MORAL SYSTEMS. – By m. s., in the generic sense, is understood a complex of principles suited to resolve a doubt of conscience.
When, with regard to good and evil, man finds himself in a state of clear, evident, and certain knowledge, attained either through reason or through Revelation, man’s duty and the task of moralists are very simple and find their formulation in the most general principle: do good and flee evil. The task, however, becomes more complex in the case of ignorance, doubt, and adherence to an opinion. One who is ignorant does not know, nor does he even raise the question of the morality of his own act. One who doubts knows that a problem exists and knows its terms, but, having no grounds on which to judge, suspends his judgment. One who holds an opinion knows the problem and its terms, and judges in a certain sense, while fearing that the truth may also lie on the opposite side. Therefore every moral doctrine must also take into consideration the demands of ignorance, doubt, and opinion.
Moral theology resolves the case of ignorance by means of the familiar distinctions of ignorance iuris et facti, etc. (v. IONORANZA), without giving rise to differences of great significance, at least in the present state of the question. Doubt, too, is susceptible to various divisions: there is doubt iuris et facti, positive and negative doubt (v. DUBBIO).
Probability, on which one relies when judging according to an opinion while fearing that the opposite opinion may be true, may be iuris et facti, speculative or practical, doubtful and slight, that is, tenuous, absolute or relative, more or less, or equally probable in comparison with the opposite opinion, and most probable (v. PROBABILITÀ). From another point of view, an opinion may appear safe (tuta), safer (tutior), or less safe (minus tuta), according to the degree to which it safeguards one from sin and from formal violation of the law (v. OPINIONE). Now moralists teach that when man finds himself in a state of doubt, he is not permitted to act, and must do everything in his power to acquire certainty, at least practical certainty, in order to avoid the danger of sinning (v. COSCIENZA). When it concerns a doubt of fact which, on the one hand, is insuperable and, on the other, cannot be converted into a doubt of law, when one is under the necessity of acting, one must follow the safer course: pars tutior est sequenda. In a doubt of law, when one is only in the realm of opinion and probability, we are faced with the case of probability: may we act, or must we postpone action until we have attained certainty, which is often unattainable?
The various attempts made by theologians to resolve this case and answer this question are commonly called m. s. In a more proper sense, therefore, m. s. is the complex of principles by means of which, in the conflict between the milder opinion in favor of freedom and a stricter opinion in favor of the law, one arrives at the formation of the practically certain conscience necessary in order to determine oneself to act without (formal) sin.
This problem cannot be ignored by any body of moral doctrines; still less was it ignored by Catholic theology, which from its beginnings resolved it in a more or less adequate and more or less satisfactory manner. Certain Fathers, especially s. Agostino and s. Tommaso, left a solution to the problem which some judge to be clouded by a breath of rigorism or tutiorism, while to others it appears to be the only possible and logical solution, consonant with a morality characterized as the morality of honesty (v. TUZIORISMO). With the Dominican Bartolomeo Medina (1528–81), theology turned toward solutions which some describe as the development and evolution of the ancient one, whereas others regard them as a deviation and a break in continuity (v. PROBABILISMO). Thus, from the 16th century onward, various systems came to be aligned around the concept of a course that was more or less safe, more or less or equally probable, broad, strict, and rigorous; these systems were called absolute and mitigated tuziorismo (v.), lassismo (v.), probabilissimo (v.), equiprobabilismo (v.), compensazionismo (v.), and probabilismo.
The existence of systems does not dispense anyone from the sincere and ardent search for truth, and above all from the great precautions of prudence. On the other hand, the question does not yet appear to be closed. Moral theology, like speculative theology, is progressing, and nothing prevents us from hoping for—or even bringing about, through contributions more substantial than merely negative criticism—the advent of something better that may take the place of systems and of the system.