REFLECTED PRINCIPLES
These are moral and general rules that supplement the direct principles for forming a certain conscience.
I. PRENOTIONS
The transition from ignorance or doubt to moral certainty, which forms the certain conscience—the only one capable of acting licitly—occurs either directly or indirectly. Directly, one seeks moral truth through study or by consulting experts (parish priest, confessor, priest); these methods provide objective assurance. However, they are not always possible, especially in cases of urgent necessity to act, nor do they always yield an answer suited to the specific case. It is then necessary to find a practical and secure way to apply various, often conflicting, norms to the case; this is the purpose of the reflected principles.They are of a moral nature in that they regulate properly human activity and lack the absolute certainty of metaphysical or physical truths, admitting the possibility of the contrary; yet this possibility is not such as to oblige one to suspend judgment or action: whoever acts according to these principles, despite the possibility of the contrary, acts rightly until it is proven that the contrary is not merely possible but actual. They are of a general nature in that they do not resolve concrete doubt through direct arguments immediately connected to the subject matter, but are norms of action generally followed by men. They are called "reflected" either because, being of a general nature, their application involves something akin to a syllogism, a return upon oneself, or because they reflect their light upon practical obscurities, dispelling their darkness for the moment.
II. MORAL VALUE
The reflected principles, when used and applied correctly, are sufficient to form a morally certain conscience in the absence of direct means. In fact, they are nothing more than norms more or less insistently rooted in human nature itself (cf. D. 50, 17, 1), dictated and regulated by prudence. Grounded in universal natural principles, they constitute not mere hypotheses but secure norms of morality. Roman law collected some of these truths, fixing them in the rules of law; canon law, at the end of the sixth book of Boniface VIII, followed this example. Many of these rules pertain to specific legal matters (benefices, judgments, etc.), but some are of a moral and general nature. From these and other sources, moralists have gathered several reflected principles. Some are akin, expressing the same truth in different terms; thus: *In obscuris minimum est sequendum* (Regulae iuris, 30a in 6°) is akin to such principles as: *Odia restringi et favores convenit ampliari* (ibid., 15), *In poenis benignior est interpretatio facienda* (ibid., 49), and *Lex dubia non obligat* (ibid., 57). Others complement one another; thus the principle: *In dubio praesumitur factum quod de iure faciendum erat*, must be interpreted in harmony with these others: *In dubio iudicandum est ex ordinariis contingentibus* (ibid., 45); *In dubio omne factum praesumitur recte factum*; and *In dubio statutum est pro valore actus*; yet *In dubio factum vel delictum non praesumitur, sed demonstrari debet*.Other reflected principles commonly cited by moralists include: *In dubio statutum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio*; *In dubio praesumptio stat pro superiore*; *In dubio melior est conditio possidentis* (c. 6, X, 11, 26; cf. Regulae iuris, 65a in 6°); *In dubio nemo praesumitur malus, nisi probetur*; but: *Semel malus, semper praesumitur malus* (ibid., 8). From their very general formulation, the importance of interpreting reflected principles in their genuine sense in individual cases is evident; otherwise, starting from different reflected principles or even from the same principle interpreted differently, one arrives at antithetical conclusions.
III. REFLECTED PRINCIPLES AND MORAL SYSTEMS
It happens that the doubtful or perplexing situation described above is not only found in individual cases but also regarding the law itself (its existence, extent, cessation, obligation: V. PROBABILITY). The resolution of doubt then touches upon the very moral problem of human activity in its presupposition of freedom in the face of the law’s obligation. On this point, moralists divide into various schools, proposing different systems and, to support their claims, appealing to various reflected principles, not always interpreted uniformly. In the external forum, ecclesiastical legislation also foresees and provides for this hypothesis, currently generally following the reflected principle of *minimum tenendum*, except in matters of favor (cf. cann. 15, 19, 20, 50, 84, 218, 2219, 2228). While the legislator, in his own sphere, can certainly dispose as he deems most expedient for the common good, the same uniformity has not yet been achieved among moralists regarding the different principles to which they appeal and the different interpretations they give to the same reflected principle.For example, the reflected principle *Lex dubia non obligat* is denied by rigorism or tutiorism (v.), probabiliorism (v.), and compensationalism (v.), exaggerated by laxism (v.), which admits it without exception even in the face of a tenuous doubt, conceded with restrictions by equiprobabilism (v.), and with exceptions more verbal than real—since these concern rather applications—by probabilism (v.). Cf. MORAL SYSTEMS.