MORAL SYSTEMS
In general, by "moral systems" (sistemi morali) is meant a complex of principles capable of resolving doubts of conscience.
When, with regard to good and evil, a person finds himself in a state of clear, evident, and certain knowledge—whether attained through reason or Revelation—the duty of the individual and the task of moralists are quite simple and find their formulation in the most general principle: "Do good and avoid evil." The task becomes more complex, however, in cases of ignorance, doubt, and adherence to opinion. Whoever is ignorant does not know and does not even pose the question of the morality of his act. Whoever doubts knows that a problem exists, understands its terms, but, lacking sufficient reasons to judge, suspends his judgment. Whoever holds an opinion knows the problem and its terms and judges in a certain way, even while fearing that the truth may lie on the opposite side. Therefore, every moral doctrine must also take into account the instances of ignorance, doubt, and opinion.
Now, moral theology resolves the case of ignorance through the well-known distinctions between ignorance of law and fact, etc. (v. IGNORANZA), without giving rise to significant differences, at least at the present stage of the question. Doubt, too, is susceptible to various classifications, such as doubt of law and fact, positive and negative (v. DUBBIO).
The probability upon which one relies when judging according to an opinion—while fearing that the opposing opinion may be true—can be of law or fact, speculative or practical, doubtful or slight (i.e., light), absolute or relative, more or less or equally probable than the opposing one, and even most probable (v. PROBABILITÀ). From another perspective, an opinion may appear secure (tuta), more secure (tutior), or less secure (minus tuta), depending on the degree to which it shields one from sin and formal transgression of the law (v. OPINIONE). Now, moralists teach that when a person is in a state of doubt, he is not permitted to act and must do everything possible to acquire at least practical certainty in order to avoid the danger of sinning (v. COSCIENZA). If the doubt pertains to a matter of fact that is insurmountable on one side and cannot be converted into a doubt of law on the other, and one is compelled to act, one must follow the safer course: *pars tutior est sequenda*. In the case of a doubt of law, when one is only in the realm of opinion and the probable, we are faced with the question of probability: may we act, or must we refrain from action until certainty is attained—a certainty that is often unattainable?
The various attempts made by theologians to resolve this case and answer this question are commonly referred to as "moral systems." In a more proper sense, therefore, a moral system is the complex of principles by means of which, in the conflict between a more lenient opinion favoring freedom and a stricter opinion favoring the law, one arrives at the formation of a practically certain conscience, necessary in order to act without formal sin.
This problem cannot be ignored by any body of moral doctrine, and the Catholic theology least of all. From its very beginnings, it has addressed this problem in a more or less adequate, more or less satisfactory manner. Some Fathers of the Church, particularly St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, have left solutions to the problem that some judge to be tainted by a certain rigorism or tutiorism, while others have seen in them the only possible, logical solution, in keeping with a morality described as the "morality of honesty" (v. TUZIORISMO). With the Dominican Bartolomé de Medina (1527–1581), theology turned toward solutions that some describe as developments or evolutions of the ancient approach, while others see them as deviations and a rupture of continuity (v. PROBABILISMO). Thus, from the 16th century onward, various systems have emerged around the concept of the safer or more or less or equally probable course of action. These systems are known as absolute and mitigated tutiorism (v.), laxism (v.), probabiliorism (v.), equiprobabilism (v.), compensationalism (v.), and probabilism.
The existence of these systems does not absolve anyone from the sincere and ardent pursuit of truth, nor from the exercise of the great virtues of prudence. On the other hand, the question does not appear to be closed. Moral theology, like speculative theology, is in a state of progress, and nothing prevents us from hoping—or even striving, through contributions more constructive than merely negative criticism—for the advent of something better that may take the place of these systems and of the system itself.