MEMORIA. – In modern psychology, which seems to continue the conception of decadent scholasticism, m. generally signifies the function that preserves images received through the senses or produced by the imagination. Through m. past states of consciousness are relived and recognized: it therefore entails the power to preserve, recognize, and locate in time and space the facts and phenomena of consciousness that have been experienced.
It now seems an established conclusion that the object of m. must be restricted to representational contents, since feelings and volitions are not repeated but are always actualized in consciousness in an original form. The principal problem of m. thus becomes the genesis and reproduction of images: investigation accordingly sought to determine whether the actions of stimuli that impress the senses reach the centers, leaving a physical imprint there, and whether special centers exist in the brain assigned to preserve the various classes of perceptual objects in isolation (the doctrine of “cerebral localizations”). Above all, the laws governing the reproduction of representations when they are evoked into consciousness were investigated: Aristotle himself had opened the way on this subject by identifying as factors of reproduction contiguity in space and time, similarity, and difference (De memoria et reminiscentia, 2, 451 b, 12 ff.; Aristotle’s anticipatory critique of Hume’s principle, which located the principal force of the association of ideas in habit, should be noted). Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that no theory or attempt to explain m. on a biological or physiological basis has so far succeeded in establishing itself; nonetheless, the extensive and rigorous investigations of positivist psychology (especially those of H. Ebbinghaus) have considerably broadened the field of action of m. and knowledge of the behavior of images. The Denkpsychologie (Külpe, Ach. Lindworski) reacted indirectly against the associationist school, but above all the Gestaltpsychologie, which maintained that the movement of ideas (v.) or images does not obey the content of individual elements but functions according to the “structure” (Gestalt) of the “whole” (Ganze); yet this school fell back into a form of physiological materialism by asserting that the cohesive force of structures was a function of the distribution of nervous energy along the system extending from the peripheral organ to the centers (the Querfunktionen, or transverse connecting currents).
The reality is that m. constitutes in man a set of highly complicated processes because of the multiplicity of the objects and forms of conduct of human life: in particular, m. is the meeting point of the life of the self (v.) and therefore of both conscious and subconscious life. H. Höfling had recourse to the “feelings” of familiarity, which communicate the conviction that something has been known previously; but the emotional theory too, although it explains certain phenomena of m., leaves many others obscure. Even after the experiments of G. E. Müller, who concluded in favor of the predominance of feelings (of familiarity), it seems that emotional factors, although usually present, play a secondary role in the processes of m. (Gemelli). A more reliable approach is the one proposed by Lindworski, for whom the principal element at work in m. is time, so that the phenomena of m. refer back to the experience of spatial and temporal “relations.”
This approach essentially returns to the original Aristotelian doctrine of m. and reminiscence: Aristotle in fact discusses at length the relations between the perception of time and m., which he orders into two phases: m. properly speaking, when the temporal relation spontaneously effects the recall without precise awareness of the interval; and “reminiscence” (v.), which instead sets out in search of the memory on the basis of a clearly defined awareness of time itself (op. cit., 2, 452 b 26–435 b 35). According to s. Tommaso, m. is the faculty that preserves apprehensions of the concrete significance of things (intentiones individuales) faculty (v.), which is the intermediate function between sensory and intellectual life (cf. Sum. Theol., 1°, q. 78, a. 4), and which is responsible for perceiving the concrete relations that things have with life.
BIBLI: H. Ebbinghaus, Über das Gedächtnis, Leipzig 1885; W. Köhler, Über Reproduktion, in Psychologische Probleme, Berlin 1933, p. 192 ff.; A. Gemelli-G. Zunini, Introduzione alla psicologia, Milan 1947, p. 176 ff. (with bibliography). Cornelio Fabro
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY. — The following should first of all be observed: 1) that it would be an arbitrary restriction of the domain of memory to limit it to the properly cognitive sphere: feelings and emotions may also be recalled (a pain experienced, a love that has faded); 2) that the proper and direct object of memory is not a thing or an external fact, but only the perception we have had of the thing or fact; the emotion aroused in us by them cannot, in fact, “re-present” in our consciousness anything other than what was previously “present” there (properly speaking, we do not remember Rome, but having seen Rome); we are therefore intermediaries between memory and the object.
1. The various kinds of memory
a) According to the object that we retain most easily, or according to acquired or innate preferences or predispositions, there is memory for dates, languages, numbers, names, genealogies, etc.; b) According to the cognitive nature of memories, there are: a) sensory or sensorial memory, when it concerns sensory images, which is subdivided into: visual memory, when one is more strongly affected by forms and colors (painters, draughtsmen, chess players who conduct several games simultaneously without ever lowering their eyes to the various chessboards); auditory memory, when it preferentially preserves the sounds of music or of the rhythmic language of poetry or of simple words (psittacism); muscular or motor memory, when it chiefly preserves the memory of the movements of the lips in pronouncing letters, syllables, and words, or of the fingers in playing an instrument, or of the legs and feet in skating, dancing, etc.; tactile memory, such as that of blind people who read books and musical scores by moving the fingertip over the text. β) intellectual memory, which remembers ideas, judgments, and reasoning; γ) affective memory, which remembers emotions and volitions.Sensory memory is also possessed by animals, as experience abundantly demonstrates; in human beings it is joined to and also supplemented by intellectual memory. A person, for example, remembers not only the sound of the words in a speech or the exact placement of the words in a verse, but also the meaning of that speech and of that verse.
2. Analysis of the mnemonic phenomenon
The elements or processes that complement one another in an act of memory may be reduced to five: fixation and preservation (fixation memory); recall (reviviscence memory); recognition (reproductive memory); localization (chronological memory).a) Fixation of the concept or image. — Physiologically, memory depends on the functionality and plasticity of the nervous tissues; these vary extremely from person to person and, in the same person, according to age, state of health, occupations, and acquired bad habits; they range from an extraordinary power of fixation to a null or almost null degree. Psychologically, the degree of fixation is proportionate to attention, the presence of centers of interest, and practice. Thus a memory is fixed all the more firmly the more strongly an event has impressed one (a battle, an earthquake, an exceptional ceremony are not easily forgotten). Fixation is likewise favored by the relationship of memory to innate or acquired tendencies (a lazy person quickly forgets the teacher’s explanation, whereas he remembers perfectly the various football matches or the names of the competitors in contests) or to the content of consciousness (someone intensely absorbed in his own reflections or in carrying out some undertaking lets a great many memories and experiences escape him). Finally, the degree of fixation depends on the law of use and disuse; practice does not create memory, but strengthens it and prevents it from disappearing by bringing the mechanisms of repetition and association into play. What has been seen only once or learned hastily is easily forgotten, whereas what has been read, seen, or heard several times, or studied calmly, is better remembered. Sensations, images, and ideas, moreover, which are easily lost when isolated, are remembered very well when brought together in groups or associative syntheses. Thus, in order not to forget an errand, one spontaneously ties a knot in one’s handkerchief; by means of mnemonic verses, dates, geographical names, and rules of grammar or logic are easily retained; likewise, by means of words constructed from the initial syllables of a particular group to be remembered, or through the drawing up of ordered lists.
b) Preservation of memories. — The revival of past experiences raises the question of how they are preserved in memory. In this process the same thing occurs as with habits which, exercised in a given direction, tend to reproduce the same acts. Thus, in memories, the acts that constitute their content disappear, but they leave a physiopsychological disposition to be repeated. Consequently, preservation of memories means nothing other than the possibility of recalling them: a psychophysiological disposition to reproduce them, which passes into action when the appropriate conditions arise.
c) Recall of memories. — This is the passage from potential memory to memory in act and consists, physiologically, in restoring, so to speak, the original organic state and, psychologically, in allowing or causing the laws of the various forms of association to intervene. Recall may be spontaneous, when the memory suddenly arises without any apparent physiopsychological connection with the current state of our consciousness (reviviscence); or voluntary, when the memory is deliberately recalled or sought with greater or lesser effort (reminiscence). The will, however, has no direct power over memory (it is commonly said: “the more I try, the less I find”; “I have the word on the tip of my tongue; I shall remember it when I am no longer thinking about it”); it cannot initiate the recall of an idea in its entirety. What it can do is provoke those associations that may place one on the path toward, and in the direction of, what one wishes to find. Thus, in order to recall a proper name, one thinks about how it begins or ends; one keeps the initial or final syllables fixed before the mind, and the name sought will eventually reappear. The insistence of the will often impedes the free play of associations; it is therefore better to allow the nervous current to run freely, so that it may spontaneously turn toward the object sought. For this reason, the best way to write a word correctly when its spelling eludes us at that particular moment is to let the pen move freely; if at a certain point we lose the continuation of a poem or prayer, the best means is to begin again from the start and allow the lips to move, so to speak, automatically. This is also why one closes one’s eyes when one wishes to recall a memory, goes into darkness, and creates silence around oneself: the more the spirit is at rest and the less distracted by current perceptions, the better the various associations function freely, and the more capable it is of recalling the past.
d) Recognition. — This is “knowing again” a past experience in a present one; it is the comparison of the current experience with the past one. The process unfolds in two successive phases: a simple sensation of the “already seen or already heard,” etc., without any evocation of the past: “I have already seen that man”; “I have already heard that music”; then, through the automatic provocation of the past, the search for the complete and determinate earlier experience, that is, the search for the earlier experience that is entirely similar to the present one: “There it is: it is Pietro”; “it is that particular passage from La Traviata.” Here we have true complete recognition.
e) Localization of memory. — Rather than a different function of m., localization is the complement of recognition and consists in determining at what moment the remembered fact occurred. Its process is regressive; one goes backward along the line of lived time. For exact localization, it is useful to establish a sort of series of milestones or points of reference, linked to the most important facts and events of our life, to which we bind, by means of association, all other memories (e.g., the various stages of schooling: gymnasium, lyceum, university; the stages of one’s career, etc.).
3) Diseases of m. — The disorders that may affect m. are divided into quantitative (amnesia, hypomnesia, hypermnesia) and qualitative (dysmnesia, paramnesia).
a) Quantitative disorders. — a) Amnesia is the total or partial loss of the capacity to fix or recall memories duly recorded at the proper time. Total amnesia in definitive form is rare; nevertheless, there are cases of personality change (the subject begins an entirely new life, without any interference from his past life); cases of very severe dementia and of profound clouding of consciousness. Amnesia in temporary form is more frequent, following violent impressions (shock) and particular cerebral concussions. Periodic amnesia may also be found, e.g., in the case of alternating personalities, where there is likewise an alternation of memories.
Amnesia is also distinguished as: anterograde (or fixation amnesia), retrograde (or recall amnesia), anteroretrograde or mixed, and lacunar: 1) anterograde, when the capacity to fix new memories is lost from the moment a pathological state occurs (e.g., the subject remembers everything up to the moment of the lesion; of what occurred afterward, until the moment of recovery, he remembers nothing). It generally occurs through clouding of the sensory apparatus, through senile dementia, or even in normal old age (the subject no longer remembers a sentence just read, whereas he remembers entire passages read in his youth); 2) retrograde, when there is a loss of duly recorded memories which, from a given moment onward, can no longer be recalled or associated, or can be recalled and associated only with difficulty and effort; this generally occurs following cerebral trauma, severe intoxication, or certain cerebral infections; 3) anteroretrograde, when there is a loss of memories preceding or following the moment of the accident; the subject thus remains so disoriented that he can neither fix new memories nor recall old ones. It occurs in severe dementias and in states of profound clouding of consciousness; 4) lacunar, when the capacity to fix all perceptions, or a group of them, becomes for some time nil or greatly weakened. β) Hypomnesia is the progressive weakening of memory and is an effect of mental illness, generally parallel to the weakening of intelligence. γ) Hypernesia is an exaltation of the capacity for recall, with the awakening of memories buried far back in the past. It occurs, e.g., in those who find themselves in the gravest and most imminent danger of death (e.g., in persons condemned to death, who recall in an instant the entire course of their lives), or in situations rich in emotion (e.g., in examinees who, excited by the surroundings and circumstances, answer more than they believed they knew); in manic or obsessive states, during fever or hypnosis (memories crowd in, speech becomes exalted and hurried). A form of pseudo-hypermnesia should also be noted, or ease of recall for a particular group of images or ideas; e.g., in delusions of persecution or in obsessions, in which a whole crowd of related representations accumulates, reinforcing those proper to the delusion.
b) Qualitative disorders. — α) Dysmnesia (a form of recall amnesia) is the difficulty of remembering certain representations at a given moment, which later return spontaneously. It appears in more or less severe forms in psychic and intellectual impairments; or it is caused simply by excessive fatigue, illness, or old age. Hence, e.g., the tiresome repetition of facts by persons who no longer remember having already recounted them. β) Paramnesia is a false m. caused by illusions of recognition. Such illusions sometimes affect the perception of the fact (two witnesses, e.g., do not always see precisely the same fact from the same angle), or the preservation of the memory and subsequent recollections (the same person recounts the same fact differently at different times), or the very expression and reporting of the fact (circumstances are added and colored both through the self-suggestion of the subject who recounts the event and through the suggestion of the surroundings and of those who listen). Hence the necessity, and at the same time the difficulty, of a valid critique of one’s own introspection and of the testimonies that are presented. The illusions of the “already seen,” produced by experiences which, in fact, were never undergone, and of the “not seen,” produced by experiences which, in fact, had already been undergone, are also characteristic. These paramnesias, if conscious, may even generate serious or profound psychological disorders, extending to terror and madness.
4. Pedagogy of m
From the study of the problems of m. and of memorization procedures, experimental psychology, especially through the work of A. Binet and H. Elbinghaus, has been able to derive various rules of high pedagogical value for the education of memory: 1) Daily study by heart, when excesses are avoided, is very useful, constituting excellent exercise for making m. ready and lively, accustoming one to personal work, and avoiding the “approximately” in knowledge. 2) For good memorization, times of greatest cerebral freshness should be chosen: childhood and youth in relation to life; morning in relation to the day. 3) Alternate exercises (a quarter of an hour, half an hour, then a little rest). Hasty and spasmodic memorization does not allow knowledge time to become firmly fixed; evening lessons are remembered more easily because the repose of the night follows. 4) Proceed from the easy to the difficult, from the little to the much within the same period of time, in order to encourage training. 5) Apply means for developing m.: describe an object, then repeat aloud the written description; fix a series of names together with their meanings, then repeat them; draw up a list of the objects in a room, with their names; have many verses studied, since they are easier to retain by virtue of rhythm and rhyme. 6) Apply attention, so that experience may produce a more vivid impression. 7) Encourage the study of foreign languages; studying one amounts to exercising m. in four directions: eye, ear, larynx, and hand, in addition to exercising the intellect. 8) Prefer the “global” method to the “fragmentary” method. A passage is retained and remembered more quickly by studying and repeating it all at once, without interrupting the succession of words and sentences, than by studying it in periods and then associating them together.MEMORY. - In the Christian language of the early centuries, the term memoria (m.) had many meanings.
Firstly, m. was the equivalent of titulus, in which case: « Memoriam posuit » was synonymous with « titulum posuit ». Gradually, m. acquired a broader and more extensive meaning, and was applied not only to the commemorative inscription but also to the entire tomb. In this sense, the Fathers and ancient writers made frequent use of it (cf. St. Augustine, Epistolarum classis, II, ep. 78: PL 33, 269; St. Paulinus of Nola, Ep. 32 ad Severum (CSEL, XXIX, 288). Epigraphic examples are then innumerable (cf. CIL, III, 4186, 10237; VIII, 9716, 22855; G. B. De Rossi, Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romae, I, Rome 1857, 448 etc.). It is not even excluded that m. could indicate the entire cemetery, and not simply a single tomb (cf. L. Renier, Inscriptions romaines de l'Algérie, n. 2031). Furthermore, in literary and epigraphic language, it also signified the church itself, which contained the tomb of a martyr (cf. St. Augustine, Sermo 323: PL 38, 1446; Contra Faustum Manicheum, 20, 21: PL 42, 385). Finally, and this especially in Africa, m. indicated the relics of the saints. This is the sense of m. when it appears on African epigraphs, accompanied by: « deposita » or « depositae » (P. Monceaux, Enquête sur l'épigraphie chrétienne d'Afrique, Paris 1907, n. 261).
From what has been said, it clearly appears how difficult the interpretation of the term m. is in the writings of the ancients and in epigraphy. In these cases, the key to the explanation lies in the verb that accompanies m. Thus, m., when preceding the inscription instead of titulus, will simply mean the memory, that is, the remembrance; it will instead signify the entire sepulcher if m. is accompanied by a verb such as: comparavit, constructit, aedificavit. When, however, with m. the expression: « deposita est; depositae sunt; hic est » or « hic sunt » also occurs; or: « Hic memoria », for example, « Sancti Juliani », it is nothing other than relics, whether direct or by simple contact.
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MEMORIA (Psychology). - The term m. in psychology designates the faculty by which the mind retains and recalls past experiences. It is one of the fundamental functions of the cognitive process, closely linked to perception, learning, and thought.
The study of m. has been approached from various perspectives: philosophical, physiological, and psychological. In the philosophical tradition, memory was often considered a faculty of the soul, distinct from the body (v. ANIMA). Aristotle, in his treatise De memoria et reminiscentia, defined it as the capacity to preserve the past in the present. The physiological approach, on the other hand, seeks to identify the organic bases of memory, particularly in the nervous system. Modern psychology has further developed these investigations, distinguishing between different types of memory: sensory memory, short-term memory, and long-term memory, each with its own characteristics and mechanisms.
Memory is not a passive recording of events but an active process of reconstruction. This is evident in phenomena such as forgetting, distortion, and the influence of emotions on recall. Experimental psychology has demonstrated that memory is subject to various laws, such as the law of repetition (the more an experience is repeated, the more it is retained) and the law of association (ideas linked to one another tend to be recalled together).
The pathologies of memory, studied in psychopathology, include amnesia (partial or total loss of memory), hypermnesia (abnormal enhancement of memory), and paramnesia (distortion of memory, as in false recognitions). These disorders highlight the complexity of the mnemonic process and its dependence on the integrity of the nervous system.