REFLECTED PRINCIPLES. - They are rules of a moral and general nature, supplementary to the direct principles for forming a certain conscience.
I. PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
The passage from ignorance or doubt to moral certainty, forming a certain conscience, the only one fit for acting lawfully, comes about by a direct or an indirect way. Directly, one seeks moral truth through study or by asking advice of competent persons (parish priest, confessor, priest); these ways give an objective guarantee. But either they are not always possible, especially when there is a necessity to act, or they do not always give an answer appropriate to the specific case. It is then necessary to find the practical and safe way to apply various norms, often discordant, to the case; for this the p. r. [reflex principles] serve.
They are of a moral nature, insofar as they regulate properly human activity and insofar as they lack the absoluteness of metaphysical or physical truths, admitting the possibility of the contrary; yet this possibility is not such as to oblige one to suspend judgment or action: whoever acts according to the p. r., notwithstanding the possibility of the contrary, acts rightly, until it is proved that it is not a mere possibility of the contrary, but a reality; they are of a general nature, insofar as they do not resolve the concrete doubt with direct arguments having an immediate connection with the subject matter, but are norms of action usually followed by men; they are called reflex insofar as, being of a general nature, in their application they contain almost a syllogism, a turning back upon oneself, or insofar as they reflect their light upon practical obscurities, dispelling for the moment their darkness.
II. MORAL VALUE
The p. r. [reflex principles], used and applied correctly, are sufficient to form a morally certain conscience in the absence of direct means. In fact they are nothing but norms more or less inscribed in human nature itself (cf. D. 50, 17, 1), dictated and regulated by prudence. Referring back to universal natural principles, they constitute not mere hypotheses, but sure norms of morality. Roman law gathered some of these truths, fixing them in the regulae iuris. Canon law, at the end of the liber VI of Boniface VIII, imitated its example. Many of these rules refer to specific juridical matters (benefices, judgments, etc.), but some are of a moral and general character. From these and from other sources moralists gathered certain p. r. Several are akin, expressing the same truth in different terms; thus: In obscuris minimum est sequendum (Regulae iuris, 30th in 6th) is akin to these principles: Odia restringi et favores convenit ampliari (ibid., 15), In poenis benignior est interpretatio facienda
(ibid., 49) and Lex dubia non obligat (ibid., 57). Others complete one another; thus the principle: In dubio praesumitur factum quod de iure faciendum erat, is to be interpreted in harmony with these other principles: In dubio iudicandum est ex ordinariis contingentibus (ibid., 43); In dubio omne factum praesumitur recte factum and In dubio standum est pro valore actus; however In dubio factum vel delictum non praesumitur, sed demonstrari debet.
Other p. r. commonly cited by moralists are: In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio; In dubio praesumptio stat pro superiore; In dubio melior est conditio possidentis (c. 6, X, II, 26; cf. Regulae iuris, 65th in 6th); In dubio nemo praesumitur malus, nisi probetur; but: Semel malus, semper praesumitur malus (ibid., 8). From this same generic formulation there appears the importance that the p. r. be understood in each individual case in their genuine sense; because otherwise, starting from different p. r. or perhaps from the same p. r., understood in a different sense, one arrives at antithetical conclusions.
III. REFLECTED PRINCIPLES AND MORAL SYSTEMS
It happens in fact that the doubtful or perplexed situation noted above is found not only in individual cases, but also with regard to the law (its existence, extent, cessation, obligation: v. PROBABILITÀ). The resolution of the doubt then involves the very moral problem of human activity in its presupposition of freedom in the face of the obligation of the law; now on this point moralists divide into various schools, proposing different systems; and to prove their assertions, they start from various p. r., not always uniformly interpreted. In the external forum the ecclesiastical legislator likewise foresees and provides for the hypothesis, at present generally following the p. r. of the minimum tenendum, excluding matters of favor (cf. cann. 15, 19, 20, 50, 84, 2218, 2219, 2228). But while he, in his own matter, can certainly dispose as he thinks most fitting for the common good, the same uniformity has not yet been reached among moralists, because of the different principles to which they appeal and the different interpretations they give to one and the same p. r.
For example, the p. r. Lex dubia non obligat is denied by rigorism or tuziorism (v.), probabiliorism (v.) and compensationism (v.), exaggerated by lassism (v.) which admits it without exception even in the face of a slight doubt, granted with restrictions by equiprobabilism (v.) and with exceptions more verbal than real, since they are rather applications, by probabilism (v.). Cf. SISTEMI MORALI.
IV. THE REFLECTED PRINCIPLES FOUNDED ON PRESUMPTION
Many p. r. in their very formulation are based on presumptions (v.), probable conjectures about an uncertain matter; probability (v.), however, must be understood in the sense of a truth to be held as such until proof to the contrary. Positive law itself (cf. cann. 1825-28, 1015, 1086, 1747, 1814, 1904, 1972), even in matters touching conscience and the rights of third parties, admits presumptions as legitimate means in the absence of others directed at proving facts or creating rights. These presumptions are in substance nothing but p. r., applied to determinate cases. By parity one may deduce that even for the strictly internal forum presumption is a legitimate p. r., which yields only to the evidence of the truth. Thus in case of doubt about the legitimacy of a Superior's command, as when there is dispute, for example, over the use of some power of his, the presumption stands for the Superior, so that the subject may not raise exceptions. Presumption, on the other hand, favors the subject, generally a good man, in the case where the Superior doubts his honesty until proof to the contrary. Some authors would even reduce all p. r. to that of presumption.