Duns Scotus, John

DUNS SCOTUS, JOHN. - Franciscan philosopher and theologian.

I. LIFE

Thanks to the historical-critical method used in the scientific research of the scholastic era, certain dates have today been traced, on the basis of which, with appropriate inferences and considerations, we are able to reconstruct the most salient phases of D. S.'s life.

A descendant of the D. family, John was certainly born in Scotland (whence the name of S.) and probably (according to an ancient Registrum Ordinis) at Maxton, today Littledean. As the date of birth, one is inclined to settle on the years 1263-66. He entered the Franciscan Order in 1278, after having attended the lower school at Haddington. Ordained priest in 1291; in 1300, from the bishop of Lincoln, he obtained the faculty to hear confessions. In 1303 he lectured on the Sentences in Paris as a bachelor. Having

Having refused, in June of the same year, to subscribe to an appeal to the Council against Boniface VIII, then at war with Philip the Fair, he was forced to leave Paris. He returned there the following year to obtain his doctorate, upon presentation of a letter from the minister general of the Order, Fr. Gonsalvo of Spain, in which the latter declared himself fully informed «partim experientia longa, partim fama quae ubique divulgata est» of the praiseworthy life, the excellent learning and the most subtle intellect of the candidate (H. S. Denifle, Chart. Univ. Paris., II, Paris 1891, p. 117). It is not easy to establish with precision the stages of D. S.'s scholarly and academic activity. It is known with certainty that «floruit Cantabrigiae, Oxoniae et Parisiis» (as is read in cod. 66 of Merton College), and that after obtaining his doctorate he held the Quodlibet disputation in the latter city. Having finally moved to Cologne, he died there - still young in years and energies - on 8 Nov. 1308.

His contemporaries called him Doctor subtilis and later generations also Doctor Verbi Incarnati and Doctor Marianus. Even while alive he had a numerous band of disciples and he soon became and remained the leader of the Franciscan school, which enjoyed a marvellous development especially in the 16th-17th centuries. His name is read in the Martyrologium Franciscanum, and he is venerated in several places. The cause of his beatification was officially opened in 1905 with a solemn petition, supported by patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, cardinals and ministers general of religious Orders.

II. WORKS

An international commission specially appointed has been working in Rome for years to prepare a worthy critical edition of the works of D. S. Meanwhile the most complete edition remains that edited by L. Wadding, printed in Lyon in 1639 and reprinted by Vivès in the last years of the past century. But of the 24 works published there, some must certainly be considered spurious, according to the latest historical-critical investigations, namely: De rerum principio (by Vitalis of Furno); Grammatica speculativa (by Thomas of Erfurt); Conclusiones ex XII libris Metaphysicorum (by Gonsalvo of Spain); Expositio in XII libros Metaphysicorum (by Antonio Andrea, according to the lectures given by S.); Expositio in VIII libros Physicorum (by Marsilius of Inghen); Meteorologicorum libri IV; In librum I et II Priorum Analyt. Aristotelis; Quaestiones in librum I et II Posteriorum Analyt.; Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus (except the first question, which is authentic). Probably spurious are: Tractatus de cognitione Dei; De perfectione statum.

All the others are authentic, namely: Opus Oxoniense and Opus Parisiense (commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard); Quaestiones subtilissime in Metaphysicam Aristotelis (only the first nine books); De anima; Quaestiones super universalia Porphiri; In librum praedicamentorum quaestiones; Quaestiones in I et II librum perhermenias; In duos libros perhermenias operis secundi quod appellant quaestiones octo; Quaestiones in librum elenchorum; Collationes; De primo principio; Theoremata; Quodlibet.

But even among these latter works not all enjoy the same authority and value for knowledge of the genuine doctrine of the Subtle Doctor. Of the De anima and the Theoremata it is known that they were drawn up by disciples, nor is it known with certainty whether they were corrected and approved by the master. Likewise the importance and literary character of the Scotist commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, which have hitherto gone under the name of Opus Oxoniense (=Ordinatio) and Opus Parisiense (=Reportationes), are quite different. For while the value of the Reportationes is relative (apart from some redaction that D. S. himself approved), because they were written by disciples according to the master's lectures, the value of the Opus Oxoniense is instead very great and decisive, inasmuch as it was written, dictated and prepared for publication by S. himself. This work in fact, even under the form of a commentary, was a definitive work that D. S. composed, elaborated and perfected by gathering the best of his lectures. Unfortunately death overtook him before the work was finished: and this explains how some questions are either entirely missing or have been barely sketched, and how the margins of the pages abound in cross-references, additions and corrections. After his death a well-prepared editio princeps was immediately produced: but from it there developed such a host of different and often arbitrary recensions that at a certain point it seemed impossible to distinguish the authentic pages of S. from the manipulations of the disciples. Fortunately attempts to re-establish the critical text were not lacking; thanks to cod. 137 of the municipal library of Assisi, written about twenty years after the death of S. with the master's own autograph in view, and to some 200 other codices, it is possible for us to reconstruct the primitive Ordinatio as it was left by the Subtle Doctor.

It should also be noted that there exist not only two Opus of S. on the Lombard, as was hitherto believed, but many more; thus on book I, alongside the Ordinatio, there is a Lectura (unpublished) from Oxford, and then six different redactions of the Reportatio, among which one examined by the author himself and hitherto unpublished. On book II too there exists a Lectura (unpublished) from Oxford, and then the Additiones (unpublished). On book III, besides the Ordinatio and the Lectura (unpublished), there are four redactions of the Reportatio, of which only one has so far been published.

III. CHARACTER

Having come when the edifice of scholastic science was already raised, D. S. was destined, also by a special tendency of his acute and subtle spirit, to assume the preponderant attitude of a critic with regard to his predecessors. He was not, nor did he wish to be, a mechanical repeater of what had already been written. For him the knowledge of truth is dynamic and always progresses: «In processu generationis humanae - he writes - semper crevit notitia veritatis» (Ox., IV, d. 1, q. 3). Objective and impartial, he loved truth more than systems. A disciple of William Ware and heir of the school of Oxford, he preferred — it is true — metaphysical arguments and set mathematics as the example of the strictest demonstration, but this did not prevent him from elaborating a synthesis dominated by the idea of love and of the will. A Franciscan, he was certainly in harmony — above all in his manner of feeling and framing problems — with the Platonic-Augustinian tradition of his Order; but at the same time he held Aristotle in the highest admiration; in many theses he abandoned his confrere St. Bonaventure (v.) and did not fail to pass the severest judgments on Henry of Ghent, considered at that time as a tenacious opponent of Thomist theories. He has sometimes been judged (e.g., by Festugiere) as a systematic and envious rival of St. Thomas Aquinas, but if at times he rejected his doctrine, he did so only amore veritatis, using a legitimate freedom in judging disputed questions. Correcting the ancient system, he aimed above all at constructing his own philosophical-theological system. Starting from the point of view that fides-ratio-auctoritas do not contradict one another, he strove to trace the essential elements of his synthesis in the sources of Revelation and in the teaching of the Church, to whose judgment he submitted his thought entirely: «Non est aliter sentiendum quam sentit Ecclesia Romana» (Ox., IV, d. 26). For the modesty shown in expounding his own opinions, Gerson rightly observed that D. S. was not guided «singularitate contentiosa vincendi, sed humilitate concordandi» (I. Gerson, Opera omnia, I, The Hague 1728, p. 100).

Moreover, the opinion is widespread that D. S. is obscure and difficult. His own disciples confess that «eius dicta communem transcendunt facultatem» (G. Vorlion, Opus super libros IV Sent., Venice 1502, f. 302ᵃ). To tell the truth, it is not easy — in the present state of things — to penetrate and formulate exactly and concretely the complex doctrinal synthesis of S., because a critical edition has so far been lacking that would have freed the Scotist works from that grave literary disorder with which they are transmitted. For this reason, one must limit oneself to fixing only the fundamental and characteristic points of the traditional Scotist philosophical-theological doctrine.

IV. PHILOSOPHY

A large part of Scotist speculation is devoted to metaphysics: and in particular to three theories: those of hylomorphism, of formalism, and of the principle of individuation. Matter is not a simple and pure potency, but a positive and absolute entity, which could exist — de potentia Dei absoluta — even without the informing principle. In every individual being (= res) there are metaphysical elements (= realitates, entitates, formalitates) which, while being really, adequately and formally identified, are nevertheless not included in one another or confused but are differentiated. This difference (distinctio formalis a natura rei), or rather the formal non-identity of the different realities of one and the same thing, is ante omnem actum intellectus, creati et non creati, essentially different from that rationis (which is produced by the intellect), and it obtains, for example, between essence and existence, between the soul and its faculties, and among these same faculties; between the divine essence and the three divine Persons on the one hand, and its divine attributes on the other, as well as among these same divine attributes. The principle of individuation of a being consists neither in its existence nor in its specific nature nor in matter nor in form, nor even in something negative, but in a particular positive reality which is called hecceitas.

1. Theodicy

We know God not by intuition but from creatures, by way of causality, negation and eminence. The concept of being is univocal to God and to creatures. This univocity is not contrary to the simplicity of God. Indeed Duns Scotus writes: «Teneo opinionem mediam, quod cum simplicitate Dei stat quod aliquis conceptus sit communis sibi et creaturae, non tamen aliquis conceptus communis ut generis» (Ox., I, d. 8, q. 3). In turn the idea of infinite Being expresses in the most perfect way the nature of God, namely «conceptum... perfectissimum conceptibilem vel possibilem a nobis haberi de Deo» (Ox., I, d. 2, q. 2; d. 3, q. 1-2). Among the divine attributes the primacy is held by the will, which, however, while being essentially free, is by no means despotic or capricious, being governed by the intellect, «cum sit Deus agens rectissima ratione» (Rep. Paris., IV, d. 1, q. 5).

2. Psychology

The soul is the substantial form of the living human composite, but in the body too there is a proper form, albeit a secondary one, by which it is a body independently of the soul that gives being to all its parts: it is the forma corporeitatis. Cognition begins from the senses, which, however, cannot attain the actual existence of things in a sure and adequate way without the help of the intellect, whose formal and proper object is the ens. In man too the intellect is surpassed in nobility by the will, which, being an essentially active and free power, is responsible for every order or disorder of the soul, commands itself, the intellect and the other powers, and chooses between good and evil or between two goods.

3. Ethics

Ethics too rests on voluntaristic foundations. Indeed morality is above all a matter of the will. Moral goodness consists formally in the election of the will (actus elicitus voluntatis), which election is already a praxis; whereas in praxes commanded ad extra there is only goodness materialiter. Perfection lies more in loving God than in knowing him. The natural law is contained in the decalogue, but principally and in the strict sense in the precepts of the first table, insofar as they are ethical principles of immediate evidence and absolute value directly concerning the infinite Being; whereas the other precepts contain within themselves contingent elements, and although they are fully in conformity with the intellect, God can dispense from them. Man is not obliged to direct his every action, even the least, toward God; and he can also perform actions which in the concrete are neither good nor bad, but simply indifferent.

V. THEOLOGY

From the fact that God is love (Deus caritas est), S. draws many and very significant conclusions. Theology itself is a science (though not in the Aristotelian sense) that is eminently practical, because it treats of God not propter speculari, but precisely propter operari, that is, not to satisfy our vain curiosity, but to enlighten us about our final end. Creation as a whole is likewise a work of love, because God, the supreme good, necessarily loving himself, wills the existence of other beings who can love him freely. Grace — which is identified with charity — resides in the will; and since the will — which is also the seat of the cardinal virtues — can with the help of Grace perform supernatural acts, it follows that the infused moral virtues are not necessary and do not exist. Celestial beatitude consists in the beatific love of God; and this love, while remaining free, is nevertheless stable and unfailing as a result of a positive predetermination of the divine will.

But the love of God triumphs above all in the Incarnation, since the existence of Christ — archetype, center and end of the universe in its twofold aspect, natural and supernatural — was not predestined solely because of the redemption. Likewise love constitutes the formal element of the redemption and is the ultimate cause of the outstanding merits of Christ: merits which, moreover, can be called infinite only in a broad sense.

A very important part in the Scotist theological system is assigned to Mariology. Mary is first of all the true Mother of God, because she cooperated actively in the conception of Christ, who thus has a double real relation: one to the divine Father and the other to the Mother. But the Marian Doctor acquired a special title of glory in the strenuous and courageous defense of the Immaculate Conception of Mary (v. IMMACOLATA CONCEZIONE). With his unsurpassable logic he in fact resolved the difficulties that the great doctors of the 13th century (Thomas, Bonaventure, Albert...) had raised against this Marian privilege, proving that the Immaculate Conception is contrary neither to the dogma of original sin nor to that of the redemption of all the sons of Adam. Indeed, from the new concept of Christ, the most perfect redeemer, he went on to attribute to the most perfectly redeemed creature the most perfect form of redemption: the preservative one. With his principle: «Si auctoritati Ecclesiae vel auctoritati Scripturae non repugnet, videtur probabile quod excellentius est attribuere Mariae» (Ox., III, d. 3, q. 1) — which his immediate disciples transformed into the famous axiom: «Potuit, decuit, ergo fecit» — D. S. laid the solid and highly fruitful foundation of Franciscan Mariological science.

Among the other theological theses of S.: the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, while not contrary to reason, cannot be the fruit of an argument quia or propter quid. Original sin consists in the privation of the original justice owed to man. The angels too, like men, are individuals grouped under one same species; and just as they could sin in the first moment of their creation, so during their trial they could repent and be converted. The Sacraments are not physical causes of Grace, although they really produce it. The essence of the sacrament of Penance consists principally in the absolution of the priest, not in the three acts of the penitent. In the Eucharist the words of consecration, of which those used by the Western Church are not all essential, do not have the power to demonstrate invincibly and fully the mystery of transubstantiation, without the exposition of tradition and the doctrine of the Church.

VI. OVERALL JUDGMENT

Throughout the course of the centuries, attacks more or less serious against the figure and the work of D. S. have never been lacking. Especially in the first decades of the neo-Scholastic movement it was almost fashionable to present him as the precursor of Kantianism, of Modernism, of Positivism and of the other errors against which the Church found itself fighting. It is enough to read the severe and hostile judgments of Z. Gonzales, of A. Werber, of W. Fox and of B. Landry.

In recent years, however, thanks to a more accurate historical-critical study of Scholasticism in general and of Scotist works in particular, the attitude of scholars toward the Subtle Doctor has been evolving and changing very noticeably, and tributes to his profoundly constructive greatness have become ever more frequent and significant, even outside Franciscan circles. Thus, while D. S. is hailed as "the last great figure of high Scholasticism" (M. Grabmann, Storia della teologia cattolica, Italian trans., Milan 1937, p. 119), Scotism in turn is judged by some as an original and powerful Scholasticism steeped in metaphysics and a homogeneous synthesis in which everything has been reduced to a marvelous unity (M. De Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie médiévale, 6th ed., Louvain 1936, pp. 347-48); by others it is considered as the greatest attempt to preserve and demonstrate in all their integrity the philosophical ideas that in the Middle Ages were taught as the foundations of the Christian vision of the world and of life (J. Carreras y Artau, op. cit. in bibl.), while for still others it represents the most complete and most fundamentally Christian synthesis of Scholastic philosophy (C. R. S. Harris, op. cit. in bibl., I, pp. 246-312). Nor are the admonitory words of Fr. Monot devoid of meaning (Dictionn. des connaissance relig., VI, col. 268): "Scotism, which has sometimes been despised by ill-informed Catholics, remains in philosophy and in theology one of the recognized forms of Christian thought."

Certainly the progressive affirmation of Scotist thought was also greatly aided by the historical role that it has played and still plays in the definitive development of certain dogmas and in the elaboration of theological synthesis. The value and the weight that S.'s teaching had in not a few decisions of the Council of Trent cannot be forgotten. To have established and defended the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is a title that by itself suffices to assure him imperishable glory (cf. J. Pohle, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, 7th ed., II, Münster in West. 1928, p. 241). Likewise the doctrine of the absolute predestination of Christ "is today gaining ground, and perhaps the time will come when, just as the Scotist school prevailed over the Thomist regarding the immaculate conception of Mary, so it will be able to prevail regarding this opinion, which marvelously smiles upon us" (G. Bonomelli, cf. Etudes franciscaines, 2 [1899], p. 577).

Nor should it be forgotten, with regard to the perfect orthodoxy of S., that the Church has not only never condemned any doctrinal proposition of his up to now, but has also expressly declared, by a decree of the Congregation issued by order of Paul V, "immunem esse a censuris doctrinam Scoti," establishing at the same time "ne quis librorum censor prohibere auderet quod certo constaret ex Scoto de promptum esse" (cf. Hurter, IV, col. 369). Thus the Holy See has approved on various occasions the general constitutions of the Franciscan Order, which prescribed to lecturers "ut litteram Scoti solum et non alios auctores ex professo explicare conentur" (cf. W.

Lampen, B. Ioannes Duns Scotus et Sancta Sedes, Quaracchi 1929). At other times it has confirmed the statutes of various universities and theological faculties of Italy, France, England, Poland, Spain, etc., where there existed chairs of S., alongside those of St. Thomas. Thus, for example, Clement XII approved the statutes of the University of Cervera, founded by Philip V, where it was prescribed: "Scoti cathedrae praefectus praecipue caveat ne in conficiendis ad praelectiones suas tractatibus, a mente eiusdem doctoris deflecta" (Bullarium Romanum, ed. Turin, XXIII, pp. 165, 170, 172).

With this, there is no intention of ignoring the preponderant favor rightly attributed by the Holy See to the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, nor of diminishing the indisputable merits of the Summa theologica, which for the clarity and simplicity of its exposition and for the richness and architectural order of its content has deserved to be chosen as the teaching text in Catholic schools. The curious alternative "either Thomas or D. S.," which half a century ago was posed and to which some replied "Thomas and not D. S.," has shown itself today to be no longer relevant and must therefore be transformed into the more just and more serene affirmation of Bazala (Povijest filozofije, II, p. 174): "With the name of Thomas, the name of D. S. will also always worthily resound."

On this point the great scholar of Scholasticism, Cardinal F. Ehrle, wrote (La scolastica e i suoi compiti odierni, Turin 1935, p. 92): "We know, finally, how to appreciate fully the fact that the Church, with all the esteem she has for the Doctor communis, refuses to emphasize the doctrine of the Saint in such a way that the opinions of other important schools might appear condemned or at least diminished by it. She knows too well what importance the free contest of ideas has, in the search for truth, in making possible the complete clarification of a problem, even when one starts from different points of view. As long as faith and love are preserved, this can only be to the advantage of truth and also of the Church herself, protectress of every truth. Therefore she grants to all teachers, students and investigators the iusta libertas. If an individual scholar, institute or religious Order wishes to adhere more closely to Thomas or to another master, they have the full right and the full freedom to do so."

In any case, it is now perfectly settled that D. S., with his excellent critical method, with his extensive use of the most rigorous rational argumentation, with his exaltation of the primacy of the will, of freedom, of activity, of love, and with his singular Christocentric-Marian speculation, created a solid and enduring doctrinal system which - embraced and defended over the centuries by a pleiad of theologians, philosophers, saintly preachers and invincible polemicists - imposes itself also and, we would say, especially upon the dispassionate research and study of our time, to which has been reserved the merit of placing, for the first time, in its full historical-critical light, the figure and the work of the great architects of integral Scholasticism, among whom D. S. occupies a place that all recognize, without reservation, as being of no small importance.

The "conspectus" of modern Scotist literature is found in E. Bettoni, Venti ultimi anni di letteratura scotista, Milan 1943; Franzisianische Studien, 8 (1911), pp. 48-66; Antonianum 3 (1928), pp. 451-84; Quatrième congrès des lecteurs de la langue française, Paris 1934, pp. 190-254; M. De Wulf, Storia della filosofia medievale, Italian trans., II, Florence 1945, pp. 304-23.

The older bibliography is in: P. Raymond, s. v. in DThC, III, coll. 1865-1947; U. Smeets, Lineamenta bibliographiae scotisticae, Rome 1942.

On the life and works of D. S.: B. Brkié, Zivot Ivana D. S., Sarajevo 1908; A. Bertoni, Le b. J. D. S., Levanto 1917; E. Giusto, La vita del b. G. D. S., Assisi 1919; A. Pelzer, Le premier livre des Reportata Parisiensia de J. D. S., in Annales de l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, V, Louvain 1923; F. Pelzer, Handschriftliches zu Shotus mit neuen Angaben über sein Leben, in Franzisianische Studien, 10 (1923), pp. 1-32; A. Callebaut, A propos du b. J. D. S. de Littledeau, in Archivum Franc. Historium, 24 (1931), pp. 305-29; Ch. Balié, Les commentaires de J. D. C. sur les quatre livres des Sentences, Louvain 1927; id., Ratio criticae editionis operum omnium J. D. S., 2 vols., Rome 1939-41; Béraud de S.-Maurice, J. D. S., un docteur des temps nouveaux, Montreal 1944.

A general synthesis of S.'s doctrine was made in the Proceedings of the Scotist Congress of Zagreb, Collectanea Franciscana Slovica, I, Sabenico 1937; there is also: R. Seeberg, Die Theologie des J. D. S., Leipzig 1900; E. Longpré, La philosophie du b. D. S., Paris 1924; P. Minges, I. D. S. doctrina philosophica et theologica, 2 vols., Quaracchi 1930; C. R. S. Harris, D. S., 2 vols., Oxford 1930; Z. Van de Woestyne, Scholae franciscanae optatus cursus philosophicus, Malines 1932; S. Belmond, Essai de synthèse philosophique du scotisme, in La France franciscaine (1933), pp. 73-131; Déodat Marie de Basly, S. docens, Paris 1934; E. Bettoni, D. S., Brescia 1946.

On individual philosophical-theological questions: Déodat M. de Basly, Grandes thèses catholiques, I, Paris 1900; II, Rome-Paris 1903; P. Minges, Die Gnadenlehre des D. S. ..., Münster 1906; id., Der Gottesbegriff des D. S., Vienna 1907; id., Das Verhältnis zwischen Glauben und Wissen, Theologie und Philosophie nach D. S., Paderborn 1908; J. Belmond, Dieu, Paris 1913; J. Klein, Der Gottesbegriff des J. D. S., Paderborn 1913; M. Heidegger, Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des D. S., Tübingen 1916; J. Carreras y Artau, Ensayo sobre el voluntarismo de J. D. S., Gerona 1923; J. Klein, Die Charitablehre des J. D. S., Münster 1926; E. Gilson, Avicenne et le point de départ de D. S., in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt. du moyen âge, 11 (1927), pp. 88-149; J. Kraus, Die Lehre des J. D. S. von der natura communis, Paderborn 1927; D. Scaramuzzi, Il pensiero di G. D. S. nel mezzogiorno d'Italia, Rome 1927; H. Klug, B. J. D. S. doctrina de sacrificio, praesertion de sacrosancto Missae sacrificio, Barcelona 1929; H. Schwamm, Das Göttliche Vorherzusen bei D. S. und seinen ersten Anhängern, Innsbruck 1934; F. Chauvet, Las pasiones, Barcelona 1936; H. Storf, De natura transsubstantiationis iuxta I. D. S., Quaracchi 1936; J. Binkowski, Die Wertlehre des D. S., Berlin 1936; E. Gilson, Les seize premiers Theoremata et la pensée de D. S., in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt. du moyen âge, 22 (1938), pp. 5-86; N. Petruzzellis, Studi sull'Edice di D. S., in Archivio di filosofia, 10 (1940), pp. 66-87, 219-33, 390-416; C. Balié, De debito peccati originali in B. V. Maria, Investigations de doctrina quam tenuit I. D. S., Rome 1941; E. Bettoni, L'ascesa a Dio in D. S., Milan 1943; M. Grajewski, The Formal distinction of D. S., Washington 1944; A. B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and their function in the Metaphysics of D. S., New York 1946.