DUNS SCOTO, GIOVANNI

SUMMARY:

I. Life

II. Works

III. Character

IV. Philosophy

V. Theology

VI. Overall judgment.

I. LIFE

Thanks to the historical-critical method employed in scholarly research during the scholastic era, certain secure dates have now been traced, from which, with appropriate inductions and considerations, it is possible to reconstruct the most salient phases of Duns Scotus’s life.

Descended from the Duns family, Johannes was born in Scotland (whence the name Duns) and probably (according to an ancient *Registrum Ordinis*) in Maxton, now Littledean. As a birth date, the years 1265–66 are generally favored. He entered the Franciscan Order in 1278 after attending lower school in Haddington. Ordained a priest in 1291, in 1300 he obtained from the Bishop of Lincoln the faculty to hear confessions. In 1303 he lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris as a bachelor. Having

some works attributed to him are certainly spurious according to the latest historical-critical investigations, namely: *De rerum principio* (by Vital du Four); *Grammatica speculativa* (by Thomas of Erfurt); *Conclusiones ex XII libris Metaphysicorum* (by Gonzalo of Spain); *Expositio in XII libros Metaphysicorum* (by Antonius Andrea, according to lectures given by Scotus); *Expositio in VIII libros Physicorum* (by Marsilius of Inghen); *Meteorologicorum libri IV*; *In librum I et II Priorum Analyticorum Aristotelis*; *Quaestiones in librum I et II Posteriorum Analyticorum*; *Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus* (except for the first question, which is authentic). Probably spurious are: *Tractatus de cognitione Dei*; *De perfectione statuum*.

All the remaining works are authentic, namely: the *Opus Oxoniense* and *Opus Parisiens* (commentaries on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*); *Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (only the first nine books); *De anima*; *Quaestiones super universalia Porphyrii*; *In librum praedicamentorum quaestiones*; *Quaestiones in I et II libros Perihermeneias*; *In duos libros Perihermeneias operis secundi, qui appellantur Quaestiones octo*; *Quaestiones in librum Elenchorum*; *Collationes*; *De primo principio*; *Theoremata*; *Quodlibet*.

Yet even among these latter works, not all possess the same authority or value for understanding the genuine doctrine of the Subtle Doctor. It is known that *De anima* and the *Theoremata* were compiled by disciples, and it is uncertain whether they were corrected or approved by the master. Likewise, the literary character and significance of Scotus’s commentaries on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*—long known as the *Opus Oxoniense* (= *Ordinatio*) and *Opus Parisiens* (= *Reportationes*)—differ considerably. While the value of the *Reportationes* is relative (apart from a few recensions actually approved by Duns Scotus himself, since they were written by disciples from his lectures), the *Opus Oxoniense* is of immense and decisive importance because it was composed, dictated, and prepared for publication by Scotus himself. Indeed, though framed as a commentary, this work was a definitive treatise that Scotus composed, elaborated, and perfected by gathering the best of his lectures. Unfortunately, death overtook him before the work was finished, which explains why some questions are entirely missing or only sketched, and why the margins are filled with cross-references, additions, and corrections. Immediately after his death, a well-prepared *editio princeps* was published, but from it there arose such a multiplicity of differing and often arbitrary revisions that at one point it seemed impossible to distinguish Scotus’s authentic pages from the manipulations of his disciples. Fortunately, attempts were made to restore the critical text; thanks to codex 137 of the municipal library of Assisi—written about twenty years after Scotus’s death with reference to the master’s own autograph and some two hundred other manuscripts—it is possible to reconstruct the original *Ordinatio* as left by the Subtle Doctor.

It should also be noted that there are not merely two *Opus* works by Scotus on Lombard, as has hitherto been believed, but many more: on Book I, alongside the *Ordinatio*, there is an unpublished *Lectura* from Oxford, and then six different recensions of the *Reportatio*, one of which was examined by the author himself and remains unpublished. On Book II there is likewise an unpublished Oxford *Lectura*, and then the unpublished *Additiones*. On Book III, in addition to the *Ordinatio* and the unpublished *Lectura*, there are four recensions of the *Reportatio*, only one of which has so far been published.

III. CHARACTER

Coming when the edifice of scholastic science was already raised high, Duns Scotus was destined, by a special bent of his acute and subtle mind, to adopt a predominantly critical stance toward his predecessors. He was neither a mechanical repeater of what had already been written nor wished to be. For him, the knowledge of truth is dynamic and ever-progressing: “In processu generationis humanae — he writes — semper crevit notitia veritatis” (*Ox.*, IV, d. 1, q. 3). Objective and impartial, he loved truth more than systems. A disciple of William Ware and heir to the Oxford school, he did indeed prefer metaphysical arguments and took mathematics as the model of strictest demonstration, yet this did not prevent him from elaborating a synthesis dominated by the idea of love and will. A Franciscan, he was certainly in harmony—especially in his manner of feeling and framing problems—with the Platonic-Augustinian tradition of his Order; yet at the same time he held Aristotle in the highest admiration, in many theses abandoned his fellow friar St. Bonaventure (v.) and did not refrain from the severest judgments upon Henry of Ghent, then regarded as a tenacious opponent of Thomist theories. He has sometimes been judged (e.g., by Festugière) as a systematic and envious rival of St. Thomas Aquinas, but whenever he rejected the latter’s doctrine, he did so *amore veritatis*, exercising a legitimate freedom in judging disputed questions. In correcting the old system, his aim was above all to construct his own philosophical-theological system. Starting from the standpoint that faith, reason, and authority do not contradict one another, he sought to trace the essential elements of his synthesis to the sources of Revelation and the teaching of the Church, to whose judgment he submitted his thought entirely: “Non est accurate sentiendum quam sentit Ecclesia Romana” (*Ox.*, IV, d. 26). In the modesty with which he presented his own opinions, Gerson rightly observed that Duns Scotus was guided not by “singularitate contentiosa vincendi, sed humilitate concordandi” (J. Gerson, *Opera omnia*, I, The Hague 1728, p. 100).

It is also widely held that Duns Scotus is obscure and difficult. His own disciples confess that “eius dicta communem transcendunt facultatem” (G. Vorlon, *Opus super libros IV Sententiarum*, Venice 1502, f. 302va). To be sure, it is not easy—given the present state of things—to penetrate and formulate precisely and concretely the complex doctrinal synthesis of Scotus, since a critical edition that would free his writings from the grave literary disorder in which they have come down to us is still lacking. For this reason, one must limit oneself to setting forth only the fundamental and characteristic points of the traditional Scotist philosophical-theological doctrine.

IV. Philosophy

A large part of sceptical speculation is reserved for metaphysics, and in particular for the three theories: hylemorphism, formalism, and the principle of individuation. Matter is not a simple and pure potency, but a positive and absolute entity, which could exist—*de potentia Dei absoluta*—even without the informing principle. In every individual being (res) there are metaphysical elements (realitates, entitates, formalitates) which, while truly, adequately, and formally identified, are not included or confused with one another but are distinguished. This difference (*distinctio formalis a natura rei*), or rather the non-formal identity of the various realities within the same thing, exists *ante omnem actum intellectus*, and is essentially different from that of reason (which is produced by the intellect). It occurs, for example, between essence and existence, between the soul and its faculties, and between these faculties themselves; between the divine essence and the three divine Persons on the one hand, and His divine attributes on the other, as well as among these divine attributes themselves. The principle of individuation of a being does not consist in its existence, nor in its specific nature, nor in matter, nor in form, nor even in anything negative; but in a particular positive reality called *heccetias*.

1. Theodicy

We know God not by intuition but from creatures, through causality, negation, and eminence. The concept of being is univocal to God and to creatures. This univocity is not contrary to the simplicity of God. Indeed, D. S. writes: «Teneo opinionem mediam, quod cum simplicitate Dei stat quod aliquis conceptus sit communis sibi et creaturae, non tamen aliquis conceptus communis ut generis» (Ox., I, d. 8, q. 3). In turn, the idea of infinite Being expresses in the most perfect way the nature of God, namely «conceptum... perfectissimum conceptibilem vel possibilem a nobis haberi de Deo» (Ox., I, d. 2, q. 2; d. 3, q. 1-2). Among the divine attributes, primacy is held by the will, which, although essentially free, is by no means disposed to caprice, being governed by the intellect «cum sit Deus agens rectissima ratione» (Rep. Paris., IV, d. 1, q. 5).

2. Psychology

The soul is the substantial form of the living human compound, but in the body there is also a proper, albeit secondary, form—*forma corporeitatis*—by which the body performs its functions independently of the soul, which gives being to all its parts. Sensory cognition is framed by the senses, which, however, cannot attain the actual existence of things in a sure and adequate manner without the aid of the intellect, whose formal and proper object is *ens*. Even in man, the intellect is surpassed in nobility by the will, which, being a power essentially active and free, is responsible for every order or disorder of the soul, commanding itself, the intellect, and the other powers, and choosing between good and evil or between two goods.

3. Ethics

Ethics is also grounded in a voluntaristic basis. Indeed, morality is above all an affair of the will. Moral goodness consists formally in the election of the will (*actus elicitus voluntatis*), which election is already a praxis; whereas in praxis commanded *ad extra* there is only material goodness. Perfection resides more in loving God than in knowing Him. The natural law is contained in the Decalogue, but primarily and strictly in the precepts of the first table, insofar as they are ethical principles of immediate evidence and absolute value concerning the Infinite Being directly; whereas the other precepts contain within themselves contingent elements, and although fully in conformity with the intellect, God can dispense from them. Man is not obliged to direct every action, even the smallest, toward God; and he can perform actions that in concreto are neither good nor bad, but simply indifferent.

V. Theology

From the fact that God is love (*Deus caritas est*), S. draws many and highly significant conclusions. Theology itself is a science (though not in the Aristotelian sense), eminently practical, because it treats of God not *propter speculari* but precisely *propter operari*, that is, not to satisfy our vain curiosity but to enlighten us regarding our ultimate end. The whole of creation is likewise an act of love, because God, the supreme good, loving Himself necessarily, wills the existence of other beings that may love Him freely. Grace—which is identical with charity—resides in the will; and since the will—which is also the seat of the cardinal virtues—can, with the aid of grace, perform supernatural acts, it follows that infused moral virtues are neither necessary nor exist. Beatitude consists in the beatific love of God; and this love, while remaining free, is nonetheless stable and indefectible by virtue of a positive predetermination of the divine will.

But the love of God triumphs above all in the Incarnation, since the existence of Christ—archetype, centre, and end of the universe in its double aspect, natural and supernatural—was not predestined solely on account of redemption. Likewise, love constitutes the formal element of redemption and is the ultimate cause of Christ’s outstanding merits; merits which, moreover, can only be said to be infinite in a logical sense.

An exceedingly important part in the sceptical theological system is assigned to Mariology. Mary is first and foremost the true Mother of God, because she actively cooperated in the conception of Christ, who thus has a twofold real relation: one with the divine Father and the other with the Mother. But the Marian Doctor earned a special title to glory in his vigorous and courageous defence of the Immaculate Conception of Mary (v. IMMACOLATA CONCEZIONE). With his unsurpassable logic he resolved the difficulties that the great doctors of the 13th century (Thomas, Bonaventure, Albert...) had raised against this Marian privilege, proving that the Immaculate Conception is not contrary either to the dogma of original sin or to that of the redemption of all the sons of Adam. Indeed, from the new concept of Christ as the most perfect redeemer, he went on to attribute to the creature most perfectly redeemed the most perfect form of redemption: the preservative. With his principle: «Si autoritati Ecclesiae vel auctoritati Scripturae non repugnet, videtur probabile quod excellentes est attribuere Mariae» (Ox., III, d. 3, q. 1)—which his immediate disciples transformed into the celebrated axiom: «Potuit, decuit, ergo fecit»—D. S. laid the solid and highly fruitful foundation of Franciscan Mariology.

Among S.’s other theological theses: the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, though not contrary to reason, cannot be the fruit of a *quia* or *propter quid* argumentation. Original sin consists in the privation of original justice due to man. The angels, like men, are individuals grouped under the same species; and just as they could sin in the first moment of their creation, so too could they repent and convert during their probation. The Sacraments are not physical causes of grace, though they do truly produce II. The essence of the sacrament of Penance consists principally in the priest’s absolution, not in the three acts of the penitent. In the Eucharist, the words of consecration—of which those used by the Western Church are not all essential—do not have the power to demonstrate invincibly and fully the mystery of transubstantiation without the exposition of tradition and the doctrine of the Church.

VI. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Attacks, more or less serious, on the figure and work of Duns Scotus have never been lacking throughout the centuries. Especially in the first decades of the Neoscholastic movement, it was almost fashionable to present him as the precursor of Kantianism, modernism, positivism, and other errors against which the Church found itself compelled to fight. It is enough to read the severe and hostile judgments of Z. Gonzales, A. Werber, W. Fox, and B. Landry.

However, in recent years, thanks to a more careful historical-critical study of Scholasticism in general and of Scotist works in particular, the attitude of scholars toward the Subtle Doctor has been gradually evolving and changing, and tributes to his profoundly constructive greatness have become ever more frequent and significant, even outside Franciscan circles. Thus, while Duns Scotus is hailed as “the last great figure of high Scholasticism” (M. Grabmann, *Storia della teologia cattolica*, Italian trans., Milan 1937, p. 119), Scotism, in turn, is judged by some as an original and powerful Scholasticism steeped in metaphysics and a homogeneous synthesis in which everything has been reduced to a marvelous unity (M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 6th ed., Louvain 1936, pp. 347–48); by others it is considered the greatest attempt to preserve and demonstrate in their full integrity the philosophical ideas that in the Middle Ages were taught as the foundations of the Christian vision of the world and life (J. Carreras y Artau, op. cit. in bibliography); for others still, it represents the most complete and fundamental Christian synthesis of Scholastic philosophy (C. R. S. Harris, op. cit. in bibliography, I, pp. 246–312). Nor are the admonitory words of Fr. Monot devoid of significance (*Dictionnaire des connaissances religieuses*, VI, col. 268): “Scotism, which has sometimes been despised by ill-informed Catholics, remains in philosophy and theology one of the recognized forms of Christian thought.”

Certainly, the progressive affirmation of Scotist thought has also been greatly aided by the historical role it has played and continues to play in the definitive development of certain dogmas and in the elaboration of theological synthesis. The value and weight of Scotus’s teaching in numerous decisions of the Council of Trent cannot be forgotten. His having established and defended the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is a title sufficient in itself to secure him imperishable glory (cf. J. Pohle, *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik*, 7th ed., II, Münster in Westphalia 1928, p. 241). Likewise, the doctrine of the absolute predestination of Christ “is gaining ground today, and perhaps there will come a time when, just as the Scotist school prevailed over the Thomist regarding the Immaculate Conception of Mary, so too it may prevail regarding this doctrine, which so admirably commends itself to us” (G. Bonomelli, cf. *Études franciscaines*, 2 [1899], p. 577).

Nor should it be forgotten, with regard to Scotus’s perfect orthodoxy, that the Church has not only not condemned any of his doctrinal propositions to date, but has also expressly declared, by a decree of the Congregation under Paul V, that “the doctrine of Scotus is free from censure,” at the same time stipulating “that no censor of books should dare to prohibit anything that is certainly known to have been drawn from Scotus” (cf. Hurter, IV, col. 369). Thus the Holy See has repeatedly approved the general constitutions of the Franciscan Order, which prescribed for lecturers “to endeavor to explain only the text of Scotus and not other authors in detail” (cf. W. Lampen, *B. Ioannes Duns Scotus et Sancta Sedes*, Quaracchi 1929). At other times it confirmed the statutes of various universities and theological faculties in Italy, France, England, Poland, Spain, etc., where there were chairs of Scotus alongside those of St. Thomas. For example, Clement XII approved the statutes of the University of Cervera, founded by Philip V, which prescribed: “The Scotist professor shall take special care that in preparing treatises for his lectures, he does not deviate from the mind of this Doctor” (*Bullarium Romanum*, Turin ed., XXIII, pp. 165, 170, 172).

This is not to ignore the preponderant favor justly accorded by the Holy See to the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, nor to diminish the indisputable merits of the *Summa Theologica*, which, for the clarity and simplicity of its exposition and for the richness and architectural order of its content, has deserved to be chosen as a teaching text in Catholic schools. The curious alternative “Either Thomas or Duns Scotus,” which half a century ago was posed and to which some had replied “Thomas and not Duns Scotus,” has today proved no longer relevant and must therefore be transformed into the more just and serene affirmation of Bazala (*Povijest filozofije*, II, p. 174): “Alongside the name of Thomas, the name of Duns Scotus will always resound worthily.”

The great scholar of Scholasticism, Cardinal F. Ehrle, wrote on this point (*La scolastica e i suoi compiti odierni*, Turin 1935, p. 92): “We fully appreciate the fact that the Church, with all the esteem it has for the *Doctor communis*, refuses to emphasize the doctrine of the Saint in such a way that the opinions of other important schools might appear condemned or at least diminished. It knows too well how important, in the search for truth, is the free competition of ideas that makes possible the full clarification of a problem, even when starting from different points of view. As long as faith and love are preserved, this can only be to the advantage of truth and even of the Church itself, the protector of every truth. Therefore it grants to all masters, students, and investigators the *libertas docendi*. If a single doctor, institute, or religious order wishes to adhere more closely to Thomas or to another master, they have full right and freedom to do so.”

In any case, it is now perfectly clear that Duns Scotus, with his excellent critical method, his extensive use of rigorous rational argumentation, his exaltation of the primacy of the will, of freedom, of activity, of love, and with his singular Christocentric speculation, has created a solid and enduring doctrinal system that—embraced and defended over the centuries by a pleiad of theologians, philosophers, saintly preachers, and polemical writers—imposes itself even, and we might say especially, upon the disinterested research and study of our own time, which has been granted the merit of placing, for the first time, the figure and work of the great architects of integral Scholasticism fully in historical-critical light, among whom Duns Scotus occupies a place of no small importance that all unreservedly acknowledge.

The “conspectus” of modern Scotist literature is found in E. Bettoni, Venti ultimi anni di letteratura scetista, Milano 1943; Franziskianische Studien, 8 (1911), pp. 48-66; Antonianum 3 (1928), pp. 451-84; Quatrième congrès des lecteurs de la langue française, Parigi 1934, pp. 190-254; M. De Wulf, Storia della filosofia medievale, vers. it., II, Firenze 1945, pp. 304-23.

The older bibliography is given by: P. Raymond, s. V. in D'ThC, III, coll. 1865-1947; U. Smecs, Lineamenta bibliographiae scotisticae, Roma 1942.

For the life and works of J. D. S.: B. Brkic, Zivot Ivana D. S., Sarajevo 1908; A. Bertoni, Le b. J. D. S., Levanto 1917; E. Giusto, La vita del b. G. D. S., Assisi 1919; A. Pelzer, Le premier livre des Reportata Parisiensia de J. D. S., in Annales de l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, V. Lovanio 1923; F. Pelster, Handschriftliches zu Skotus mit neuen Angaben über sein Leben, in Franziskianische Studien, 10 (1923), pp. 1-32; A. Callebaut, A propos du b. J. D. S., de Littledean, in Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 24 (1931), pp. 305-29; Ch. Balic, Les commentaires de J. D. S. sur les quatre livres des Sentences, Lovanio 1927; id., Ratio criticae editionis operum omnium J. D. S., 2 voll., Roma 1939-41; Béraud de S.-Maurice, J. D. S., un docteur des temps nouveaux, Montréal 1944.

A general synthesis of the doctrine of S. was made in the Acts of the Scotist Congress of Zagreb, Collectanea Franciscana Slavica, I, Sebenico 1937; cf. also: R. Seeberg, Die Theologie des J. D. S., Leipzig 1900; E. Longpré, La philosophie du b. D. S., Paris 1924; P. Minges, J. D. S., doctrina philosophica et theologica, 2 voll., Quaracchi 1930; C. R. S. Harris, D. S., 2 voll., Oxford 1930; Z. Van de Woestyne, Scholae franciscanae aptatus cursus philosophicus, Malines 1932; S. Belmond, Essai de synthèse philosophique du scotisme, in La France franciscaine (1933), pp. 73-131; Déodat Marie de Basly, Scotus doctor, Paris 1934; E. Bettoni, D. S., Brescia 1946.

On individual philosophical and theological questions: Déodat M. de Basly, Grandes thèses catholiques, I, Paris 1900; II, Rome-Paris 1903; P. Minges, Die Gnadenlehre des D. S., Münster 1906; id., Der Gottesbegriff des D. S., Vienna 1907; id., Das Verhältnis zwischen Glauben und Wissen, Theologie und Philosophie nach D. S., Paderborn 1908; J. Belmond, Dieu, Paris 1913; J. Klein, Der Gottesbegriff des J. D. S., Paderborn 1913; M. Heidegger, Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des D. S., Tübingen 1916; J. Carreras y Artau, Ensayo sobre el voluntarismo de J. D. S., Gerona 1923; J. Klein, Die Charitalehre des J. D. S., Münster 1926; E. Gilson, Avicenne et le point de départ de D. S., in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 11 (1927), pp. 38-49; J. Kraus, Die Lehre des J. D. S. von der natura communis, Paderborn 1927; D. Scaramuzzi, Il pensiero di G. D. S. nel mezzogiorno d'Italia, Roma 1927; H. Klug, B. J. D. S., doctrina de sacrificio, praesertim de sacrosancto Missae sacrificio, Barcelona 1929; H. Schwamm, Das Göttliche Vorherrschen bei D. S. und seinen ersten Anhängern, Innsbruck 1934; F. Chauvet, La passion, Barcelona 1936; H. Storff, De natura transubstantiationis iuxta I. D. S., Quaracchi 1936; J. Binkowski, Die Wertlehre des D. S., Berlin 1936; E. Gilson, Les seize premiers Theoremata et la pensée de D. S., in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 22 (1938), pp. 5-86; N. Petruzzellis, Studi sull'Etica di D. S., in Archivio di filosofia, 10 (1940), pp. 66-87, 219-33, 390-416; C. Balic, De debito peccati originalis in B. V. Maria. Investigationes de doctrina quam tenuit I. D. S., Roma 1941; E. Bettoni, L'ascesa a Dio in D. S., Milano 1943; M. Grajewski, The Formal distinction of D. S., Washington 1944; A. B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and their function in the Metaphysics of D. S., New York 1946.