MEMORIA

MEMORY. — In modern psychology, which seems to continue the conception of decadent Scholasticism, memory (m.) generally signifies the function that preserves sensory images or those produced by the imagination. Through memory, past states of consciousness are relived and recognized; it thus involves the ability to preserve, recognize, localize in time and space, and reproduce the facts and phenomena of lived experience.

It now seems established that the object of memory must be restricted to representative contents, since feelings and volitions are not repeated but occur in consciousness always in an original form. The main problem of memory thus becomes the genesis and reproduction of images: research has therefore sought to determine whether the actions of stimuli that impress the senses reach the centers, leaving a physical imprint, and whether there exist special centers in the brain tasked with preserving isolated the various classes of perceptual objects (the doctrine of "cerebral localization"). Above all, the laws governing the reproduction of representations when evoked in consciousness were investigated. On this subject, the path had already been opened by Aristotle himself, who identified as factors of reproduction contiguity in space and time, similarity, and difference (*De memoria et reminiscentia*, 2, 451 b, 12 ff.; cf. the noted anticipation of Aristotle’s critique of Hume’s principle, which placed the principal force of the association of ideas in habit). Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that every theory or attempt at biological or physiological explanation of memory has thus far failed to prevail. However, the extensive and rigorous research of positivist psychology (especially by H. F. Ebbinghaus) has significantly expanded the field of memory and knowledge of the behavior of images.

Against the associationist school, the Denkpsychologie (Külpe, Ach, Lindworski) reacted indirectly, but above all, the Gestalt psychology did so, asserting that the movement of ideas or images does not obey the content of individual elements but is a function of the "structure" (Gestalt) of the "whole" (Ganze). Yet this school lapsed into a form of physiological materialism by affirming that the cohesive force of structures depended on the distribution of nervous energy along the system from the peripheral organ to the centers (the *Querfunktionen* or transverse connecting currents).

In reality, memory in humans constitutes a set of highly complex processes due to the multiplicity of objects and modes of human life. In particular, memory is the point of encounter between the life of the ego (cf.) and thus both conscious and subconscious life. H. Höffding resorted to "feelings" of familiarity, which convey the conviction of prior knowledge of something; yet even the emotional theory, while explaining some mnemonic phenomena, leaves many others in obscurity. Even after the experiments of G. E. Müller, which concluded in favor of the predominance of feelings (of familiarity), it seems that emotional factors, though usually present, play a secondary role in memory processes (Gemelli). A more secure path is that suggested by Lindworski, for whom the principal element in memory is time, so that mnemonic phenomena are recalled through the experience of "relations" in space and time.

This approach essentially returns to Aristotle’s original doctrine of memory and recollection: Aristotle, in fact, discusses at length the relationship between the perception of time and memory, which he divides into two phases: memory proper, when the temporal relation operates the recall spontaneously without precise knowledge of the interval; and "recollection" (cf.), which instead proceeds by searching for the memory based on a well-defined knowledge of time itself (*op. cit.*, 2, 452 b 26-453 b 35). According to St. Thomas Aquinas, memory is the faculty that preserves the apprehensions of the concrete meaning of things (individual intention) learned by the cogitative faculty (cf.), which is the intermediate function between sensitive and intellectual life (cf. *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 78, a. 4), to which belongs the perception of the concrete relations that things have with life.

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EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY. — First of all, it must be observed: 1) that it would be an arbitrary restriction to limit the domain of memory solely to the properly cognitive field: for feelings and emotions can also be recalled (a pain experienced, a love that has faded); 2) that the proper and direct object of memory is not a thing or an external fact, but only the perception we had of that thing or fact; the emotion provoked by them in us cannot, in fact, "re-present" in our consciousness anything other than what was "present" there before (properly speaking, we do not remember Rome, but having seen Rome). We are thus the intermediaries between memory and the object.

1. **The various kinds of memory.** — a) According to the object we most readily retain or according to acquired or innate preferences or predispositions, there is memory for dates, languages, numbers, names, genealogies, etc.; b) According to the cognitive nature of the memories, there is: α) sensory or sensorial memory, if it concerns sensory images, which is subdivided into: visual memory, when one is most struck by forms and colors (painters, designers, chess players who conduct simultaneous games without ever lowering their eyes from the boards); auditory memory, when it primarily preserves sounds of music or the rhythmic language of poetry or simple words (pistacism); motor or muscular memory, when it chiefly retains the memory of movements of the lips in pronouncing letters, syllables, and words, or of the fingers for playing an instrument or of the legs and feet for skating, dancing, etc.; tactile memory, as in the case of the blind who read books and musical scores by tracing the text with the fingertips. β) Intellectual memory, which recalls ideas, judgments, and reasoning; γ) Affective memory, which recalls emotions and volitions.

Sensory memory also belongs to animals, as experience abundantly proves; in humans, it is joined and even integrated by intellectual memory. For example, a person does not merely remember the sound of the words in a speech or the exact placement of words in a verse, but also the meaning of that speech and that verse.

2. **Analysis of the mnemonic phenomenon.** — The elements or processes that integrate with one another in an act of memory can be reduced to five: fixation and preservation (fixation memory); recall (revival memory); recognition (reproduction memory); localization (chronological memory).

a) Fixation of the concept or image. — Physiologically, memory depends on the functionality and plasticity of nervous tissues, which vary extremely from person to person and, in the same person, according to age, state of health, occupations, and acquired bad habits; they range from an extraordinary power of fixation to a null or almost null degree. Psychologically, the degree of fixation is proportional to attention, the presence of centers of interest, and exercise. Therefore, a memory is fixed all the more when an event has made a strong impression (a battle, an earthquake, an exceptional ceremony are not easily forgotten). Similarly, fixation is favored by the relationship of memory with innate or acquired tendencies (a lazy person quickly forgets the teacher’s explanation but remembers football matches or the names of competitors in races very well) or with the content of consciousness (one who is intensely absorbed in their own reflections or in carrying out some enterprise forgets a great deal of memories and experiences). Finally, the degree of fixation depends on the law of use and disuse; exercise does not create the memory but strengthens it, prevents it from disappearing, and involves the mechanism of repetition and association. What is seen once or learned hastily is easily forgotten, while what is read, seen, or heard repeatedly or studied calmly is remembered better. Sensations, images, and ideas that are easily lost if isolated are, instead, remembered very well if grouped or in associative syntheses. Thus, to avoid forgetting an errand, one spontaneously ties a knot in a handkerchief; through mnemonic verses, dates, geographical names, grammatical or logical rules are easily retained; likewise, through words constructed with the initial syllables of a specific group to remember or by drafting ordered lists.

b) Conservation of memories. — The revival of past experiences raises the question of how they are conserved in memory. The same process occurs here as in habits, which, when exercised in a certain direction, tend to reproduce the same acts. Thus, in memories, the acts that form their content disappear, but they leave a physiopsychological disposition to be repeated. Therefore, the conservation of memories means nothing other than the possibility of recalling them; a psychophysiological disposition to reproduce them, which comes into action when the appropriate conditions arise.

c) Recall of memories. — This is the transition of memory from potentiality to actuality and consists, physiologically, in restoring, so to speak, the original organic state and, psychologically, in allowing or having the laws of the various kinds of association intervene. Recall can be spontaneous, when the memory arises suddenly without any apparent physiopsychological link to the current state of our consciousness (reviviscence); voluntary, when the memory is deliberately evoked or sought with more or less effort (reminiscence). However, the will does not have direct power over memory (it is commonly said: “it is enough that I try and I cannot find it”; “the word is on the tip of my tongue; I will remember it when I no longer think about it”), nor can it initiate the recall of a complete idea; what it can do is provoke those associations that can put one on the path and direction of what one wants to find. Thus, to recall a proper name, one thinks about how it begins or ends; one keeps the initial or final syllables fixed in the mind, and the sought-after name will eventually reappear. The insistence of the will can often hinder the free play of associations; therefore, it is better to let the nervous current flow freely because it spontaneously directs itself toward the sought-after object. For this reason, the best way to spell a word correctly whose spelling escapes us at a given moment is to let the pen flow freely; if at a certain point we forget the rest of a poem or prayer, the best means is to start again from the beginning and let the lips move, so to speak, automatically; for this reason, one also closes their eyes when trying to recall a memory, seeks darkness, and silence, because the more the mind is at rest and less distracted by current perceptions, the better the various associations function freely, and it is more capable of evoking the past.

d) Recognition. — This is the “knowing again” of a past experience in a present one; the comparison of the current experience with the past one. The process unfolds in two successive phases: simple sensation of the “already seen or heard,” etc., without any evocation of the past: “I have seen that man before”; “I have heard that music before”; then, through automatic provocation of the past, the search for the complete and determined old experience, i.e., the search for the old experience that is entirely similar to the present one: “ah, it’s Peter”; “it’s that passage from *La Traviata*.” Here we have true and complete recognition.

e) Localization of the memory. — More than a different function of memory, localization is the complement of recognition and consists in determining at what moment the remembered event occurred. Its process is regressive; one goes back along the line of lived time. For exact localization, it is useful to constitute a series of milestones or reference points, linked to the most important facts and events of our life, to which we bind all other memories through association (e.g., the various school stages: grammar school, high school, university; career stages, etc.).

3) Illnesses of memory. — The disturbances that can affect memory are divided into quantitative (amnesia, hypomnesia, hypermnesia) and qualitative (dysmnesia, paramnesia).

a) Quantitative disturbances. — a) Amnesia is the total or partial loss of the ability to fix or properly recall memories duly recorded at the appropriate time. Total amnesia in a definitive form is rare; however, there are cases of personality change (the subject begins an entirely new life without any interference from the past life); cases of very severe dementia and severe clouding of consciousness. More frequent is amnesia in a temporary form, following violent impressions (shock) and certain cerebral concussions. Periodic amnesia can also be found, for example, in cases of alternating personalities, where the memories also alternate.

Amnesia is distinguished also into: anterograde (or of fixation), retrograde (or of recall), anteroretrograde or mixed, lacunar: 1) anterograde, when the capacity to fix new memories is lost from the moment a pathological state occurs (e.g., the subject remembers everything up to the moment of the lesion; of what happened afterwards, up to the moment of recovery, nothing is remembered). It generally occurs due to clouding of the sensory apparatus, senile dementia, or even in normal old age (the subject no longer remembers a sentence just read, while remembering whole passages read in youth); 2) retrograde, when there is a loss of duly recorded memories, which from a certain moment can no longer be recalled or associated, or only with difficulty and effort; this generally occurs following cerebral trauma, severe intoxications, or certain cerebral infections; 3) anteroretrograde, when there is a loss of memories before or after the moment of the incident; the subject is thus disoriented and can no longer fix new memories nor recall old ones. It occurs in severe dementias and states of severe clouding of consciousness; 4) lacunar, when the capacity to fix all or a group of perceptions becomes for some time null or greatly weakened.

B) Hypomnesia is the progressive weakening of memory and is the effect of mental infirmity and generally runs parallel to the weakening of intelligence. Y) Hypermnesia is the exaltation of the capacity for recall with the awakening of memories buried for a long time in the past. It occurs, e.g., in those who are in very grave and imminent danger of death (e.g., in those executed, who in an instant recall the entire course of their life) or in situations rich in emotion (e.g., in examinees, who, excited by the environment and circumstances, respond with more than they thought they knew); in manic or obsessional states, during fever or hypnosis (memories crowd in, speech becomes excited and precipitate). A form of pseudohypermnesia must also be noted, or ease of recall for a certain group of images or ideas; e.g., in delusions of persecution or in obsessions, where a whole crowd of related representations accumulates, reinforcing those proper to the delusion.

b) Qualitative disturbances. — a) Dimnesia (a form of amnesia of recall) is the difficulty of recalling at a given moment certain representations, which later return spontaneously. It appears in more or less severe forms in psychic and intellectual impairments, or is simply provoked by excess fatigue, illness, or old age. Hence, e.g., the tedious repetition of facts by people who no longer remember having already told them. B) Paramnesia is a false memory due to illusions of recognition. Such illusions sometimes affect the perception of the fact (two witnesses, e.g., do not always see exactly the same fact from the same angle), or the preservation of the memory and subsequent recall (the same person recounts the same fact differently at different times), or even the very expression and reference of the fact (circumstances are added and colored both by the subject’s autosuggestion, who is recounting, and by the suggestion of the environment and of those listening). Hence the necessity and at the same time the difficulty of valid criticism of one’s own introspection and of the testimonies brought forward. Also characteristic are the illusions of the “already seen,” provoked by experiences that were never actually realized, or of the “never seen,” provoked by experiences that were already realized. If conscious, these paramnesias can also generate serious or profound psychological disturbances, up to terror and madness.

4. Pedagogy of memory

From the study of the problems of memory and of memorization procedures, experimental psychology, especially through the work of A. Binet and H. Ebbinghaus, has been able to derive various norms of high pedagogical value for the education of memory: 1) daily study by heart, when it avoids excesses, is very useful, constituting an excellent exercise to make memory ready and lively, habituating one to personal work and avoiding the “cramming” of “knowing.” 2) For good memorization, the times of greatest cerebral freshness should be chosen: childhood and youth with regard to life; morning with regard to the day. 3) Alternate exercises (a quarter of an hour, half an hour, then a little rest). Hasty and spasmodic memorization does not give time for knowledge to become well fixed; lessons learned in the evening are more easily remembered because they are followed by the rest of the night. 4) Proceed from the easy to the difficult, from the little to the much within the same span of time, to favor training. 5) Apply the means of developing memory: describe an object, then repeat aloud its written description; fix a series of names with their meanings, then repeat them; draw up a list of the objects in a room, with their names; have many verses studied, which are easier to retain because of their rhythm and rhyme. 6) Apply attention so that the experience produces a livelier impression. 7) Favor the study of foreign languages; studying one is equivalent to exercising memory in four directions: eye, ear, larynx, hand, in addition to exercising the intelligence. 8) Prefer the “global” method to the “fragmentary” method. One retains and remembers a passage more quickly by studying and repeating it all at once, without interrupting the succession of words and sentences, than by studying it in periods and then associating them together.

MEMORY. — In the Christian language of the early centuries the term memory had many meanings.

In the first place, memory was equivalent to titulus, in which case: “Memoriam posuit” was synonymous with “titulum posuit.” Little by little, memory received a broader and more extended meaning, and came to be applied not only to the commemorative inscription, but also to the entire tomb. In this sense the Fathers and ancient writers make frequent use of it (cf. St. Augustine, Epistolarum classis, II, pp. 78; PL 33, 269); St. Paulinus of Nola, Ep. 32 ad Severum (CSEL, XXIX, 288). Epigraphic examples are numerous (cf. CIL, III, 4186, 10237; VIII, 9716, 22535; G. B. De Rossi, Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romae, I, Roma 1857, 448 etc.). It is not excluded that memory may also indicate the entire sepulchre, and not merely a single compartment (cf. L. Renier, Inscriptiones romaines de l’Algérie, no. 2031). Moreover, in literary and epigraphic language it also signified the church itself that contained the tomb of a martyr (cf. St. Augustine, Sermo 323; PL 38, 1446; Contra Faustum Manichaeum, 20, 21; PL 42, 385). Finally, and this especially in Africa, memory indicated the relics of the saints. This is the sense of memory when it recurs in African epigraphs, accompanied by “deposita” or “deposita” (P. Monceaux, Enquête sur l’épigraphie chrétienne d’Afrique, Paris 1907, no. 261).

From what has been said, it is clear how difficult the interpretation of the term *m.* is in the writings of the ancients and in epigraphy. In these cases, the key to the explanation lies in the verb that accompanies *m.* Thus, *m.*, placed before an inscription instead of *titulus*, will simply signify *memoria*, that is, the memory; it will signify the entire sepulchre, however, if *m.* is accompanied by a verb such as: *comparavit*, *construxit*, *aedificavit*. When, on the other hand, the expression “deposita est; depositae sunt; hic est” or “hic sunt” also occurs with *m.*, or “Hic memoria,” e.g., “Sancti Juliani,” it refers to nothing other than relics, whether direct or of mere contact.