TUZIORISM. – From *opinio tutior* (= the safer opinion), it is one of the moral systems (v.) developed to resolve problems relating to conscience (v.) when it finds itself in a state of doubt, in order to guide it toward achieving practical certainty, indispensable for determining how to act without sin. It is absolute if it always sides with the law; mitigated if it sides with freedom only in the case where the latter has the highest probability on its side.
I. ABSOLUTE T
It teaches that in the event of a conflict between two opinions, one favoring the law and the other favoring freedom, one is bound to follow always the one that sides with the law, even if the opposing opinion, which favors freedom, is most probable, and this on the basis of the principle: *in dubiis via tutior est eligenda*. Absolute t. therefore, inasmuch as it accords no relevance whatsoever to probability in solving the problem, disregards indirect solutions (v. REFLEX PRINCIPLES) and always adheres to the safest course, even speculatively.Absolute t. has enjoyed the full sympathy of Jansenist theologians; suffice it to recall Giovanni Sinnigh (d. 1666), author of the proposition condemned by Alexander VIII (7 Dec. 1690): *Non licet sequi opinionem vel inter probabiles probabilissimam* (Denz.-U., 1293), P. Nicole (1625-95), Go-
though proposed by Antonio da Cordova around the year 1572, the majority of supporters of mitigated t. are also found among the sympathizers of Jansenism. Suffice it to recall: Giovanni Opstraet (d. 1720), whose *Dissertatio theologica de praxi administrandi Sacramentum poenitentiae* was placed on the Index; Martino Steyaert (1701); Enrico di S. Ignazio (d. 1719) and more recently Cardinal Gerdil (1802). On the other hand, the position of certain probabilists such as Antoine, Gazzaniga, Patuzzi, Fagnani, Concina, Contenson, Gonzales, etc., is in practice hardly distinguishable from that of mitigated tuziorists (J. Noldin, *Summ. theol. mor.*, I, 20th ed., Innsbruck 1929, pp. 227, 232). These authors support their thesis with the same arguments as the rigorists. It is not a system condemned by the Church, but it now appears to have been abandoned by all theologians for the same reasons for which absolute t. is rejected. Indeed, according to some (Noldin, *op. cit.*, n. 232, p. 227), the most probable opinion required in order to act against the law either amounts to speculative certainty, in which case one is in absolute t., or it does not, and then its supporters must admit the liceity of acting with a practically uncertain conscience, since they refuse to make use of indirect principles to escape uncertainty.
III. T. OF THE FATHERS AND SCHOLASTICS. – With regard to the t. or rigorism of the Fathers and early scholastics, it should be noted that at most one can speak of a mitigated t. The explicit use of reflex principles (v.) was known rather late; yet from the earliest centuries one finds in the Fathers and other authors practical solutions that necessarily presuppose the implicit use of such principles (cf. Lactantius, *De divin. inst.*, 3, 27; St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio* 37, *In sancta lumina*, 18 ff.; St. Jerome, *Tim.*, 3, 2; Tit. 1, 6; *Apol. adv. Rufin.* 1, 32; St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, 22, 75; *De fide et operibus*, 10, 35). As for the medieval theologians, it should be observed that their t., apart from their ignorance of reflex principles, is largely due to the excessive attention paid to objective morality, a reaction to the moral subjectivism of Peter Abelard, from which even St. Thomas is not exempt (cf. O. Lottin, *Principes de morale*, I, Louvain 1947, pp. 177-83; II, 11, 1948, pp. 236-37). Yet even here there are practical solutions that anticipate the application of the principle *Lex dubia non obligat* (cf. V. CATHREIN, VIKTOR, *Quid senserit s. Thomas de principio: Lex dubia non obligat*, in *Gregorianum*, 3 [1922], pp. 449 ff.).