TUZIORISMO. - From opinio tutior (= “safer opinion”), it moral systems (v.) that conscience (v.) when it is in a state of doubt, guiding it to attain the practical certainty indispensable for deciding to act without sin. It is absolute if it always favors the law; mitigated if it favors freedom only when the latter has the highest probability in its favor.
I. ABSOLUTE T
It teaches that, in the event of a conflict between two opinions, one in favor of the law and the other in favor of freedom, one is always obliged to follow the one that stands for the law, even if the opposing opinion, which stands for freedom, is highly probable, and this on the basis of the principle: in dubiis via tutior est eligenda. Absolute t., therefore, insofar as it attaches no importance to probability in resolving the problem, rejects indirect solutions (v. PRINCIPI RIFLESSI) and always adheres to the safer position, even speculatively.Absolute t. enjoyed all the sympathies of Jansenist theologians; it suffices to recall Giovanni Sinnigh (d. 1666), author of the proposition condemned by Alessandro VIII (7 Dec. 1690): Non licet sequi opinionem vel inter probabilissimam (Denz-U, 1293), P. Nicole (1625–95), Go-
The tutiorists support their thesis with various arguments. It is never lawful to expose oneself to the danger of sinning; but whoever follows an opinion, even a most probable one, against the law, exposes himself to such danger; therefore it is never lawful to choose the opinion that favors freedom, even if it is most probable. But these are sophisms rather than arguments, and their ultimate roots lie in more manifest errors concerning freedom, Grace, the effects of sin, etc. Among other things, the Jansenists taught that the divine precepts are impossible for man (cf. Denz-U, 1298, 1301, 1303), and along these lines they had every interest in supporting the first error with the further error of obstinate rigorism.
A refutation of absolute tutiorism is not difficult. Alexander VIII condemned the aforementioned proposition of Fr. Sinnigh, which is the quintessence of absolute tutiorism. Blatantly confusing formal sin with material sin, and demanding that in doubt one always follow the safer course, that even doubtful laws be observed, and that even the danger of merely material sin be avoided, absolute tutiorism has at least as much likelihood of imposing nonexistent obligations as probabilists have of exempting from real obligations. And this is considering the matter from a strictly objective point of view, whereas from the practical point of view it makes Christian life exceedingly difficult and intolerable. Now the yoke of Christ is what it is; he himself described it as light, and no one has the right to make it heavier merely in order to remain consistent with his other errors, still more pernicious ones. Therefore the Church, the saints, and all the more balanced theologians have rightly raised their voices in condemnation of absolute tutiorism (cf. s. Alfonso, Theol. moral., I, I, n. 82, ed. L. Gaudè, I, Rome 1905, p. 61).
II. MITIGATED TUTIORISM
Mitigated tutiorism—or mitigated rigorism—teaches that, in the event of a conflict between two opinions, one of which favors the law and the other freedom, one is always obliged to follow the opinion that favors the law, unless the opposing opinion is most probable. The difference from absolute tutiorism is not great, but it is clear: the former recognizes no right to probability, whatever its degree, whereas the latter avails itself of probability against the law only when it is maximal; the former always favors the law, while the latter favors freedom only when it has the whole weight of probability on its side.Although proposed by Antonio da Cordova around the year 1572, the majority of the proponents of mitigated tutiorism likewise came from among those sympathetic to Jansenism. It will suffice to recall: Giovanni Opstraet (d. 1720), whose Dissertatio theologica de praxi administrandi Sacramentum poenitentiae was placed on the Index; Martino Steyaert (1701); Enrico di S. Ignazio (d. 1719); and, more recently, Cardinal Gerdil (1802). On the other hand, the position of certain probabiliorists, such as Antoine, Gazzaniga, Patuzzi, Fagnani, Concina, Contenson, Gonzales, etc., is in practice difficult to distinguish from that of the mitigated tutiorists (J. Noldin, Summ. theol. mor., I, 20th ed., Innsbruck 1929, pp. 227, 232). These authors prove their thesis with the same arguments as the absolute rigorists. It is not a system condemned by the Church, but it now appears to have been abandoned by all theologians for the same reasons for which absolute tutiorism is rejected. Indeed, according to some (Noldin, op. cit., n. 232, p. 227), the most probable opinion required in order to act against the law either amounts to speculative certainty, in which case one is dealing with absolute tutiorism, or it does not, in which case its proponents must admit the lawfulness of acting with a practically uncertain conscience, since they refuse to make use of indirect principles in order to escape uncertainty.
III. T. OF THE FATHERS AND THE SCHOLASTICS. — With regard to the t., or rigorism, of the Fathers and the early scholastics, it should be noted that at most one can speak of a mitigated t. The explicit use of reflex principles (v.) became known rather late; but from the earliest centuries the Fathers and other authors are found offering practical solutions that necessarily presuppose the implicit use of such principles (cf. Lactantius, De divin. ist., 3, 27; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 37, In sancta lumina, 18 ff.; St. Jerome, Tim., 3, 2; Tit. 1, 6; Apol. adv. Rufin. 1, 32; St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, 22, 75; De fide et operibus, 10, 35). As for the theologians of the Middle Ages, it should be observed that their t., besides arising from ignorance of reflex principles, was largely due to the excessive attention devoted to objective morality, which emerged as a reaction against the moral subjectivism of Pietro Abelardo and from which even St. Thomas was not exempt (cf. O. Lottin, Principes de morale, I, Lovanio 1947, pp. 177-83; II, ivi 1948, pp. 236-37). Here too, however, there is no lack of practical solutions that foreshadow the application of the principle Lex dubia non obligat (cf. V. CATHREIN, VIKTOR, Quid senserit s. Thomas de principio: Lex dubia non obligat, in Gregorianum, 3 [1922], p. 449 ff.).