TUZIORISM. - From opinio tutior (= "safer opinion"), it is one of the moral systems (v.) that arose to resolve problems relating to conscience (v.), when it finds itself in a state of doubt, in order to direct it toward attaining the practical certainty indispensable for determining itself to act without sin. It is absolute if it always stands for the law; mitigated if it stands for liberty only in the case where the latter has maximum probability on its side.
I. ABSOLUTE TUTIORISM
It teaches that in the case of a conflict between two opinions, one in favor of the law and the other in favor of liberty, one is bound always to follow the one that favors the law, even if the opposite one, which favors liberty, is most probable, and this on the basis of the principle: in dubiis via tutior est elegenda. Absolute tutiorism therefore, insofar as it grants no relevance to probability in the solution of the problem, fails to recognize the indirect solutions (v. PRINCIPI RIFLESI) and always adheres to the safer side, even speculatively.
Absolute tutiorism enjoyed the full sympathies of the Jansenist theologians; it suffices to recall Giovanni Sinnigh (d. 1666), author of the proposition condemned by Alexander VIII (Dec. 7, 1690): Non licet sequi opinionem vel inter probabilissimam (Denz-U, 1293), P. Nicole (1625-95), Gomaro Huygens (1631-1702), Pascal, Sancirano, Arnauld, etc. The whole struggle aroused against probabilism in all its forms was conducted by them, also under the most varied pseudonyms.
The tutiorists support their thesis with various arguments. It is never lawful to expose oneself to the danger of sinning; but whoever follows an opinion, even a most probable one, against the law, exposes himself to such a danger; therefore it is never lawful to opt for the opinion that favors liberty, even if it is most probable. But these are sophisms rather than arguments, and they have their ultimate roots in more manifest errors concerning liberty, Grace, the effects of sin, etc. Among other things, in fact, the Jansenists taught that the divine precepts are impossible for man (cf. Denz-U, 1298, 1301, 1303) and along these lines they had every interest in supporting the first error with the other error of obstinate rigorism.
A refutation of absolute t. does not present itself as difficult. Alexander VIII condemned the aforementioned proposition of Fr. Sinnigh, which is the quintessence of absolute t. By supinely confusing formal with material sin, and by demanding that in doubt one always follow the safer side, that even doubtful laws be observed, and that even the danger of merely material sin be avoided, absolute t. has at least as many probabilities of imposing nonexistent obligations as the probabilists have of exempting from real obligations. And this is considering the matter from a strictly objective point of view, whereas from the practical point of view it makes the Christian life extremely difficult and intolerable. Now the yoke of Christ is what it is; he himself described it as light, and no one has the right to make it heavier, merely to remain consistent with his other errors, which are even more pernicious. Justly, therefore, the Church, the saints and all the most balanced theologians have raised their voice in condemnation of absolute t. (cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. moral., I, I, n. 82, ed. L. Gaudè, I, Rome 1905, p. 61).
II. MITIGATED TUZIORISM
Mitigated tuziorism - or mitigated rigorism - teaches that in the case of a conflict between two opinions, one of which favors the law and the other favors liberty, one is bound always to follow the one that favors the law, unless the opposite opinion is most highly probable. The difference from absolute tuziorism is not great, but it is clear: the former recognizes no right at all to probability, whatever its degree, whereas the latter avails itself of it against the law only in the case where it is maximal; the former is always for the law, the latter is for liberty only if it has all probability on its side.
Although it was proposed by Antonio da Cordova around the year 1572, even the majority of the supporters of mitigated tuziorism are to be found precisely among the sympathizers of Jansenism. It suffices to recall: Giovanni Opstraet (d. 1720), whose Dissertatio theologica de praxi administrandi Sacramentum poenitentiae was placed on the Index; Martino Steyaert (1701); Enrico di S. Ignazio (d. 1719) and more recently Cardinal Gerdil (1802). On the other hand, the position of certain probabiliorists such as Antoine, Gazzaniga, Patuzzi, Fagnani, Concina, Contenson, Gonzales, etc., is in practice hardly distinguishable from that of the mitigated tuziorists (J. Noldin, Summ. theol. mor., I, 20th ed., Innsbruck 1929, pp. 227, 232). These authors prove their thesis with the same arguments as the absolute rigorists. It is not a system condemned by the Church, but it now appears abandoned by all theologians for the same reasons for which absolute tuziorism is rejected. Indeed, according to some (Noldin, op. cit., n. 232, p. 227), the most highly probable opinion required in order to act against the law either is equivalent to speculative certainty, and then one is in absolute tuziorism, or it is not equivalent, and then its supporters must admit the lawfulness of acting with a practically uncertain conscience, insofar as they refuse to make use of indirect principles in order to emerge from uncertainty.
III. TUZIORISM OF THE FATHERS AND OF THE SCHOLASTICS
As regards the t. or rigorism of the Fathers and the early scholastics, it should be noted that at most one can speak of a mitigated t. The explicit use of the reflex principles (v.) was known rather late: but from the earliest centuries there are found in the Fathers and other authors practical solutions which necessarily presuppose the implicit use of such principles (cf. Lactantius, De divin. ist., 3, 27; St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 37, In sancta lumina, 18 ff.; St. Jerome, Tim., 3, 2; Tit. 1, 6; Apol. adv. Rufin. 1, 32; St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, 22, 75; De fide et operibus, 10, 35). As for the theologians of the Middle Ages, it should be observed that their t., besides the ignorance of the reflex principles, is largely due to the excessive attention paid to objective morality, which came as a reaction to the moral subjectivism of Peter Abelard and from which not even St. Thomas escapes (cf. O. Lottin, Principes de morale, I, Louvain 1947, pp. 177-83; II, ibid. 1948, pp. 236-37). But even here there is no lack of practical solutions that prelude the application of the principle Lex dubia non obligat (cf. V. Cathrein, Quid senserit s. Thomas de principio: Lex dubia non obligat, in Gregorianum, 3 [1922], p. 449 ff.).