Reflected Principles

PRINCIPI RIFLESSI. — These are rules of a moral and general nature, supplementary to the direct principles for forming a certain conscience.

I. PRELIMINARY NOTIONS

The transition from ignorance or doubt to moral certainty, forming the certain conscience—the only one suited to acting licitly—takes place by a direct or indirect route. Directly, one seeks moral truth through study or by asking the advice of competent persons (parish priest, confessor, priest); these means provide an objective guarantee. But either they are not always possible, especially when action is necessary, or they do not always provide an answer appropriate to the specific case. It is then necessary to find the practical and safe way to apply various, often discordant, norms to the case; the reflected principles serve this purpose.

They are moral in character, insofar as they regulate properly human activity and insofar as they lack the absoluteness of metaphysical or physical truths, admitting the possibility of the contrary; nevertheless, this possibility is not such as to oblige one to suspend judgment or action: whoever acts according to the reflected principles, despite the possibility of the contrary, acts rightly until it has been proved that this is not merely a possibility of the contrary, but a reality. They are general in character, insofar as they do not resolve the concrete doubt through direct arguments having an immediate connection with the matter at issue, but are norms for action ordinarily followed by people. They are called reflected insofar as, being general in character, in their application they contain almost a syllogism, a return upon oneself, or insofar as they reflect their light upon practical obscurities, dispelling their darkness for the moment.

II. MORAL VALUE

The p. r., when rightly used and applied, are sufficient to form a morally certain conscience in the absence of direct means. In fact, they are nothing other than norms more or less insite in human nature itself (cf. D. 50, 17, 1), dictated and regulated by prudence. Drawing upon universal natural principles, they constitute not mere hypotheses but certain norms of morality. Roman law gathered some of these truths, establishing them in the regulae iuris. Canon law, at the end of the liber VI of Boniface VIII, followed its example. Many of these rules concern specific juridical matters (benefices, trials, etc.), but some are moral and general in character. From these and other sources, moralists gathered certain p. r. Several are related, expressing the same truth in different terms; thus: In obscuris minimum est sequendum (Regulae iuris, 30° in 6°) is akin to these principles: Odia restringi et favores convenit ampliari (ibid., 15), In poenis benignior est interpretatio facienda

(ibid., 49), and Lex dubia non obligat (ibid., 57). Others complement one another; thus the principle: In dubio praesumitur factum quod de iure faciendum erat, is to be interpreted in harmony with these other principles: In dubio iudicandum est ex ordinariis contingentibus (ibid., 43); In dubio omne factum praesumitur recte factum and In dubio standum est pro valore actus; however, In dubio factum vel delictum non praesumitur, sed demonstrari debet.

Other p. r. commonly cited by moralists are: In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio; In dubio praesumptio stat pro superiore; In dubio melior est conditio possidentis (c. 6, X, II, 26; cf. Regulae iuris, 65a in 6b); In dubio nemo praesumitur malus, nisi probetur; but: Semel malus, semper praesumitur malus (ibid., 8). The importance of having the p. r. understood in individual cases according to their genuine meaning is apparent from the generic formulation itself; otherwise, starting from different p. r., or perhaps from the same p. r. understood in a different sense, one arrives at antithetical conclusions.

III. REFLECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND MORAL SYSTEMS

It may indeed happen that the doubtful or perplexing situation noted above occurs not only in individual cases, but also with regard to the law (existence, extent, cessation, obligation: V. PROBABILITÀ). The resolution of doubt then concerns the very moral problem of human activity in its presupposition of freedom in relation to the obligation of the law; now, on this point moralists are divided into various schools, proposing different systems; and in order to prove their assertions, they proceed from various reflective principles, not always interpreted uniformly. In the external forum the ecclesiastical legislator also foresees and provides for this eventuality, currently following in general the reflective principle of minimum tenendum, excepting matters of favour (cf. cann. 15, 19, 20, 50, 84, 2218, 2219, 2228). But whereas he, in his own sphere, can certainly make such provisions as he considers most fitting for the common good, the same uniformity has not yet been attained among moralists, because of the different principles to which they appeal and the different interpretations they give to one and the same reflective principle.

For example, the reflective principle Lex dubia non obligat is denied by rigorism or tutiorism (v.), probabiliorism (v.), compensationism (v.), exaggerated by laxism (v.), which admits it without exception even in the face of slight doubt, equiprobabilism (v.), probabilism (v.) with exceptions more verbal than real, since these are rather applications. Cf. SISTEMI MORALI.

IV. REFLEX PRINCIPLES FOUNDED ON PRESUMPTION

Many reflex principles, in their very formulation, are founded on presumptions (v.), probable conjectures concerning an uncertain matter; probability (v.), however, must be understood in the sense of a truth to be held as such until proof to the contrary. Positive law itself (cf. cann. 1825-28, 1015, 1086, 1747, 1814, 1904, 1972), even in matters affecting conscience and the rights of third parties, admits presumptions as legitimate means in the absence of others directly intended to prove facts or create rights. These presumptions are in substance nothing but reflex principles applied to particular cases. By parity of reasoning, it may be deduced that even for the strictly internal forum presumption is a legitimate reflex principle, which yields only to the evidence of truth. Thus, in the event of doubt concerning the lawfulness of a Superior’s command, when, for example, the use of some power of his is disputed, the presumption is in favour of the Superior, so that the subject cannot raise objections. Presumption, on the other hand, favours the subject, generally presumed good, should the Superior doubt his honesty, until proof to the contrary. Some authors would indeed reduce all reflex principles to that of presumption.