” not *per modum formae substantialis* or *accidentalis*, but *per modum quo esse actualis exsistentiae dicitur actus essentiae ut quo* and of the suppositum (individual) *ut quod exsistit*; so that “it is said that the suppositum is the same as the individual substance having *per se* being” (*Defensiones*, ed. T. Pègues, V, Tours 1907, p. 105). As can be seen, Capreolus’s explanation is in harmony with the Thomistic doctrine of the intimate constitution of the being. This is given not by essence alone, but by essence together with its act of being. Only the being, therefore, is *sui iuris* and autonomous, because only the being—and not the essence—is the whole that possesses itself, belongs to itself, and not to another, that is, is subsistent. But it is not subsistent except by virtue of its own act of being, which confers upon it the first and most fundamental autonomy, the ontological one, root and explanation of all the other autonomies that belong to the person—namely, psychological autonomy, by which the person is a conscious, self-aware subject; moral autonomy, by which it is a subject responsible for its own actions; and juridical autonomy, by which it is a subject of rights and duties. Capreolus is at pains to make it clear that this, in his view, is the doctrine of St Thomas: “And in this way it seems to me that St Thomas understood personality as adding something positive above the rational nature and the individual of rational nature... so I believe that this is what the holy Thomas thought” (*ibid.*). Thus “person or suppositum adds to individual nature the *esse* of actual existence” (*ibid.*, p. 106); and this, according to the Aquinate himself, “because according to him the person or suppositum in such cases adds being” (*ibid.*, p. 107). Note this: it adds *esse*, the act of being, and not merely an order or relation to the act of being, as some have mistakenly thought. Thus the person is the whole, the complete being of intellectual order. Of this whole, the material constituent is the individual essence; the formal constituent, however, is the act of being, corresponding and commensurate with this same essence; and both together give the total constituent, that is, the *ens complutum*, which, precisely because it is a whole, is autonomous, independent, and therefore a person.
It is easy to see the applications of this theory: anything that is defective either in the line of the material constituent, that is, of the essence—as in the case of the separated soul—or in the line of the act of being—as in the case of the human nature of Christ—is thereby incomplete as a being; no longer a whole but a part, and therefore no longer *sui iuris*, no longer a person. Similarly, in the Trinity each of the Persons is constituted by the subsistent and relative act of being, identified on the part of the act of being that in God constitutes the essence, and distinguished on the part of the relation that relatively opposes one to another. And so the act of being comes to be not only the formal constituent of God as One, but also of God as Three.
With regard to the principle of individuation, for Capreolus matter signifies nothing other than matter under quantity, that is, matter actually quantified; which, as matter, confers incommunicability, and, as quantified, confers singularity—both indispensable to the constitution of the corporeal individual. Capreolus treats this at length in the second book of the *Sentences*, dist. 3, q. 1 (*Defensiones*, III, ibid. 1903, pp. 200–41). That even here Capreolus faithfully reproduces the doctrine of St Thomas, unlike other Thomists who came later, is shown by a simple reading of certain texts of the Aquinate, for example these: “Matter under certain dimensions is the cause of individuation” (*De nat. mat.*, III); “its being marked out is to be under certain dimensions” (*ibid.*); “from matter arises diversity in number within the same species... insofar as it is subject to quantified dimensions” (*In Boeth. De Trin.*, q. 4, a. 2); “matter, once understood as embodied and quantified, can be understood as divided into distinct parts, so that it may receive distinct forms according to a further degree of perfection” (*I*, q. 76, a. 6, ad 2). And it is not a matter of the exigency or order to quantity, or of quantity in root, but of quantity in act: “Dimensions are understood in matter not in complete act before natural forms, but in incomplete act, and thus they are prior in the way of generation” (*De veritate*, q. 5, a. 9).
These questions of individuation and of the person are still the most studied today; yet in others, too, Capreolus would deserve to be more fully brought to light, to the great advantage of authentic Thomism, given the enormous importance of this Thomist, whom posterity recognizes in the title that remains his, Prince of the Thomists.