Capreolus, John

CAPREOLUS, JOHN. - Dominican theologian, called the "Princeps Thomistarum." Born in the diocese of Rodez (southern France) in 1380, died there on 7 April 1444; he entered the Dominicans of that city while still young. After his first studies, in 1409 he was sent to Paris, where he taught until 1411, expounding the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Having obtained his degree in theology in 1412, he was appointed regent of studies in the convent of Toulouse, whence probably the appellation of Tholosanus that is often given him; he remained there until 1426, the year in which he returned to the convent of Rodez.

The work with which C. left an indelible mark on the history of theology and of Thomism is the Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, which he composed between 1409 and 1432 and which was printed for the first time at Venice from 1480 to 1484, then again in 1514, 1519 and 1589, always at Venice. After that there were no further editions until 1900. This fact is due to the influence of Protestantism, which with its anti-scholastic spirit mortified sound studies, especially those of scholastic theology; but the decline of scholasticism also played its part, in the sense that it made unpopular works and authors that had nevertheless been highly esteemed. An indirect impulse toward the reprinting of C.'s work came from the encyclical Aeterni Patris of Leo XIII (1879), which restored scholastic philosophy in general and Thomistic philosophy in particular. But the one who advocated the need for a new edition was Msgr. Bourret, bishop of Rodez and later cardinal, and it was obtained through the efforts of two Dominicans, Fathers C. Paban and T. Pègues (5th ed., 7 vols., Tours 1900-1908).

The personality of C., a most modest man, remains little known because very few wrote about him, and even his doctrine has not to this day been the object of special studies, apart from some isolated question. It is not to be believed, however, that C., living in sad and turbulent times, remained indifferent or extraneous to the life of the Church; serious writers such as Fontana, Percin, and Sponde affirm that he took part in the Councils of Constance (1414-17) and of Basel (1431-43), but as for that of Basel there stands in the way the grave difficulty that the Acts of the Council are completely silent about C. Nevertheless his love for the Church and his most pious soul are evident from many indications scattered throughout his work. But the characteristic, one might say specific, note of C.'s personality is his love for St. Thomas, in whose favor he wrote precisely his Defensiones; a love by no means unreasonable and fanatical; on the contrary, very serene and well weighed. Thus C., who with his genius could have composed an excellent personal work, preferred almost to disappear before the Aquinate so that he might shine in his full light. He declares this candidly himself at the beginning of the Defensiones, after stating the first question: "Antequam ad conclusiones veniam praemito unum quod per totam lecturam haberi volo pro supposito, et est quod nihil de proprio intendo influere, sed solum opiniones quae mihi videntur de mente s. Thomae fuisse recitare, nec aliquas probationes ad conclusiones adducere praeter verba sua, nisi raro. Obiectiones vero... propono locis suis adducere et solvere per dicta s. Thomae".

In fact the mind and the innovative work of the Aquinate had provoked lively reactions and tenacious oppositions even within his own Order; but these naturally became much more serious in other circles that did not feel able to renounce their tradition and their masters, and threatened to overwhelm young Thomism if only by force of numbers. C. courageously undertook the arduous labor of defense, and the victory was his. The adversaries were strong and able. Among those of the household stood out Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, the Doctor resolutissimus, sometimes also called Doctor temerarius, who after having been master of the Sacred Palace died bishop of Meaux in 1334. A robust intellect and an independent spirit to the highest degree, he must have been most formidable if later he would succeed in driving even Cajetan mad, who wrote: "Factus sum insipiens, sed Durandus me coegit" (In Sum. Theol., 3ª, p. 75, n. 4, n. 16). Of the outsiders mention should be made of the Franciscan G. Scotus, called the Doctor subtilis (d. 1308) and above all P. Aureolus (d. 1322), also a Franciscan and bishop of Aix in Provence, against whom it may be said that C. fights continuously because in his judgment Aureolus is the principal adversary of St. Thomas, one who sums up and completes all the others, not excepting Scotus himself. But the most ardent against Thomism were the Nominalists led by the combative Franciscan William of Ockham (d. 1347). Innovators and bold, they had spread widely, drawing upon themselves several condemnations as well, but in vain. Their doctrines penetrated everywhere, taking very deep roots both in the theological and in the philosophical field. The principal Nominalist cited by C. is Gregory of Rimini of the Hermits of St. Augustine, who was also general of his Order and died in 1568. Leaving aside other lesser ones, the authors whom C. adduces and in large part refutes are 27: alone against all, tranquil, courteous, he gives his adversaries no peace: he follows them step by step, dismantling one after another all their positions. In this Defense of his, C. is forced to follow not the order of St. Thomas but that of Peter Lombard, because the target of the adversaries was precisely the Aquinate's commentary on the Sentences, which were at that time and remained for centuries thereafter the textbook of the schools of theology; but C. displays so vast and deep a knowledge of all the works of the Saint and cites them with such intelligence and aptness that no one else can stand equal to him in the whole history of Thomism. Not for this is C.'s work a mere cento; it is instead an organic, harmonious and unified work; although its apologetic character forcibly gives it the form of a mosaic and the appearance of a compilation.

Given the very task he had undertaken, C.'s doctrine coincides with that of St. Thomas, from whose teachings he has absolutely no intention of departing. On the disputed points, however, C. takes on a historical and theoretical value of the first order: historical, because he is closer to the sources than all the great commentators on the Aquinas; theoretical, because it is not presumable that a man of such talent failed to grasp exactly the thought of his author, for whom he felt the highest esteem and a profound love. Particularly, however, C.'s name has remained linked to two very important, indeed central, questions in all philosophy and theology: the ontological constitution of the person and the principle of individuation of bodies. As for the first, C. holds that, according to the Aquinas, the formal constitutive element of the person is the actus naturae, not per modum formae substantialis aut accidentalis, sed per modum quo esse actualis existentiae dicitur actus essentiae ut quo et suppositi (individui) ut quod exsisti; so that dicatur suppositum esse idem quod individuum substantiale habeas per se esse (Defensiones, ed. T. Pègues, V, Tours 1907, p. 105). As can be seen, C.'s explanation is in harmony with the Thomistic doctrine of the intimate constitution of being. This is given not by essence alone, but by essence together with its act of being. Only being, therefore, is sui iuris and autonomous, because only being, and not essence, is the whole that possesses itself, is of itself and not of another, that is, is subsistent. But it is subsistent only by virtue of its own act of being, which confers on it the first and most fundamental autonomy, the ontological one, root and explanation of all the other autonomies that belong to the person, namely the psychological autonomy by which the person is a conscious subject, antracenten; the moral autonomy by which it is a subject responsible for its own actions; and the juridical autonomy by which it is a subject of rights and duties. And C. is anxious to make it known that this, in his view, is the doctrine of St. Thomas: «Et isto modo videtur mihi quod s. Thomas intellexit personalitatem addere aliquid positivum supra naturam rationalem et individuum naturae rationalis... ita existimo sensisse sanctum Thomam» (ibid.). Therefore «persona vel suppositum supra naturam individuatam addit esse actualis existentiae» (ibid., p. 106); and this according to the Aquinas himself, «quia secundum eum persona seu suppositum in talibus supra naturam addit esse» (ibid., p. 107). Note well: it adds the esse, the act of being, and not a simple order or relation to the act of being, as someone has erroneously thought. Thus the person is the whole, the being complete in the intellectual order. Of this whole, the material constitutive element is the individual essence; the formal constitutive element, on the other hand, is the act of being, corresponding and commensurate to this same essence; and the two together give the total constitutive element, that is, the ens completum which, precisely because it is a whole, is autonomous, independent, and therefore a person. It is easy to see the applications of this theory: everything that is deficient in the line of the material constitutive element, that is, of essence, such as the separated soul, or in the line of the act of being, such as the human nature of Christ, is for that very reason incomplete as a being; no longer a whole but a part, and therefore no longer sui iuris, no longer a person. Equalin the Trinity each of the Persons is constituted by the act of being, subsistent and relative, being identified on the part of the act of being which in God constitutes the essence, and being distinguished on the part of the relation which relatively opposes them one to another. And thus the act of being comes to be not only the formal constitutive element of God as One, but also of God as Three.

With regard to the principle of individuation, materia signata is for Capreolus nothing other than materia sub quantitate, that is, matter actually quantified; which, insofar as it is matter, confers incommunicability, and insofar as it is quantified, confers singularity — both of which are indispensable for the constitution of the corporeal individual. Capreolus treats this at length in the second book of the Sentences, dist. 3, q. 1 (Defensiones, III, there 1903, pp. 200-41). That in this too Capreolus faithfully reproduces the doctrine of St. Thomas, unlike other Thomists who came later, is shown by the simple reading of certain texts of the Aquinate, for example these: «Materia sub certis dimensionibus est causa individuationis» (De nat. mat., III); «signatio eius est esse sub certis dimensionibus» (ibid.); «ex materia causatur diversitas secundum numerum in eadem specie... prout subest dimensionibus interminatis» (In Boeth. De Trin., q. 4, a. 2); «materia, iam intellecta sub corporeitate et dimensionibus, potest intelligi ut distincta in diversas partes, ut sic accipiat diversas formas secundum ulteriorem perfectionis gradum» (I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 2). And it is not a question of the requirement or the ordering to quantity, or of quantity in root, but of quantity in act: «Dimensiones praentelliguntur in materia non in actu completo ante formas naturales, sed, in actu incompleto, et ideo sunt prius in via generationis» (De veritate, q. 5, a. 9).

These questions of individuation and of the person are also today the most studied; but in others too C. would deserve to be brought more into the light, to the great advantage of authentic Thomism, given the enormous importance of this Thomist whom grateful posterity wished to adorn with the title, which remains his, of Prince of the Thomists.

Umberto Degl'Innocenti