Modernism

MODERNISMO. – This is the heterodox tendency that emerged among Catholic scholars at the end of the last century and in the early years of the present one, with the aim of renewing and interpreting Christian doctrine in harmony with modern thought. The term m. occurs officially for the first time in the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis of Pope Pius X, as the common designation for a complex of errors in all fields of Catholic doctrine (Sacred Scripture, dogmas, worship, philosophy), in order to reduce it to its original core.

SUMMARY:

I. Historical Origins

II. The Encyclical – Pascendi –

III. Doctrinal Character

IV. Principal Errors

V. Critique.

I. HISTORICAL GENESIS

The remote origin of modernism is to be sought in the restlessness and craving for novelty that, from the pontificates of Gregory XVI and Pius IX onward, were spreading in certain Catholic circles, especially in France, impatient with scholastic theology: the condemnations of Lamennais’s indifferentism (1834), Bautain’s (1840) and Bonetty’s (1855) traditionalism, the rationalism of G. Hermes (1835) and Günther (1857), ontologism (1861), and Frohschammer (1862), as well as the accumulation of errors gathered in Pius IX’s Syllabus (1864), were the stages of the error and the symptoms of the storm gathering over the Church. The celebration of the First Vatican Council (1870) was for a time a providential bulwark: the dogmatic constitution De fide catholica defined the relations between reason and faith and established the supernatural essence of faith and therefore of the genuine Catholic notion of Revelation and biblical inspiration; Constitution I (the only one completed), De Ecclesia Christi, affirmed the divine authority of the Church and its infallible teaching office in the person of the successor of the Prince of the Apostles, the Roman Pontiff. The first signs of the new heresy in Catholic circles took shape in France, RENNES (v.), through the work of A. Loisy (v.), and through the tendency of not a few Catholic scholars who intended to bring themselves into line with the results of recent investigations into the comparative history of religions and dogmas, the philology of texts, and biblical archaeology, in order to provide an apologetic of Christianity suited to the needs of the new times. The Church had already acknowledged the necessity of an appropriate and urgent renewal of sacred studies, and of biblical studies in particular; evidence of this is Leo XIII’s encyclical Precidentissimus Deus (1893), which outlined their meaning, program, and principles: the encyclical left the private scholar a broad field of research in all those matters «qui expositionem certam et definitam adhuc desiderant» (cf. Denz-U, 1942), while, with regard to points already defined by the Church, he could still deepen them, adapt them to the needs of the times, and defend them against the attacks of opponents. For this purpose the same Pontiff established the Pontifical Biblical Commission (1902), but Loisy proceeded along his own path, and modernism was able to spread and organize itself in England with Tyrrell, BUON, FAMIGLIA (v.), Murri (v.), Minocchi (v.), and in certain German Catholic circles, with an ever more alarming breadth and penetration.

It fell to Pius X to undertake the arduous task of unmasking the heresy; and, in an almost unique event in the history of the Church, modernism collapsed in upon itself almost immediately. Pius X’s first intervention was the decree of the Holy Office Lamentabili (v.) of 5 July 1907, which summarized the new errors in 65 articles. The decree became a solemn condemnation with the encyclical Pascendi of 8 September of that same year, 1907; the encyclical, to the great surprise of modernism’s own proponents, condensed the logical synthesis of their principles with a «magisterial exposition and a magnificent critique» (G. Gentile). Finally, in order to avoid every compromise and ambiguity in the sphere of ecclesiastical teaching and discipline, Pius X, in the motu proprio Sacrorum Antistitum of 1 September 1910, expressly referring to the two preceding documents, published the formula of the “anti-Modernist oath,” which at the same time presents the cornerstones of Catholic doctrine and the principal errors of modernism that sought to undermine II. It may be said that this is where the history of modernism ends; its painful but by then necessary epilogue was the pontifical condemnation of the leaders who had proved rebellious or recalcitrant. In vain did some proponents of modernism (Programma dei modernisti, 2nd ed., Turin 1911, p. 97 ff.) appeal to Newman’s doctrines on the “illative sense” of faith and on the evolution of dogmas that he defended, because he always maintained the necessity of the guidance of the ecclesiastical magisterium (cf. J. Guitton, La philosophie de Newman. Essai sur l'idée de développement, Paris 1933, p. 166 ff.). In particular, modernism’s central idea of an unresolvable antagonism between the tradition of the Church and contemporary thought, to be resolved entirely at the discretion of the latter, stands in open contrast with Newman’s formula of the development of dogma, according to which «old principles return in new forms, and the idea changes with them in order to remain identical», a principle that ought rather to have prevented than encouraged modernism (Essay on the development of christian doctrine, London 1878, p. 40). Moreover, Newman’s orthodoxy was defended by Pius X in his letter to the bishop of Limerick of 10 March 1908: «Profetto in tanta lucubrationum eius copia, quidpiam reperiti potest, quod ab usitata theologorum ratione videatur, nihil potest quod de ipsius fide suspicionem afferat» (Acta S. Sedis, 41 [1908], p. 201).

In the same sense, those scholars who, although sympathetic to the new ideas, accepted the pontifical decision while protesting their desire to remain faithful to the authority of the Church should not expressly be included among the modernists condemned by the encyclical (and they constituted the majority). Among these perhaps should also be included Baron von Hügel (1852–1925), who was deeply influenced by Newman (cf. M. Schüller-Hermkes, Friedrich von Hügel, Religion als Ganzheit, Düsseldorf 1948, p. 441 ff.): taking advantage of the favor he enjoyed among the modernists, he attempted, insofar as he was able, to bring Loisy and Tyrrell back to obedience to the Church (op. cit., p. 467 ff., where the author concludes: «Hügels Religionsphilosophie ist also unzweidentig antimodernistisch»; nevertheless, on p. 480, n. 180, the letter of 4 May 1907 from Cardinal Steinhuber, prefect of the Index, to Cardinal Ferrari is reproduced, in which the writings of von Hügel were deplored together with those of Tyrrell, Fagazzaro, and Murri. But this was still before any formal condemnation; M. Nédoncelle also defends the orthodoxy of von Hügel, La pensée religieuse de Fr. von Hügel, Paris 1935, pp. 15–40).

II. THE ENCYCLICAL «PASCENDI»

Considered in its content, its method, and even its wholly unmistakable style, it is one of the most decisive documents of the supreme magisterium, and among all the acts of Pius X it remains the most distinguished monument of his pontificate, a document expressing his most heartfelt concerns and serving as the definitive completion of that dam against the tide of modern errors which, for a century now, had engaged the work of the Roman pontificate for the preservation of the faith. Its distinctive feature lies in the strongly theoretical structure that gives it a singular transparency, through which the multiple aberrations of m. dissolve, revealing their distortion and their evident dissonance with the sacred deposit of the faith. The errors of m. had been carefully collected and denounced by the decree Lamentabili in resolute and lucid formulas (Denz-U, 2001-63); the encyclical takes them up again, presents them in their genesis, and links them together, tearing them away from that aura of indeterminacy in which their proponents had deliberately left them. In this sense, it may be said that, despite coming so shortly after the decree, the encyclical gives an original and new exposition of the same errors, with a mastery of the terminology and technique of the opposing side perhaps unique in a document of this kind; for this reason it was bound to draw back onto the right path those who, in good faith, were serving in the ranks of error. This first part, the most extensive and elaborately developed, is followed by disciplinary instructions which the bishops are to implement in the selection of seminary professors and in the advancement of philosophical, theological, and auxiliary secular studies. The doctrinal section is divided into three points, in which the three principal stages or phases of the error are analyzed—or rather, as the encyclical profoundly puts it, the various personalities that merge and intersect in the proponents of m.: the philosopher, the believer, the theologian, the historian, the critic, the apologist, and the reformer.

The substance of the exposition lies in demonstrating the solidarity and continuity of the three moments in the demolition of the faith, insofar as the philosopher began by asserting absolute individual subjectivism and relativism, proclaiming as the sole criterion the private feeling of each person, in which not only conviction concerning the Supreme Being is resolved, but also the content and meaning of dogmas themselves. The encyclical warns against the twofold exacerbation to which Catholic doctrine is subjected by the new criterion: “transfiguration,” insofar as divine truth is forced to assume a subjective exaltation in order to move the subject, and “deformation” (defiguratio), insofar as a situation different from its reality is arbitrarily created for the faith, in contradiction with the declarations of the First Vatican Council (Denz-U, 1808). The most harmful consequence is the profession of the intrinsic and unlimited evolution of dogmas, whose meaning and value derive not from their immutable content but from the subjective emotion they may arouse in the believer: blindness born of an itch for novelty and proud presumption, as Gregory XVI had already denounced (Denz-U, 2072-80).

It is understandable that the “believer” finds himself released from every criterion of objectivity and extrinsic authority, from divine tradition, and thus embraces the absurdity of asserting, for example, that history can say nothing about the divinity of Jesus Christ, which is present solely to the consciousness of the believer: a violent separation already condemned by Pius IX (Denz-U, 1656) and earlier by Gregory IX in 1228, at the first appearance of theological rationalism (Denz-U, 442 ff.). Under the appearance of fideism, the proponents of m. intend to place faith at the discretion of human conscience (Denz-U, 2081-86). Immanence, proclaimed by the philosopher and lived by the believer, is applied by the “theologian” to the formulas and truths of faith, with the conclusion that “representations” of divine reality are reduced to “symbols,” which relate to particular states of the believer’s consciousness and change along with it: this also applies to the Sacraments and to divine inspiration. The Church herself is a product of collective experience and must adapt to its rhythm, without any coercion or imposition by an external authority. Along this line, the proponents of m. go on to define the relations between the Church and political power, asserting an absolute separation between Church and State, contrary to the determination made by Pius VI in the constitution Auctorem fidei, which condemned the error of the Council of Pistoia (Denz-U, 1502 ff.). In this way every consistency and authority of the ecclesiastical magisterium, together with every external manifestation or hierarchical structure of it, is demolished: there is no sphere that m. did not invade and dislodge from its foundations in order to replace it with arbitrariness. The final conclusion is already implicit in the first step of philosophical subjectivism: the proclamation of atheism and the abolition of every religion (Denz-U, 2087-2109). It was a strange mixture of murky aspirations which, under the pretext of a pseudomystical coating and with an appeal to an interiority more theoretical than intimately practical, claimed to champion the politics of the new democracy (as Murri did in Italy), to be superimposed upon and substituted for the action of the Church.

Shortly thereafter, through the motu proprio Praestantia Scripturae (18 November 1907), the Pope rose up against the distortions attempted with regard to the decree Lamentabili and the encyclical Pascendi, threatening excommunication against those who contradicted them and declaring that the contumacious in the errors condemned therein were guilty of heresy, because in most of those propositions the foundations of the faith were assailed (Denz-U, 2114). The Pope not only personally supervised the execution of the provisions of the encyclical and those concerning the anti-Modernist oath, but also intensified the activity of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, which pronounced “with authority” on the principal problems of theology and biblical exegesis; likewise, he founded the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome, so that it might gather the most expert Catholic scholars of the Sacred Text and prepare there the new professors of Sacred Scripture for the seminaries.

III. DOCTRINAL NATURE

The gravity of the dogmatic error of m. lies entirely in its fundamental principle. M. consists not so much in opposition to one or another of the revealed truths as in a radical change in the very notion of “truth,” “religion,” and “revelation”: the essence of this change lies in the unconditional acceptance of the “principle of immanence” that underlies modern thought. It is true that this theoretical principle is rarely expressed systematically by the proponents of m., since they devote themselves preferably to the positive study of the history of the Church, dogmas, and the Bible; nevertheless, the critical approach they follow in their research is dominated by that principle, which abandons Christian truth without remainder to the contingency of human culture and subjective experience. In this respect m. also derives, in a historically evident way, from the movement of the Lutheran Reformation itself, as the encyclical itself warns (Denz-U, 2086), insofar as the “Reformation” detached the faith of the individual from obedience to the hierarchical authority established in the visible Church. The Protestant principle found its secular version in Kantian epistemological subjectivism and from there in the twofold tendency of the transcendental idealism of Fichte-Schelling-Hegel, which subordinated religion to philosophy, and of the fideistic irrationalism (closer to Kant) of Jacobi-Fries-Schleiermacher, which placed the essence of religion in the individual “feeling” of the divine.

The inevitable fruit of this invasion of subjectivity into the realm of faith was the disintegration of the traditional doctrine of truth carried out by the German “liberal theology” of the second half of the nineteenth century. After the Hegelians Feuerbach, Strauss, and Bauer, who denied not only Revelation but every natural and positive religion, it treated the truths of Christianity, and of revealed religion in general, as a historical and cultural product of the age in which they arose (Ritschl, Vatke, Tröltsch, Hermann). The concept of the “development” or “becoming” (Werden) of consciousness, elaborated by Hegel from the standpoint of abstract dialectics, was proposed by Darwin as the sole and fundamental law for understanding the origin of life and of consciousness itself. Spencer, within the sphere of philosophy, set forth in his First Principles the “theory of the Unknowable,” which, like Kant a century earlier, declared every rational path to the attainment of the Absolute impossible. Moreover, the new path to access spiritual reality was indicated in the psychological analysis of intimate experience, contemporaneously in the work of H. Bergson in France and W. James in America. But the most direct and complete source from which the proponents of m. drew was the theory of “symbolic fideism” that A. Sabatier expounded with great appeal in Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion (Paris 1879, especially pp. 390 ff.). In it, the principle of vital immanence is applied radically to all the foundations of Christian faith, and it is shown at the same time, with complete mastery of Protestant theology, that the reduction of faith to subjective “instinct” is the only logical result of the principle of the “Reformation” (cf. Fr. Heiler, A. Loisy, der Vater des katholischen Modernismus, Munich 1947, p. 46). At the same time, the results of modern philology applied to the Sacred Text raised new problems concerning the authenticity, structure, and interpretation of the inspired books, problems that patristic and scholastic theology could not have suspected in the composition of the New Testament; explorations of the ancient civilizations of the biblical world in the Middle East and the study of extrabiblical religions brought to light analogies and similarities that could not be accidental and therefore required an overall interpretation according to a unitary principle. M. took advantage of this to resume the attempt of “Gnosticism” to embrace all the demands of truth through a single principle: the subjectivity of truth and the relativity of all its formulas, and hence the relativity of dogma.

The danger of m. lies in its extreme pliability, which seeks to evade every definite and precise qualification, both in philosophy and in theology: indeed, the proponents of m. avoid accepting either philosophical system in its entirety, claiming to have grasped the unitary principle that characterizes modern man beyond and above the oppositions between systems. This principle, which constitutes the essence of m., is identified with vital immanence understood as “private experience.” Its significance for Christian knowledge lies in the “mediation” that the principle of immanence effects upon every real, historical, and philosophical datum with respect to the prolegomena of faith: the existence of God, immortality, and future life in the strictly theoretical sphere, and, in the sphere of apologetics, with respect to the objective evidentiary value of miracles and prophecies. Then, within the sphere of the truths of faith itself, m. effects this “mediation” in the most radical manner, eliminating any effective distinction of value between the various religions and even between the most opposed attitudes that the individual may adopt within his religion. It can be said today that m. has unified, in this principle of immanence, the opposing tendencies of phenomenalism, idealist historicism, and the fideism of Kant-Schleiermacher, namely: 1) “reality” is the impression of consciousness (Hume, James, Bergson); 2) truth is resolved into the destiny or development of human consciousness (Hegel); 3) this consciousness manifests and attests itself in intimate impression or perception (“sensua” in the encyclical Pascendi, Schleiermacher’s “Gefühl”), as it occurs to the individual on each occasion. Thus the proponents of m. were able to claim that they accepted the Church’s entire doctrine, whereas in reality they simultaneously rejected: 1) the concept of God’s “ontological transcendence” with respect to the created order and the finite mind, so that God is replaced by the “divine”; 2) the very concept of the supernatural, so that dogmas are reduced to “symbols” and “approximations”; 3) finally, the concept of the “ecclesiastical magisterium,” whose authority binds only to the extent that the private conscience of the individual finds itself in agreement with external authority. M. therefore overturned the traditional method of Christian apologetics in the relationship between “science and faith,” renewing the Averroist error of dissociation within the very consciousness of the Christian, as the Oath warns (Denz-U, 2146), between the believer’s external obedience to the authority of the Church, which proposes the truth to be believed, and the scholar’s inner conviction. Thus the content and very value of those same truths were withdrawn from the ecclesiastical magisterium and reserved to a form of “supercomprehension” by virtue of the subject’s religious emotion. Ultimately, the only valid formula of religious truth was reduced to the structure that consciousness gives itself in the face of individual problems of faith. The encyclical therefore rightly characterizes m. not so much as heresy as a “compendium of all heresies”; it might almost be called the “essential heresy,” insofar as it overturns and denies the very guarantee of orthodoxy, namely the supreme magisterium, which, through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, continues in the Church according to the promise of Jesus Christ.

IV. ERRORI PRINCIPALI

L'encicl. Pascendi dichiara nel modo più perentorio che il m., a causa della sua professione di soggettivismo radicale, trapassa al di là di ogni religione nell'agnosticismo assoluto e quindi di necessità finisce nell'ateismo. Il Programma dei modernisti, pubblicato nel nov. 1907 come risposta all'enciclica, lungi dallo scagionarlo, risulta una conferma punto per punto della opportunità e fondatezza della condanna papale.

1. M. biblico. — Alla dottrina (il Programma dice «opinione») tradizionale che nella Bibbia si possiede il processo genuino della Rivelazione sia del Vecchio sia del Nuovo Testamento, perché garantita dall'autorità di Dio che l'ha ispirata in ogni sua parte e per l'autorità degli scrittori secondari (ad es., Mosè, Giosuè, gli Evangelisti), che furono testimoni immediati o mediati di ciò che narrano, si oppongono, a sentire i modernisti, i recenti risultati della critica biblica secondo i quali i libri storici del Vecchio Testamento sono semplici raccolte di materiali che «non mostrano alcuna pretesa di provare la verità, ma semplicemente di purificare il sentimento religioso del lettore» e che perciò non possono aver Dio come autore principale. In questo senso si può

ben ammettere che la Bibbia «non contiene alcun errore propriamente detto e molto meno le bugie sia pur officiose», in quanto che il racconto biblico si rapporta «a quelle forme e alle esigenze di vita dei lettori per i quali ciascun libro è stato scritto» (Il programma dei modernisti, 2ª ed., Torino 1911, p. 40). Parimenti l'ispirazione biblica non è più da concepire come una meccanica trasmissione delle parole o dell'idea da Dio all'uomo, ma in una vitale concezione della parola insieme e dell'idea per opera dell'uomo unito a Dio in una maniera speciale e soprannaturale (ibid., p. 41) che però il Programma non precisa. Va notato infine che, secondo il m., lo scopo e il contenuto della divina Rivelazione non ha tanto carattere dottrinale riguardante la conoscenza astratta della divinità, quanto l'istruzione pratica del come venerare Dio e conformare la vita alla norma suprema della sua volontà (ibid., p. 45). La negazione dell'ispirazione come carisma, della storicità e del contenuto di verità assoluta del libro sacro è ripetuta e analizzata a riguardo del Nuovo Testamento nella composizione dei Vangeli e dei rapporti fra loro, dove si fa distinzione fra l'elemento storico e l'elemento soprannaturale della fede, per passare alla distinzione nominata dalla stessa enciclica (Denz-U, 2076) fra «il Cristo della storia e il Cristo della fede (Programma, pp. 66 sgg., 115): all'una appartiene di conoscere che Cristo è uomo, all'altra che Cristo è Dio e tocca al fedele vedere dappertutto il Cristo secondo lo spirito» (ibid., p. 73). Importa poco alla fede di accertare la nascita verginale, i miracoli clamorosi e infine la resurrezione del Redentore e se è possibile o no attribuire a Cristo l'annuncio di alcuni dogmi e la fondazione della Chiesa: questi fatti sfuggono alla storia e non hanno realtà che per la fede (ibid., p. 111). Il principale rappresentante del m. biblico fu A. Loisy.

2. M. teologico. — Al principio del cristianesimo non c'era che la fede intensamente vissuta, senza dottrine definite o dogmi: questi sono «incrostazioni depositate dalla riflessione di coscienze esaltate, specialmente di s. Paolo, ma estranee al contenuto primitivo del Vangelo di Gesù ch'era un caldo e appassionato annuncio del regno imminente e un invito alla purificazione interiore» (ibid., pp. 74, 88). Altrettanto dicasi della dottrina dei primi Padri, dai quali esula ogni tendenza dogmatica così che è «arbitrario e aprioristico» far risalire all'insegnamento primitivo di Gesù e dei suoi primitivi seguaci i dogmi dei concili e specialmente la fede del Concilio di Trento nella loro espressione. La «evoluzione dei dogmi» è stata, secondo il m., l'effetto dell'adattamento vitale «indispensabile al cristianesimo per sopravvivere nell'ambiente ellenistico in cui venne a trovarsi fuori della Palestina, e ciò vale specialmente per i dogmi fondamentali trinitario e cristologico e per l'organizzazione della Chiesa» (ibid., p. 81 sgg.). Così che «tutto è cambiato nella storia del cristianesimo, pensiero, gerarchia e culto: l'elemento costante di verità ai primi tempi della Chiesa, nei secoli seguenti, compresa la scolastica e il Concilio di Trento che la canonizzò, come ai nostri giorni, è l'esperienza religiosa ch'è sempre identica negli uni e negli altri» (ibid., p. 92). In tutta la storia del Vecchio e del Nuovo Testamento si attua «la continuità di una Rivelazione che nella coscienza umana il divino fa di se stesso sempre più intensamente» (ibid., p. 111): dogmi, organizzazione ecclesiastica, Sacramenti... non sono che mezzi per realizzare quell'esperienza più profonda del divino; e i fautori del m. auspicano di poter in futuro farne a meno (ibid., p. 112).

3. M. filosofico. — Il Programma rigetta categoricamente l'accusa di «agnosticismo» e — pur riconoscendo di accettare la critica negativa fatta alla ragione da Kant e Spencer (ibid., p. 28) — dichiara di professare un atteggiamento radicalmente diverso, quello cioè di spiegare ogni tipo di conoscenza (fenomenica, scientifica, filosofica, religiosa) in funzione dell'«azione» e quindi dell'esperienza che è propria ad ognuno in quei campi. In particolare nella sfera religiosa, sia per provare l'esistenza di Dio come per accertarsi della divina Rivelazione, non importano più le dimostrazioni della metafisica medievale e la testimonianza del miracolo e della profezia:

oggi sono invece « le esigenze della nostra vita morale e l'esperienza del divino che si compie nelle profondità più oscure della nostra coscienza, che conducono ad un senso speciale delle realtà soprasensibili » (ibid., p. 97). Quanto all'accusa d'immanentismo, il Programma, pur riconoscendo che l'enciclica ha visto bene, si affanna a dimostrare che il « principio d'immanenza » non è affatto in contrasto con la tradizione cattolica in quanto anche per questo il giudizio « Dio esiste », ammesso come la stessa teologia scolastica ammette che non è giudizio né analitico a priori né sintetico a priori, resta che sia sintetico a posteriori, cioè dimostrabile con l'esperienza, « la quale non può essere altro che quella che si compie dalla e nella coscienza dell'uomo » (ibid., p. 100). Anche i Padri e lo stesso s. Tommaso non hanno voluto dire altro, e l'immanentismo non è quel grosso errore che l'enciclica ha voluto far credere (ibid., pp. 101 sgg., 120 sgg., 138 sgg.). Quanto ai rapporti fra scienza e fede, il Programma professa di ammettere la distinzione più netta nel senso che la fede religiosa è il « bisogno istintivo... che nasce spontaneamente e si svolge indipendentemente da ogni tirocinio di preparazione scientifica » (ibid., p. 123). Il Programma come conclusione dichiara che il m. non avversa né la Scrittura e neppure la tradizione ma soltanto l'interpretazione scolastica delle medesime perché ormai sorpassata dal metodo critico della coscienza moderna (ibid., p. 127).

V. CRITICA

The Program therefore confirmed all the principal charges brought by the encyclical Pascendi and identified as its guiding principle in the conception of faith, history, dogmatic formulas, and the hierarchy of worship private subjective experience. This criterion of private experience is presented as the undisputed and definitive result of modern thought, which ought to constitute the sole formula for the possibility of religious truth for human consciousness in general. By exploiting and exaggerating the critical insufficiency of certain traditional positions in the field of exegesis and Church history, m. substantially changed the interpretation of the data and of the very meaning of faith, natural religion, and the function of human reason. Greek-Christian realism was thus rejected wholesale—a realism founded on the distinction between man, the world, and God, and on the distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders; thereby every vestige of transcendence was abolished. Consequently, every absolute and transcendent value of the first principles of reason was eliminated, and with them the possibility of the logical structure of discourse and the validity of every metaphysical position were removed. The protests of certain modernists that they accepted Catholic doctrine in its entirety are of no avail, because m. contains in the “principle of vital immanence” the corrosive poison not only of the essence and truths of faith but also of the objective value of any absolute truth, whether factual or rational, and returns to the principle of Protagoras that “man is the measure of all things” (Theaet., 152, frag. B 1). Although m. derives, through multiple channels, from the subjectivism of modern thought, it has no theoretical consistency, because it does not commit itself fully to any particular system or philosophy; it thus resolves itself into a phenomenon of “theoretical contamination” and superficial concordism. The most essential contamination, however, was the attempt to interpret the subject’s intimate experience (self-consciousness) as being in direct continuity with, and as the sole authentic expression of, religious life, and to take common or natural religious consciousness as the essence or common denominator of divine Revelation itself and of the life of Grace. The religious experience (v.), within the life of Grace and faith, can have only a secondary value and can exist only in dependence upon Revelation and the ecclesiastical magisterium.

The error of m. nevertheless benefited the life of the Church indirectly, by rallying its finest forces to confront the most insidious and widespread attack on its spiritual mission: higher studies at Catholic universities, stimulated by m., were in this first half of the century completely renewed, especially in the field of biblical sciences and the history of dogmas, where m. had its arsenal of weapons. Yet the danger of m. has never been completely overcome, because human reason, corrupted by sin, inherently tends to set itself up as the absolute criterion of truth and to subject faith to itself. An endeavor akin to theological m. is the so-called “theologie nouvelle,” which appeared in France after the Second World War and was vigorously denounced in Pius XII’s encyclical Humani generis (12 Aug. 1950).